a lina joy · (6) mengenai isu kuatkuasa kebelakangan, kes sim seoh beng @ sin sai beng & anor...

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Lina Joy lwn. Majlis Agama IslamWilayah Persekutuan & Yang Lain

LINA JOY

lwn.

MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAMWILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN & YANG LAIN

MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN, PUTRAJAYAAHMAD FAIRUZ KHN

ALAUDDIN MOHD SHERIFF HMPRICHARD MALANJUM HMP

[RAYUAN SIVIL NO: 01-2-2006 (W)]30 MEI 2007

[2007] CLJ JT(1)

UNDANG-UNDANG PENTADBIRAN: Remedi - Semakankehakiman - Pembuat keputusan awam - Murtad - Ketua PengarahPendaftaran Negara enggan memadam perkataan “Islam” dari kadpengenalan si murtad dan meminta supaya dikemukakan sijil murtad dariMahkamah Syariah - Sama ada menyalah tafsir undang-undang danmengambilkira faktor luaran - Sama ada melakukan ketidak-munasabahan Wednesbury - Kaedah-Kaedah Pendaftaran Negara 1990,ss. 4, 14 - Perlembagaan Persekutuan, art. 8, 11, 74, 121(1A), JadualKesembilan

UNDANG-UNDANG PERLEMBAGAAN: Undang-undangPersekutuan dan Negeri - Hal-hal mengenai undang-undang Islam -Murtad - Sama ada suatu persoalan yang berkaitan dengan undang-undang Islam - Sama ada termasuk dalam bidangkuasa MahkamahSyariah - Perlembagaan Persekutuan, art. 11, 74, 121(1A), JadualKesembilan

UNDANG-UNDANG PERLEMBAGAAN: Bidangkuasa -Mahkamah Syariah - Bidangkuasa tersirat - Implikasi perlu - Samaada bidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah boleh berbangkit secara implikasi -Mahkamah Syariah memiliki kuasa statutori untuk mengadili persoalanpemelukan agama Islam - Sama ada berbidangkuasa mengadili persoalanmurtad - Perlembagaan Persekutuan, art. 74, 121(1A), JadualKesembilan - Akta Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan) 1993, ss. 46(2)(b), 87-91

UNDANG-UNDANG ISLAM: Bidangkuasa - Mahkamah Syariah -Bidangkuasa tersirat - Mahkamah Syariah memiliki kuasa statutorimengadili persoalan pemelukan agama Islam - Sama ada secara

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implikasi berbidangkuasa mengadili persoalan murtad - Akta PentadbiranUndang-Undang Islam (Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan) 1993,ss. 46(2)(b), 87-91

PENTAFSIRAN STATUT: Kuatkuasa kebelakangan - Kesahan -Faktor yang perlu dipertimbang - Sama ada menyentuhi soal prosedur -Statut boleh berkuatkuasa secara kebelakangan jika niatnya jelas -Kaedah-Kaedah Pendaftaran Negara 1990, kk. 4, 5, 14

Perayu, seorang yang asalnya beragama Islam, telah meninggalkanIslam dan memeluk agama Kristian. Pada 8 Januari 1997, perayumemohon kepada Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara (‘JPN’ atau “NRD’)untuk menukar nama Azlina bt Jailani yang tercatat di kadpengenalannya (‘KP’) kepada nama Lina Lelani atas alasan, sepertiyang terserlah dari akuan statutorinya, bahawa beliau telahmemeluk agama Kristian dan berhasrat untuk mengahwini seoranglelaki Kristian. Permohonan perayu telah ditolak oleh JPN. Pada15 Mac 1999, perayu sekali lagi memohon untuk menukarnamanya atas alasan yang sama, tapi kali ini kepada nama Lina Joy.Bagaimanapun, untuk permohonan kedua ini, atas nasihat pegawaiJPN, perayu membuat satu akuan statutori tambahan di manabeliau memberi sebab ingin menukar namanya sebagai sengajamemilih nama itu dan bukan kerana menukar agama. Permohonanperayu diluluskan oleh JPN, dan pada bulan November 1999perayu telah diberikan KP barunya (permohonan rasmi untukmendapat KP baru dibuat pada 25 Oktober 1999). Apapun, KPbaru tersebut masih mengandungi perkataan “Islam” di dalamnya,sebagai menandakan agama yang dianuti perayu. Faktamenunjukkan bahawa kemasukan perkataan “Islam” itu adalahselaras dengan kehendak pindaan kepada Kaedah-KaedahPendaftaran Negara 1990 (‘Kaedah-Kaedah 1990’ atau ‘1990Regulations’), yakni pindaan P.U(A)70/2000, yang berkuatkuasakebelakangan ke 1 Oktober 1999. Perayu bagaimanapun masihterkilan, dan dengan itu memohon kepada JPN untuk memadamkannama “Islam” dari KPnya. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara(‘KPPN’ atau ‘DG’) berpendapat bahawa permohonanmemadamkan nama “Islam” hanya boleh dipertimbang jika ianyadisokong oleh perintah Mahkamah Syariah yang menyatakanbahawa perayu sememangnya telah murtad, dan atas alasan itutelah mengarahkan supaya suatu perintah atau sijil sedemikiandikemukakan kepadanya. Arahan ini tidak dipatuhi dan akibatnyaKPPN menolak permohonan perayu berdasarkan peruntukank. 14 Kaedah-Kaedah 1990.

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Perayu memfail saman untuk mencabar keputusan KPPN, namunsamannya ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi atas alasan, antara lain,bahawa keputusan KPPN atau JPN tidak mencabul hak asasikebebasan beragama perayu seperti yang dijamin di bawah per.11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘PP’ atau ‘the Constitution’).Perayu merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Fakta menunjukkanbahawa, di hadapan Mahkamah Rayuan, perayu memilih untukmencabar keputusan JPN semata-mata atas persoalan undang-undang pentadbiran, sekaligus mengemukakan persoalan berikutkepada mahkamah tersebut, iaitu: sama ada JPN betul di sisiundang-undang apabila menolak permohonan perayu supayaperkataan “Islam” dipadamkan daripada kad pengenalannya, sertadalam memerlukan supaya suatu sijil atau perintah murtad daripadaMahkamah Syariah dikemukakan terlebih dahulu.

Mahkamah Rayuan, melalui suatu keputusan majoriti, menjawabpersoalan yang dikemukakan secara positif, sekaligus memutuskanbahawa JPN betul dari sudut undang-undang pentadbiran apabilamenolak permohonan perayu. Lebih terperinci, Mahkamah Rayuanmengambil pendirian bahawa dakwaan perayu bahawa terdapatkesilapan fakta pada KPnya kerana menamakan agamanya sebagai“Islam” telah dengan sendirinya memberi hak kepada JPN dibawah k. 4(c)(x), Kaedah-Kaedah 1990 untuk memerlukan perayumengemukakan keterangan dokumentari bagi menyokong ketepatanhujahnya bahawa beliau bukan lagi seorang Muslim. MenurutMahkamah Rayuan lagi, persoalan keluar atau tidaknya seseorangdari agama Islam adalah persoalan yang berkaitan dengan undang-undang Islam, dan oleh kerana itu, disebabkan JPN tidakberkelayakan untuk memutuskan perkara itu, dan bagi mengelakkanrisiko ia memadamkan nama “Islam” dengan secara salah, makaadalah wajar dan munasabah bagi JPN mengamalkan dasar yangmemerlukan penentuan oleh pihak berkuasa agama sebelummengambil tindakan memadamkan perkataan “Islam” dari KPseseorang Muslim.

Perayu memohon dan memperoleh izin untuk merayu keMahkamah Persekutuan dan berikutnya mengemukakan tigapersoalan undang-undang untuk penelitian, kupasan dan jawapanyang arif hakim-hakim mahkamah tertinggi, iaitu: (i) sama ada JPNberhak di sisi undang-undang untuk mengenakan syarat supayaperayu mengemukakan suatu sijil atau perisytiharan atau perintahdaripada Mahkamah Syariah yang memperakukan bahawa beliaumurtad sebelum memadamkan perkataan “Islam” di dalam KPnya;(ii) sama ada JPN telah dengan betulnya mentafsirkan kuasanya di

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bawah Kaedah-Kaedah 1990, khususnya kk. 4 & 14, apabilamengenakan syarat di atas walaupun ianya tidak diperuntuk denganjelas di dalam Kaedah-Kaedah 1990 itu; dan (iii) sama ada kesSoon Singh Bikar Singh lwn. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia(PERKIM) Kedah & Anor telah diputuskan dengan betulnyaapabila ia memakai teori bidangkuasa tersirat yang dikemukakan didalam kes Md Hakim Lee lwn. Majlis Agama Islam WilayahPersekutuan, Kuala Lumpur dan tidak mengikut kes Ng Wan Chanlwn Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor dan Lim ChanSang lwn. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Pulau Pinang & Satu KesYang Lain, yang mengisytiharkan bahawa sekiranya tidak adabidangkuasa yang jelas yang diberikan kepada Mahkamah Syariah,maka mahkamah-mahkamah sivil hendaklah mengekalkan bidangkuasa mereka.

Diputuskan (menolak rayuan)

Oleh Ahmad Fairuz KHN menyampaikan penghakimanmajoriti:

(1) Berasaskan taakulan-taakulan yang dihuraikan, jawapan sayakepada persoalan-persoalan yang dikemukakan adalah sepertiberikut: (i) jawapan kepada persoalan pertama adalah “JPNberhak”; (ii) jawapan kepada persoalan kedua adalah “JPNbetul”; dan (iii) jawapan kepada persoalan ketiga adalah “SoonSingh (supra) telah diputuskan dengan betulnya”. (perenggan18)

(2) Kaedah 14(1) Kaedah-Kaedah 1990 adalah berkenaan (i)penukaran nama di bawah perenggan (a); dan (ii)membetulkan butir-butir yang tidak betul di bawah perenggan(c). Kes perayu di sini adalah terjatuh di bawah perenggan(c). Bagaimanapun k. 14 tidak menyatakan apakah yangpatut diberi atau dibekalkan kepada JPN dalam kes-kesbutiran tidak betul tersebut. Sehubungan dengan itu, k. 4menjadi relevan, kerana kaedah itu dengan jelasnyamenyatakan bahawa sesiapa yang memohon untuk suatu KPganti di bawah k. 13 atau k. 14 hendaklah mematuhi k. 4.Oleh yang demikian, JPN mempunyai justifikasi di bawahk. 4(c)(x) untuk memerlukan penentuan dari penguasa agamaIslam mengenai kemurtadan perayu atau keluarnya perayudari agama Islam.

