ga-4 specpol western sahara

7/28/2019 Ga-4 Specpol Western Sahara

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LETTERFROMTHESECRETARYGENERAL

HonorableDelegates,

IamYahyaBerkolGLGEand it ismyhonorandpleasure towelcomeyou toEuroAsia

2011conference.

Iam

agraduate

of

Ankara

University,

Faculty

of

Law

and

have

been

participating

inMUNconferencesforalmosttenyearsnow.Hopefully,wewillallrememberthisconferenceas

afruitfulandjoyfulexperience.

The age of colonilazation is long gone; nevertheless, the problems and conflicts it left

behind still persists. The United Nations perceives Western Sahara as the last trace of

colonilazationin

the

world.

It

is

possible

to

disagree

with

this

opinion.

A

former

colony

of

Spain,

nowadayscontrolledbyMorocco,WesternSaharaisatopicdiscussedbytheUNandtheAfrican

Union numerous times. Despite these efforts, the problem is still unresolved. Consequently,

WesternSaharasitsbeforeusastheperfectselectionforGeneralAssembly4,Special,Political

andDecolonizationCommitteetopic.

Itwill

not

be

challenging

for

delegates

to

find

resources

on

the

topic

should

you

feel

that

further research beyond the study guide as countless documents are already available on the

internet. Still, I believe that the study guide will provide you with most of the information

required.Secondpointtoindicatewouldbethenecessityofresearchingforthecountrypolicies

astherearemanyAfricancountriessupportingoneoftheopposingpartiestotheconflict.Make

sure

that

you

stick

to

your

country

policies

and

try

to

act

accordingly

while

debating

on

possible

outcomesofthecommittee.


2/33

Thankingto

the

creators

of

the

study

Guide,

my

under

secretary

generals

BetlBodur

and

OkyanusAkn,fortheirworkIwouldliketodeclaremyexcitementbeforemeetingyouinperson.

AlltheBest,

YahyaBerkolGLGE

SecretaryGeneralofEuroAsia2011

LETTERSFROMTHEUNDERSECRETARYGENERALS

DearDelegates,

I would like to welcome you to the Special, Political and Decolonization Committee of

EuroAsiaMUN 2011TrainingandDevelopmentConference.

Myname

is

BetlBodur.

Im

asophomore

at

Ankara

University

Faculty

of

Law.

Iparticipated

in

MUNconferencesasadelegate,andthisyearforthefirsttime,Iamamemberoftheacademic

team.

ThisyearsSPECPOLcommitteewilldiscussTheQuestionofWesternSahara,whichhas

beenunderthefocusoftheUnitedNationsforoverthreedecadesdueto itsuniquestatus.The

topicis

also

crucial

as

the

United

Nations

enters

Third

Decade

of

Eradication

of

Colonization

and

the territory is perceived as the last colony in Africa. General Assembly Fourth Committee will

handlethesituationmainlyfromthereferendumdisputesperspective;opposingfrontsofwhich

are, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. Delegates are expected to propose a comprehensive

methodfortheorganizationofareferendum.TheCommitteewillalsoanalyzethehumanrights

aspect

of

the

question.


3/33

Ibelieve

you

will

enjoy

the

conference,

since

the

topic

includes

many

features

to

be

solved.

Regards,

BetlBodur

UnderSecretaryGeneralforLegalandSPECPOLCommittees

Hello,

I am Okyanus Akn, one of the Under SecretariesGeneral responsible for the Special

Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL) of EuroAsia 2011. I study International

Relations at Middle East Technical University; but currently I am continuing my studies at the

Universityof

Leeds

as

an

Erasmus

exchange

student.

Since

my

high

school

years,

Ihave

been

involved inMUNconferencesandrelatedactivitiesbothasadelegateandacommitteedirector

forseveral times.However, this is the first time that Ihave thepleasureofactingasanUnder

SecretaryGeneralwiththeteamofYahyaBerkolGlge,theSecretaryGeneral.

InchoosingtheQuestionofWesternSaharaastheagenda itemforSPECPOL,ourteams

mainfocus

was

on

the

fact

that

this

issue

has

become

one

of

the

particular

ones

covered

by

the

FourthCommitteeand notbeensolvedthusfarsincetheday itwasadoptedintoitsagenda.In

formingthisstudyguidewithmyfellowBetlBodur,wetriedtobeascomprehensiveaspossible

soastoaddresstheverymultidimensionalaspectsoftheQuestionsuchasthosestemmingfrom

politicalclaimsovertheTerritory, individualconcernsfornaturalresourcesandalsooverlapping

yet

divergent

ambitions

caused

by

different

political

and

diplomatic

benefits.


4/33

Ibelieve

through

dealing

with

this

demanding

item,

you

will

have

the

chance

to

acquire

the skills needed by an MUN delegate basically because of the fact that the issue of Western

Sahara can be taken as a longlasting one that can only be tackled through cooperation,

compromiseandpersuasion. Inaddition,throughparticipating inEuroAsia,youcanalsousethe

opportunitytogetpreparedforMUNTRthatwillbeevenmoredemandingandcompetitive.

Iwish

you

have

avery

successful

and

gratifying

experience.

Peace,

OkyanusAkin

UnderSecretaryGeneral

GENERALASSEMBLYFOURTHCOMMITTEE:SPECIALPOLITICALANDDECOLONIZATION

THEQUESTIONOFWESTERNSAHARA

HISTORYOFTHECOMMITTEE

FollowingtheestablishmentoftheUnitedNations in1945,theFourthCommitteeofthe

GeneralAssemblyonSpecialPoliticalandDecolonization(SPECPOL)wasestablishedinitiallyasad

hocorgantodealwiththeproblemsofdecolonizationandselfdetermination inthethenglobal

contextwhilstaconsiderableamountofregionshadbeenremainingundercolonialpossession,as

well as to alleviate the work load of and resolve political issues not discussed by the First

Committee,DisarmamentandInternationalSecurityCommittee(DISEC). TheCommitteebecame

apermanentoneundertheGeneralAssemblyin1978.


