kedah during the japanese occupation...

Kedah During The Japanese Occupation (1942-45)

ABDUL WAHAB HASHIM

SINOPSIS Esei ini tidak bertujuan untuk mengkaji setiflp aspek pendudukan Jepun di Kedah.

tetapi sekadar untuk melihat 'kesan-kesannya ke atas politik dan sosia!. Keadaan ekonomi tidak disentuh walaupun ianya aspek yang terpenting. Hanya pandangan-pandangan umum terhadapnya diperkatakan. Penekanan esei ini ialah kepada sikap orang-orang Melayu terhadap pendudukan Jepun. Esei ini juga tidak membicarakan tentang orang-orang Cina dan India kerana mereka itu adalah golongan minoriti di Kedah di waktu itu. Mereka disebut apabi/a disentuh isu gerakan anti-Jepun.

INTRODUcnON The period after 1909 treaty was relatively peaceful as for as Anglo-Siamese

relations was concerned. Both countries were not at loggerheads with each other. In fact Siam was quite happy with the existing friendly Anglo-Siamese relations. Thus when the Second World War broke out "it seemed apparent that the Thai government world resist the Japanese aggression. Solemn promises of assistance were given.' However this "apparent" supports proved to be misleading. Lord Strabolgi2 considered it to be a failure or! the part of the British Intelligence Service to give a proper picture of the influence of the Japanese over the Thai government. But, perhaps, the Intelligence Service should not be blamed altogether since there were cases when warning and information of such nature was ignored by Ibe War Cabinet. Even in the 1930's, there were "circumstancial stories of Japanese designs on Thai, though in view of the apparently strong position of the British in Malaya, and the French in Indochina, they were not taken seriously".3 This was again a grave miscalculation on the part of the British policy-makers. In addition to this, there had also been a growth in the "Young SiameSe movement"· which was &trongly nationalistic in character. By the 1930's it was virtually in control of the Siamese government. "Part of the propaganda was directed against the Treaty of 1909 which transferred the four northern unfederated Malay states from Thailand to Britain.'" In this campaign the "Young Siamese" were supported by Japan who advocated the restoration of these four Malay states to Thailand.

In the late 1930's it became apparent to the Thai leaders that a policy of

I Strabolsi, Lord (R.N.) Singapore and aft~r. Q stiUly oj tht Pacifi~ Campaign. (London. 1942) pp. S2. 2 - ibid . 3 - ibid 4 -ibid 5 - ibid

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cooperation with Japan was more realistic and rofitable. They had seen the Japanese success in China in 1937 is a clear sign of Japanese supremacy in this part of the world. Moreover, cooperation with Japan would provide them with an apportunity to "regain lost territories in Indochina and to advance Thai interests in Burma and Malaya as well."6 At the league of Nations Thailand discreetly abstained from "a vote of pen sure against Japan for invading Manchuria."7 When War broke out in Europe the Thai government under Pibul Songgram saw it fit to adopt a "revisionist policy in Southeast Asia in the hope of regaining its lost territories in Loas and Cambodia and of generally anhancing its position in respect of France and possibly to Britain."· When finally the Japanese decided to attack Malaya the Japanese government chose to offer the Thai government three alternatives: it could allow the Japanese to use its territory for moving troops and supplies into Burma and Malaya in return for which Japan promised not to intefere in Thailand's internal administration; or Thailand and Japan would from a defensive military alliance, under which Thailand would assist the Japanese war effort, in return for a guarantee of assistance in case Thailand were attacked by a third party; or Thailand would join Japan in the War against the Allies, in return for which Japan would agree to the return to Thailand of all territories in the Malay peninsular ceded to Britain in 1909."· With the type of government in power then, it was not surprising that the latter alternative was accepted by the Pibul government. The Japanese effected this treaty immediately.

On 13th December 1941, the Thai Prime Minister, Field Marshall Pibun Songgram made a broadcast over the Radio. Strabolgi gave the gist of the Speech as follows: "I want to assure you, in this instance I am not a traitor. I would like you to know that Japan is our greatest friend in life or death, and we have to walk together shoulder to shoulder to fight our cornman enemy. All of you should know that Britain took a large piece of our territory in the south for which Japan is now fighting. I hope our army will be proud to be in the same front with the Japanese army. Presently we will ally ourselves with Japan."!O It is clear from this speech that Thailand was already on the verge of re-alignment. They were no longer in sympathy with the British. It was not surprising that they soon made their formal declaration of war on the United States and the British empire in January 1942.

Kedah was the first state in Malaya to have felt the full brunt of Japanese armed might. Kedah was the most highly guarded British position outside Singapore. The famous 'Jitra Line' deployed about 30,000 soldiers who were mainly composed of the 11th Indian Division under the command of General Murray Lyons. According to the British the Jitra Line was hastily prepared despite the fact that their Intelligence had already informed them of the impending Japanese attack from northen Malaya, probably through Siam. When the Japanese opened up on the British forces on the 10th December 1941, the Jitra Line was not yet ready. As a result delaying tactics were employed. However, it proved to be ineffective.

The Japanese forces were not really checked. They surged forward untiringly. In this campaign the use of thanks on the part of the Japanese was a decisive factor in paving the way for the Japanese sweeping victory over the Malayan defenders.

Many reasons for the British defeat have been offerred by the various authors who had written on this episode. Lieut. General Percival" had put forth several explanations for the Japanese victory. He cited the lack of fighter planes as one of the factors that accounted for the absence of resistance against the Japanese over the air. The Japanese Air Force made use of the air bases in Southern Thailand to freely harass

6 Nuechterlcin. Donald E .. Thailand and the Struggle for SoutheQst Asia. (New York, 1965) pp.68. 7 ibid. 8 ibid pp.69. 9 ibid pp.73.

10 Strabolgi, Lord (R.N.) Singapore and A/ter. (London 1942) pp.53. 11 Lieut. General Percival was the British commander of Malaya at the lime of the Japanese invasion.



the Malayan targets. As a result of the constant attacks by the Japanese aircrafts heavy losses and casualties were inflicted. "The situation was made worse by our lack of fighter protection and proper anti-aircraft ground defence,"" argued Percival. Consequently by the 11 th December almost all the aerodromes in Northern Malaya had to be evacuated. These aerodromes, some of which were left almost in tact (example Alor Star) provided theJapanese with further advantages over the British Air Force.

With regards to the Jitra Line Percival said that "the battle of Jitra was half-lost before it began."13 Instead of taking an offensive step, the British employed a defensive strategy which had an adversed effect on the morale of the troops. Moreover, the composition of the British troops was also weak. Most of the troops were inexperienced whereas the Japanese on the other hand, were well-trained in jungle fighting. In addition the Japanese soldiers fought in the traditional Japanese manner, paying no attention to their losses.

