MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA

KES NO: 18(10)/4-1728/12

BETWEEN

KHAIRUL ANUAR BIN ABD RADZAI

AND

MAYBANK BANKING BERHAD ('MAYBANK')

AWARD NO: 1268 OF 2014

Before : Y.A. TUAN FREDRICK INDRAN X.A. NICHOLASCHAIRMAN (Sitting Alone)

Award Issued at : Industrial Court of Malaysia, Penang Branch

Venue of Hearing : Industrial Court of Malaysia, Penang Branch

Date of Reference : 25.9.2012

Dates of Mention : 29.11.2012; 13.12.2014; 15.1.2013; 20.3.2012;23.4.2013; 15.5.2013; 9.7.2013; 9.10.2013;

Dates of Hearing : 24.2.2014 & 25.2.2014

Company's Written Submission: 23.7.2014

Claimant's Written Submission : 5.5.2014

Claimant's Reply To Claimant's Written Submission: 22.8.2014

Representation : Mr. Raam KumarMessrs K.B. Tan, Kumar & PartnersAdvocates & Solicitors(Learned Counsel for the Claimant)

Miss Jenice Leo & Mr. Darmain SegaranMessrs Shook Lin & Bok Advocates & Solicitors(Learned Counsel for the Respondent)

1

AWARD

The Reference:

Khairul Anuar bin Abd Radzai (‘the Claimant’) ceased from his erstwhile service with

Malayan Banking Berhad (‘Maybank’) (‘the Company’) with effect from 21.7.2011.

The Claimant, being aggrieved by the circumstances surrounding the cessation of his

employment, made a written representation on 29.7.2011 to the Director General for

Industrial Relations, Malaysia under s. 20 (1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the

Act’). The said representation was duly entertained by the Director General as it was

formally and presumably regularly filed within the sixty day period allowed under s. 20

(1A) of the Act.

The conciliatory exertions thereafter undertaken by the said Director General’s office in

pursuance of that representation turned out to be of no avail; wherefore that office,

being convinced that the matter could not be amicably resolved thereat, duly notified the

Honourable Minister of Humans Resources, Malaysia of that failed reconciliation

process. This notification was made pursuant to s. 20 (2) of the Act.

Upon the perusal of this notification and its ancillary papers, and by virtue of s.20 (3) of

the Act, the Honourable Minister found it fit to exercise those powers under that section

to refer this matter to the Industrial Court of Malaysia for due determination and final

disposal.

2

As a result of which the Claimant’s initial representation was transformed into a

Ministerial Reference for an Award before this Court. The said Ministerial Order was

dated 25.9.2012.

The Matrix:

The Claimant commenced his employment with the Company on 4.2.2002 in the

position of Assistant Accounts Officer on a salary of RM1,449.00 per month. His last

held post there was that of Senior Executive Accounts Officer earning a salary of

RM5,175.00 per month.

The Claimant’s troubles began with the advent of the following communiqué from the

Company (exact copy);

*1

~ intentionally left blank ~

3

4

5

Pursuant to the domestic inquiry convened on 14th & 15th April 2011, the Claimant was

dismissed from employment vide the following missive (exact copy):

*2

6

The Claimant now comes before this Court to aver that his dismissal from employment

pursuant to the above said letter was without just cause or excuse and was contrary to

the principles of equity, good conscience and natural justice. He prayed to be reinstated

in his former position without loss of seniority, wages or benefits, monetary or otherwise,

together with arrears of salary or alternatively, any other remedy that this Court may

deem fit in the circumstances.

The Company, on the other hand, has denied the Claimant’s allegations and contends

instead that it was unequivocally correct in taking the action that it did in all the

circumstances of this case.

{NB/ As there was no adverse comment flowing from the Claimant with regard to the

legitimacy of the said domestic inquiry, this Court will deem it valid.}

The Issue:

As there was no dispute as to the actual factum of dismissal in this case, the sole issue

that arose for the determination of this Court was whether the Claimant was dismissed

with just cause or excuse. That noteworthy utterance of the then Lord President, the

Honourable Mr. Justice Tun Salleh Abas in the case of WONG CHEE HONG v

CATHAY ORGANISATION (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1988] 1 CLJ 45; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 298 (of

the then Supreme Court of Malaysia), has practical relevance here; which went like this:

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“When the Industrial Court is dealing with a reference under s. 20, the first thing that the

Court will have to do is to ask itself a question whether there was a dismissal, and if so,

whether it was with or without just cause or excuse.”