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(2a) Saya bersetuju dengan penghakiman majoriti MahkamahRayuan bahawa, jika JPN menerima pengakuan seseorangbahawa dia telah keluar dari agama Islam berasaskanperisytiharan yang dibuat olehnya, maka JPN mengambilrisiko apabila mengecapkan, secara silap, seseorang sebagaibukan Muslim sedangkan menurut undang-undang Islamorang itu masih belum lagi keluar dari agama Islam. Lebih dariitu, ia akan menyenangkan seorang Muslim bertindak untukdiklasifikasikan sebagai bukan Muslim semata-mata untukmengelak dari dihukum atas kesalahan di bawah undang-undang Islam, dan ini tentunya akan mengakibatkan celaandari masyarakat Islam. Atas alasan-alasan ini juga, dasar yangdigunapakai JPN adalah sesuatu yang sesempurnanyamunasabah. (perenggan 6)

(3) Rujukan yang dibuat oleh JPN kepada Mahkamah Syariahbagi mendapatkan pengesahan kemurtadan perayu bukanbererti bahawa JPN telah menurunkan kuasa atau tugasnyadi bawah k. 14 Kaedah-Kaedah 1990 kepada pihak ketigaseperti yang dihujahkan perayu. Ini kerana k. 4(c)(x) denganjelasnya memberi kuasa kepada JPN untuk memerlukanketerangan dokumentari yang difikirkan mustahak bagimenyokong ketepatan mana-mana butiran yang dikemukakan.Rujukan sedemikian tidak bermakna bahawa MahkamahSyariah diminta untuk memutuskan sama ada meluluskanataupun tidak permohonan memadamkan perkataan “Islam”.Itu masih dalam budibicara JPN. (perenggan 8)

(4) Walaupun dalam kes Ismail Suppiah lwn. Ketua PengarahPendaftaran Negara keputusan JPN yang memerlukan sijilserupa daripada Majlis Agama telah dibatalkan atas alasanultra vires k. 14, namun, harus diingat bahawa kes tersebutmelibatkan permohonan untuk menukar nama di dalam KPdan bukannya memadamkan perkataan “Islam” daripada KP.Selain itu, kes tersebut diputuskan dalam konteks undang-undang Johor, di mana s. 141(2) Enakmen berkaitan(Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam Johor 1978) menunjukkanbahawa Kadi pun tidak mempunyai hak untuk memberi atautidak memberi persetujuan untuk keluar dari agama Islam.Dengan kata lain, dalam halkeadaan kes, berdasarkankejelasan perkataan-perkataan dalam s. 141(2) tersebut, JPNsepatutnya menerima akuan statutori plaintif yang menyatakanbahawa ia telah keluar dari agama Islam. (perenggan 9)

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(5) Hujah bahawa Mahkamah Syariah Wilayah Persekutuan tidakmempunyai bidangkuasa penentuan murtad disebabkan AktaPentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Wilayah-WilayahPersekutuan) 1993 (Akta 505) tidak mempunyai peruntukanmengenai murtad, dan oleh sebab itu tindakan JPNmengenakan syarat supaya diperolehi perintah mahkamahtersebut adalah satu tindakan yang tidak munasabah yangmencapai tahap “Wednesbury unreasonableness” disebabkanperintah yang diminta itu mustahil dapat diberi – adalah tidakbermerit. Perlu ditekankan bahawa item 1 dan 2 dalamJadual Kesembilan PP memperuntukkan antara lain bahawaMahkamah-Mahkamah Syariah hendaklah mempunyaibidangkuasa hanya atas orang-orang yang menganuti agamaIslam dan hanya mengenai mana-mana perkara yangtermasuk dalam perenggan itu (item 1) dan salah satudaripada perkara-perkara dalam perenggan tersebut adalah“undang-undang Islam”. Sehubungan itu, per. 74(4) PPmenegaskan bahawa keluasan ungkapan-ungkapan am dalamJadual Kesembilan tidak boleh dikira sebagai dihadkan olehungkapan-ungkapan khusus yang terdapat dalam JadualKesembilan itu. Oleh yang demikian, adalah munasabah bagiJPN mengenakan syarat-syarat tersebut kerana perkaramurtad ini adalah satu persoalan yang berkaitan denganundang-undang Islam dan seperti yang dikatakan olehMahkamah Agong dalam kes Dalip Kaur lwn Pegawai PolisDaerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor bahawajawapan kepada persoalan sama ada seseorang itu adalahseorang Muslim atau telah keluar dari agama Islam sebelumdia meninggal dunia adalah termasuk dalam dunia undang-undang Syariah yang memerlukan pertimbangan-pertimbanganserius dan tafsiran wajar atas undang-undang itu. Makakeputusan JPN bukanlah suatu keputusan yang sebegitumelampau tidak munasabahnya dalam keingkaran terhadaplogik atau standard moral hingga tiada seorang pun yangwaras yang menumpukan pemikiran kepada persoalan yangperlu diputuskan itu boleh mencapai keputusan sedemikian.(perenggan 10)

(6) Mengenai isu kuatkuasa kebelakangan, kes Sim Seoh Beng @Sin Sai Beng & Anor lwn Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai AraBerhad menegaskan bahawa ujian yang dipakai adalah samaada undang-undang itu menyentuh hak-hak substantif, danjika ya maka ia hendaklah berkuatkuasa secara prospektifkecuali terdapat arahan yang jelas dalam enakmen itu bahawa

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ia hendaklah berkuatkuasa kebelakangan. Dalam rayuan disini, terdapat dengan jelasnya suatu arahan bahawa pindaan-pindaan kepada Kaedah-Kaedah 1990, kecuali untuk k. 19,hendaklah dianggap telah mula berkuatkuasa pada 1 Oktober1990. Justeru, pindaan-pindaan kepada kk. 4 & 5 dan jadualpertama adalah berkuatkuasa secara kebelakangan. Ianyamengikut bahawa tindakan JPN mengeluarkan KP denganpenambahan perkataan “Islam” adalah sah di sisi undang-undang. (perenggan 11)

(7) Cara seseorang keluar dari sesuatu agama semestinyamengikut kaedah atau undang-undang atau amalan yangditentukan atau ditetapkan oleh agama itu sendiri. Perayutidak dihalang dari berkahwin. Namun, kebebasan beragamadi bawah per. 11 PP memerlukan perayu mematuhi amalan-amalan atau undang-undang agama Islam khususnyamengenai keluar dari agama itu. Apabila ketentuan-ketentuanagama Islam dipatuhi dan pihak berkuasa agama Islammemperakukan kemurtadannya barulah perayu bolehmenganuti agama Kristian. Dengan kata lain, seseorang tidakboleh sesuka hatinya keluar dan masuk agama. (perenggan 14& 15)

(7a) Harus juga diingat bahawa Islam bukanlah semata-mata satuhimpunan dogma-dogma atau ritual tetapi adalah suatu carahidup yang lengkap dan merangkumi semua bidang aktivitimanusia. Dan jika diteliti per. 11(1), 74(2) dan item 1 disenarai 2 dalam Jadual Kesembilan PP, akan ketara bahawaIslam itu meliputi antara lain undang-undang Islam. Justeru,jika seseorang Muslim ingin keluar dari agama Islam, diasebenarnya menggunakan haknya dalam konteks undang-undang syariah yang mempunyai jurisprudensnya sendirimengenai murtad. Dalam konteks ini, apa yang dilakukan JPNadalah semata-mata untuk menentukan perayu bukan lagiberagama Islam secara yang ditetapkan oleh Islam, dan sayatidak nampak bagaimana tindakan itu boleh dikatakanbertentangan dengan per. 11(1) PP. Seterusnya, meminjamkata-kata Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR di dalam kesKamariah Ali lwn Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan – jika maksud per.11 PP adalah bahawa seseorang bebas masuk atau keluardari sesuatu agama sesuka hatinya dan tiada undang-undangboleh memerlukan dia mengikut sesuatu peraturan sama adauntuk memeluk atau keluar dari sesuatu agama, maka secaranatijahnya, bukan sahaja undang-undang yang menetapkan

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cara untuk seseorang itu memeluk Islam dan keluar dariagama Islam tidak sah, malah undang-undang yangmenjadikan suatu kesalahan jika seorang Islam itu berzina,berkhalwat, tidak membayar zakat dan lain-lain itu semuanyaadalah tidak sah juga. Dengan yang demikian, sayamengambil pandangan bahawa, khusus berkaitan denganagama Islam, per. 11 PP tidaklah boleh ditafsirkan dengansebegitu luas sehingga boleh membatalkan semua undang-undang yang mengkehendaki seseorang Islam itu mengerjakansesuatu kewajipan agama Islam atau melarang merekamelakukan sesuatu perkara yang dilarang oleh agama Islamatau yang menetapkan acara bagi melakukan sesuatu yangberkaitan dengan agama Islam. (perenggan 17)

(8) Kes Soon Singh telah diputuskan dengan betulnya.Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Soon Singh menyatakanbahawa persoalan di hadapannya adalah mengenaibidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah di bawah per. 121(1A) PP.Ia mengakui bahawa tiada peruntukan khusus di dalamEnakmen Kedah berkaitan yang memberi bidangkuasa kepadaMahkamah Syariah untuk mengendalikan persoalan murtad.Namun, mengambilkira item 1, Senarai 2 Jadual KesembilanPP di baca bersama kes Dalip Kaur, yang menunjuk kepadaperkara murtad sebagai termasuk dalam bidangkuasaMahkamah Syariah, dan mengambilkira seterusnya “Craiseson Statute Law” serta kes Albon v. Pyke di mana Tindal Jturut menggunakan perkataan “necessary implication” – makaMahkamah Persekutuan merumuskan bahawa adalah sejajardengan logik untuk Mahkamah Syariah, yang telah denganjelasnya diberi bidangkuasa untuk mengadili perkara-perkarayang berkaitan dengan pemelukan agama Islam, secaraimplikasi perlu, juga berbidangkuasa untuk mengadili perkara-perkara yang berkaitan dengan keluarnya seorang Muslim dariagama Islam, sekaligus mengenepikan bidangkuasaMahkamah-Mahkamah Sivil ke atas perkara-perkara. Tidakada cacatnya taakulan Mahkamah Persekutuan ini. Oleh itu,responden-responden betul dalam hujah mereka bahawa,dalam kes ini, oleh kerana Akta 505 mengandungiperuntukan-peruntukan mengenai perkara-perkara berhubungdengan pemelukan Islam sebagai di bawah bidangkuasaMahkamah Syariah Wilayah Persekutuan (ss. 87 dan 91dibaca bersama s. 46(2)(b) Akta), maka secara implikasi

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perkara-perkara mengenai murtad atau keluar dari agamaIslam adalah juga termasuk dalam bidangkuasa MahkamahSyariah tersebut. (perenggan 15 & 16)

Per Richard Malanjum FCJ (dissenting):

(1) Legislative bodies, whether Parliament or State LegislativeAssemblies, do not have independent and sovereignlegislative power merely on the basis of the Legislative Listsin Schedule 9 of the Constitution. In fact such legislativepowers are derived from the Constitution itself. Hence, oneis not wrong to say that the Legislative Lists are subordinateto the fundamental liberties provisions enshrined in theConstitution. (para 52)

(2) Just as any legislation or any part thereof will be struckdown if it fails to conform with any provisions of theConstitution, so too with administrative, departmental andexecutive discretions, policies and decisions. In order tosupervise and monitor the exercise of administrative,departmental or executive discretions, our courts havefollowed with modifications where necessary the legalprinciples pronounced by the courts in other common lawjurisdictions. For instance, to be valid, administrative,departmental or executive discretions must not suffer fromany of the three categories of legal infirmities, namely,illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. (paras 53 &54)

(3) Relevant to the consideration of regs. 4 and 14 of the 1990Regulations is art. 8(1) of the Constitution which proclaimsthat “all persons are equal before the law and entitled to theequal protection of the law”. Likewise, art. 8(2) prohibits anyform of discrimination against citizens unless expresslyaurthorized by the Constitution itself on the ground only ofreligion, race, descent or place of birth or gender in any law.Only article 8(5) provides that art. 8 does not invalidate orprohibit any provision regulating personal law. With respect,the registration and indentity card regulations are notprovisions governing or regulating personal law. (para 62)