Mills in his article on Malaya had stated that the "Japanese had 100,000 seasoned troops, at least 175 tanks and complete control of the air"" for the battle of Singapore. The British, on the other hand had only 75,000 troops fully armed. While the number of British troops defending Singapore could be accepted the number of Japanese troops is questionable. Tsuji Masanobu gave 60,000" as the total strength of the Japanese army who were involved in the whole of the Malayan Campaign. It is possible, therefore that the large number of Japanese Army given by Mills is merely an excuse, a justification for British defeat. It must be admitted that the Japanese troops outmanoeuvred the British by their superior mobility, training and preparation. In fact, the Japanese deserved their victories. Lieut. General Cordon Bennet '6 considered the speed of Japanese movements as contributary factor to the Japanese success. In fact, he considered it as the most important reason for the British defeat. He then gave three reasons for this speed. The Japanese, in the first place, could adapt themselves pretty well to the climatic conditions. As a result they could carry out their operations better. Moreover, the speed also accounted for "the ability of the Japanese to cut through difficult terrain without depending on roads and railways."l7 Finally, the speed helped the japanese to overcome rivers, swamps and streams swiftly. Destroyed facilities were also repaired in record time. All these factors in a way accounted for the Japanese superiority. The short period they took to capture Malaya is a further testimony to the truth of this 'speed' factor.

In a broadcast over Radio Japan (during the Japanese occupation of Malaya), Lieut. General Sir Lewis Heath was reported to have stated that "a policy of 'secrecy and surprise attack' played a potent role in the early stages of the current war.",a These qualities were further enhanced by the fact that "they could carry out their plans despite all obstacles as thoroughly as they cail prepare it on paper."'9 Perhaps, this statement has some element of truth in it through it is know that this report in reality had already been censured by the Japanese authority before it was broadcast. It is true in the sense that the coming of the Japanese was not expected, though the British Intelligence (authority) had know that the Japanese would invade North Malaya first. The Japanese convoy carrying . the invading forces had been sighted by the British Reconnaissance plane which fell to the Japanese ruse. The convoy had changed course

12 Percival, A.E., Thf! War in Malaya, (Calculta, 1957) pp. 128. I) - ibid - pp. 132. 14 Mills, L.A .. (ed.) Thf! Nf!M' World of Soulnnul Asia, (Minnesota. 1949) pp. 196. 15 Tsuji. Colonel Masanobu. Singaporf! tht! Jopanf!u Version, Transl. Margaret E., B.A., Dip. Ed (Ed.) Howe H.V.,

(Sycieny, 19(0) pp. J&.J7. 16 Lieul, General Bennet. Gordon wrote lhe book "Why Sinppore fell ," 17 Bennet. Gordon. Why SingopDrf! Flll, (Sydeny. 1944) pp. 244 18 ibid - pp. 248. 19 ibid -



on seeing the British plane, but later continued on her journey. The British pilot reported this discovery to the British Headquarters in Singapore. The High Command in turn postponed the launching of the MATADOR 20 plan. As a result, the plan failed miserably. In this instance, the element of 'surprise' helped the Japanese to gain advantage over their British counterparts.

Finally, it must be admitted that the British had overlooked the local factors in their preparation for war. They relied mostly on foreign forces like the Indians, Australians as well as EroufJean Volunteers rather than capitalising on the local natives themselves. Apart from the two battalions of the Malay Regiment, the vast majority of available manpower was not utilised. These natives had two distinct advantages over their alien" counterparts. Firstly they have a better knowledge of the area in which the fighting took place. Their ability to adapt themselves to the local situation is much superior than that of the Japanese and the Europeans. Secondly, the fight against the Japanese would affect them more since they were fighting for their. own motherland unlike the British and her allies who were out only to maintain their territorial gains. In this respect even General Percival himself realised the advantages when he said that "I am of the opinion that we did not make proper use of the local forces.,,22 He was more inclined to beliave that the local forces would better, at least, to be employed as guides and helpers, instead of being were spectators.

All the above factors which accounted for the fall of Malaya also applies to that of kedah for the fall of Kedah was the first step towards Japanese victory over all parts of Malaya. Hence, whatever the weakness of the British Army in general as well as the Japanese superiority on the whole was manifested in the major battle that took place in Jitra.

I After the British surrender, the Japanese government made some decisions

regarding the future administration of Malaya. According to Kakuo Aoki, the Greater East Asia Minister, Singapore and the Japanese territory, since the Japanese 'considered it to be very important strategically. "In the rest of Malaya, the existing administrative structure was to be maintained as far as possible with Japanese Advisers and controllers assigned to the native rulers.,,23 It was also announced that a new federation of state would be established, and "Japan would assume a protectorate over it as well as over the component states."" .

At first millitary administration would be established. In this respect, local administrative structure would be utilised as much as possible. This military administration would be gradually done away with as soon as a new administrative formula is found. The primary duty of this military administration was to restore peace and order. In addition the administration should also "secure immediate control of resources for the war effort and to strive for the self-sufficiency of the needs of occupation troops from local resources. "25 Commercial, communication, industrial as well as financial facilities were to come under the Japanese control too.

20 The MATADOR plan was a defence plan devised by Gen. Percival for the defence of Malaya. 21 'alien' here refers to troops fonned from non-native soldiers. 22 Percival. A.E. The War in Malaya, (Culcutta, 1957) pp.311. 23 Eisbree. W.H., Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist MOllemenlS, 1940 - 1949. (Harvard. 1953) pp. 21-22. 24 - ibid - pp.22 2S Lee Ah Chai. Singapore under the Japanese 1942·1945. (Singapore. 1959) pp.3.



Guidance was to be given to the local people in order to make them feel dependent on the military administration. "Natives were to reconcile themselves to such pressure as would be unavoidably involved for them in the acquisition of resources by the administration."2. The administration also encourged the rise in "political standard" of the Malayans. However "independence was not regarded as within the realm of possibility because of the low living standards and the lack of political development. "27

As far as the Chinese were concerned they were to be compelled to cooperate with the administration in addition to having to renounce their loyalty to the "Chungking" government. 2. Similar action were to be taken against the enemy nationals, meaning those people who owed allegiance to the Allied powers. Those who were unwilling were to be either deported or punished accordingly. However, the administration had to give due respect to all the national and social customs of the country. Finally it was stated that any modifications and changes in the overall colonial policy were to be decided upon at latter conferences. These were the outlines of policies which the Japanese foreign office had drafted out for the various territories that fell into their hands. In most cases, these objectives were aimed primarily at Malaya. They were the skeletons on which the Japanese administrators based their policies in Malaya. Kedah was similarly treated before it was handed over to Siam in 1943.

In the economic field, it was the policy of the Japanese government that there would be a division of labour in regard to products and industries based on economic, geographical and other relevant factors. The most relevant of all these factors was the objective of making the countries "incapable of separating from Japan politically. "2. In addition the Japanese confiscated all the property of the British and her allies in Malaya including Kedah. This confiscation was not for the benefits of the local population but for the Japanese themselves. This policy clearly shows the real intention of the Japanese as far as the Co-Prosperity sphere was concerned.

The coming of the Japanese Premier, General Tojo, to Malaya in July 1943 was quite timely for the people of Kedah. Due to this visit a Thai-Japanese agreement was reached. The transfer of sovereignty from Japan to Siam was to materialise from this agreement. Though this agreement merely introduced new master to Kedah, nevertheless, the new master was very much the lesser of the two evils. At least, the Thai government proved to be more liberal and tolerent as we will see in the later stages of this essay.