5/33

Aspart

of

the

General

Assembly,

the

Fourth

Committee

may;

Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation formaintaininginternationalpeaceandsecurity,includingdisarmament;

Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except where adispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council, make

recommendationson

it;

Discuss,withthesameexception,andmakerecommendationsonanyquestionswithinthescope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United

Nations;

Initiatestudiesandmakerecommendationstopromoteinternationalpoliticalcooperation,the

development

and

codification

of

international

law,

the

realization

of

human

rights

and

fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in the economic, social,

humanitarian,cultural,educationalandhealthfields;

Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impairfriendlyrelationsamongnations.

Today,

the

SPECPOL

deals

with

a

variety

of

subjects

which

include

those

still

related

to

decolonization,Palestinianrefugeesandhumanrights,peacekeeping,mineaction,peacefuluses

of outer space,public information and atomic radiation. Other than these general subject that

have been covered by the Fourth Committee as if they have been adopted as themes of the

sessions,recently in the66thSession,SPECPOLhasproduceddraftresolutionsanddecisionson,

suchas,

Israeli

Practices

Affecting

Human

Rights

of

the

Palestinian

People

(A/C.4/66/L.13),

the


6/33

Occupied Syrian Golan (A/C.4/66/L.17), Effects of atomic radiation (A/C.4/66/L.7), Persons

displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities (A/C.4/66/L.10), Question o

Western Sahara (A/C.4/66/L.5)as to be discussed by the SPECPOL at EuroAsia, Question o

Gibraltar(A/C.4/66/L.4)

and

so

on.

ThecurrentChairoftheFourthCommitteeoftheGeneralAssemblyinits66thsessionisRomania.

INTRODUCTION

A formercolonyofSpain fromthe19thCenturyuntil1975,WesternSahara isadisputed

territoryinNorthAfricasurroundedbyMorocco,AlgeriaandMauritania.

Thisdispute

has

been

one

of

the

persistent

ones

dealt

with

by

the

United

Nations

(UN)

since1963whenWesternSaharawas recognisedasanonselfgoverning territoryby theUN in

accordance with General Assembly (GA) Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The UNs

involvement in the Western Sahara issue furthered on December 16, 1965, when the General

AssemblyadopteditsfirstresolutiononwhatwasthencalledSpanishSahara,requestingSpainto

takeall

necessary

measures

to

decolonize

the

territory,

while

entering

into

negotiations

on

problemsrelatingtosovereignty. Followingthissituation,Spainwasfirstlyaskedtodecolonise

theterritoryin1965andtoorganiseareferendumonselfdeterminationin1966bytheUN.

The abandonment of theadministrative control of Western SaharabySpain to thejoint

administrationbyMoroccoandMauritaniain1975wasensuedbyawarbetweentheseactorsand

thePOLISARIO

Front,

which

has

been

recommended

as

the

representative

of

the

people

of

Western Sahara (GA 34th Session/37), proclaiming Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

Eventually, Morocco asserted its control over and annexed the northern twothirds of Western

Sahara in1976andclaimed the rest in1979withmajornatural resourcesafterMauritaniahad

withdrawn.

A

guerrilla

war

between

Morocco

and

the

Polisario

Front

ended

with

the

ceasefire

agreementbrokeredbytheUNin1991.Sincethen,WesternSaharahasbeencontrolledmostlyby


7/33

Moroccowhereas,

backed

by

Algeria,

the

SADR

controls

the

remainder.

However, many neighboring states reject Moroccan administration of Western

Sahara. Several states have created diplomatic ties to the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic

Republic" represented by the Polisario Front in exile in Algeria, while others

recognizeMoroccansovereignty overWesternSahara.

TheUN

has

been

sponsoring

talks

between

Morocco

and

the

Polisario

front

over the negotiations for the status of Western Sahara. However, the UN organized

referendum on the territory's final status has been recurrently postponed. Whereas

Morocco has been trying to maintain Moroccan sovereignty with an autonomy

proposal for the territory, the POLISARIO has been after a popular referendum

includingthe

option

of

independence.

MilestonesTimeline

During the Berlin Conference in 18841885, Spain was

recognised as the colonial power of presentday Western Sahara

consideredas

res

nullius

nobodys

property.

1960s: In 1963, UN Special Committee on Decolonisation

declared Western Sahara a nonselfgoverning territory to be

decolonized.In1965,theUNGAadopteditsfirstresolutiononWesternSahara,requestingSpain

to decolonise the Territory (A/RES/2072(XX)). In 1966, the UNGA requested Spain to organize a

referendum

under

UN

supervision

on

self

determination.


8/33

1970s:

In

1973,

with

the

purpose

of

obtaining

independence

for

Western

Sahara,

FrentePopular deLiberacin deSagua el Hamra yRo deOro, the POLISARIO was founded in

Marutania.In1975,theInternationalCourtofJusticepublisheditsadvisoryopiniononthestatus

oftheTerritorybeforecolonizationbySpain.:theCourthasnotfoundlegaltiesofsuchnature

asmightaffect theapplication of resolution1514 (XV) in thedecolonisationofWesternSahara

and,in

particular,

of

the

principle

of

self

determination

through

the

free

and

genuine

expression

of thewillof thepeoplesof the Territory. Again in1975,Spainagreed tocedeadministrative

controloftheTerritorytoMorocco(northerntwothirds)andMauritania(southernthird),aftera

transitionaltripartiteadministrationperiodandofficiallywithdrew fromtheTerritory in1976. In

thesameyearPOLISARIOproclaimedtheSADRandMoroccoandMauritaniadividedtheTerritory,

whereMauritania

received

the

southern

third

and

Morocco

the

northern

two

thirds.

The

then

OrganisationofAfricanUnitys(OAU)proposalforaceasefireandareferendumwasrejectedby

Morocco in 1979. In August 1979, Morocco took control of most of the southern part of the

TerritorypreviouslyoccupiedbyMauritania.