The General Principles:

In COLGATE PALMOLIVE Sdn. Bhd. v. YAP KOK FOONG (Award 368 of 1998), it

was held as follows:

“In a section 20 reference, a workman’s complaint consists of two elements: firstly, that

he has been dismissed, and secondly that such dismissal was without just cause or excuse.

It is upon these two elements being established that the workman can claim his relief, to

wit, an order for reinstatement, which may be granted or not at the discretion of the

Industrial Court. As to the first element, industrial jurisprudence as developed in the

course of industrial adjudication readily recognizes that any act which has the effect of

bringing the employment contract to an end is a ‘dismissal’ within the meaning of section

20. The terminology used and the means resorted to by an employer are of little

significance; thus, contractual terminations, constructive dismissals, non-renewals of

contract, forced resignations, retrenchments and retirements are all species of the same

genus, which is ‘dismissal’.”

8

As there is no quarrel that there was a clear cut dismissal of the Claimant by his

employer and bearing in mind the factual matrix of this case, I take cognizance of the

declaration of the late Mohd. Azmi FCJ in the cases of WONG YUEN HOCK V.

SYARIKAT HONG LEONG ASSURANCE SDN. BHD. & ANOR [1995] 3 CLJ 344 and

MILAN AUTO SDN. BHD. V. WONG SHE YEN [1995] 4 CLJ 449 wherein His Lordship

articulated the two-fold function of the Industrial Court under a section 20 reference. To

paraphrase; it is first ~ to determine whether the alleged misconduct of the employee

had been established; and second ~ whether that proven misconduct constitutes just

cause or excuse for the decision by the Company to dismiss.

In GOON KWEE PHOY v J & P COATS (M) Bhd. [1981] 1 LNS 30 Raja Azlan Shah CJ

(Malaya) (as DYMM Paduka Seri Sultan Azlan Shah Sultan Perak Darul Ridzuan

then was) speaking for the Federal Court ruled: -

“Where representations are made and are referred to the Industrial Court for enquiry, it

is the duty of that court to determine whether the termination or dismissal is with or

without just cause or excuse. If the employer chooses to give a reason for the action

taken by him, the duty of the Industrial Court will be to enquire whether that excuse or

reason has or has not been made out. If it finds as a fact that it has not been proved, then

the inevitable conclusion must be that the termination or dismissal was without just

cause or excuse. The proper enquiry of the court is the reason advanced by it and that

court or the High Court cannot go into another reason not relied on by the employer or

find one for it.”

9

That learned author, Dr. Dunston Ayadurai in his erudite text Industrial Relations In

Malaysia: Law & Practice 3rd Edition at page 297 states: -

“A workman can seek a remedy under section 20 only if he had been dismissed. More

often than not, there is no dispute that there was an actual dismissal of the workman by

his employer. The only issue for the Industrial Court to determine is whether the

dismissal had been for just cause or excuse, the onus of proving the existence of the

same being cast upon the employer.” [emphasis added]

And this onus or burden of proof on the Company is based on a standard of a balance

of probabilities (see UNION of CONSTRUCTION, ALLIED TRADES AND

TECHNICIANS v. BRAIN [1981] ICR 542, [1981] IRLR 224, CA; SMITH v. CITY of

GLASGOW DISTRICT COUNCIL [1987] ICR 796, [1987] IRLR 326, HL; POST OFFICE

(Counters) Ltd V. HEAVEY [1990] ICR 1, [1989] IRLR 513, EAT; IREKA

CONSTRUCTIONS BERHAD v. CHANTIRAVATHAN a/l SUBRAMANIAM JAMES

[1995] 2 ILR 11 and TELEKOM MALAYSIA KAWASAN UTARA v. KRISHNAN KUTTY

SANGUNI NAIR & Anor. [2002] 3 CLJ 314).