To understand how this transfer came about, we must go back to the period just prior to the outbreak of the second world war. Up to 1938, the sympathy of the Thai government was still with the British. However, when Pibul Songgram came to power in 1938 it was alrqdy apparent thatJapan was going to attack Hong Kong and Malaya eventually. Thailand itself would become a battleground if there was to be no adju.stment to her prevailing foreign policy. Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok believed that, "in the final resort it was our military weakness in the Far East which ... led to the alliance between Japan and Siam."30 Were the British able to hold their own against the Japanese it was doubtful that Siam would change her neutral policy. As it was, it was already evident that Japan was going to win the first encounter.

At about this time, the 'Young Siamese' movement was born. This movement was nationalistic in character. It was interested in regaining the past greatness of Siam. The movement also aspired to regain their lost territories in Loas, the Shan states and the 26 - ibid - pp.l 27 Elsbree. W.H .. Jopo1f's rol~ ill SoulMiuI Asialt NatiCNfQ/i.1:t MOPrlMnt /940-/946. (Harvard. 1953) pp.22. 28 Chungkins was the seat of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai Shek. 29 E1mm:. W.H .• Japan 's rok in SotiIMQ.JI Asimr Nationalist M()~menIS 1940-1946. (Harvad. 19S3) pp. 28 - quoted from a

telegram from German Ambasador in Tokyo 10 Gennan Foreign Office. 29th January, 1942 -International Mititary Tribunal for the Far East.

30 Nuechterlein, Donald E .• Thai/aM and the ~lruggle for SOIIlhMfI Asia, (New York. 1965) pp. 12-13.



Northern parts of Malaya. It was this consideration that made the government change the name of the country to Thailand in 1939. By 1940, Thailand had gained certain parts of Indochina through the support of Japan.

On December 7th, the Thai Foreign Office was approached by the Thai Ambassador who requested for permission to move through Thailand en route to Burma and Malaya. Pibul, who was away was hastily recalled and a Cabinet meeting was convened. At this meeting, Pridi spoke in favour of resisting the Japanese while Pibul "chose the middle course of granting the requested permission but refusing either the active collaboration or the complete alliance with the Axis powers which had also been suggested. "31 Earlier, in the introduction I have listed out some ofthe alternatives which the Thais had to choose from. But in actuality, the Thais had no alternatives at all. Pibul could not rely on the British for be had received "a message from the British at Singapore to the effect that no help would be forthcoming from that quarter. "32

Later, however, it was found out that by not collaborating with Japan, Thailand was to suffer more. As such on December 21st, 1941, a treaty of alliance was formally concluded between Japan and Thailand and in January 1942, Thailand declared war on the United States and the British Empire. The terms of the December 21st treaty referred mainly to the question of Thai-Japanese friendship. Article II of the Treaty states that, "if either party is involved in military dissenssion with a third party, Japan and Thailand as allied powers agree to help each other by every kind of political, military and economic means."33 This article clearly shows how Japan intended to

. make use of this treaty for her own ends, especially when it was signed amidst Japanese hostilities against the British and her allies. In addition it was also stated that the treaty would remain valid for only ten years after its signing. Hence, this treaty became the basis of Thai-Japanese relation throughout the Japanese supremacy in Southeast Asia.

The visit of the Japanese Premier, General Tojo, to Southeast Asia in July 1943, further enhanced the Thai position in the eyes of the Japanese government. Before arriving in Malaya General Tojo had already visited Thailand. While in Thailand, Pibul Songgram took the opportunity to approach Hideki Tojo on the subject of Thai-Nippon collaboration. On July 6th, 1943, Malai Sinpo quoted a report from Bangkok with this headlines, "Thailand Recovers Lost Territories - Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu."34 Under this banner the newspaper went on to report that Nippon and Thailand have agreed upon the inclusion of four Malay states as well as two provinces in the Shan states within the Thai territory. The joint statement reads, " .... Later the two premiers in the most friendly atmosphere conducted an important discussions regarding the Thai territory and Nippon-Thai collaboration. As a result the two premiers reached a complete agreement in views regarding the inclusion within the Thai territory of the four provinces of Per lis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, in North Malai and two provinces in Keng Tung and Mong Tan, in the Shan states. "35 T!iis agreement was soon followed by efforts to implement it. Discussions were carried out between the Nippon and Thai officials on the manner in which the states should be incorporated into Thailand. Meanwhile, Kedah remained under the Japanese administration.

On August 11th, 1943, the Thai Cabinet approved the Nippon-Thai agreement, "Details together with the primary budget for these territories will be submitted immediately to the National Assembly."'6 On August 14th, the Malai Sinpo

31 Bush, Noel E., Thailand .- An Inlrodvction to modem Siam, (Toronto. 1964) pp.78. 32 - ibid -33 Tsuji. Colonel Masnobu. Singapore the Japanese Version. Transl. Margaret, E., (Ed.) Howe, H.V. (Sydney, 19(0)

pp.I06. 34 MaJa; Sinpo, July 6th, 1943. Vo!.l. No. 158. 35 - ibid -36 - ibid - August 12th, 1943, Vol.3, No.l90.



announced that the Thai Army would be stationed in the New Provinces and local Governors were also established. On August 21st, the Thai-Nippon treaty which was signed on August 20th, 1943 was announced by Malai Sinpo. This ·treaty formally stated Japan's recognition of the inclusion of Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Trengganu and their islands into the Thai territory. Futher the treaty disclosed that, "Nippon Will have ceased the administration which it at present excercises in the two foregoing Articles within sixty days from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty."37 These sixty days would be the transitional period in which the Thai administrators will replace their Japanese counterparts. Meanwhile the Japanese would still be in full control.

By September 2nd, the Thai National Assembly of People Representatives had unanimously passed a Bill authorising the Government to appoint local inhabitants to govern the newly acquired territories. This new measure was adopted "with a view to preventing any inconveniences that may be caused to the inhabitants on account of their unfamiliarity with the Thai system of administration. "38 It is evident here that by September 1947 Thailand was already prepared· to take in the new territories. However, the formal take-over only took place on October 20th, 1943. This was therefore done in accordance with the treaty signed on August 20th which called for a transitional period of sixty days before the switch of authority can be made.

On this date Thailand completed peaceful take-over of Kedah's administration. The Malai Sinpo reported that "the National Army of Thailand completed peaceful entry into the capital cities of the four states. Citizens waving Thailand Nippon flags, lined up on both sides of the streets and welcomed the Thai soldiers. "3. This report tends to give the impression that the people were very happy to receive their new masters. However, it is doubtful that the majority of the people were happy with this change. Perhaps, they were happy to the extent that they no longer had to bear the Japanese strocities. Their past experiences with Thailand promised them a better time under the Thai administration. The truth of this statement, however, has yet to be seen.