1980s: In 1980, Morocco began

constructing

the

first

of

a

series

of

defensive

sandwalls stretchingover2,400km inorder to

protect theWesternpartof theTerritory. After

formallyapplyingformembership intheOAU in

the same year, the SADR is admitted to

membership

in

the

OAU

in

1981

followed

by


9/33

Morocco,firstly,

suspending

its

participaiton

in

the

Organisaiton

and,

then,

withdrawing

from

the

OAUin1984.Intheperiodbetween19851988theSettlemenProposalspresentedbytheUN

andtheOAUwereexaminedanddidbecomeknownasSettlementPlan.

1990s: In1990,UnitedNationsMission for theorganizationof aReferndum inWestern

Sahara,MINURSO,wasestablishedby theSecurityCouncilresolutionS/1991/690.TheMission is

mandatedto

implement

the

Settlement

Plan:

monitor

the

cease

fire,

identify

eligible

voters

for

participationinthereferendum,andcreatetheconditionsandmodalitiesforthesupervisionand

conductofthereferendum.In1991,MoroccoandthePOLISARIOsuspendmilitaryoperationswith

theceasefireagreementannouncedbythethenUNSecretaryGeneralJavierPrezdeCullar.In

1997,JamesBaker,thethenthenPersonalEnvoyoftheUNSecretaryGeneralforWesternSahara

mediatesthe

Houston

Accords,

which

define

the

compilation

procedures

for

the

electoral

body,

troopconfinement,refugeerepatriationandacodeofconductforthereferendum.

2000s: The Baker Peace Plan, Baker Plan I envisaging the integration, with a degree of

autonomy, of the Territory within Morocco, was submitted and, however, rejected by the

POLISARIOin2001.In2002,fouroptionsregardingthesituationoftheTerritorywasputforward

tothe

Security

Council

by

the

UN

Secretary

General

Kofi

Annan:

1. ImplementationofSettlementPlanwithoutconcurrenceoftheparties;2. RevisionofFrameworkAgreement;3. ExplorepossibledivisionoftheTerritorybetweenthetwoparties;4. Termination of MINURSO, acknowledging that the UN cannot resolve the problem

without

requiring

one

of

the

parties

to

do

something

it

does

not

want

to

do.


10/33

However,the

Security

Council

did

not

endorse

any

of

these

four

options.

In

2003,

the

SecretaryGeneralpresentedanotherPeacePlan,namelytheBakerPlanII(S/2003/565),supported

bytheSecurityCouncil,providingfortheselfdeterminationofthepeopleofWesternSaharaafter

a threeyear period of provisional administration by a governing body and the residents in the

Territorysince1999tochooseamongindependence,integrationorautonomywithinMorocco.It

wasaccepted

by

the

POLISARIO.

In

2004,

Morocco

rejected

the

Baker

Plan

IIby

placing

various

limitationsonitsuchasrejectingthetransitionarrangementsandtheoptionofindependence.In

April2007MoroccosubmitteditsautonomyplanforWesternSaharaentitled"MoroccanInitiative

forNegotiatinganAutonomyStatutefortheSaharaRegion"totheSecretaryGeneral. POLISARIO

alsopresentedtotheSecretaryGenerala"Proposal foraMutuallyAcceptablePoliticalSolution

thatProvides

for

the

Self

Determination

of

the

People

of

Western

Sahara."

In

the

talks

of

June

2007,thePOLISARIOstateditsreadinesstoconsidertheMoroccanautonomyplan,butobviously

continuedtoinsistonareferendumonselfdetermination,includingtheoptionofindependence.

Moroccoseemedreadytoofferselfdeterminationonlybasedonautonomy.However,evenafter

the third round talks between Morocco and the POLISARIO in 2008, there was no progress on

confidencebuilding

measures,

but

there

were

preliminary

discussions

on

thematic

subjects,

including administration, competencies and institutions. After the fourth round of talks in the

same year, Morocco made a statement that the choice was not between autonomy and

independence but between autonomy and status quo with regard to its territorial integrity.

Following theEuropeanUnion (EU) summitwithMorocco inSpain in2010emphasising theEU

supported

UN

efforts

on

Western

Sahara,

MINURSOs

mandate

was

renewed

until

2011,

and

againin2011,themandatewasextendeduntil30April2012.InJune2011,partiestotheconflict


11/33

metfor

the

seventh

round

of

informal

talks

and

for

the

eighth

round

in

July

discussing

the

two

on

theissueoftheelectoralcorps,mechanismsforselfdetermination,andtheformsofguarantees.

ThereisstillalackofprogressovertheWesternSaharaconflict.

OPPOSINGFRONTS:THEFRENTEPOLISARIOANDMOROCCO

Western Sahara saw acts of violence as Moroccan security forces forcibly dismantled a

Sahrawiprotest

camp

near

the

Moroccan

administered

regional

capital,

Laayoune

(Arieff,

2011)

on8November2010.WhileMoroccanauthoritiesdenytheresponsibilityofthe incidents, they

alsoclaimthattheFrentePopulardeLiberaciondeSaguiaelHamrayRiodeOro(POLISARIO)has

organized them.This isonlyoneparticularexampleof theongoingdisputebetween twosides,

andtheinternationalcommunityisconvincedthatitwillcontinueintheforeseeablefuture.Only

twomonths

later,

the

popular

upheavals

of

the

Arab

Spring

began

sweeping

across

North

Africa

andtheMiddleEast,includingliberalizationreformsinMorocco.Nevertheless,thetalksbetween

theFrentePOLISARIOandMoroccowererelativelyunaffectedbytheseeventsastheycontinued

atregularintervalsandremaineddeadlocked(MissonNotes,2011).

Western Sahara has been under the occupation by Morocco since 1975, after the

withdrawalof

former

colonial

power,

Spain,

and

shortly

after

the

International

Court

of

Justice

(ICJ) had rejected both Moroccos and Mauritanias territorial claims. As mentioned in the

previous section, Mauritania has abandoned its claims in the year 1976. As, the ICJ advisory

opinion goes, Having considered this evidence and theobservationsof theother Stateswhich

tookpart in theproceedings, theCourtfinds thatneither the internalnor the internationalacts

relied

upon

by

Morocco

indicate

the

existence

at

the

relevant

period

of

either

the

existence

or

the

internationalrecognitionoflegaltiesofterritorialsovereigntybetweenWesternSaharaandthe


12/33

Moroccan

State.(http://www.icj

cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=323&code=sa&p1=3&p2=4&case=61&k=69&p3=5) it is obvious

that international lawsposition isabenefit for theFrentePOLISARIO. Although there isan ICJ

opinion,theuncompromisingstanceofbothsideshasmadeWesternSahara,thequestionofthe

pastthreedecades.