In the above said book entitled Industrial Relations In Malaysia: Law & Practice 3rd

Edition the learned author Dr. Dunston Ayadurai had this to say at pages 325 & 326:-

“The Industrial Court has confirmed that it is for the employer to determine initially

whether or not an employee has committed a misconduct, but that in doing so the

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employer must act fairly and reasonably, after appropriate investigation, and on the basis

of fact rather than assumptions. In Shell Malaysia Trading Co Sdn. Bhd. v

National Union of Petroleum & Chemical Industry Workers (Award 134 of

1986): -

The company cited various authorities from Soonavala’s ‘The Supreme Court on

Industrial Law’ ….. But one authority relied on by the company goes on to add:

It is for the management to determine whether the act of the workman

constitutes misconduct, and whether it merits an order of dismissal.

However, in determining whether there has been such misconduct, it must

have facts upon which to base its conclusions, and it must act in good faith

without caprice or discrimination, and without any motive of victimization

or intimidation or resorting to unfair labour practice, and there must be no

infraction of the accepted rules of natural justice. When the management

does have facts from which it can conclude misconduct, its judgement

cannot be questioned, provided the aforementioned principles are not

violated. On the other hand, in the absence of these facts, or in the case of

any violation of the aforementioned principles, its position is untenable,

and it becomes a fit case for interference by the Industrial Tribunal.”

In AZAHARI SHAHROM & Anor. v. ASSOCIATED PAN MALAYSIA CEMENT Sdn.

Bhd. [2010] 1 ILR 423 @ 436 this Court was of the view that:

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“It is trite that the association between employer and employee out of necessity is

fiduciary in nature. There has to be mutual trust and confidence that one would deal with

the other in all fairness and rectitude over the rights and obligations flowing between the

parties under the employment agreement. If one does an act or commits an omission

which is inconsistent with that fiduciary relationship then that act or omission will be

mala fides. This principle has equal application as against the employer and the

employee in their respective positions viz. the employment relationship between them.”

B.R. Ghaiye in his text Misconduct in Employment Chapter XIX at page 650 states:

“The relation between an employer and an employee is of a fiduciary character. The word

“fiduciary” means belonging to trust or trusteeship. It means that whenever an employer

engages a worker he puts trust that the worker will faithfully discharge the service and

protect and further the interest of the employer.”

In TIAN SAN Sdn. Bhd. v. LIN KIM PING (Award 483 of 1997) the Court held:

-“It is an established principle in industrial jurisprudence that in every employment

contract there is an implied term that a party thereto will not without reasonable cause

conduct himself in a manner likely to damage or destroy the relationship of trust and

confidence between the parties as employer and employee: see Bliss v. South

Thames Regional Health Authority [1995] IRLR 308 (Court of Appeal).”

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In CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Bhd. v ILHAM MOHAMAD (Award 29

of 2001) it was stated:

“The implied term of contract relied upon by the company can hardly be gainsaid. In

‘The Modern Law of Employment’ at p. 446, G H I Fridman puts the matter this

way:

The relation of master and servant implies necessarily that the servant shall be in a

position to perform his duty duly and faithfully, and if by his own act he prevents

himself from doing so, the master may dismiss him. There are thus two aspects of

the employee’s duty under a contract of employment. He must provide a

satisfactory performance of the work he has contracted to do; and he must act

faithfully and in accordance with the interest of his employer.”

And Professor of Law Alfred Avins in his book Employees’ Misconduct wrote at pages

537 & 538:

“The servant is bound to give faithful personal service to his master and, as a

consequence, to refrain from any course of conduct the natural tendency of which must

be to injure the master’s trade or business.”

In PEARCE v. FOSTER [1886] (17) QBD 536, Lord Esher MR observed:

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“The rule of law is that where a person has entered into the position of servant, if he does

anything incompatible with the due and faithful discharge of his duty to his master, the

latter has the right to dismiss. The relation of master and servant implies necessarily that

the servant shall be in a position to perform his duty and faithfully, and if by his own act

he prevents himself from doing so, the master may dismiss him.”

And Lopes LJ in the same case stated as follows:

“If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty

in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That need not be a

misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business. It is sufficient if it is a

misconduct which is prejudicial to the interest or reputation of the master.”

And in TELEKOM MALAYSIA Bhd. v. S. SIVALINGAM (Award 427 of 1995) it was

said:

“The only issue for the court to decide is: was the conduct committed by the claimant of such a

serious nature that it warranted the punishment of dismissal? In other words, what the Court has

to determine is whether the nature and extent of the misconduct could constitute just cause or

excuse for the dismissal. The question therefore arises whether the employer was reasonable

under the circumstances in its decision to dismiss the claimant.”