II

Before the occupation of Kedah and the other three northern states of Malaya by 1bailand was formally effected on October 20th, 1943, Thailand had already drawn up the main outlines of policy of administration. According to the outline of administration published in the Malai Sinpo on September 17ih, 40 the administration oft~e four states would be placed under the Thai Army. Secondly, the administrative aff3lrs of each state shall be carried out by the administrator." The four administrators assigned to the respective states were to be under overall supervision of a Chief Administrator. In addition each Administrator would be advised by the local army commander. Thirdly, the Administrator was allowed the choice of using his discretion on the methods of administration "he deems most suitable to the inhabitants or conditions in his province. "42 Fourthly, it was the duty of the administrative adviser to assist the Cheif Administrator in carrying out the general administrative affairs. Finally, it was clearly stated that the "chief of the armed police force shall assist the

37 - ibid -, August 21st 1943. Vo1.3. No.I98. 38 - ibid- September ltd, 1943, Vol.), No.209. 39 - ibid. October 20th, 1943. VoI.4. No. 249. 40 MaJaj Sinpo, September 17th, 1943, Vol.3, No.ll!. 41 -ibid-42 - ibid-



Chief Administrator in matters concerning general policing"" of the respective states. These were the outlines of the administration of Kedah, Trengganu, Kelantan and Perlis as announced by Thailand on September 15th, in Bangkok. From these outlines, it is apparent that the emphasis was still on military administration. There was to be no civilian administration until the beginning of 1944'when the Thai government decided to be more liberal in her attitudes towards these four states. Until then Kedah remained and continued to be under military administration.

Simultaneous with this announcement the Thai Highest Command also gazetted the appointment of the Cheif Administrator for the four Malay states as well as an administrator for each state.44 Major Pramit Chong Charaen was to be Administrator of Kedah Police while Perlis was to be administered by Cham Na Songkhrma. Kelantan and Trengganu were to be administered by Lieutenant Charn Charan Chaichakar and Colonel Prayoon Ratenakich respectively. The adviser to the administration was Captain Momrajuorgse Chalermlarfwhile Police-Colonel Chaiam Linjat was appointed as the Commander of the armed police. From this list it is apparent that Thai officers occupy the most important posts in the administration of the respective states. However, it was not stated whether minor appointments were to be from the Thai nationals as well. As such we find that in Kedah these minor posts were given to the Malay officers who had held some positions during the pre-war period. Tengku Abdul Rahman was one of those appointed to serve under the Siamese rule. He was delegated the post of Director of Education for Kedah. His first action was to abolish the study of the Japanese language in all schools. Instead Malay was included in the school carriculum. He could do this because many of the Siamese officers in Kedah were his schoolmates. Soine of the had been studying with him at the Cambridge. In addition he also introduced a new subject as well, that is "Discipline" for he considered "adab sopan yang baik ada-Iah satu keutamaan besar dalam kehidupan tiap-tiap manusia .....

The above story with regards to Tengku Abdul Rahman is indeed a small example of the liberal outlook of the Thai military administration. In other departments similar structure of administration prevailed. Malay officers with previous experience under the British Advisory administration were appointed to serve under the Siamese high officials. This administrative structure was even more predominant in district level. Here, almost all the officers (Malay) which had been serving under the previous government were retained. The only difference was to be found in the Thai terms which were used for the various posts. A good example would be the use of the word "Neban .. 46 instead of the usual Malay term of "Ketua Kampong". Apart from this difference in terminology, the administration at district level remained unchanged from its pre-war level.

However, when "power" is taken into consideration, it will be evident that the highest authority in the district in this period lie with the commander of the District Police force. His power was usually above that of the District Officer. This is understandable considering that Kedah was then under Martial law. In addition to this, it could also be seen that the various departments in the district office usually were not as efficient as before. In fact, problems regarding land was completely neglected. No request for land was entertained. This is again understandable since, the emphasis then was more on self-sufficiency rather than anything else.

With regards to low, judicial or otherwise, there was practically no change. If there were, at least the rural people were not made aware of it. They only knew of one great significance, that is if they committed crime they would be heavily punished. Apart 43 - ibid -44 - ibid -45 Miller. Harry. Trans!. MustafTa Suhaimi. Pulera Dj-Raja dan Perdana Menter;, (Kuala lumpur. 1959) pp. 69. 46 This inforamtion is obtained from an interview conducted in Baling.



from this knew nothing of the changes. Muslim laws ~efinitely not changed since, the power to change these laws were still vested in the Sultan.

In the field of defence, the changes that occurred were merely the continuation of the Japanese legislation whereby, every able-bodied man, between eighteen and fifty years of age were compelled to undergo military training twice a week. In addition guard-posts were also maintained in every village. The villagers, under the direction of the "Neban" would take turns to guard the various posts erected by the villagers themselves under the so-called spirit of "gotong-royong". But, nevertheless, in reality, the people built all these posts under fear of death at the hands of the Japanese whose atrocities had already been well-know. Although the villagers were responsible for the security of their own village, they were not issued with any kind of guns or arms. They were to car.ry either poles or "parang". All these guard-posts were under the overall charge of the District police commander. It was observed that under the Siamese rule, the military training as well as guard duties were more relaxed. At least the people were allowed some breathing space.

Coming back to the administration proper, the liberal Siamese attitude was further illustrated when the Thai authority did not prevent Malay officers from organising relief fund for the refugees of the "Burmese death railway" who were pouring into Kedah. Though the government on her part was not willing to help, to contribute due to treaty obligation with Japan, she did not persecute those who organised the funds. In this respect, once again Tengku Abdul Rahman came into prominence. Due to the poor response of the public the Tengku together with his colleagues organised 'Sandiwara-sandiwara mengutip derma di sana sini."47 All in all, the Tengku could call upon thirty Malay youths to help him in the voluntary job. As a result of this effort, two hostels were erected to accommodate all these refugees who had suffered terribly at the hands of the Japanese. Such voluntary work could not have been possible if Kedah was under the Japanese direct rule.

Finally, it must be noted also that by December 1943, the Thai government was already considering the transfer of administration to the Sultan of kedah. They intended to do this in order to "strengthen the political power of the Sultans so as to place these states (meaning Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis) completely under their leadership. "48 This plan further assured the Sultan's trust in the sincerity of the Siamese government. In addition, this concession proved the advantage of being under the Siamese influence in this period.

III In Kedah, as in other parts of Malaya, the Malays were extremely fortunate in

that they were considered to be the natives ofKedah. Being the rightful rulers they were thus given the benefits which the other races could not enjoy. The Japanese made them feel that they were responsible for their own government. Though, this was not precisely the case, the opportunity to occupy the post which had previously been occupied by the British improved their confidence to govern by themselves.49

Moreover the Japanese were instructed to "treat the Natives with kindness."'o The Japanese soldiers and administrators had also been told that "these natives have" reached a point of almost complete emasculation,"" since they have already been

47 Miller, Hany, Trans!. MustafTa Suhaimi. /'ulera Di-Roja dan Perdana Menteri. (Kuala Lumpur. 1959). 48 MoJo; Sinpo, Kuala Lumpur, December 18th. 1943. VolA. No. 300. 49 The administration of kedah had been undertaken mostly by the Malays themselves even before the Japanese

occupation. SO Tsuji. Col. Masanobu Singapore '~Japa1U!st! Version. Trans!. Margaret E.t (Ed.) Howe. H.Y. (Sydney. 19(0) pp. 305. 51 -ibid- .



exploited by the Chinese and Europeans alike. Besides, the customs of the natives were also to be respected, especially with regards to religion. They were not to offend the Muslims by occupying their mosques without due observation of their (the Malays) common practice, that is to remove shoes before entering the mosques. Above all, if possible, they were to avoid using places of worship altogether. All these instructions with 'reference to the natives further illustrate the discrimination of the Japanese against the other races.