Onone

side,

there

is

Morocco;

which

is

determined

to

claim

the

autonomy

of

Western

Sahara

withinitsbordersandwhichinsiststhatthequestionofWesternSaharaisaninternalissueanda

reason of conflict between itself and Algeria. Actually, Morocco has initiated a large scale

settlement policy in Western Saharan cities such as Laayone and considers them as Moroccan

provinces.AnddespitethefactthattheWesternSaharanconflicthasbeenafinancialburdento

Morocco,this

has

not

undermined

its

firm

commitment

to

the

marocanity

of

Sahara.

On

the

othersidethere istheFrentePOLISARIOwhichhasdedicated itsactstowardstheestablishment

ofan independentSahrawiArabDemocraticRepublic(SADR).Inthissectionthepositionsofthe

two fronts through the policies of the United Nations and the role of third parties will be

discussed.

1. UnitedNationsinWesternSaharaTheUN,fromtheverybeginningofthedisputehasbeencontributingtothesolutionprocess

of the question of Western Sahara, since the Spanish withdrawal. Each secretary general has

focused on this problem during their terms by appointing a special representative solely for

WesternSahara.AswellastheSecurityCouncil,theGeneralAssemblyhasalsoputgreat


13/33

emphasison

the

problem

and

the

fourth

committee

has

taken

the

question

as

one

of

its

agenda

items.

Theyear2011 isalso theyear that theUnitedNationshasentered theThirdDecadeof

Eradication of Colonization. Western Sahara, which is claimed to be the last piece of land of

colonialism in Africa is therefore of great importance. Besides the ultimate goal of the United

Nations

that

is

decolonization

and

selfdetermination

of

the

last

sixteen

non

self

governing

territoriesonearth,whichWesternSaharaislistedunder,inthissubsectionothermajoreffortsof

the UN will be explained in topics of MINURSO, Baker Plan and the final status of the two

opposingsides.

a. UnitedNationsMissionFortheReferendum inWesternSahara(MINURSO):TheSettlement

Proposals

and

Establishment

In 1985, the United Nations Secretary General, in cooperation with the Organization of

African Unity (OAU), initiated a mission of good offices leading to the settlement proposals,

whichwereacceptedon30August1988bothbyMoroccoandtheFrentePOLISARIO.In1990,the

SecurityCouncilhasadoptedthereportoftheSecretaryGeneralwhich includedthe full textof

the settlementproposals.SecurityCouncilResolution621 (20September1988),authorized the

SecretaryGeneral toappointaspecialrepresentative forWesternSaharaandrequestedhimto

transmitareportontheholdingofareferendumforselfdetermination ofthepeopleofWestern

Sahara and on ways and measures to ensure the organization and the supervision of such a

referendumbytheUNincooperationwiththeOAU


14/33

(http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27

4E9C

8CD3

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/MINURSO%20SRES621.pdf).

On29April1991,theSecurityCouncil,initsresolution690decidedtoestablishtheUnited

Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in accordance with

theSecretaryGeneral's report which further detailed the implementation plan

(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml).The

implementation

plan covered the transitional process of a referendum in which the participants would choose

betweenintegrationwithMoroccoorindependence. Theresolutionwasbasedonthereportof

the Secretary General, dated 19 April 1991. The report covered many aspects of both the

settlementproposalsand theestablishmentand thecourseofMINURSO.Thesecretarygeneral

referredto

the

topics

of

the

special

representative

for

Western

Sahara,

the

transitional

period,

the ceasefire, Moroccan military presence, confinement of each partys troops and designated

locations,releaseofpoliticalprisonersanddetainees,exchangeofprisonersofwar,identification

ofvotersandlastbutnottheleastorganizationofareferendum.

It was stated previously that each secretary general, since the decision of the Security

Council,has

appointed

special

representatives

for

Western

Sahara.

Most

of

the

key

events

and

documentsincludingtheBakerPlan,whichwillbeexplainedinfollowingtopics,weretheresults

oftheeffortsofthespecialrepresentatives.Thepartiesseemedtohavereachedanagreementin

the settlement proposals of 1988 on the issues such as the release of political prisoners and

detaineesand theexchangeofprisonersofwar.The InternationalCommitteeof theRedCross

contributed

to

the

work

with

the

parties

and

families

concerned.

However

the

differences

that

remainedafterthesettlementplansandtheestablishmentofMINURSO,whichcontinueeven


15/33

todaywere

about

the

identification

of

voters,

thus

the

organization

of

the

referendum,

which

naturally made the maintenance of the ceasefire impossible. The problem of identification of

votersandtheorganizationofthereferendumwillbeexplained,embeddedinfollowingtopics.

b. FromtheEstablishmentofMINURSOtotheBakerPlanSincethedeploymentofMINURSO,theceasefirehasbeengenerallyheld.Thetransitional

period,however,hasnotbegun;giventhepartiesdivergentviewsonsomekeyelementsofthe

plan, in particular with regard to the criteria for eligibility to vote

(http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurso/minurso.pdf). This problem constituted the

core of the question of Western Sahara. In order to overcome this issue, in 1993, MINURSOs

IdentificationCommissionwasestablished.Duetoproceduraldifficulties,thesearchforpotential

voters did not end for three years. Finally, the Secretary General suspended the identification

process.Onlythemilitarycomponentsofthemissionremainedsoastomaintaintheceasefire.

Theidentificationprocessresumedin1997withtheappointmentofJamesBaker,theformerUS

Secretary of State to the position in the post of Personal Envoy for Western Sahara by the

Secretary General (Kofi Annan). The voter identification was completed in 1999 with 86000

voters. MINURSOthenfacedmorethan130000appealsbythosedeniedidentificationasvoters

whoweresupportedbyMorocco(Arieff,2011).TheUNSecurityCouncilResolution1301,urged

thetwopartiestoconsideralternativewaystoeasetheprocessofreferendum,intheyear2000.