14

In the persuasive authority of the case of TAYLOR V. PARSONS PEEBLES NEI

BRUCE PEEBLES LTD. [1981] IRLR 119, the English Employment Appeals Tribunal

held as follows:

“In determining the reasonableness of an employer’s decision to dismiss, the proper test

is not what the policy of the employer was, but what the reaction of a reasonable

employer would be in the circumstances. …. That includes taking account of the

employee’s length of service and previous record.”

A Preamble to the narration of the Evidence:

In an effort to be free of the drag and load of unrequired detail, I will attempt to distil the

review of this case to its essence without, as far as possible, compromising upon its

critical features.

Having said that, unless otherwise indicated in the context, this narration is an amalgam

of the plausible evidence which was presented in this case grounded upon the

jurisprudence peculiar to Industrial Law; and upon which the final order is based.

The Evidence:

The Company’s Case & the Claimant’s response thereto

15

To cut to the chase the Company’s case was that the Claimant was dismissed upon

charges of misconduct relating to the authoring and issuing of an anonymous letter on

9.3.2011; which was sent via fax transmission to the Company’s Industrial Relations

Unit. The said letter contained various allegations against named individual officers of

the Company.

The Company then directed its officers to carry out an investigation on the provenance

of the said letter; both with regard to its source as well as its contents. The latter was

revealed to be unfounded, while the former was ostensibly discovered to be the

Claimant.

The shop from where the fax was sent was said to have been inquired into; and two

shop assistants (both called as witnesses before this Court) identified the Claimant as

the person responsible for having sent the offending article, i.e. the said anonymous

letter; through them from their shop at the material time.

That being established the Company took the action that it did which led to the

Claimant’s dismissal. The Company, through its Head of Group I.R. & Governance ~

witness designated ‘COW 5’ at trial ~ explained why the decision to terminate was

taken. I can do no better that to quote him verbatim thus:

“Every employee of the Bank (the Company in this instance) has the right to raise

concerns it [sic] may have to the Bank’s management so long as those concerns are

legitimate and are made through the proper channels.

16

It is clear that the Claimant’s allegations against specific individuals in the Bank’s SME

Business Center Perak and Perak Region Management Team were tainted with mala fide.

As it had been shown that the allegations in the said letter were baseless it was obviously

the case that the Claimant had set out to defame and scandalously bring disrepute to the

Bank and/or the named individuals in the said letter.

Bearing this in mind, the deceptive conduct of the Claimant in denying his authorship of

the said letter and refusing to take ownership of the allegations he had raised shows a

clear intent of hostility towards the Bank. As such the Bank decided that it could no

longer repose any trust and confidence in the Claimant to continue in employment with

the Bank.”

It transpired during the course of the trial that the Claimant had appealed his dismissal

and pursuant to this COW 5 had occasion to converse with the Claimant; this is what he

(COW 5) had to say on the issue:

“Based on his appeal letters, the Bank’s management instructed me to have a

conversation with him and also the Union representing him with a view to reinstate him

back [sic] as an officer of the Bank. Based on all the evidence advanced, the

management felt that he had sent out that complaint letter. As such, the management was

prepared to give him another chance if he has been remorseful and realized that he has

made a mistake. Unfortunately, he did not admit or still maintained that he did not do it.

Therefore the matter did not proceed further.” [emphasis added]

17

The long and short of the Claimant’s response was that he did not do it ~ i.e. neither did

he author the offending letter nor was he responsible for sending it.

The Evaluation:

It is trite that the Claimant is not the one who must prove that he was not guilty of

misconduct [see the case of STAMFORD EXECUTIVE CENTRE v. DHARSINI

GANESAN (Award No. 263 of 1985)]. That burden is cast squarely upon the Company.

The entire flavor Company’s case was that the Claimant was dismissed for his

intransigent attitude in not owning up to having authored and sent the offending letter.

While what can be deduced from the evidence on the whole and upon a balance of

probabilities is that the Claimant did send the fax; there was no real or cogent evidence,

that was forth-coming at trial, with regard to the authorship of the same. Just because

one may have been instrumental in sending or dispatching a letter does not, by any

stretch of the imagination, necessarily connect to having been the composer thereof.