Many reports of disrespect as regards to the mosques were made by the Malays regarding the use of the mosques by the soldiers. However, after complaints had been made by the natives to the local commanders, due action was taken by the Japanese. From henceforth, all mosques were left in tact. Muslims were allowed to worship in peace. [This is true even with respects to other religions).

That the Malays had not suffered much economically was apparent at the cutset. That they were comparatively well of in this period of "brutality, poverty and disorder"" is a clear indication of their position viz-a-viz the Japanese. But, however good they were treated by the Japanese, there is no denying the fact that the Malays themselves have sufferred to some extent.

Many authors have given opinions on the attitude of the Malays in general towards the Japanese. Allegations from being Japanese collaboraters to being extremely passive have been made. Numerous reasons have been offerred. I shall now examine the truth of these allegations. By so doing I hope to establish the true picture of the situation [if not, the nearest picture would do). In addition to the opinion which have been experessed in books, I shall also venture to uncover the various arguments put forth in the Malay newspapers in post-war issues.

General Percival was of the opinion that "the Malay Civil population, taken all round, was inclined to be apathetic throughout the campaign, though there was no very extensive fifth-column activity. "53 However he did not deny the fact that the Malays were more united in their stand and that "they could still fight and fight well, however, when properly trained and disciplines. "54 This was clearly shown by the gallantary of the members of the Malay Regiment. This opinion was somewhat shared by L.A. Mills though he did not precisely state that the Malays were passive. He excused those few who had worked in collaboration with the Japanese as a factor which prevails in every country. These individuals had served the British enemy either for money or because they had previous grievances. He was of the opinion that, "the overwhelming majority were loyal to British rule"" There were no cases of "any Malay ever having fired on British troops."s. Reports of such nature could be attributed to the success of the Japanese infiltration tactics. In their disguise, they were taken to be Malays.

Dennis Russel-Roberts, on the other hand, divided the Malays into two categories. To him, most of the "civilian Malaysjust sat on the fence to see which side was going to win and there were many cases of our position being given away by them."" While to some extent it is true that most Malays were fence-sitters, it is questionable that the Malays had purposely given away British position. Perhaps they had done so under thereat of death. The second category Malays were those who had served in the Malay Regiment. Dennis Russel Roberts commended them in these words, "these were little men with big hearts. The two regular battalions commanded by Toby Andre and Walter Young and led by the best type of British Officer, showed

52 Williams W.o Malol'.fia and the Modern Wor/d, (Ed.) Bro. Micheal T .. (Penang, 1964) pp.208 . S3 Percival. A.E .. The' War in Malayo, (Cakutta. 1957) pp.71. 54 - ibid-SS Mills. l.A. (ed.) Th, N('\',' Slolel a/Southeast A.fio. (Minnesota. 1949) pp. 191. 56 - ibid-57 Roberts. Dennis Russel . Spotlight on Singapore. (Singapore. 1965) pp. 280.



the staff they were made of in fighting at the Gap on the island."sB. It is noticeable here that the author, in praising the soldiers in the Malay Regiment also commanded the British officers who led them. But, nevertheless, all the authors whose opinions I have already discussed have agreed in a way or other, that the Malays under arms were brave fighters. To this extent they all agreed. Perhaps all these opinions are fair considering the circumstances,s9 the Malays had to face. It is true that most Malays had been fence-sitters during the war. They have not been made aware of the consequences by their British rulers. As such they should not be blamed entirely. They could have resisted the Japanese if they were given a chance to defend their country as was illustrated by the soldiers in the Malay Regiment.

Malay language newspapers which were in circulation during the war have expressed opinions in their editorials as regards to the Japanese occupatiori. Having studied and compared the various comments made by the editors about the Japanese rulers during and after the Japanese occupation, I Have come to the conclusion that they are indeed conflicting. During the Japanese occupation, newspapers like the Perobahan Baharu, Seruan Raayat and Majlis seem to supports the Japanese. Whatever the policies of the Japanese government, they praised them. In fact they went to the extent of calling upon all Malays to be vigilant and to fight against the British and her allies. But, on the other hand, immediately after the war, they changed their tune. They suddenly became anti-Japanese and they treated the Japanese occupation of Malay as a most unfortunate period of Malayan history. These contradictory stands seem to indicate that freedom of press was not tolerated by the Japanese. Censorship must have been carried out by the Japanese Information Service over all the news and editorials. The ban on radios and wireless sets during this period further confirms the allegation that editorials were heavily censored. This censorship can therefore explain the collaborative nature of all the Malay editorials. Only when the British came back that they were free to say as they wish. In spite of this the editor of the Perobahan Baharu, Mohd Yunus Hamidi, was prosecuted in Court by the British for his vicious editorials during the Japanese occupation. He was acquited on the argument that the editorials were not essentially his work.

In addition, fierce editorial exchanges also took place between the Malay-language and non-Malay-language newspapers, just immediately after the war. The non-Malay language papers like the Malay Mail accused the Malays of being Japanese collaborators. This allegation was later denied by the Malay-language newspapers. These exchanges went on for some time before they cooled down.

To support further the above argument relevant passages from the above-mentioned newspapers can be cited. Perubahan Baharu its editorial on 11.3.1364 (A.H.) had made a call to the Malays in these terms, " ... kita suka berpesan kata lagi kepada orang ramai terutama bangsa Melayu iaitu dengan melihat kekenchangan perang sekarang ini maka dewasa yang akhirnya telah hampir sampai tetapi sudah tentu kemenangan muktamad itu akanjatuh ke tangan pihak yang suci niatdan tujuan perangnya .. .. ".60

This editorial did not really shown that it was anti-British. It discreetly stated that ultimate victory would only be gained by those with sincere motives (" .... kemenangan muktamad itu akan jatuh ke tangan pihak yang suci niat dan tujuan perang-nya ... "). It did not commit itself on this matter of ultimate victory. Hence it is quite difficult to say that it was pro-Japanese. The editorial then went on to say that the Malays should stand firm in their struggle for their own rights. " ... membela dan mempertahankan

58 - ibid-59 I shall discuss all the various circumstances and reasons for the Malay attitude towards the end of this Chapter. 60 P~rubohan BanQru, 11.3.1364 (A.H.): Kuala Lumpur.



hak-hak kebangsaan kita bukan merampas hak orang."61 Towards the end of the Japanese rule the Perubahan Baharu again made another

call for Malay support. This time it clearly stated that the British were the enemies. However, the call was quoted from the "Warta Perak". It was bluntly stated that Malays would perish if the British were win the war. Hence it was the duty of the Malays to resist the allied forces.