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(3a) Regulation 4, in particular reg. 4(c)(iva), has however singledout Muslims for additional procedural burdens andimpediments which are not connected to personal law. Itrequires that any registrant or person applying who is aMuslim has to state his or her religion. The requirement doesnot apply to non-Muslims. There is therefore a differentialtreatment for Muslims. This is tantamount to unequaltreatment under the law and in the absence of any exceptionfound to justify the discrimination the said sub-regulation hasinfringed art. 8(1) of the Constitution. For this reason alone,the relief sought by the applicant ought to be granted.(para 63)

(4) NRD, in insisting for the production of an apostasycertificate from the Federal Territory Syariah court, hadoverlooked the point that the application of the appellantshould be considered within the context of the requirementsof regs. 4 and 14 only. NRD must also treat the series ofapplications by the appellant as one continuous episode. Inthe form submitted by the appellant she stated her religionto be Christianity, and hence the third application should beprocessed and considered only on that basis. It is not thefunction of NRD to add further requirements which havenot been stipulated in the regulations. Therefore, in comingto its decision to reject the application of the appellant onaccount of non-production of an order or a certificate ofapostasy, NRD had asked itself the wrong question and hadtaken illegally irrelevant factors into account and hadexcluded relevant factors. NRD had thus acted ultra vires itspowers under Regulations 1990 (CCSU v. Minister for theCivil Service). (paras 72 & 73)

(4a) The insistence by NRD for a certificate of apostasy is alsonot consonant with the requirement of reg. 4(c)(x) of the1990 Regulations because the call for proof of renunciationof religion does not fall within the meaning of the words“particulars submitted”. NRD was only empowered to callfor such documentary evidence that it considered “necessaryto support the accuracy of any particulars submitted”. Theonly “particulars submitted” by the appellant was her statusas a Christian and thus NRD could call for documentaryevidence to support the accuracy of that particular. NRDcould not call for documentary evidence that the appellant

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was or was not a Muslim, since the appellant had notsubmitted any particular that she was a “Muslim”. (paras 75& 79)

(5) The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal, in confiningthe matter to the third application only, had completelyignored the history of the plight of the appellant in herdealings with NRD. Undoubtedly, it was the ‘compartmentalizedapproach’ adopted by the majority judgment that led it todistinguish the present case from the unreported case ofIsmail Suppiah. With respect, I am unable to agree with thedistinction made. Such an approach could only be correct ifthe history of the present appeal is omitted. Otherwise bothcases are premised on the same reason. (paras 76, 77 & 78)

(5a) The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal also erredwhen it said that the policy adopted by NRD wasreasonable. The conclusion that the policy was reasonablewithin the test of Wednesbury Corporation v. Ministry ofHousing has missed one cardinal principle. The implementationof the policy has a bearing on the appellant’s constitutionalright to freedom of religion under art. 11 of the Constitution.Hence, before the policy can be said be reasonable withinthe meaning of the test of Wednesbury, its constitutionalitymust first be considered. The majority judgment failed tocarry out this exercise. (paras 79, 80 & 82)

(5b) The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal likewise erredin stating that the DG was right in stating that apostasy isexclusively within the realm of the Syariah Court. Apostasyinvolves complex questions of constitutional importance andentails consideration of arts. 5(1), 3(4), 11(1), 10(1)(a),10(1)(e), 12(3) and the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.Since constitutional issues are involved, the civil superiorcourts should not decline jurisdiction by merely citing art.121(1A). The said article only protects the Syariah Court inmatters within their jurisdiction which does not include theinterpretation of the Constitution. (para 83)

(6) The insistence by NRD for an apostasy certificate is alsounlawful, illegal and unreasonable because: (i) it istantamount to delegation of authority by NRD to someother third body not sanctioned by law; (ii) the insistencewas almost impossible of performance as under the applicable

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law the Syariah Court in the Federal Territory has nostatutory power to adjudicate on the issue of apostasy; and(iii) to ask the appellant to apply for such certificate is to askher to self incriminate. This apart, NRD had not observedthe rules of natural justice when it mechanically rejected theappellant’s repeated applications and failed to give her a fairhearing. It was also guilty of unfairness towards the appellantin not informing the appellant that reg. 4 would be amended.Indeed, there is a reasonable suspicion that reg. 4, althoughformulated in 2000, was deliberately amended retrospectivelyto 1 October 1999 in order to target and to prejudice thethird application of the appellant. This being the case, myanswers to the first two questions are in the negative. (paras85-92)

(7) I am in agreement with the views as expressed by HashimYeop A Sani CJ in Dalip Kaur and Harun Hashim SCJ inMuhamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v. Faridah bte Dato’ Talibthat jurisdiction must be express and not implied. I also holdthe view that to rely on implied power as a source ofjurisdiction would set an unhealthy trend. In thecircumstances, I am inclined not to follow the reasoning inSoon Singh. Consequently, my answer to question 3 is alsoin the negative. (paras 99-104)

Kes-kes yang dirujuk:Albon v. Pyke [1842] 4 M & G 421 (dirujuk)Aminah v. Supt Of Prisons [1968] 1 MLJ 92 (dirujuk)Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Tribunal [1969] 1 All ER 208

(dirujuk)Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB

223 (dirujuk)Attorney General lwn. Bernazar [1960] 3 All ER 97 (dirujuk)Azizah Shaik Ismail v. Fatimah Shaik Ismail [2003] 4 CLJ 281 CA

(dirujuk)Bread Manufacturer of New South Wales v. Evans [1986] 56 ALJR 89

(dirujuk)Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 1 QB 175 (dirujuk)Calcutta Gas Co v. State of Weat Bengal AIR [1962] SC 1044 (dirujuk)CCSU v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (dirujuk)Che Omar Che Soh v. PP [1988] 2 MLJ 55 (dirujuk)City Council of George Town v. Govt of Penang [1967] 1 MLJ 169

(dirujuk)Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Banji AIR [1952] SC 16 (dirujuk)Dalip Kaur lwn. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam

& Anor [1991] 3 CLJ 2768; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 77 SC (diikuti)

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Datuk Hj Harun Idris v. PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155 (dirujuk)Dewan Undangan Kelantan v. Nordin Salleh [1992] 2 CLJ 1125; [1992] 1

CLJ (Rep) 72 SC (dirujuk)Ghazali v. PP [1964] 30 MLJ 159 (dirujuk)Ismail Suppiah lwn. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara (R-1-24-31-1995)

(dist)Isman Osman v. Govt of Malaysia [1973] 2 MLJ 143 (dirujuk)Jackson Stanfield v. Butterworth [1948] 2 All ER 358 (dirujuk)J P Berthelsen v. Director General Immigration [1987] 1 MLJ 134 (dirujuk)Kamariah Ali lwn. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan, Malaysia [2002] 3 CLJ 766

CA (diikuti)Lachmandas v. State of Bombay [1952] SCR 710 (dirujuk)Lavender v. Minister of Housing [1970] 3 All ER 871 (dirujuk)Lim Chan Seng v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam [1996] 3 CLJ 231 HC

(dirujuk)Lim Phin Khian lwn. Kho Su Ming [1996] 1 CLJ 529 FC (dirujuk)Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2005] 4 CLJ

666 CA (dirujuk)Madhavan Nair v. PP [1975] 264 (dirujuk)Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang v. Shaik Zolkaffily [2003] 3 CLJ 289 FC

(diikuti)Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur

[1997] 4 CLJ Supp 419 HC (diikuti)Mohamed Habibullah Mahmood v. Faridah Dato’ Talib [1993] 1 CLJ 264

SC (dirujuk)Ng Wan Chan lwn. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor (No 2)

[1991] 3 MLJ 487 (dirujuk)Oriental Insurance Co Ltd & Anor v. Minister of Finance [1992] 2 MLJ 776

(dirujuk)P Patto v. Chief Police Officer, Perak & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 204 (dirujuk)Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture [1968] 1 All ER 694 (dirujuk)Pathumma v. State of Kerala A [1978] SC 771 (dirujuk)Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v. Sri Lempah Enterprise

Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135 (dirujuk)Persatuan Aliran Kesederaran Negara v. Minister of Home Affairs [1988] 1

MLJ 442 (dirujuk)PP v. Mohamed Ismail [1984] 2 MLJ 219 (dirujuk)PP v. Su Liang Yu [1978] 2 MLJ 79 (dirujuk)Pyx Granite v. Ministry of Housing [1959] 3 All ER 1 (dirujuk)R v. Inner London Education Authority ex parte Westminster City Council

[1986] 1 All ER 19 (dirujuk)R v. Secretary for Health ex parte United States Tobacco International Inc

[1991] 3 WLR 529 (dirujuk)R v. Windsor Licensing ex parte Hodes [1983] 2 All ER 551 (dirujuk)Re Mohamed Said Nabi, deceased [1965] 3 MLJ 121 (dirujuk)Sim Seoh Beng & Anor lwn. Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai Ara Bhd [1995]

1 CLJ 491 CA (diikuti)

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Soon Singh Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia(PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 2 CLJ 5 FC (dirujuk)

Surinder Singh Kanda v. Govt of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 28 MLJ169 (dirujuk)

Wednesbury Corporation v. Ministry of Housing [1966] 2 QB 275 (dirujuk)Yew Bon Teow lwn. Kenderaan Bas Mara [1983] 1 MLJ 1 (dirujuk)

Perundangan yang dirujuk:Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 (Johor), s. 141(2)Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993, ss. 2, 7,

10, 24, 46(2)(b), 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95,Federal Constitution, arts. 3(1), (4), 4, 5(1), 8(1), (2), (5), 10(1)(a),

(e), 11(1), 12(3), 14, 74(2), 77, 121(1A)National Registration Regulations 1990, regs. 4, 13, 14Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss. 19, 121(1A)Interpretation and General Clauses Act 1967, s. 67

Sumber-sumber yang dirujuk:Bernion’s Statutory Interpretation, 2nd edn, ms 362Craies on Statute Law, 7th edn, ms 112

Bagi pihak perayu - Dato’ Dr Cyrus Das (Benjamin Dawson, Yapp Hock Swee& Steven Thiru bersamanya)

Bagi pihak responden pertama - Hj Sulaiman Abdullah (Halimatul Sa’adiahAbu Ahmad, Norhusniah Hussin & Nursaliza Samsudin bersamanya)

Bagi pihak responden kedua & ketiga - Dato’ Umi Kalthum Abdul Majid,Peguam Kanan Persekutuan (Azizah Hj Nawawi & Mohamad Nasir,Peguam Kanan Persekutuan bersamanya)

Bagi pihak Majlis Peguam - Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (Ang Hean Lengbersamanya)

Bagi pihak HAKAM - Ramdas TikamdasBagi pihak Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism Christianity

Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS) - Leonard Teoh Hooi LeongBagi pihak Women’s Aid Organisation (WAO), Women’s Centre For Change

(WCC), Women’s Development Collective (WDC), All Women’s ActionSociety (AWAM) & Sisters In Islam (SIS) - Meera Samanther

Bagi pihak Association of Women Lawyers (AWL) & National Council ofWomen Organisations (NCWO) - Rasmani Kandiah

[Rayuan dari Mahkamah Rayuan, Rayuan Sivil No: W-01-29-2001]

Dilaporkan oleh WA Sharif

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PENGHAKIMAN

Ahmad Fairuz KHN:

[1] Perayu telah diberi kebenaran merayu ke mahkamah ini atassoalan-soalan berikut:

(a) Adakah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara (JPN) berhak, mengikutundang-undang, mengenakan syarat supaya perayumengemukakan suatu sijil atau suatu pengisytiharan atauperintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah yang memperakukanbahawa beliau adalah murtad sebelum perkataan “Islam” didalam Kad Pengenalan (KP) perayu dipadamkan (deleted)?