TheUNconcludedthatprocessingappealscouldtakelongerthantheinitialidentificationprocess

and thateffective implementationof thesettlementplanwould require the fullcooperationof

Moroccoand

the

Frente

POLISARIO

(Arieff,

2011).

However

the

eligibility

of

voters

was

not


16/33

confirmedby

the

fronts.

The

POLISARIO

support

that

the

Morocco

have

been

placing

Moroccans

from north to the area so as to increase the number of Moroccan voters; furthermore the

POLISARIOhadobjectedtotheUNledstudyclaimingthatonly85000ofthepotentialvoterswere

eligibleoutof147000,andafterashortwhileitfoundonly65000suitedfortheelections.

c. TheBakerPlanIn2001, theSecretaryGeneralpresentedareportonWesternSaharathat includedasetof

stepssoontobereferredtoastheBakerPlananddiscusseditwithbothparties.Theplanwentas

follows:

The executive would be elected by voters identified in December 1999, which wasconstituted of people, favoring the POLISARIO and excluded a population supported by

Morocco.

Foreignrelations,naturalsecurityanddefensewouldbecontrolledbyMoroccoforafiveyearperiodofautonomy.

A referendum will be held to determine the final status as either independence orintegration intoMorocco,attheendoffiveyearson interim.Thesolevotercriterionfor

thisreferendumwouldbeoneyearresidenceinWesternSahara.

The Frente POLISARIO and its regional backer Algeria, rejected the draft Framework

Agreementhowever,asitwasconcedingtoMoroccosdemandswhileprovidingtoolittletotheir

ownclaims(MissionNotes,2011).Thus,thefirstBakerPlanwasunsuccessful.Also,thepartition

choicewasrefusedbybothparties.


17/33

InJanuary

2003,

Baker

presented

acompromise

that

did

not

require

the

consent

of

the

parties (Arieff, 2011). The plan was in a more detailed form as the Peace Plan for Self

Determinationof thePeopleofWesternSahara,withstrongsupport from theSecurityCouncil.

Theplanwentasfollows:

The referendum would propose three options: Integration with Morocco, autonomy orindependence

of

SADR.

Votersforthereferendumwillbeconstitutedofpeopleon:December1999list,UNOfficeof High Commissioner on Refugees repatriation list as of October 2000 or continuously

resident in the Western Sahara since December 30, 1999 (this would also include

Moroccansettlers).TheUNwoulddeterminethesettlerswithoutappeal(Arieff,2011).

During the interim, a Western Sahara Authority would be the local government andMoroccowouldcontrolforeignrelations,nationalsecurityanddefense(Arieff,2011).

Moroccoobjectedduetotheadditionofathirdoption,independence,tothereferendum.

In2004,Moroccodeclaredthat itwouldonlyacceptautonomyasasolution tothequestionof

Western Sahara, emphasizing that it would agree on negotiations with Algeria insisting it is a

bilateralprobleminnature.ThePOLISARIO,ontheotherhand,claimingindependenceistheonly

solution;acceptedtheagreement.Thus,thesecondBakerPlanwasalsounsuccessful.

OnJune2004, JamesBakerhasresigned fromhispositionas thePersonalEnvoyandtheBaker

PlanhasnotbeenmentionedintheSecurityCouncilresolutionssincethen.


18/33

d. FurtherKeyDevelopmentsAftera twoyeargap, theSecretaryGeneralappointedPetervanWalsum to thepost in

2006.Despite four rounds of talksduring 2007 and 2008, the newenvoy madeno progress in

bridging the divide between Moroccos autonomy plan and POLISARIOs position that a

referendumonindependencemustbeanoption(MissionNotes,2011).Neitherpartywaswilling

to discuss others proposals, that is, Moroccos for the autonomy and the POLISARIOs for a

referendum. Algeria and Mauritania were also present in the four rounds of negotiations in

observerstatus.AfterVanWalsumsexpression,anindependentWesternSaharaisnotarealistic

proposition, intheSecurityCouncil;hewasnotreappointedinAugust2008duetoPOLISARIOs

claimsthathewasbiasedinfavorofMorocco.

ChristopherRosswasappointedasPersonalEnvoyin2009.Ross,spentthefirsthalfofthe

yearwithinformaltalksandvisitstotheregion;schedulingthefifthroundofnegotiationstothe

endoftheyear.OnAugust2009,duringand informaltalkbetweenparties;humanrights issues

werediscussedforthefirsttimeacontentiousissueforthepartiesandtheirrespectivebackers,

andnotable in theabsenceofeitheraUNhuman rightsmonitoringmechanism toaddress the

partiesallegationsorahumanrightsmandateforMINURSO(MissionNotes,2011).

Although the fifth round of negotiations was expected to be held in 2009, Moroccan

militaryactivitiesagainstSaharanactivistsaugmentedthepressureanduncompromisingstance

ofMoroccanleaders,itwaspostponedtothebeginningoftheyear2010.Rossvisitedtheregion

on March and August in 2010.Both parties insisted on their commitment to 2007 proposals.

Another roundof informal talksbetweenpartiesunder thesupervisionofPersonalEnvoyRoss,

beganin

November

2010.

During

the

talks,

Moroccan

military

forces

intervened

GdeimIzik

camp


19/33

where Sahrawi people who protest socioeconomic conditions in Moroccancontrolled Western

Sahara.DespiteRosssattemptstodiscourageforceful intervention,thecampexperiencedgross

human rights violations. While the clashes did not bring the negotiations to an end, they did

heightenmistrust

on

both

sides

(Mission

Notes,

2011).

AftertheLaayoneincidentsthetwopartieshadinformaltalksinDecember2010andJanuary

2011duringwhichtheyonlyagreed todiversifytheactivitiesof thePersonalEnvoy.Duringthe

informal talks in March 2011 parties were engaged in solid exchange of opinions; without any

changes in the April 2007 positions. There was an agreement in discussing natural resources,

whichwill

be

explained

in

detail

in

following

sections,

and

possible

measures

to

calm

the

situation

in upcoming talks. In July 2011, although the parties did not reach a consensus in the main

problem, that is April 2007 positions, they began discussing issues such as government,

environmentandhealth.Theyalsoagreed tosupportmeetingswithUNHCR inorder todiscuss

therefugeeprobleminWesternSahara;whichwillalsobeexplainedinfollowingsections.