"Semua orang sedia maklum hidup atau mati, timbul atau tenggelamnya bangsa (Melayu) pada masa yang akan datang terletak pada hasilnya sekarang. Kalau Inggeris dan Amerika menang bangsa Melayu akan mati, akan tenggelam .... ".2

This call for Malay resistance was also made over the Radio. Such radio-talks were reported in the Malay papers in tum. Perubahan Baharu, for example had reported the speech ofChe' Halimah Noor in its edition on 19.6.1364 (A.H.) Due to this simultaneous campaign by.!he Radio and newspapers to rally Malay support, it is highly probable that the call did not originate from the Malays themselves. Perhaps there were a few Malays who collaborated with"the Japanese on this issue, but it is more possible that the Japanese masterminded the campaign.

Immediately after the war non-Malay language newspapers started hurling accusations at the Malays. The Malay Mail stated, "Bahawasanya semua orang tahu dalam masa pemerintahan Jepun dahulu perjuangan bermati-matian antara Melayu dengan China telah berlaku di Johor .... ".3 The editor summed up this Malay Mail comment by saying, "Pendek kata Malay Mail menuduh Melayu berhati jahat menyerang dan membunuh China .... ".. This accusation was answered comprehensively by the Seruan Rakyat in one of its December, 1945 issue. In addition to elaborating on the activities of the Malays during the Japanese occupation, the editorial also quoted from the '!Seruan Rakyat" ofIpoh. It endorsed the opinion of the Seruan Rakyat which stated, " .... ada pun yang sebenamya jadi talibarut Jepun itu bukannya Melayu melainkan China dan Indians. China jadi talibarut dengan menyokong kerajaan patung Wang Ching Wei dan Indian kerajaan patung Subhas Chandra Bose .... "., In other words, Seruan Rakyat flatly denied the accusation that the Malays were Japanese collaborators. To the Seruan rakyat, Chinese and Indians were the real collaborators. The editorial then went on to describe some of the activities of the Malays in Malaya with regards to the defence of ' Malaya as well as the guerella activities.

All the above descriptions of the Malay attitudes reflect mainly on the Malays in Malaya as a whole, It is questionable whether this also applies to the Kedah Malays, As newspapers and materials are not available to ascertain their views at that period it is difficult to make any comment. However, it is probable that educated Malays shared these views,

How then can we account for the naive and indifferent attitudes of the rural Malays, Several probable reasons can be offered here, the most important of which is education. Being mostly uneducated they were unawere of the real significance of the new arrangement. Thus, they could not really think for themselves. They usually succumbed to the Japanese propagal)da. Most of them could not be persuaded even to support the guerella movement because they were too frightened of the Japanese. Secondaly, they had no means of communication with the outside world, Generally they did not possess any radio or wireless set. Even if they had access to newspapers, they would not understand them since they were mostly illiterates, Thirdly they were too pre-occupied with their economic problems to ,bother about anything else. They

61 -ibid-62 - ibid - 6.6.1364 (A.H.). 63 SerutJlf Rakyal, Kuala Lumpur. No.16. Tahun 1,20.1 1.1945, translation of quotation from the Malaya Mail. 64 - ibid-6S - ibid - 12.12.1945., No. 35, Tahun t.



would rather concentrate on survival rather than resisting the Japanese. The fear of the consequences of resistence held them back. Finally, they were also lacking in active leadership. Inspired leadership was absent. As such, the feeling of national consciousness was not awakened in their minds. All these factors accounted for their seemingly "naive and indifferent" attitudes.··

IV

In Thailand, the imminent defeat of the Japanese at the hands of the Allies was foreseen by the Pibul Songgaram regime as early as 1944. He took the opportunity to resign from the government when a motion for compulsory conscription was defeated in the National Assembly. Apart from the realisation that the Japanese were going to be defeated, Pibul was also aware that Pridi was organising an underground movement in support of the Allies. The Thai Legation in Washington had also dissociate itself from the decision of declaring war on the Allied powers in 1942. By resigning Pibul probably hoped that Thailand would not be so harshly treated by the Allies later on. Pridi, though he was the most influential politician in Thailand then, did not seize the Premiership for fear that Japan would be too suspicious. Instead the premiership was given to Khuang Aphaiwongse "whose main task during the last year of the war was to placate the incerasingly nervous Japanese. ".7

Immediately after the Japanese surrender on August 15th, 1945, Pridi declared himselfto be the Regent. In order to regain the favour of the Western Allies he declared that "territories taken from Britain in Malaya and Burma in 1943 would be returned and damages were promised to citizens of these countries for losses sufferred. ".8 He further pointed out that Pibul's declaration of war on the Allies was illegal sir.ce it was not signed by the Regency and not ratified by the national Assembly. To please the Allies, he appointed Seri Pramoj. the leader of Thai Legation in Washington as the new Premier. It pleased the United States a great deal while the British government criticised the American stand. However, due to American intervention and pressure, the British finally agreed to sign a treaty with Thailand on January 1st, 1946. "The British withdrew their demand to reorganize the armed forces and the Thais were given the authority to prosecute their own war criminals."·' In addition to this Japan also agreed to a grant of It million tons of free rice to the British. However the major point of the treaty dealt with the Malay states. as well as the Burmese provinces ceded to Thailand by the Japanese in 1943. It was agreed that "Thailand would return the Malay and Burmese territories acquired during the war.,,70 Later on British was to relax her request for free rice from Thailand. A fixed price was arranged in order that Thai economy would not be destroyed by the drastic measure. It was with this arrangement between Thailand and Britain that Kedah was once again handed over to the British. The people of Kedah were never consulted over this new arrangement.

The decisive factor that contributed to the immediate surrender of the Japanese was undoubtedly the atomic bombs. However, the supremacy of the atomic bombs does not eclipse the fact that there was a fifth column movement raging in Kedah during the occupational period. Kedah being under the Siamese rule in the second half of the JapaneSe occupation was undoubtedly the centre of guerella activities since, the Siamese were not as harsh as the Japanese. To some extent they can be considered as very liberal. This liberal attitude has been apparent when in December 1943, the 66 Allthesc factors which accounted for the rural Malay attitude is derived from my observation gained from interviews. 67 Darling, F.e., Thui/and and 1M Unjt~d Stules, (Washington D.C .• 1965), pp. 36. 68 Nucchtcrlein. Donald. E .. Thailanti and the Struggle for Southeast Asia. (N. York. 1965) pp. 85. 69 Darling, F.e., Thailand and the United Stales. (Washington D.C.. 19(5), pp. 43. 70 Nuechterlein. D.E .. Thailand and the Slruggle for Southeast Asia, (N. York, 1965) pp. 87.



Siamese had already decided to give more power to the Sultan. Moreover the Malay administrators in Kedah were also given a great deal offreedom in their activities. No cases can be cited whereby suspected guerellas and fifth-colummists were persecuted by the Siamese. In addition, Kedah also had a very poor communication system. Most of the areas were in accessible. Urban centres were very few. All these conditions provided an ideal atmosphere for resistence movements to flourish. Thus, it was not surprising that MPAJA 71 members could move freely in areas like Baling and SikH Apart from these people, British trained guerellas were also dropped in Kedah, or to be precise, in Kroh, a border town in Perak. A notable member of such group is the present Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces staff, General Tengku Osman Jewa. These guerellas had been trained in India. They were made up of Malays who were stranded in Mecca and Egypt. Having completed their training they were in · tum parachuted into Kedah and Pahang. They were more popularly known as "force 136".