(b) Adakah JPN telah dengan betulnya mentafsirkan kuasanya dibawah Kaedah-Kaedah Pendaftaran Negara 1990 (Kaedah-Kaedah 1990) khususnya k. 4 dan k. 14, untuk mengenakansyarat seperti yang tersebut di atas manakala ianya tidakdiperuntukkan dengan secara jelasnya di dalam Kaedah-Kaedah1990 itu?

(c) Adakah kes Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh lwn. PertubuhanKebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 2CLJ 5 telah diputuskan dengan betulnya apabila ia menggunapakai teori bidangkuasa tersirat yang dikemukakan di dalam kesMd Hakim Lee lwn. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan,Kuala Lumpur [1997] 4 CLJ Supp 419 dan tidak mengikut kesNg Wan Chan lwn. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan &Anor (No 2) [1991] 3 MLJ 487 dan Lim Chan Seng lwn.Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Pulau Pinang dan 1 kes yang lain[1996] 3 CLJ 231 yang mengisytiharkan bahawa sekiranyatidak ada bidangkuasa yang jelas yang diberikan kepadaMahkamah Syariah, maka Mahkamah-Mahkamah Sivilhendaklah mengekalkan bidangkuasa mereka?

[2] Perayu telah dilahirkan sebagai seorang Muslim. Oleh keranabeliau berhasrat untuk mengahwini seorang lelaki Kristian, perayumembuat permohonan kepada JPN pada 21 Februari 1997 untukmenukarkan namanya daripada Azlina binti Jailani kepada LinaLelani atas alasan bahawa beliau telah menganuti agama Kristian.Permohonan ini tidak diluluskan oleh responden ketiga (KetuaPengarah Pendaftaran Negara). Pada 15 Mac 1999 perayumemohon sekali lagi untuk menukarkan namanya tetapi kali inidaripada Azlina binti Jailani kepada Lina Joy. Di dalam akuanstatutorinya, perayu sekali lagi menyatakan bahawa beliau mahunamanya itu ditukar kerana beliau telah menganut agama Kristian.

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Pada 2 Ogos 1999, perayu, bertindak atas nasihat seorangpegawai JPN, membuat suatu lagi akuan statutori di dalam manabeliau memberi sebab ingin menukarkan namanya sebagai sengajamemilih nama itu dan bukannya kerana beliau menukar agama.Pada bulan November 1999, perayu telah diberi KPnya yang barutetapi JPN telah memasukkan perkataan “Islam” di bahagian depanKPnya dan namanya terdahulu di belakang kad itu. Pada 3 Januari2000, perayu memohon kepada JPN untuk perkataan “Islam”dipadamkan (deleted). Permohonan ini ditolak dan perayudimaklumkan bahawa permohonannya itu tidak sempurna tanpasuatu perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah yang menyatakanbahawa beliau telah keluar dari agama Islam. Perayu kemudiannyamembuat permohonan di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk beberapadeklarasi terhadap Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan danKerajaan Malaysia. Deklarasi-deklarasi yang dipohon itu adalahberasaskan pencabulan hak asasinya kepada kebebasan beragamaseperti yang dijaminkan oleh Perkara 11(1) PerlembagaanPersekutuan (PP). Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah Tinggi telahmenolak permohonannya itu. Perayu kemudiannya merayu keMahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan secara majoriti telahmenolak rayuannya itu. Perayu kemudiannya membuat permohonanuntuk kebenaran merayu di mahkamah ini dan permohonanannyaitu telah dibenarkan atas soalan-soalan yang disebutkan padapermulaan penghakiman ini.

[3] Di Mahkamah Rayuan pihak-pihak bersetuju (dan ini adalahjelas daripada alasan-alasan penghakiman majoriti dan penghakimanmenentang) bahawa satu isu sahaja yang perlu dipertimbangkanoleh mahkamah – iaitu, sama ada JPN betul, mengikut undang-undang, apabila menolak permohonan perayu supaya perkataan“Islam” dipadamkan daripada KPnya dan dengan memerlukansuatu sijil atau perintah murtad daripada Mahkamah Syariahterlebih dahulu. Penghakiman majoriti mahkamah itu telahmemutuskan bahawa JPN tidak bersalah dari sudut undang-undangpentadbiran apabila menolak permohonan perayu Lina Joy v. MajlisAgama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2005] 4 CLJ 666 di ms699. Perayu dalam permohonannya kepada JPN menyatakanadanya kesilapan dalam KPnya dan kesilapan itu ialah agamanyadisebut sebagai agama “Islam”. Justeru itu penghakiman majoritiberpendapat bahawa kenyataan perayu itu dengan secara tidaklangsung membawa erti bahawa perayu mengatakan yang beliautelah keluar dari agama Islam. Oleh yang demikian, JPN bolehlahmemerlukan perayu, di bawah k. 4 (c)(x) Kaedah-Kaedah 1990,mengemukakan keterangan dokumentari bagi menyokong ketepatan

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hujahnya bahawa beliau bukan lagi seorang Muslim. Penghakimanmajoriti juga memutuskan bahawa keluar atau tidaknya seseorangitu dari agama Islam adalah suatu persoalan yang berkaitan denganundang-undang Islam. Dan persoalan itu bukanlah dalam bidangkuasa JPN yang tidak dilengkapi atau berkelayakan untukmemutuskan perkara itu. Kerana itu, JPN telah mengamalkan satudasar untuk memerlukan penentuan oleh pihak berkuasa agamasebelum JPN bertindak untuk memadamkan perkataan “Islam”daripada KP seseorang Muslim. Dasar ini, mengikut penghakimanmajoriti adalah dengan sempurnanya munasabah [2005] 4 CLJ 666di ms 694.

[4] Dalam mahkamah ini, peguam terpelajar perayu telahmenghujahkan bahawa hanya Kaedah-Kaedah 1990 sahaja yangmenjadi sumber bertulis mengenai kuasa di bawah mana JPN bolehmemerlukan perintah murtad. Mengikut peguam terpelajar ituKaedah-Kaedah 1990 tidak mengandungi peruntukan yangmengizinkan JPN memerlukan dokumen berkenaan dari perayu.Peguam terpelajar seterusnya menekankan bahawa dokumen yangdiiktiraf di bawah k. 14 adalah suatu akuan berkanun sahaja. Olehitu dengan meminta suatu dokumen dikeluarkan dan dokumen itutidak pula diperuntukkan atau dibenarkan oleh k. 14, JPN telahbertindak ultra vires kuasa-kuasanya di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah1990. Ini, hujah peguam terpelajar itu, adalah tidak sah di sisiundang-undang pentadbiran. Peguam itu seterusnya berhujahbahawa penghakiman majoriti sepatutnya memutuskan sedemikiandan kegagalannya berbuat begitu sewajarnyalah dijadikan alasan-alasan atas mana mahkamah ini, sebagai sebuah MahkamahRayuan, semestinya mengenepikan penghakiman itu.

[5] Peguam terpelajar responden-responden kedua dan ketigamenekankan bahawa permohonan perayu adalah untukmemadamkan perkataan “Islam” daripada KPnya. Oleh itupermohonan itu tergolong di bawah k. 14(1)(c) iaitu untukmembetulkan butir-butir mengenai agamanya. Kaedah 14(1)berbunyi:

(1) A person registered under these Regulations who:

(a) changes his name;

(b) acquires the citizenship of Malaysia or is deprived of hiscitizenship of Malaysia; or

(c) has in his possession an identity card containing anyparticular, other than his address, which is to hisknowledge incorrect,

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shall forthwith report the fact to the nearest registrationoffice and apply for a replacement identity card with thecorrect particulars

Peguam terpelajar kemudiannya merujuk kepada k. 4 yangberbunyi:

4. Any person who is required to register under regulation 3(1)or 3(2) or to re-register under regulation 18 or 28 or who appliesfor a replacement identity card under regulation 13 or 14, shall:

(a) …

(b) …

(c) give the following particulars to the registration officer asaforesaid, namely:

(i) his name as appearing in his Certificate of Birth or suchother document or, if he is known by different name,each of such names, in full;

(ii) his previous identity card number, if any;

(iii) the full address of his place of residence within Malaysia;

(iv) his race;

(iva) his religion (only for Muslims);

(v) his place of birth;

(vi) his date of birth and sex;

(vii) his physical abnormalities, if any;

(viii) his status as a citizen of Malaysia or other citizenshipstatus;

(ix) such other particulars as the registration officer maygenerally or in any particular case consider necessary; and

(x) produce such documentary evidences the registrationofficer may consider necessary to support the accuracyof any particulars submitted.

Peguam terpelajar itu kemudiannya menekankan bahawa k. 4(c)(ix)dan (x) adalah kuasa yang menjustifikasikan JPN mengenakansyarat keperluan sijil murtad.

[6] Mengenai penghujahan-penghujahan ini, saya bersependapatdengan penghakiman majoriti bahawasanya k. 14(1) adalahberkenaan:

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(a) penukaran nama di bawah perenggan (a); dan

(b) membetulkan butir-butir yang tidak betul di bawah perenggan(c).

Kes perayu terjatuh di bawah butir-butir yang tidak betul mengikutperenggan (c). Bagaimanapun k. 14 tidak menyatakan apakah yangpatut diberi dalam kes-kes butiran-butiran yang tidak betul tetapik. 14(1) sememangnya memerlukan perayu untuk melaporkan faktamengenai butiran-butiran yang tidak betul, kepada PejabatPendaftaran yang terdekat sekali dan untuk memohon suatu KPganti yang mengandungi butir-butir yang betul. Sehubungandengan ini k. 4 menjadi relevan kerana kaedah itu dengan jelasnyamenyatakan bahawa sesiapa yang memohon untuk suatu KP gantidi bawah k. 13 atau 14 hendaklah mematuhi k. 4 itu. Olehdemikian saya bersetuju dengan peguam terpelajar responden-responden kedua dan ketiga bahawasanya JPN mempunyaijustifikasi di bawah k. 4(c)(x) untuk memerlukan penentuan daripenguasa agama Islam mengenai kemurtadan perayu atau keluarnyaperayu daripada agama Islam. Oleh demikian saya bersetuju denganpenghakiman majoriti yang mengatakan bahawa perayu dalampermohonannya yang ketiga menyatakan kesilapan dalam KPnyaialah mengenai kenyataan agamanya sebagai “Islam” dan perayumahu kesilapan itu diperbetulkan dengan mengeluarkan perkataan“Islam” dari KP itu. Ini samalah seperti perayu mengatakanbahawa beliau telah keluar dari agama Islam. Oleh itu, JPN boleh,mengikut k. 4(c)(x), memerlukan perayu mengemukakan keterangandokumentari bagi menyokong ketepatan penegasannya bahawabeliau bukan lagi seorang Muslim. Saya juga bersetuju jika JPNterima pengakuan seseorang bahawa dia telah keluar dari agamaIslam berasaskan perisytiharan yang dibuat olehnya maka JPNmengambil risiko apabila mengecapkan, secara silap, seseorangsebagai bukan Muslim manakala mengikut undang-undang Islamorang itu masih belum lagi keluar dari agama Islam. Ini juga akanmenyenangkan mereka yang telah dilahir dan dididik sebagaiseorang Muslim tetapi bersikap acuh tak acuh atau tidak pedulikepada agama Islam diklasifikasikan sebagai bukan Muslim hanyasemata-mata untuk mengelak dari dihukum atas kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah undang-undang Islam. Ini semua akanmengakibatkan celaan dari masyarakat Muslim. Atas sebab-sebabinilah, sama seperti pandangan penghakiman majoriti, saya percaya,JPN telah menggunapakai dasar bahawa akuan statutori sahajaadalah tidak cukup untuk membolehkan perkataan “Islam”

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dikeluarkan dari KP seseorang Muslim. Ini adalah kerana hal keluardari agama Islam itu adalah suatu perkara yang berkaitan denganundang-undang Islam dan kerana itu JPN menggunapakai dasaryang memerlukan penentuan oleh pihak berkuasa agama Islamsebelum JPN boleh bertindak untuk memadamkan perkataan“Islam” daripada KP seseorang Muslim. Atas pertimbangan-pertimbangan seperti dihuraikan di atas saya setuju denganpenghakiman majoriti bahawa sesungguhnya dasar JPN itu adalahsesuatu yang sesempurnanya munasabah.