2. TheRoleofThirdPartiesInhisarticleTheSanctityofBordersandtheQuestionofWesternSaharaTerhiLehtinensays;

ThestructureofantagonisminthecurrentWesternSaharaconflictiscomplex.First,there

isafundamentaldisagreementbetweenMoroccoandthePOLISARIO/SADR,supportedby

theUNresolutionsandtheInternationalCourtofJusticedecision,onthestatusofSahara.

Second,there isadisputebetweenMoroccoandotherNorthAfricancountries,especially

AlgeriaandLibya,on their supportfor thePOLISARIOfront,perceivedas interference in

Moroccaninternalaffairs.Consequently,theWesternSaharanquestionhasthreatenedthe

regional stability of North Africa over the decades. Third, there is a great divergence

betweentheOAUandMoroccoontheprincipleofinviolabilityofexistingstatebordersand

practically,on

the

admittance

of

the

SADR

as

an

OAU

member

state

(Lehtinen,

2000).


20/33

Thesewords

make

it

impossible

to

think

Western

Saharan

question

lies

solely

between

the

twoopposing fronts,MoroccoandFrentePOLISARIO.Theproblemhad formerly includedSpain

andMauritania. ReferencestotheAfricanUnion (formerOAU),andTheLeagueofArabStates

areunavoidableasthefirstsupportstheSADRandthemajorityoftheparticipantsofthe latter

supportMorocco. SinceMoroccoperceivesthequestionasabilateralproblemamongitselfand

Algeria,and

SADR

is

supported

by

it,

Algeria

also

has

to

be

on

the

focus.

Each

third

party

will

be

mentionedinfollowingtopics.

a. AlgeriaAlgeria and Morocco are rivals with different decolonization histories and different

politicalsystems (Arieff,2011).Almost,since independence,theneighborshavecompeted fora

regionalpreeminence, and the Western Sahara is where thecontest is nowjoint (Arieff,2011).

AlgerianeverclaimedtheSaharanterritory,butithasactivelysupportedthePOLISARIOsactsfor

the independence of the Western Sahara. The revolutionary and anticolonial stance of the

Algerianstateinthe1970sandtheremnantsoftheborderdisputebetweenMoroccoandAlgeria

have contributed to the Algerian involvement (Lehtinen, 1999). Various authors claim that an

easieraccess to theAtlanticOceanandexploitationofmineral resources is themainmotiveof

Algerias stance. Algeria is considered to be one of the most important reasons of SADRs AU

membershipandrecognitionfromvariousLatinAmericancountries;thusMoroccosnotbeinga

member of the AU. Due to Western Sahara dispute, the Arab Maghreb Union of which both

MoroccoandAlgeriaaremembers,hasnotheldasummitsince1994.


21/33

b. AfricanUnionThe African Union succeeded the Organization of African Unity in 2002 was founded

around the principle of decolonization in the core. The AU perceives the question of Western

Saharaasthequestionofthe lastcolony inthecontinent. InAugust1994,TheLiaisonOffice in

WesternSaharawasestablishedbytheAUsoastoassisttheregistrationprocess leadingupto

the referendum. Today, the office, which Is based in Laayoune, holds weekly meetings with

leadingmembersofMINURSO,consultswithMoroccoandPOLISARIO,andprovideshumanitarian

assistance for Sahrawi refugees in the camps in the Tindouf region of Algeria (Mission

Notes,2011).IntheAfricancontext,thecommitmenttodecolonizationandinviolabilityofexisting

borders has led to the recognition of the SADR and to the withdrawal of Morocco from the

organization(Lehtinen,1999).TheAUhasalsobeenexploringwaysofbetteringitsrelationswith

MoroccobysometraderelationsanddiplomaticconversationfacilitatedbythePersonalEnvoyof

theUNSecretaryGeneral.Thesearchforastrongerbondbetweentwoactorsishopedtoaffect

thefutureofthenegotiationsaboutWesternSaharainapositiveway.

c. GroupofFriends:FrancehasbeenasteadfastsupporterofMoroccobeing itsnumberonetradingpartner,

primarycreditorandforeigninvestorwithclosebusinessandsocialties.Thetiesbetweenthetwo

havebeenandremainextremelyclosesincethetimethatMoroccoachievedindependencefrom

France and French political and other elite maintain second homes and spend vacations in

Morocco.Attimes,FrancehasactedasspokesmanforMoroccointheSecurityCouncilandwithin

the

Group

of

Friends

and

has

supported

the

UN

position

only

when

Morocco

has

been


22/33

comfortable with it. It has shown no hesitation to stand alone from the rest when this suits

Morocco.

Starting in 2004, after the Madrid bombing and with the election of the current

government,SpainhasalsomovedclosertoMoroccoandawayfromitsmorenuancedposition.

Security(cooperationincounterterrorismgiventhatseveralofthebomberswereMoroccans,in

counternarcoticmeasuresandillegalmigrationfromAfrica)andbusiness(Moroccobeingamajor

tradepartnerandSpaingettingthe lionssharefromtheEUfisheriesagreementwithMorocco)

areplayingamajorroleinthecurrentgovernmentsstance.Howeverwidespreadpublicsupport

forPolisarioinSpainandmuchneededcooperationwithAlgeriaintheenergysectorhavecaused

Spaintooscillateinitsposition,whichhasoftenfurthercomplicatedthesituation.AlthoughSpain

isnotapermanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil,forhistoricalreasons ithasbeenoneofthe

foundingmembersoftheGroupofFriendsofWesternSaharatheUS,France,UK,Russiaand

Spainandassuchitplaysakeyroleinnegotiatingthevariousresolutionsevenwhenitisnotin

theCouncil.

Russiaontheotherhand,hasbeeninmoreofabindbeingcaughtbetweenitspositionon

Kosovo, the independence of which it protests vehemently, and the declared independence of

AbkaziaandSouthOssetia,bothofwhichitengineeredandofwhichRussiaisoneofahandfulof

statestosupport.