Meanwhile in Kedah itself a new movement was taking shape. Most of the people who had called for the formation of this movement, a movement for independence, had been inspired by the Indonesian nationalist who had visited Malaya just before the Japanese surrender. These inspired young men who were excited by the idea of an independent Malay included Encik Khir Johari and Encik Senu Abdul Rahman. They formed a movement which was known as "Seberkas" in 1944. To escape from the Japanese persecution this association was submerged as a commerical enterprise, called "Syarikat Seberkas". One ofits first members was Tengku Abdul Rahman. This movement planned to seize independence as soon as the war was over. Unfortunately, this goal could not be achieved due to the lack of cooperation between the nationalists in the rest of Malaya.

In the jungle, it has been rumoured that the Communist guerellas under the MPAJA banner was planning to seize control immediately after the Japanese surrender. They planned to declare Malaya as a Communist Republic. The Tengku and his colleagues in the "Seberkas" were not happy with this communist idea. They feared that there would be bloodshed if such a declaration was made. The Malays would have definitely oppose it. All the Chinese would have been massacred had it not been for the Tengku and his 'Seberkas' colleagues. In order to prevent a communist take-over, the Tengku contacted the guerella Force 136. This Force was ready to march into 'Alor Setar and deprive the communists of their objective.

When the Japanese finally surrendered in August 1945, the communist take-over did not materialise. Instead the flag of Kedah was raised in front of the Balai Besar, by the youths of Seberkas, supported by the Force 136. In this way, bloodshed was prevented. The communist guerellas did not dare to fight it out. In any case, if the communits had resisted the Chinese would have been massacred since the Malays greatly outnumbered them even in Alor Star.

The British Army had liberated Malay rather swiftly since they met with little resistence from the people. In fact, they were warmly welcomed back as liberators. This lack of resistence on the part of Malayans clearly showed the lack of national consciousness among the majority of the people and the failure of the Japanese to rally the natives against· the British. In short, their stay in Kedah as weD as in Malaya as a whole was never accepted by the people. Many probable reasons can be advanced to account for the Japanese failures. In the first place their Army h!tif' already created a bad impression in their campaign against Malay. The local people were treated harshly. Such treatment, undoubtedly turned the people against them though, they somewhat mended their ways towards the latter part oftheir stay. Lack offair trials for

71 MPAJA stands for the Malayan Peoples anti·Japancsc Army. 12 During the Emergency these two Districts became infested with Communist terrorists. the remnanls of MPAJA

gu=JIas.



suspects further aggravated the situation. Secondly, the people were also not given freedom of movements and communications. For instance, they were not allowed to listen to news from other radio stations apart from those operated in Malaya. Thirdly, the people had to suffer as a result of economic hardships.

Economic activities in Malaya were disrupted when the Japanese took over. Efforts at selt-reliance failed miserably. The shortage of foodstuffs was not remedied. Social amenities were also not provided. These facilities that have been destroyed during the war were not repaired. Finally, due to economic difficulties, the Japanese could not plan any development in order to attract and to rally the natives to their side. Thus it was not surprising that when the war ended, the Japanese found themselves without local sympathisers.

CONCLUSION

In reviewing the whole period under discussion many significant points can be observed. Politically, it can be realised that Kedah during this period was theoretically under two occupational powers, viz. the Japanese up to 1943 and the Siamese in the remainder years. It is also evident that although Kedah came under the Siamese control after 1943, in reality the Japanese still had the overall power. Administratively the Siamese might have been the rulers of Kedah, but defence matters were still with the Japanese. No doubt Kedah was principally different from the rest of Malaya, excluding Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, in that it was rather liberally administered after October 1943, nevertheless, notable achievements were not apparent. It is granted that Malay officers had been employed in the administration, but this policy provided hardly any change at all to its prewar structure. Malay officers had been employed extensively in the administration even before the war.

In the economic field, the Japanese could not boast of any substantial achievement. The standard of living of the people declined miserably. Tin and rubber industries were neglected. Foodstuffs were inadequate to cater for all the demand. Clothings were inadequate to cater for all the demand. Clothings were also scarce. Though money was in great abundance, it has relatively no purchasing power. In short, inflation was widespread. It is admitted that the Japanese had attempted" to introduce double

words, ..... pada hari inilah empat tahun yang lalu telah berlaku peristiwa yang sehabis-habis malang sekali yang pernah dialami oleh dunia Timur .... "" The editor went on to state that the Japanese had celebrated December 8th, with great joy, " ... walhasil hujung ekornya berlumur dengan tahi. ,,"

The Japanese had left many legacies them when they finally surrendered in 1945. These legacies are mostly evil though it must be admitted that the Japanese had contributed a great deal towards the development of nationalism in Malaya.

In the field of Medicine, the Japanese did nothing to improve the health conditions of the population, When the British came back they found that they did not have enough doctors, nurses and dresers to go round. Before the occupation adequate supply of staffs were available. At least the number of staff was kept at operational level. ,. Apart from this, the Japanese also disrupted the good work of their predecessors in the field of "malaria". An anti-malarial campaign was launched just before the war. By 1941 it had achieved a certain amount of success. The coming of the Japanese undid the whole of the good work. In fact new breeding grounds for mosquitoes appeared which threatened to increase the danger of the problem. Typhoid, malaria and yaws were on the increase since the Japanese had made no effort to improve and to remedy the situation. Diseases like cholera, small-pox, tropical typhus and beri-beri which had been under controlled in prewar years became uncontrollable during the Japanese occupation due to ne~ect as well as poor nutrition together with undernourishment. Besides all these diseases, a new one came to flourish, that is venereal disease. This disease was largely spread by the Japanese soldiers who had gone on rampage during the early part of the Japanese campaign. the victims of rape surrerred considerably and they were the people who spread the disease. These were among the few legacies which the British had to face in the reconstruction period. many years were required and drastic measures had to be undertaken.

Similar disruptions occurred in the field of education. In this case the people in towns sufferred because the schools here were used for other purposes; like accommodating the soldiers. School eauipments were also lost. No chinese schools were allowed to function . Only Malay and Indian vernacvular schools remained open and these were few in number. Thus there was a great need for teachers and school equipments after the war in order to normalise the education system.

The Japanese also left behind a corrupt police force, comparatively smaller in number but less efficient. " ... The standards of eficiency of the police forces had fallen during the Japanese occupation,"" said Jones. This decline in standards of efficiency can be attributed to the economic instability of the period as well as thecerrupt attitude of the Japanese administrators. Though, the Japanese had dealt severely with criminals, the record of brutal · crimes increased due to the easiness of obtaining firearms. The British administration therefore, had to re-vitalise the police force and control the crime. This was indeed a formidable task.

In addition to all these departments, dormant departments like Agriculture, Forestry, Sllrveys, Geology and Mines had to be reactivated. New and skilled officers had to be found to re-organise these departments.