[7] Mengenai dasar JPN ini, perayu juga menghujahkan bahawadengan memerlukan sijil murtad itu, JPN telah menurunkan kuasadan tugasnya di bawah k. 14 kepada pihak ketiga agar pihak ketigaitu memutuskan sama ada meluluskan ataupun tidak permohonanmemadamkan perkataan “Islam” itu. Ini, mengikut Perayu, tidakboleh dilakukan kecuali diizinkan oleh undang-undang yang relevan.Justeru itu dasar JPN tanpa kebenaran di bawah k. 14 itu adalahbercanggahan dengan undang-undang. Seterusnya peguamterpelajar perayu menghujahkan bahawa tugas mahkamah bukanlahuntuk mengesahkan sesuatu dasar sebagai sesuatu yangmunasabah; malah apa yang mahkamah telah gagal untukmenghayati ialah bahawa perkara-perkara sedemikian adalah untukpihak legislator dan bukannya untuk pihak mahkamah memutuskansama ada sepatutnya atau tidak rujukan dibuat kepada sesuatubadan agama yang lain.

[8] Atas hujah perayu ini, saya berpendapat, seperti yangdihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar pihak-pihak responden-responden kedua dan ketiga, bahawa k. 4(c)(x) dengan jelasnyamemberi kuasa kepada Pegawai Pendaftaran untuk memerlukanketerangan-keterangan dokumentari yang difikirnya mustahak bagimenyokong ketepatan mana-mana butiran yang telah dikemukakan.Oleh itu rujukan kepada sesuatu pihak yang berkuasa atas perkaraundang-undang Islam adalah diperuntukkan oleh undang-undangdan justeru demikian ianya tidaklah bersalahan dengan undang-undang seperti mana yang dihujahkan oleh perayu. Rujukanbukanlah bermakna bahawa Mahkamah Syariah diminta untukmemutuskan sama ada meluluskan ataupun tidak permohonanmemadamkan perkataan “Islam” itu. Mahkamah Syariah cumadiminta untuk mengesahkan bahawa perayu adalah beragama Islamatau tidak berdasarkan undang-undang Islam. Berpandukan darikeputusan ini nanti, adalah dalam budibicara JPN untukmemutuskan sama ada kebenaran boleh diberi untuk memadamkanatau tidak perkataan “Islam”.

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[9] Peguam terpelajar perayu telah juga merujukkan kepadamahkamah ini kes Ismail bin Suppiah lwn. Ketua PengarahPendaftaran Negara (R-1-24-31 tahun 1995). Mengikut peguamterpelajar itu, kedua-dua kes Ismail dan kes rayuan di mahkamahini adalah mengenai:

(a) pertukaran nama kerana pertukaran agama;

(b) kuasa-kuasa JPN di bawah k. 14;

(c) suatu sijil daripada Majlis Agama sebagai suatu pra-syaratsebelum JPN boleh menimbangkan permohonan di bawah k.14;

(d) kebebasan memilih agama oleh seseorang dijamin di bawahPerkara 11 PP;

(e) pihak ketiga tidak boleh memutuskan mengenai agama manaseseorang itu wajar pilih; dan

(f) kaedah 14 tidak mengenakan suatu syarat bahawa satu sijildiperolehi daripada Majlis Agama.

Peguam terpelajar itu seterusnya menunjukkan bahawa saya adalahhakim dalam kes Ismail itu dan saya telah membatalkan keputusanJPN yang memerlukan satu sijil daripada Majlis Agama sebagai ultravires k. 14.

9.1. Plaintif dalam kes Ismail adalah seorang Muslim semenjakianya dilahirkan. Plaintif memohon supaya nama Muslimnyaseperti yang di dalam KPnya itu ditukar ke nama Hindu atasalasan, seperti yang disebut dalam akuan statutorinya, beliautelah keluar dari agama Islam dan memeluk agama Hindu.JPN berkeras menghendaki kelulusan Jabatan Agama IslamJohor atau Kadi Besar Johor atas tindakan Plaintif keluar dariagama Islam. JPN masih enggan meluluskan permohonanplaintif walaupun peguam plaintif telah melaporkan kepadaKadi Besar Johor perihal plaintif telah keluar dari agamaIslam. Malah JPN telah merujuk hal ini kepada dan untuktindakan Jabatan Agama Islam Johor. Kerana itu plaintifmemohon dan memperolehi dari Mahkamah Tinggi KualaLumpur suatu perisytiharan bahawa kelulusan JabatanAgama Islam Johor itu adalah tidak perlu dan bahawasanyasebarang rujukan oleh JPN kepada Jabatan itu adalah ultravires k. 14, Kaedah-Kaedah 1990, s. 141(2) EnakmenPentadbiran Agama Islam Negeri Johor 1978 (Administrationof Islamic Law Enactment 1978 Negeri Johor), dan Perkara

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11(1) PP. Plaintif juga pohon dan perolehi perintah agarJPN mengeluarkan KP sementara atas nama plaintif yangbaru.

9.2. Mengenai hujah perayu bahawa JPN tidak membuat rayuanatas keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Ismail itu dankerana itu JPN tidaklah boleh di dalam rayuan ini mengambilpendirian yang bercanggahan dengan keputusan MahkamahTinggi itu.

9.3. Penghakiman majoriti menegaskan bahawa kes Ismail adalahsuatu kes yang melibatkan permohonan untuk menukarnama di dalam KP manakala rayuan perayu dalam mahkamahini ialah untuk memadamkan perkataan “Islam” daripadaKPnya. Kerana tiada alasan-alasan penghakiman dalam kesIsmail itu, sebab-sebab Mahkamah Tinggi membuatkeputusan sedemikian tidaklah dapat diketahui. Justeru ituMahkamah Rayuan hanya mampu membuat beberapa tekaanmengenai kenapa saya telah memutuskan demikian dalam kesIsmail itu. Tekaan-tekaan itu berpunca dari saya dikatakantelah melihat kes Ismail itu dari sudut ianya perlu diputuskandalam konteks undang-undang Johor. Saya telah dikatakanmungkin berpendapat bahawa JPN salah apabila JPNmemerlukan persetujuan Jabatan Agama Islam Johor sebelumplaintif keluar dari agama Islam manakala mengikut EnakmenJohor pihak berkuasa yang betul ialah Kadi di bawah s.141(2). Seksyen 141 Enakmen Johor itu berbunyi:

141

(1) Sesiapa yang memasukkan sebarang orang memelukagama Islam hendaklah dengan serta-merta melaporkanperkara itu kepada Kadi dengan memberi keterangan-keterangan yang perlu untuk pendaftaran.

(2) Sesiapa mendapati bahawa seseorang Islam telah keluardaripada Agama Islam hendaklah dengan serta mertamelaporkan kepada Kadi mengenai keputusannya keluardaripada Islam dengan memberi keterangan-keteranganyang perlu dan Kadi hendaklah mengisytiharkan bahawaorang itu telah keluar daripada Agama Islam, danhendaklah didaftarkan.

9.4. Adalah juga menjadi tekaan penghakiman majoriti bahawasaya mungkin telah berpendapat yang JPN telah salah fahams. 141 kerana di para 10 affidavit JPN bertarikh 28 Julai1995, pegawai JPN nampaknya menyatakan bahawa sub-

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seksyen (2) hanya terpakai atas seseorang yang dahulunyatelah memeluk agama Islam di bawah subseksyen (1),manakala sebenarnya subseksyen (2) itu adalah bebas darisubseksyen (1). Penghakiman majoriti juga menekankanbahawa saya mungkin berpendapat, dari kejelasan perkataan-perkataan dalam subseksyen (2), bahawa di Johor, Kadisendiripun tidak mempunyai hak untuk memberi atau tidakmemberi persetujuan kepada seseorang Muslim keluardaripada agama Islam. Hal itu terserah semata-mata kepadaorang yang berkenaan. Tugas Kadi adalah hanya untukmengumumkan fakta keluarnya seseorang dari agama Islamdan kemudiannya mendaftarkannya. Tugas itu hanyalahmekanikal. Bertitik-tolak dari ini, saya ditekakan telahberpendapat bahawa:

(a) di Johor seseorang Muslim adalah bebas untuk keluardari agama Islam dan ia melakukannya dengan hanyamenyatakan demikian;

(b) tiada kelulusan atau penentuan oleh mana-mana pihakberkuasa agama diperlukan;

(c) JPN sepatutnya menerima akuan statutori plaintif yangmenyatakan bahawa plaintif telah keluar dari agamaIslam sebagai bukti bahawa plaintif bukan lagi seorangMuslim; dan

(d) JPN sepatutnya meluluskan permohonan plaintif untuktukar namanya.

9.5. Dari tekaan-tekaan seperti dihuraikan di atas, ketaralahbahawa kes Ismail itu semestinyalah diteliti dalam konteksundang-undang Johor. Seksyen 141(2) Enakmen PentadbiranUndang-Undang Islam Johor 1978 dengan jelasnyamenunjukkan bahawa Kadi pun tidak mempunyai hak untukmemberi atau tidak memberi persetujuan untuk keluar dariagama Islam. Justeru itu tekaan penghakiman majoriti ituadalah betul apabila dikatakan kerana kejelasan perkataan-perkataan dalam s. 141(2) JPN sepatutnya hendaklah terimaakuan statutori plaintif yang menyatakan plaintif telah keluardari agama Islam sebagai bukti bahawa plaintif bukan lagiseorang Muslim dan JPN sepatutnyalah meluluskanpermohonan Plaintif untuk tukar namanya. Wajar ditekankandi peringkat ini bahawa penghuraian di atas menunjukkanPerkara 121(1A) dan item 1, senarai 2, Jadual 9 PP tidaktimbul dalam kes Ismail itu.