As for the US, from the start of the conflict it has been an undisputed supporter of

MoroccoalthoughuntilApril2004itmaintainedamoreneutral,handsoffpositionsupportingUN

efforts,especiallywhenBakerwasthePersonalEnvoy. InJuly2003,theUSwas instrumental in

getting France on board the Security Council resolution supporting Bakers plan, even though

Morocco had indicated that it was not happy with it. In April 2004 however, when Morocco

rejectedtheplanoutright,theUSweakeneditssupportandjoinedFranceandSpaininsupporting


23/33

asolutionbasedonMoroccospromisedautonomyproposal.Moroccoscooperationoncounter

terrorismanditsperceivedsupportiveroleontheIsraeliPalestinianconflictwerethekeyfactors

influencingtheUStodepartfromitspreviouslymoreneutralapproach.

THEQUESTIONOFNATURALRESOURCESINWESTERNSAHARA

Article1paragraph2ofthetwoUNcovenants,the InternationalCovenantonEconomic,

Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, goes as

follows:

Allpeoplesmay,for theirownends,freelydisposeof theirnaturalwealthand resources

withoutprejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation,

basedupontheprincipleofmutualbenefit,andinternationallaw.Innocasemayapeople

bedeprivedofitsownmeansofsubsistence.

This expression leads the international relations and legal literature to perceive the

questionofnaturalresources inWesternSaharaasaquestionofselfdetermination.Thearticle,

identical in both covenants, was applied by UN Human Rights Committee; and in 2001, the

InternationalLawCommissionhasconfirmedtheselfdeterminationaspectofnaturalresources.

Thefourthcommittee,asitisspecifiedfordecolonization,thereforetakesthequestionofnatural

resourcesinWesternSaharaintoconsideration.

Theeconomic importanceof theWesternSaharan territory,with theworlds richest fishing

grounds,

huge

untapped

phosphate

and

other

mineral

deposits

and

significant

oil

and

gas

reserves is claimed to be one of the triggering factors in the Western Sahara dispute by some

authors.TheCIAsWorldFactbooksaysWesternSaharadependsonpastoralnomadism,fishing

and phosphate mining as the principle sources of income for the population

(https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wi.html).


24/33

1. PhosphatesWestern Saharas shares of Moroccanregistered sales of phosphate imply that Western

Sahara alone would be among worlds largest exporter of phosphates. Phosphate is important

simplybecauseitisnonsubstitutable(Haugen,2007).

In the Madrid Agreement, signed in14 November 1975 and which divided Western Sahara

between Mauritania and Morocco while Spain kept certain interests, the phosphate resources

wereatgreatimportance.35percentoftheBauCraaminessharesstillbelongtoSpain.Morocco

isthebiggestphosphateexporterintheworld.POLISARIOhasattackedtheBauCraaminesseveral

timesbeforetheceasefire,whichshowstheimportanceofthehighcapacityofphosphatemines

in Western Saharan economy. Highranking military officers play important roles in the

phosphatesextraction.

2. NaturalGasandOilAsacontrasttotheEUMoroccoFisheriesPartnershipAgreement,enteredintoforcebetween

eight different oil companies and the Government of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is

basedonanacknowledgementthattheresourcesofWesternSaharashallnotbeexploitedunless

this is for the direct benefit for Sahrawi people, in accordance with the positions of their

representativebody,POLISARIO(Hauge,2007).

Theagreementsareimportantinthreeways:

First,theyaddressthePOLISARIO.

Second, they consider Sahrawian people have the right to take decisions regarding thenaturalresourcesintheirterritories.


25/33

Third,

they

imply

that

the

conflict

will

one

day

come

to

end.

3. EUMoroccoFisheriesPartnershipAgreementThe fish delivered in the occupied Western Sahara city Laayoune alone represents 38.6

percentofthetotalMoroccanreportedfishcatch(Haugen,2007),accordingto2004figures.Each

yearmorethanonemilliontonsoffisharebroughtbyfishingvesselsfromthecoastofMorocco

whichincludesthecoastoutsideofWesternSahara.

TheUNCharterofEconomicRightsandDutiesofStates,1974,proclaimsthatnostatehas

therighttopromoteorencourageinvestmentthatmayconstituteanobstacletotheliberationof

a territory occupied by force. Yet to compensate for overfishing in European waters the

European Union has negotiated with Morocco a fisheries agreement, which permits European

fishinginbothMoroccanandSahrawiwaters(TUCReport,2006). OnMay22,2006; EUmember

statesdecidedtoenterintoanagreementwithMoroccowhichisapplicabletothewatersunder

the sovereignty orjurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco, giving 119 vessels, mostly Spanish,

access to these waters (Haugen,2007). Thus, the attemps to exclude Western Saharan waters

werenotsuccessful.

TheEUsupportsthattheagreementlegalaslongasitdoesnotopposewiththeinterestof

localpeople. The legalopinion of the EU states that theagreementcannot beprejudged that

Morocco will not comply with its obligations under international law visvis the people of

WesternSahara(Haugen,2007).Haugenfurtherstatesinhisarticlethat:

This ignores theactualMoroccanpolicyuntil today.Very little indicates thatMorocco is

preparedto

facilitate

afisheries

policy

which

is

defined

and

implemented

together

with

and


26/33

inaccordancewith thewishesof the legitimate representativeof theSahrawianpeople.

Moreover(thelegalopinion)doesnotspecifythatitisonlytheformercolonialpeople,the

Sahrawis,whohas legal rightsover thenatural resources,while the currentpopulation,

consistingto

alarge

extend

of

Moroccan

settlers,

do

not

have

such

rights.

As mostof the traditional inhabitantsarecurrently refugees,andasSahrawis represent

only twopercentof the fish industryemployees; there isno likelihood that theywillhaveany

benefitfromtheagreement(Haugen,2007).ThisisthereasonwhythePOLISARIO isagainstthe

agreement.