Only in the field of nationalism that Malay and Kedah in particular can be thankful to the Japanese. Malays, especially were roused to a new consciousness. The myth that the British were unconquarable had now been shattered by the Japanese triumph in 1942. The Japanese had put forth the idea of "Asia forthe Asians" and had attc:mpted 10 form the "Co-prosperity sphere." Altilough these concepts failed, they

74 Semon RDk)'Qt. Kuala Lumpur, 8.12.1945, No.J2. Tabun I (Editorial commenl in memoryo(thefirstJapaneseauack on Malaya entitled "HART IN''') ,

75 - ibid -76 Operational level here means the level by which the running of the Health Department can be maintained. 17 Jones, S.W ., Public Administration in Malaya. (London. 1953) pp. 168.



nevertheless made the Malays realised their future role. Inspired by their counterparts in Indonesia they no longer think in terms of Kedah only but Malaya in general. The term 'independence' came to mean something to them. It was with this hope in mind that the "Saberkas" association was founded in Kedah. Similar organisations were encouraged by the Japanese, namely the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (K.M.M.), Pembela Tanah Ayer (PET A) and Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS). All these national organisations were inspired by the Japanese. Though some of them opposed the British, the majority of them secretly opposed any power which tried to tule them. Thus far, Malaya can be thankful to the Japanese. Beyond that, the people of Malaya including Kedah owens nothing.

Finally, it must be admitted that the Japanese occupation period, be it in Kedah or anywhere else in Malaya is not popular. Even those who had gained something or other in that period, have denounced the period as the most unfortunate events in the history of Malaya. Those who had sufferred at the hands of the Japanese have all the more reasons to dispise the occupation.

APPENDIX I

The Thai-Japanese Treaty signed in Bangkok on 21st December 1941. Its terms were: For the Governments of the Empire of Japan and the itingdom of Thai the

establishment of a new Order in East Asia is the onaly road to the prosperity of Eastern Asia.

This agreement is made in the belief that 'the above-named government have the firm will and the ability to eliminate all sources of trouble between them and that restoration of unconditional world peace is an essential matter.

Article I An alliance is established between the two countries, Japan and Thailand as the

foundation for respect of sovereignty and the mutual independence.

Article II If either party is involved in military dissension with a third party, Japan and

Thailand as allied powers agree to help each other by every kind of politi cia I, military and economic means.

Article III

Matters which become operative under Article II shall be determined by a conference between the Government Agencies in Japan and in Thailand having power to deal with the matters in question.

Article IV In the event of Japan and Thailand becoming involved in collaborations in

hostilities no peace or truce shall be made expect in accordance with mutual agreement.

Article V This treaty becomes effective simultaneously with signatures on behalf of the two

powers and it will remain valid for ten years. The contracting countries shall consult each other about renewal of the treaty at an appropriate time before the expiration of the aforesaid period.

Appendix. I - Tsuj i. Colonel Masanobu, Singapore the JOJ1(lMse Version. Transl. by Margaret. E., B.A., Dip. Ed., (ed.) Howe, H.V., (Sydney 1960) pp. 106.



APPENDIXll

Thai-Japanese Treaty The Government of the Empire of Nippon and the Royal Government of

Thailand, being unshakeably determined in close cooperation between the two countries to prosecute the common war against the United States of America and the British Empire to its successful conclusion and establish a Greater East Asia based on justice, have agreed upon the following articles:-

Article I Nippon rcognises the incorporation into the territories of Thailand of the states of

Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis and the islands belonging to those states.

Article II Nippon recognises the incorporation into the territories of Thailand of the states

of Kentung and Mongpan in the Shan region.

Article m Nippon will have ceased the administr;ltion which it at present excercise in the

territories specified in the two foregoing Articles within sixty days from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty.

Article IV The frontiers of the territories specified in Articles I and II shall be in accordance

with the boundaries of the states as on the dates of the signing of the present treaty.

Article V Matters of detail for execution of the present. treaty shall be decided through

consultions between the authorities concerned of the two territories.

Article VI The present treaty shall come into force on the date if its signature. This treaty was signed by Field Marshal Pibual Songgram and Teiji Tsubokami,

on 20th August 1943.

Appendix II - Mala; Sinpo. August 21st. 1943, Vol. J . No. 198.



KEDAH UNDER THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION (1942 - 1945)

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

A NEWSPAPERS: a) ENGLISH

Malai Sinpo (Japanese Occupation), Kuala Lumpur, 1943 - 1945.

b) MALAY

Majlis, Kuala Lumpur, 1940, 1945 (Jawi) Pelita Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1945, 1946 (Rinni) Perubahan Baharu, Kuala Lumpur, 1944, 1946 (Rumi) Seruan Rakyat, Kuala Lumpur, 1945, 1946 (Rumi)

B REPORTS

Fetkration of Malaya Annual Report, 1948 Kedoh-Perlis Annual Reports by British Officers, 1938

C BOOKS:

Baharin, Shamsu1, Malaya Dalam Tawarikh Dunia (3), (Saudara Sinaran Berhad, Penang, 1965) Bennet, Gordon, H., Why Singapore Fell, (Sydney, 1944) Busch, Noel, F., Thailand: An Introduction to Modern Siam, (Toronto, Canada 1964) Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upsitk Down, (Singapore, 1949) Cowan, C.D., Nineteenth Century Malaya, (London, 1962) Darling, Frank, C., Thailand and the United States, (Washington D.C., 1965) E1sbree, W.H., Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 -1946, (Harvard, 1953)

Emerson, R., Malaysia: a study of Direct and Indirect Rule, (Kuala Lumpur, 1964). Glover, Edwin, In 70 Days: The Story of Japanese Campaign in British Malaya

(London, 1946). Gullick, J. M., Malaya, (London, 1964). Jones, S. W., Public Administration in Malaya, (London, 1953). Lee Ah Chai, Singopore Under the Japanese 1942-1945, (B. A. Academic Exercise)

(Singapore, 1956). Maxwell, W. G., Gibson, W. S., (Eds.) Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay

States and Borneo, (London, 1924). Miller, Harry, (Transl.) Mustaffa Shuhaimi, Putera Di Raja dan Perdana Menteri

(Kuala Lumpur, 1959). Mills, L. A., (ed.) The New World of Southeast Asia, (Minnesota, 1949). Nuechterlein, Donald, E., Thailand and the struggle for Southeast Asia, (N. York,

1965). Percival. A. E., The War in Malaya (Calcutta, 1957). Potter, John Deano, A Soldier Must Hang (London, 1963). Roberts, Dennis Russel, Spotlight on Singapore, Singapore, 1965.



Soenamo, Radin, "Malay Nationalism 1900-1945", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. I, N·o.l, 1960.

Strabolgi, Lord., (R. N.) Singapore and After: A Study of the Pacific Campaign, (London, 1942).

Strategieus, The War Moves East, (London, 19 ). Tsuji, Colonel Masanobu, Singapore The Japanese Version Transl. by Margaret, E., B.

A., Dip. Ed., (ed) Howe, H. V. (Sydney, 1960). Tregonning, K. G., A History of Modem Malaya, 1964. Williams, W ., Malaysia and the Modern World, (ed.) Bro. Michael, T., (Penang, 1964). Winstedt, Sir Richard., A History of Malaya (London, 1949).



kedah during the japanese occupation...

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