Nonetheless, the letter was sent and dire consequences befell the Claimant, but not

upon those innocents named therein. The Company, in its wisdom and wherewithal,

established that the allegations put forth were unfounded; and so they, if you will, “shot

the messenger”. And all because he would not own up to being the likely, nay, the

revealed herald!

18

That the contents of letter concerned was perhaps mischievous (see the documentary

exhibit at pages 22 to 25 in bundle marked ‘A’); and possibly targeted at embarrassing the

individuals named therein; this Court found it too much of a stretch to consider it as

embarrassing and/or hostile towards the Company per se; or how, if at all, it could

seriously and/or adversely effect the relevant employment relationship between it (the

Company) and the Claimant.

Was the Company’s response a proportionate measure to the Claimant’s proven

misconduct, such as it was? A reprimand perhaps was surely in order; but could the

punishment extend to a dismissal?

In the entire circumstances of this case, I think not.

The action of the Company to dismiss must measure up to the test of reasonableness

which include the notions of proportionality; i.e. the punishment must be proportional to

the culpability that may be apportioned for the misconduct. The arbitrary and/or

capricious deprivation of a person’s livelihood by managerial authority must be inhibited

and tempered by compassion. There appeared to be a semblance of it when the

Company’s management instructed COW 5 to look into the reinstatement of the

Claimant upon his appeal, but nothing, it appears, came of this exercise. It does show

however, the fact that the Company was prepared at that stage to give the Claimant

another chance at earning his livelihood; but that it did not follow through effectively and

practically upon that commendable and worthy emotion of ‘compassion’.

19

Thus, applying the test as suggested in TAYLOR V. PARSONS PEEBLES NEI BRUCE

PEEBLES LTD. (supra); and if viewed in equity, good conscience and the substantial

merits of this case as prescribed by s. 30 (5) of the Act; the termination by the Company

of the Claimant in this instance appears excessively harsh, bordering on the inequitable

and certainly disproportionately stark.

That there were other less severe sanctions available in the “armoury of punishment”

open to the Company to redress the situation brought about by the Claimant of sending

the impugned fax, is trite. That they chose the ultimate and terminal one was somewhat

draconian in all the circumstances of this case.

Hardly a reasonable reaction from a reasonable employer in the entire state of affairs

revealed in this case!

As a consequence, it is the inevitable finding of this Court that on the evidence in its

entirety; and based upon a balance of probabilities; the Claimant’s dismissal from

employment by the Company in this particular and peculiar set of circumstances was

sans just cause or excuse.

20

The Remedy:

The Claimant has sought the intercession of this court to order his reinstatement at the

company without loss of wages, allowance, service, seniority, privileges or benefits of

any kind and/or any other alternative relief as this Court deems fit and proper. In the

circumstances of this case, particularly the manner of the parting of ways, I am of the

considered view that the interest of both parties and that of industrial harmony as a

whole would not be served by an order of reinstatement. Thus, compensation in lieu of

reinstatement; and backwages, shall be the alternative remedy ordered here.

The Federal Court in DR. A. DUTT v ASSUNTA HOSPITAL [1981] 1 MLJ 304 held that

the Industrial Court is authorized to award monetary compensation if of the view that

reinstatement is not appropriate. Compensation constitutes two elements viz. a)

compensation in lieu of reinstatement and b) backwages. [See also the Court of Appeal

in KOPERASI SERBAGUNA Bhd. SABAH v JAMES ALFRED, SABAH & Anor.

[2000] 3 CLJ 758].

In HOTEL JAYAPURI v NATIONAL UNION OF HOTEL BAR & RESTAURANT

WORKERS [1980] 1 MLJ 109 the Federal Court held that if there was a legal basis for

paying compensation, the question of amount is very much at the discretion of the Court

to fix under section 30 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967.

21

In the exercise by the court of its discretion reference is had to O P Malhotra’s The Law

of Industrial Disputes Vol. 2, 6th Edition at page 1432: -

“ ….. the tribunal has the discretion to award compensation instead of reinstatement if the

situation of a particular case is unusual or exceptional so as to make reinstatement

inexpedient or improper. The tribunal has to exercise its discretion judicially ….”

And at page 1434 of the same book: -

“There is no fixed formula for the computation of compensation in cases of wrongful

dismissal of a workman. The amount of compensation has to be fixed taking all the

relevant facts and circumstances of a particular case into account.”

It is undisputed that the Claimant’s last drawn monthly remuneration amounted to

RM5,175.00.