Italso

is

argued

that

the

agreement

represents

the

Moroccan

sovereignty

claims

over

the

territory. Spain is the administrative force of Western Sahara; but the agreement addresses

Morocco. This argument caused contradictions between European companies, as once a

NorwegiancompanyclaimedsuchanagreementwouldweakentheUNsponsoredpeaceprocess.

Fromaninternationallawperspective,therearetwooptions:

First,theFisheriesAgreementcanberevised inordertoonlycoverthewaterunderthesovereigntyofMorocco.

Second,theFisheriesAgreementcanbecancelled,as isbuiltonawrongfulpremisethatMoroccohas legalcompetencetoenter intoanagreementwhichalsocoversaterritory

whichMoroccooccupies(Haugen,2007).


27/33

HUMAN

RIGHTS

ASPECT

OF

THE

QUESTION

Refugees

TheSahrawirefugeesituationisoneof

the most protracted refugee situations

worldwide. Sahrawi refugees arrived to

Algeriain197576andwererecognizedby

thehostStateonaprimafaciebasis.Ever

since they have been residing in four

refugeecamps,namelyAwserd,Dakhla,LaayouneandSmara,andonesettlementintheAlgerian

southwesternprovinceofTindouf.Theestimates for therefugeesarebeyond100,000whereas

UNHCRs statistics claim that there are 116,415 refugees originating from Western Sahara

Territory, there are an estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees in the camps according to the

GovernmentofAlgeria.

OnthesideoftheUnitedNations,UNHCR is indialoguewith thehostGovernmentand the

Sahrawi refugee leadership seeking to conduct a registration exercise to determine the exact

numberofrefugeesinthecamps.Pendingapositiveconclusionofthisdialogue,forthepurpose

of UNHCRs humanitarian operation, the office is using a planning figure of 90,000 vulnerable

refugees in the camps. UNHCR has been continuing to protect and assist Western Saharan

refugees in the camps. Consequently, Western Saharan refugees received the basics of

subsistence, adequate food, water and sanitation, health services and primary education.

Furthermore,UNHCRhasreorienteditsprogrammein2010toinvestinthefutureofgenerations,


28/33

through

capacity

building

and

support

to

local

human

rights

protection

institutions

and

mechanisms. Protection activities focus on monitoring the overall situation in the camps,

developing contacts and enhancing cooperation with the refugee leadership and camp

managementtoaddressrefugeeprotectionissues,advocacytopreventsex/genderbasedviolence

(SGBV) and other forms of human rights abuses and discrimination; capacity development and

trainingfor

local

administrative

bodies

and

the

judiciary

(e.g.

human

rights

training

for

Sahrawi

lawenforcementstructures).

PoliticalRightsandCivilLiberties

As the occupying force in Western Sahara, Morocco controls local elections which is

claimed tobeexcluding independenceminded leaders fromboth the localpoliticalprocessand

theMoroccan

Parliament.

Western Sahara is not listed separately on Transparency International's Corruption

Perceptions Index,but reportsofcorruptionarewidespread.Despite the fact that the territory

possesses extensive natural resources, including phosphate, ironore deposits, hydrocarbon

reserves,andfisheries,thelocalpopulationremainslargelyimpoverished.

Sahrawis are not permitted to form independent political or nongovernmental

organizations,andtheirfreedomofassemblyisseverelyrestricted.Asinpreviousyears,activists

supporting independenceandtheirsuspectedforeignsympathizersweresubjecttoharassment.

SahrawisaretechnicallysubjecttoMoroccanlaborlaws,butthereislittleorganizedlaboractivity

intheterritory.


29/33

MoroccoandthePOLISARIOFrontbothrestrictfreemovementinpotentialconflictareas.

Morocco has been accused of using force and financial incentives to alter the composition of

WesternSahara'spopulation.

CONCLUSION

WesternSahara,beingoneofthelastsixteennonselfgoverningterritoriesrecognizedby

the United Nations, has been an area of dispute since the withdrawal of the former colonial

powerSpain.Theareahasbeenthecauseofmanyproblems.TheFrentePOLISARIOwhichisthe

political body representing the efforts for the establishment of the independent Sahrawi Arab

DemocraticRepublic

(SADR)

is

one

of

the

present

actors

with

regards

to

problems

facing

the

territory.Thefirstproblem,being inbetweenthePOLISARIOfrontandMorocco, isembodiedas

thereferendumdisputesbetweentwoparties.ThesecondoneisbetweenMoroccoandAlgeria,

theregionalbackerofthePOLISARIOfront.Thethird,whichcoversawiderareathatincludesthe

memberStatestotheAfricanUnionandtheLeagueofArabStates,isontherecognitionofeither

SADRsor

Moroccos

sovereignty

over

the

territory.

Apart

from

these;

exploitation

of

the

natural

resources in the territory constitutes disagreements in the international community, with

European Union and European companies being major actors as well as Morocco and the

POLISARIO front.Thehumanrightsaspectofthequestion; includingpreoccupationssuchasthe

human rightsviolations in the territory, theproblemsof the refugeecamps, thepolitical rights

andcivil

liberties

of

the

Sahrawi

people,

is

also

worth

the

primary

attention

of

the

international

community,namely,theUnitedNations.

The United Nations General Assembly Fourth Committee has dealt with the dispute on

WesternSharacomprehensivelysincethedayitwasincludedintheagendaofit.TheCommittee

is expected to give further recommendations on the permanent solution of the dispute in its

upcomingresolutions.


30/33

Pointsthat

aGood

Resolution

Should

Include:

The recommendation of the General Assembly Fourth Committee about a possibleconsensusontheproblemsthatemergefromdifferingreferendumoptions

TheopinionandthesuggestionsoftheCommitteeaboutWesternSahara,solelyaboutitspositionasanonselfgoverningterritory

ThesubmissionsoftheCommitteetoMINURSOsprogram

ThesuggestionsoftheCommitteetothetwoopposingfrontsforahealthierenvironmentfornegotiation

Possible ways of cooperation of the United Nations General Assembly with other thirdpartiesforthebettermentofthesituationintheterritory.

ThepositionandtherecommendationsoftheCommitteeregardingthenaturalresourcesquestionofWesternSahara


31/33

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