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[10] Isu berikutnya yang dihujahkan oleh perayu ialah sama adaMahkamah Syariah Wilayah Persekutuan mempunyai bidang kuasapenentuan murtad. Perayu menghujahkan bahawa JPN telah selamaini mengambil pendirian yang sama mengenai pelbagai permohonanperayu iaitu perayu mesti pertamanya mendapatkan suatu perintahmurtad daripada Mahkamah Syariah atau, seperti yangkemudiannya dikatakan oleh Ketua Pengarah dalam afidavitnya,daripada mana-mana pihak berkuasa agama Islam yang lain. Perayujuga menghujahkan bahawa Akta Pentadbiran Undang-UndangIslam (Wilayah Persekutuan) 1993 (Akta 505) tidak mempunyaiperuntukan mengenai murtad. Mahkamah Syariah atau mana-manaBadan Islam yang lain tidak diberi bidangkuasa dalam hal murtaddan tidak ada kuasa juga diberi kepada mana-mana pihak berkuasadi bawah Akta tersebut untuk mengeluarkan perintah murtad.Inilah kedudukannya pada semua masa yang material di dalam kesperayu antara bulan Februari 1997 hingga Januari 2000 dan hinggake hari ini. Mengikut pihak perayu lagi, s. 46(2)(b) Akta 505, sepertiyang terdapat sekarang, menyenaraikan perkara-perkara dalam manaMahkamah Syariah boleh melaksanakan bidangkuasa sivilnya dan dibawah seksyen ini perkara murtad tidak terdapat di dalam senaraiitu. Penghakiman majoriti akur bahawa Akta 505 tidakmengandungi sebarang peruntukan mengenai murtad. Penghakimanitu seterusnya mempertimbangkan hujah perayu bahawa keputusanMahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Soon Singh (supra) telahmembentukkan prosedur yang diikuti oleh JPN dalam memerlukanperakuan daripada Mahkamah Syariah sebelum jabatan itumenerima fakta bahawa seseorang Muslim telah keluar dari agamaIslam. Keputusan di dalam kes Soon Singh, mengikut penghakimanmajoriti, telah dan masih sahih (authoritative) dan dalam undang-undang pentadbiran, dari sudut keputusan itu, JPN telah bertindakdengan betul apabila menamakan Mahkamah Syariah sebagai pihakberkuasa yang boleh mengeluarkan perakuan murtad dan JPN akanterima perakuan itu sebagai bukti perayu bukan lagi seorangMuslim. Penghakiman majoriti, bagaimanapun, berpendapat bahawapersoalan mengenai betul atau tidaknya keputusan Soon Singhadalah tidak penting lagi kerana rayuan dihadapannya telahdipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak kepada rayuan itu dikira sebagaimengenai kesahihan keputusan JPN mengikut undang-undangpentadbiran dan bukan lagi mengikut persoalan-persoalanperlembagaan. Oleh itu perayu berhujah dalam Mahkamah Rayuanbahawa tindakan JPN mengenakan syarat supaya diperolehiperintah Mahkamah Syariah adalah tindakan yang tidak munasabahmengikut kes Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury

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Corp [1948] 1 KB 223. Ini adalah kerana, mengikut Perayu,perintah itu mustahil diperolehi disebabkan ketiadaan peruntukanmengenai murtad dalam Akta 505. Di peringkat ini, adalah wajarbagi saya untuk menyatakan persetujuan saya dengan bahagianpenghakiman majoriti yang menyatakan bahawa apa yang JPNmahu ialah suatu perakuan dari seseorang yang mempunyai kuasauntuk membuatnya dan jika JPN bertindak mengikut perakuan itu,maka JPN adalah bebas dari sebarang kesilapan atau disalahkanoleh awam dalam perkara yang sebegitu mustahak dan sensitif.Justeru itu penghakiman majoriti memutuskan bahawa ketidakrelaanJPN bertindak tanpa perakuan pihak berkuasa agama lslam adalahmunasabah. Penghakiman itu juga memutuskan bahawa persoalansama ada seseorang muslim itu murtad atau tidak adalah satupersoalan yang berkaitan dengan undang-undang Islam. Dan jikamahkamah memutuskan bahawa ketidakrelaan JPN adalah tidakmunasabah, maka itu akan membawa erti bahawa mahkamahmenghendaki JPN menerima fakta bahawa mengikut undang-undang Islam seseorang Muslim boleh dianggap oleh dunia sebagaitelah keluar dari agama Islam dan bukan lagi seorang Muslimapabila orang itu kata dia telah keluar dari agama Islam.

10.1 Mengenai penghakiman majoriti bahawa tindakan JPN adalahmunasabah bila JPN perlukan suatu sijil/deklarasi/perintahdaripada Mahkamah Syariah yang menyatakan perayu adalahmurtad, saya ingin menambah dengan menekankan bahawaitem 1 senarai 2 dalam Jadual kesembilan PP memperuntukkan,antara lainnya, bahawa Mahkamah-Mahkamah Syariahhendaklah mempunyai bidangkuasa hanya atas orang-orangyang menganuti agama Islam dan hanya mengenai mana-mana perkara yang termasuk dalam perenggan itu (item 1)dan salah satu daripada perkara-perkara dalam perenggantersebut ialah “undang-undang Islam”. Sehubungan denganini, perkara 74(4) PP menegaskan bahawa keluasanungkapan-ungkapan am dalam Jadual kesembilan tidak bolehdikira sebagai dihadkan oleh ungkapan-ungkapan khusus yangterdapat dalam Jadual 9 itu. Perkara 74(4) PP adalah sepertiberikut:

74

(4) Where general as well as specific expressions areused in describing any of the matter enumerated in theLists set out in the Ninth Schedule the generality of theformer shall not be taken to be limited by the latter.

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Oleh demikian adalah munasabah bagi JPN mengenakansyarat-syarat tersebut kerana perkara murtad ini, mengikutpenghakiman majoriti (dan saya bersetuju dengannya), adalahsatu persoalan yang berkaitan dengan undang-undang Islamdan seperti yang telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Agongdalam kes Dalip Kaur lwn. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai PolisDaerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1991] 3 CLJ 2768; [1991]1 CLJ (Rep) 77 bahawa jawapan kepada persoalan sama adaseseorang itu adalah seorang Muslim atau telah keluar dariagama Islam sebelum dia meninggal dunia, adalah termasukdalam dunia undang-undang Syariah yang memerlukanpertimbangan-pertimbangan serius dan tafsiran wajar atasundang-undang itu. Dalam hal keadaan sedemikian, sayabersetuju dengan penghujahan peguam terpelajar responden-responden kedua dan ketiga bahawa syarat supaya suatu sijilatau perisytiharan atau perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariahbahawa perayu telah jadi murtad bukanlah suatu keputusanyang tidak munasabah sehinggakan sebegitu melampau dalamkeingkaran terhadap logik atau standard moral yang diterimahingga tiada seorang yang waras yang telah menumpukanpemikirannya kepada persoalan yang perlu diputuskan ituboleh mencapai keputusan itu.

[11] Mengenai hujah responden-responden kedua dan ketigabahawasanya JPN berhak untuk memasukkan perkataan “Islam” dimuka hadapan KP perayu dalam bulan November 1999 keranapindaan-pindaan kepada k. 4(c) (iva) dan k. 5(2) telah dibuatberkuatkuasa kebelakangan kepada 1 Oktober 1999 dan kuatkuasakebelakangan ini telah dibenarkan kerana pindaan-pindaan ituadalah berbentuk prosedur, perayu menghujahkan bahawa selagipindaan itu tidak diwartakan pihak eksekutif (misalnya JPN) tidakboleh menggunakan pindaan itu dan bertindak atasnya. Perayumenarik perhatian kepada fakta bahawa permohonannya untuk KPtelah dibuat pada 25 Oktober 1999 manakala pada 1 Oktober1999 pindaan itu belum diwartakan. Perayu menekankan bahawakedudukan sebenar undang-undang semasa itu ialah bahawaperayu adalah berhak untuk suatu KP baru di atas nama Lina Joytanpa apa-apa kenyataan mengenai agama diletakkan dalam KP itu.Pindaan itu mengikut perayu tidak boleh dibuat berkuatkuasakebelakangan kerana ianya menjejaskan hak perayu yang sedia adaitu.

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11.1 Atas isu kuatkuasa kebelakangan ini saya ingin merujukkepada kes Sim Seoh Beng @ Sin Sai Beng & Anor lwn.Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai Ara Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 491 yangmenyatakan bahawa ujian yang betul untuk digunapakai bagimenentukan sama ada sesuatu undang-undang bertulis adalahberkuatkuasa secara prospektif atau kebelakangan ialah untukpertamanya memastikan sama ada undang-undang itu akanmenyentuh hak-hak substantif jika dikuatkuasakan secarakebelakangan. Jika ia, maka, prima facie undang-undang ituhendaklah ditafsirkan sebagai mempunyai kesan prospektifsahaja, kecuali terdapat arahan yang jelas dalam enakmen itubahawa ianya hendaklah berkuatkuasa kebelakangan.

In our judgment, the correct test to be applied todetermine whether a written law is prospective orretrospective is to first ascertain whether it wouldaffect substantive rights if applied retrospectively. If itwould, then, prima facie that law must be construed ashaving prospective effect only, unless there is a clearindication in the enactment that it is in any event tohave retrospectivity. (bahasa asal penghakiman).

Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lim Phin Khian lwn. KhoSu Ming [1996] 1 CLJ 529 telah menyatakan bahawapersoalan dalam kes itu ialah sama ada anggapan prima facietiadanya kuatkuasa kebelakangan telah diganti dengan maksudParlimen yang bertentangan dan jika betul, sejauh mana.

Thus, in any given case, the task to be undertaken bya court is to examine the particular statute that hasfallen for interpretation and to ascertain what Parliamentintended. In the context of the present case, thequestion that falls for determination is whether the primafacie presumption against retrospectivity has beendisplaced by contrary Parliament intention, and if so, towhat extent. (bahasa asal penghakiman).

Kes Attorney General lwn. Bernazar [1960] 3 All ER 97 pulamenyatakan bahawa keadaan adalah berlainan apabila statutitu berkuatkuasa kebelakangan sama ada kerana statut itumengandungi perkataan-perkataan yang jelas menunjukkandemikian atau kerana statut itu adalah hanya mengenaiperkara-perkara prosedur; oleh itu Parlimen telah menunjukkantujuannya bahawa Akta itu hendaklah terpakai atas prosiding-prosiding yang tergantung, dan Mahkamah Rayuan adalahberhak untuk memberi kesan kepada tujuan kebelakangan inisama seperti mahkamah di peringkat pertama (1st instance).

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But it is different when the statute is retrospectiveeither because it contains clear words to that effect orbecause it deals with matters of procedures only; forthen Parliament has shown an intention that the Actshould operate on pending proceedings, and the Courtof Appeal are entitled to give effect to this retrospectiveintent as well as a court of 1st instance. (bahasa asalpenghakiman).

Dalam kes Yew Bon Teow lwn. Kenderaan Bas Mara [1983] 1MLJ 1 Majlis Privy telah menyatakan bahawa persoalan samaada sesuatu statut itu hendaklah ditafsirkan secaraberkuatkuasa kebelakangan, dan jika demikian sejauh mana,adalah terletak pada maksud/tujuan legislator seperti yangdilafazkannya melalui perkataan-perkataan yang digunakandalam statut itu, di samping mengambil kira kaedah tafsiranbiasa dan peruntukan-peruntukan relevan dalam mana-manastatut tafsiran.

Whether a statute is to be construed in a retrospectivesense, and if so to what extent, depends on theintention of the legislature as expressed in the wordingof the statute, having regard to the normal canons ofconstruction and to the relevant provisions of anyinterpretation statute. (bahasa asal penghakiman).

Saya ingin juga merujuk kepada s. 19 Intepretation Acts1948 dan 1967 yang menyatakan:

19

(1) The commencement of an Act or subsidiary legislationshall be the date provided in or under the Act orsubsidiary legislation or, where no date is soprovided, the date immediately following the date of itspublication in pursuance of section 18.

(2) Acts and subsidiary legislation shall come intooperation immediately on the expiration of the daypreceding their commencement.

(3) Notwithstanding section 2(1) and (2) and section65(2), subsections (1) and (2) shall apply:

(a) to all Acts enacted after the 31st December 1968including Acts which amend laws enacted beforethe commencement of Part I of this Act; and

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(b) to all subsidiary legislation made after the 31stDecember 1968, whether made under a lawenacted before or after the commencement of PartI of this Act whether or not that law has beenrevised under the Revision of Laws Act 1968.