Compensation in lieu of reinstatement:

As there is prevalence in the Industrial Court of this nation to base compensation in lieu

of reinstatement on the multiplicand of one (1) month’s remuneration, this Court can

see no justification from departing from this norm.

The multiplicand is therefore RM5,175.00.

22

As regards the multiplier, it is undisputed that the Claimant had served the Company

for a period of about 9 years or thereabouts (i.e. from 4.2.2002 to 21.7.2011). The

multiplier will therefore be 9.

In the circumstance, compensation under this head amounts to RM46,575.00

[RM5,175.00 x 9].

Backwages:

In DR. A. DUTT V. ASSUNTA HOSPITAL (supra) Hashim Yeop A. Sani J. held that “a

reinstatement order carries with it a prima facie right to an order for the recovery of wages since

the date of dismissal. Such an order is ancillary to the order of reinstatement.”

In RANK XEROX LTD. v CHOONG SIN SING @ CHONG LIAN HWA [1990] 1 ILR 455,

it was held that where reinstatement is ordered, full backwages up to the date of

reinstatement should be paid save for cogent reasons.

And in THILAGAVATHY ALAGAN MUTIAH v MENG SING GLASS Sdn. Bhd. & Anor

[1997] 4 CLJ Supp 368, Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J. held that full backwages from the time

of dismissal up to the date of the award were payable to the workman in respect of

whom reinstatement was not ordered by the Industrial Court.

23

However, this court is mindful of the Second Schedule to the Act, introduced by the

Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2007 (Act A1322) which came into force on

28.2.2008 (PU(B) 84/08); which provides that back pay may be ordered from the date of

dismissal based on the last drawn salary but subject to a maximum of 24 months.

[emphasis added]

Proviso: The Rescaling of Compensation:

As the principles of equity and good consciences have to be applied in the exercise of

discretion in the granting of financial relief, consideration ought to be had to the

possibility of rescaling the monetary award ordered for backwages. To that end, this

court will now reflect on the heads that it considers relevant under which the

recompense could or should be rescaled; and in the instant case it is the Claimant’s

contributory conduct which has led to the quandary of his dismissal from employment;

and for his admitted post dismissal gainful employment. He was re-employed

elsewhere within 4 months of his instant dismissal.

Contributory Conduct

It is irrefutable that the Claimant’s action in sending the relevant fax got him into his

troubles in the first place. Although not shown by the Company to this Court to be grave

enough to warrant dismissal in this instance, his proven misconduct is sufficiently

significant to be taken into account in relation to the measure of recompense to be

24

ordered. The Claimant, in all good conscience, must be made to bear some

responsibility for his ill thought-of transgression. To allow him to go ‘scot-free’ would

send the wrong message to would-be perpetrators of this type of misconduct. Under the

circumstances and in view of the Claimant’s contributory conduct this Court sees fit to

rescale downward the award for backwages under this head to the extent of 50% of

what is to be awarded below, having taken into consideration his post dismissal

earnings.

Given the circumstances established during the trial of this case with regard to the post-

dismissal earnings of the Claimant, an appropriate adjustment has to be made under

this head of compensation; which I now order as follows:

i) Full backwages for a period of 4 months: RM5,175.00 x 4 = RM20,700.00;

ii) Backwages for the balance of 20 months @ RM5,175.00 per month less

50% to account for post dismissal earnings: RM5,175.00 x 20 =

RM103,500.00 – RM51,750.00 (representing 50%) = RM51,750.00.

[Making the total backwages thus ordered as: RM20,700.00 + RM51,750.00 =

RM72,450.00 less 50% (for contributory conduct) = RM36,225.00].

25

The Final Order:

This Court now orders that the Company do pay the Claimant the sum of RM82,800.00

less statutory deductions, if any, not later than 15 days from the date of this Award. The

said sum is made up as follows:-

Compensation in lieu of reinstatement: RM46,575.00

Backwages as scaled down above: RM36,225.00

Total (before statutory deductions): RM82,800.00

In Extenso & Under My Hand.

HANDED DOWN AND DATED THIS 14th DAY OF NOVEMBER 2014.

~ Signed ~(FREDRICK INDRAN X.A. NICHOLAS)

CHAIRMANINDUSTRIAL COURT OF MALAYSIA

PENANG BRANCHAT GEORGETOWN

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