Di dalam rayuan di mahkamah ini terdapat dengan jelasnyasuatu arahan (seperti tersebut dalam kes Sim Seoh Beng)bahawa pindaan-pindaan kepada Kaedah-Kaedah 1990,kecuali untuk k. 19, hendaklah dianggap telah mulaberkuatkuasa pada 1 Oktober 1990 (shall be deemed to havecome into operation on 1 October 1990). Justeru itupindaan-pindaan kepada k. 4, k. 5 dan jadual pertama adalahberkuatkuasa secara kebelakangan. Oleh itu tindakan JPNmengeluarkan KP dengan penambahan perkataan “Islam”adalah sah di sisi undang-undang.

[12] Majlis Peguam, HAKAM, dan Malaysian ConsultativeCouncil of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism, sebagaipemerhati diarah (watching brief) telah turut memberi pandangan-pandangan mereka masing-masing yang secara ringkasnya adalahseperti berikut:

(a) jika seseorang tidak lagi menganuti (profess) agama Islam, makadianya tidak boleh lagi berada di bawah bidangkuasaMahkamah Syariah. Jika dia dikatakan masih lagi di bawahbidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah maka perbuatan itu adalahsuatu pencabulan hak kemanusiaannya di bawah Perkara 11(1)dan Perkara 8, Perlembagaan Persekutuan;

(b) perkara murtad (apostasy) tidak dimasukkan ke dalam item 1senarai 2 kepada Jadual Sembilan PP;

(c) perakuan murtad adalah ketara bertentangan denganperuntukan kebebasan asasi di bawah Perkara 11;

(d) perisytiharan (declaration) oleh perayu bahawa beliau adalahseorang Kristian bererti bahawa beliau menganuti agamaKristian dan ini bererti bahawa beliau tidak boleh lagi dianggapsebagai seorang Muslim atau seorang yang menganuti agamaIslam;

(e) Chua H dalam kes Re Mohamed Said Nabi, deceased [1965] 3MLJ 121 telah merujuk kepada Shorter Oxford EnglishDictionary untok pengertian “profess”. Kamus itu berkata:

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“profess” means ‘to affirm one’s faith in or allegiance to (areligion, principles, God or Saint etc)’. Ini bererti JPN tidakberhak untuk mengenakan syarat agar perayu kemukakan suatusijil kerana mahkamah-mahkamah syariah tiada bidangkuasa atasperayu yang tidak lagi menganut agama Islam. Perayu masihhidup dan telah membuat akuan statutori dan afidavit-afidavityang menunjukkan bahawa beliau menganuti agama Kristian.Justeru itu, tidak perlulah untuk mana-mana pihak berkuasaIslam memutuskan sama ada beliau murtad atau tidak;

(f) Kerajaan Malaysia telah menggambarkan (represented) diperingkat antarabangsa dan kepada warganegaranya, bahawaianya berpegang (subscribe) kepada norma-norma kebebasankepercayaan (faith) yang komprehensif, pemikiran (thought) dansuara hati (conscience) seperti diisytiharkan (declared) dalamPerkara 18 Perisytiharan Sejagat Hak-hak Manusia (UniversalDeclarations of Human Rights). Justeru itu perayu mempunyaiharapan yang sah (legitimate expectation) bahawa KerajaanMalaysia dan agensi-agensinya tidak akan bertindak bercanggahandengan gambarannya itu;

(g) Perayu telah, kerana permohonannya untuk memadamkan(delete) perkataan “Islam” itu tidak dibenarkan, dinafikanhaknya untuk mengahwini seorang yang menganut agamaKristian atau mengahwini seseorang mengikut kehendaknya. Iniadalah suatu penafian kepada haknya di bawah Perkara 5(1)Perlembagaan Persekutuan;

[13] ABIM, Muslim Lawyers Association dan Persatuan PeguamSyarie Malaysia, juga sebagai pemerhati diarah (watching brief),telah turut memberi pandangan-pendangan mereka masing-masingyang secara ringkasnya adalah seperti berikut;

(a) Perkara 11 Perlembagaan Persekutuan menggunakan perkataan-perkataan “profess and practice”. Justeru itu perkara keluardari agama Islam hendaklah mengikut perundangan berkaitandengannya. Seseorang boleh keluar dari agama Islam tetapihendaklah ikut tatacaranya. Kalau ikut kehendak atau sesukahati seseorang maka akan huru haralah keadaan umat danagama Islam. Oleh demikian penentuan oleh mahkamah syariahadalah mengikut kehendak perundangan syariah dan justeru itutidaklah berlawanan dengan Perkara 11;

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(b) Mengenai hak sama rata (equal rights) di bawah Perkara 8Perlembagaan Persekutuan, Perkara 8 itu adalah tertaklukkepada peruntukan-peruntukan yang kawal selia (regulate)undang-undang keluarga (personal law)

[14] Mengenai pandangan-pandangan di perenggan-perenggan(12) dan (13) di atas saya bersetuju dengan pendapat-pendapat didalam perenggan (13). Di dalam rayuan di hadapan mahkamahsekarang, tiada ketentuan muktamad bahawa perayu tidak lagimenganuti agama Islam. Maka, kenyataan bahawa perayu tidakboleh lagi berada di bawah bidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah keranaMahkamah Syariah hanya ada bidangkuasa terhadap seseorangyang menganuti agama Islam (profess) tidak boleh/wajar ditekankan.Cara seseorang keluar dari sesuatu agama adalah semestinyamengikut kaedah atau undang-undang atau amalan (practice) yangditentukan atau ditetapkan oleh agama itu sendiri. Perayu tidakdihalang dari berkahwin. Kebebasan beragama di bawah Perkara11 PP memerlukan perayu mematuhi amalan-amalan atau undang-undang agama Islam khususnya mengenai keluar dari agama itu.Apabila ketentuan-ketentuan agama Islam dipatuhi dan pihakberkuasa agama Islam memperakukan kemurtadannya barulahperayu dapat menganuti agama Kristian. Dengan lain perkataanseseorang tidak boleh sesuka hatinya keluar dan masuk agama.Apabila ia menganuti sesuatu agama, akal budi (common sense)sendiri memerlukan dia mematuhi amalan-amalan dan undang-undang dalam agama itu.

[15] Perayu seterusnya menghujahkan bahawa, JPN tidak bolehbertindak secara memperkosakan hak-hak kebebasan beragamasetiap warganegara di bawah Perkara 11 PP atau secaradiskriminasi mencabuli jaminan-jaminan di bawah Perkara 8(2) PPyang melarang sebarang diskriminasi atas alasan agama. Perayumenegaskan bahawa Perkara 11 itu memberinya kebebasan mutlakuntuk keluar dari agama Islam dan menjadi seorang Kristian.Mengikutnya kebebasan itu tidak boleh dengan sahnya dihadkanatau dikawal oleh mana-mana undang-undang seperti AktaPentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan)1993 [Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act1993] oleh Mahkamah Syariah, atau oleh mana-mana pihakberkuasa lain. Justeru itu pihak perayu memohon agar MahkamahTinggi memperakukan bahawa tindakannya keluar dari agama Islamadalah teratur (proper) dan sah (valid) di bawah Perkara 11 PP.Ini, tegas peguam terpelajar Persatuan Peguam-Peguam Muslim

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Malaysia, mengandaikan bahawa Mahkamah Sivil mempunyaibidangkuasa untuk membuat deklarasi yang dipohon oleh perayuitu. (Justeru itulah timbulnya soalan ketiga).

15.1. Peguam terpelajar perayu menarik perhatian mahkamah inikepada keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yangberkonflik. Kes-kes seperti Ng Wan Chan v. Majlis AgamaWilayah Persekutuan (No. 2) (supra) dan Lim Chan Seng v.Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam (supra) memutuskan bahawatanpa bidangkuasa yang dengan jelasnya diberi kepadaMahkamah Syariah atas sesuatu perkara tertentu, makamahkamah sivil hendaklah mengekalkan bidangkuasanya atasperkara itu. Pula, kes Md. Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama IslamWilayah Persekutuan (supra) menganjurkan teori bidangkuasatersirat. Mengikut teori itu, adalah memadai jika perkara itutelah dikhususkan untuk Mahkamah Syariah di dalam item 1,senarai 2, dalam Jadual 9 PP. Mengikut peguam terpelajar itulagi, kes Soon Singh (supra) telah menyelesaikan konflik itudengan menggunapakai teori bidangkuasa tersirat seperti yangdianjurkan oleh kes Md. Hakim Lee. Peguam terpelajar perayuseterusnya merujuk kepada keputusan-keputusan MahkamahPersekutuan dalam kes-kes Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinangv. Shaik Zolkaffily [2003] 3 CLJ 289 dan Azizah binti ShaikIsmail v. Fatimah binti Shaik Ismail [2003] 4 CLJ 281 yangmengikut keputusan kes Soon Singh. Sungguhpun demikian,peguam terpelajar itu tetap menghujahkan bahawa keputusankes Soon Singh itu adalah salah di sisi undang-undang kerana:

(a) keputusan itu gagal mengambilkira bahawa semuaenakmen undang-undang Islam negeri mewujudkan duaentiti yang berbeza, iaitu: Majlis Agama dan MahkamahSyariah. Dalam enakmen-enakmen, itu Majlis Agamamemainkan peranan pentadbiran manakala MahkamahSyariah adalah Badan Kehakiman. Peguam terpelajar itukemudiannya telah merujuk kepada Akta 505 yangmelalui ss. 24, 7 dan 10 memperuntukkan hal-halmengenai penubuhan, keanggotaan, fungsi, tugas danaktiviti Majlis Agama manakala s. 46 memperuntukkanbidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Kes Soon Singh(supra), ujar peguam terpelajar itu, membuat satukesilapan kerana tidak membezakan antara Majlis danMahkamah Syariah. Akibat dari kesilapan tersebut diatas kes Soon Singh telah turut silap apabila ianya

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menganggap bahawa Mahkamah Syariah di mana-manaadalah pihak berkuasa yang mengurus dan mengendalikanhal-hal pemelukan agama Islam. Seksyen-seksyen 139-141 Enakmen di negeri Kedah merujuk kepada Majlissebagai pihak berkuasa yang mengendalikan hal-halpemelukan agama Islam. Begitu juga dengan ss. 77-89Enakmen di Pulau Pinang yang merujuk kepadaPendaftar Pemelukan Agama Islam dan s. 82menunjukkan Majlis yang menyimpankan rekod pemelukagama Islam. Sama juga dengan Akta 505 yang melaluiss. 85-95 menjelaskan bahawa Majlis yang mengendalikanhal-hal pemelukan agama Islam. Justeru itu, tekanpeguam terpelajar itu, kenyataan oleh kes Soon Singhbahawasanya semua enakmen-enakmen negeri memberibidangkuasa kepada mahkamah-mahkamah Syariahdalam hal-hal berkenaan pemelukan agama Islam ituadalah ketara salah.

(b) Otoriti-otoriti yang digunapakai oleh kes Soon Singh bagimengasaskan teori bidangkuasa tersiratnya itu tidakmenyokong keputusannya. Jika otoriti-otoriti ituditelitikan, otoriti “Craies on Statute Law (7th edn) ms112 sebenarnya menyatakan bahawa bahasa yang jelasdan tidak kabur (express and unambiguous language)adalah diperlukan untuk mengubahkan bidangkuasamahkamah-mahkamah undang-undang (altering thejurisdiction of courts of law). Otoriti kes Albon v. Pyke[1842] 4 M & G 421 menunjukkan Tindal CJ di para424 mengatakan yang kaedah umum, tidak syak lagi,ialah bahawa bidangkuasa mahkamah-mahkamah atasantidak diambil atau hilang kecuali melalui perkataan-perkataan yang jelas atau implikasi perlu.

the general rule undoubtedly is that the jurisdiction ofthe superior courts is not taken away, except byexpress words or necessary implication. (bahasa asalpenghakiman)

(c) Kesalahan-kesalahan kes Soon Singh seperti dihuraikan diperenggan-perenggan 15(a)-(b) di atas telahmenyebabkan kes Soon Singh merumuskan bahawabidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah tidak perlu diberi olehundang-undang tetapi memadai dengan hanya merujukkepada senarai negeri dalam Jadual ke 9 sepertidilakukan oleh kes Md. Hakim Lee. Ini, kata peguam

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terpelajar itu, mencanggahi prinsip penggubalan undang-undang oleh legislator dan kaedah bahawa sesuatuundang-undang bertulis mestilah dibuat oleh legislatordan ianya tidak boleh berkuatkuasa sehinggalah undang-undang itu diberitahu melalui warta. Mengikut peguamterpelajar itu lagi, kesan keputusan kes Soon Singh ituialah bahawasanya sesuatu undang-undang itu dianggaptelah wujud walaupun perkara itu hanya terdapat dalamitem 1 senarai 2 Jadual 9 PP dan legislator belummembuat undang-undang atas perkara itu. Kes SoonSingh telah gagal mengenalpasti perbezaan antara kuasauntuk membuat undang-undang atas sesuatu perkaradan pembuatan undang-undang itu sendiri. Peguamterpelajar itu kemudiannya memetik apa yangMahkamah Agong India kata dalam kes Calcutta Gas Cov. State of Weat Bengal AIR [1962] SC 1044 di 1049iaitu kuasa untuk membuat undang-undang adalahdiberi kepada Legislator-Legislator yang berkenaan olehPerkara 246 Perlembagaan India. Peruntukan-peruntukan dalam ketiga-tiga senarai adalah hanyakepala-kepala atau bidang-bidang untuk pembuatanundang-undang: senarai-senarai itu menyempadankandaerah dalam mana legislator-legislator yang berkenaanboleh beroperasi.

The power to legislate is given to the appropriateLegislatures by art 246 of the Constitution. Theentries in the three Lists are only legislative heads orfields of legislation: they demarcate the area overwhich the appropriate Legislatures can operate (bahasaasal penghakiman)

Justeru itu, tegas peguam terpelajar perayu, keputusanSoon Singh bahawa hak untuk membuat undang-undangatas sesuatu perkara adalah sama dengan membuatundang-undang itu sendiri wajarlah ditolak sebagaiduluan buruk (bad precedent).

(d) Seksyen 67 Interpretation and General Clauses Act1967 mengisytiharkan bahawa setiap Akta Parlimen atauEnakmen Negeri adalah Akta atau Enakmen untukumum dan ianya boleh diberi notis kehakiman. Kes SoonSingh telah mengecualikan keperluan menyiarkanundang-undang atau proses pembuatan undang-undangmelalui peringkat rang undang-undang dan berakhir

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dengan perkenanan Raja. Justeru itu kes Soon Singh inihendaklah diperbetulkan segera, demikian ditekankanoleh peguam terpelajar perayu. Dalam meneruskanpenghujahannya mengenai kes Soon Singh ini, peguamterpelajar perayu memetik pemerhatian oleh HashimYeop Sani dalam kes Dalip Kaur a/p Gurbox Singh v.Pegawai Polis Daerah (OCPD) Bukit Mertajam & Anor(supra) yang antara lainnya, menyatakan bahawa Perkara121(1A) yang baru itu, yang berkuatkuasa mulai 10 Jun1988, telah melucutkan bidangkuasa mahkamah-mahkamah sivil atas perkara-perkara yang di dalambidangkuasa mahkamah-mahkamah Syariah. Walaubagaimanapun klausa itu tidak melucutkan bidangkuasamahkamah sivil untuk menafsirkan mana-mana undang-undang bertulis negeri yang diluluskan untukpentadbiran undang-undang Islam.

The new clause (1A) of art 121 of the constitutioneffective from 10 June 1988 has taken away thejurisdiction of the civil courts in respect of matterswithin the jurisdiction of the syariah courts. But thatclause does not take way the jurisdiction of the civilcourt to interpret any written laws of the statesenacted for the administration of Muslim law (bahasaasal penghakiman)

Bagi peguam terpelajar itu, pemerhatian itu denganjelasnya menunjukkan bahawa mahkamah sivil hendaklahmemutuskan sama ada sesuatu perkara itu terjatuhdalam bidangkuasanya atau bidangkuasa MahkamahSyariah.

15.2. Peguam terpelajar responden-responden kedua dan ketigapula berpendirian bahawa kes Md. Hakim Lee telahdiputuskan dengan betul. Justeru itu beliau berpendapat kes-kes Soon Singh dan Shaik Zolkaffily adalah mengandungiprinsip-prinsip yang betul mengenai bidangkuasa MahkamahSyariah.

15.3. Peguam terpelajar responden 1 merujuk kepada perkataanimplikasi (implication) seperti terdapat dalam “Bernion’sStatutory Interpretation 2nd edn” di ms 362 iaitu:

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Implikasi boleh muncul daripada bahasa yang digunakan,daripada konteks, atau daripada pemakaian sesetengahkaedah luaran.

Implication may arise from the language used, from thecontext, or from the application of some external rule(bahasa asal report)

Seterusnya peguam terpelajar itu menekankan bahawa olehkerana Akta 505 itu mengandungi peruntukan-peruntukanmengenai perkara-perkara berhubung dengan pemelukanagama Islam sebagai di bawah bidangkuasa MahkamahSyariah (s. 87 dan s. 91 dibaca dengan s. 46(2)(b) Akta505) maka secara implikasi, perkara-perkara mengenai murtaddan keluar dari agama Islam adalah juga di dalambidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah.

15.4. Di dalam kes Soon Singh, perayu memohon agar MahkamahTinggi mengeluarkan deklarasi yang beliau bukan seorangMuslim. Peguam terpelajar Jabatan Agama Islam Kedah(JAIK) membuat bantahan awal memohon agar permohonanperayu ditolak kerana Mahkamah Tinggi tiada bidangkuasaatas perkara seseorang itu bukan Muslim. Perkara itu adalahdi bawah bidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Mahkamah Tinggibersetuju dengan hujah peguam terpelajar JAIK dan menolakpermohonan perayu yang kemudiannya merayu ke MahkamahPersekutuan. Dalam penghakimannya Mahkamah Persekutuanmenyatakan bahawa persoalan di hadapannya ialah mengenaibidangkuasa Mahkamah-Mahkamah Syariah di bawah Perkara121(1A) PP. Mahkamah Persekutuan juga akui tiadanyaperuntukan-peruntukan khusus (express provisions) di dalamEnakmen Kedah yang memberikan bidangkuasa kepadaMahkamah Syariah untuk mengendalikan (deal) persoalanmurtad. Selepas itu Mahkamah Persekutuan merujuk kepadaCraies on Statute Law, kes Albon v. Pyke, Bennion’s StatutoryInterpretation and kes Dalip Kaur.

15.5. Mengenai kritikan peguam terpelajar perayu atas rujukan yangdibuat oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan kepada “Craies on StatuteLaw” dan kes “Albon v. Pyke”, saya hanya perlu tekankanbahawa Tindal CJ juga gunakan perkataan-perkataan implikasiperlu (necessary implication). Justeru itu MahkamahPersekutuan berpendapat bahawa adalah sejajar dengan logikuntuk Mahkamah Syariah, yang telah dengan jelasnya diberibidangkuasa untuk mengadili perkara-perkara yang berkaitan

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dengan pemelukan agama Islam adalah, secara implikasiperlu, juga mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk mengadili perkara-perkara yang berkaitan dengan keluarnya seorang Muslim dariagama Islam atau kemurtadanan. Saya tidak nampaksebarang kecacatan dalam taakulan penghakiman MahkamahPersekutuan itu. Oleh demikian saya tiada lain pilihanmelainkan menjawab soalan ketiga itu dengan mengatakanbahawa kes Soon Singh telah diputuskan dengan betul.

[16] Seperti yang telah dihuraikan di perenggan sebelum ini, kesSoon Singh ketara menunjukkan bahawa hal murtad adalah dalambidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Di perenggan (10) saya juga telahmerujuk kepada item 1, senarai 2, Jadual 9 PP bagi menunjukkanbahawa perkataan penting yang digunakan di situ ialah “matters”dan kerana “Islamic Law” adalah salah satu daripada “matters”yang terdapat dalam item 1 itu dan apabila dibaca pulaberlatarbelakangkan kes Dalip Kaur, maka amat ketara sekalibahawa sesungguhnya perkara murtad itu adalah perkara yangberhubungkait dengan undang-undang Islam (Islamic Law) dannyatalah oleh itu ianya adalah di dalam bidangkuasa MahkamahSyariah dan kerana Perkara 121(1A) PP, maka Mahkamah-Mahkamah Sivil tidak boleh campur tangan dalam hal itu.

[17] Beberapa hujah juga telah diketengahkan mengenai beberapahak-hak perayu di bawah PP. Telah juga diperhujahkan bahawakeperluan mengemukakan sijil/perakuan dari Mahkamah Syariah/Pihak Berkuasa bagi mengesahkan perayu murtad adalahbercanggah dengan kebebasan di bawah Perkara 11 PP. Mengikuthujah itu Perkara 11 PP memberi kebebasan kepada perayu untukmenganut mana-mana agama dan untuk keluar daripada sesuatuagama. Tiada siapa atau apa pun boleh menghalangnya dariberbuat demikian. Sebarang tindakan menghalang Perayu darimembuat sesukanya dalam pemilihan agama atau keluar dari mana-mana agama adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 11 PP.

17.1 Perkara 11 PP adalah seperti berikut:

(1) Every person has the right to profess and practise hisreligion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it.

(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceedsof which are specially allocated in whole or in part for thepurposes of a religion other than his own.

(3) Every religious group has the right:

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(a) to manage its own religious affairs;

(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious orcharitable purposes; and

(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer itin accordance with law.

(4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of KualaLumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, federal law may control orrestrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or beliefamong persons professing the religion of Islam.

(5) This Article does not authorize any act contrary to anygeneral law relating to public order, public health or morality.

17.2. Apa yang jelas dalam Perkara 11 itu ialah penggunaanperkataan-perkataan “… right to profess and practice hisreligion ...” Seperti yang dikatakan oleh Abdul HamidMohamad HMR (ketika itu) dalam kes Kamariah bte Ali lwn.Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan, Malaysia [2002] 3 CLJ 766: “kata-kata ‘has the right’ itu terpakai kepada ‘profess’ dan juga‘practice’”. Mengikut kes Che Omar bin Che Soh v. PublicProsecutor [1988] 2 MLJ 55. Islam itu bukan sahaja suatuhimpunan dogma-dogma dan ritual-ritual tetapi ianya adalahjuga suatu cara hidup yang lengkap merangkumi semuabidang aktiviti manusia, persendirian atau awam, perundangan,politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya, moral atau kehakiman. Danjika diteliti Perkara-Perkara 11(1), 74(2) dan item 1 di senarai2 dalam Jadual 9 PP akan ketara bahawa Islam itu meliputiantara lainnya undang-undang Islam. Justeru itu, seperti yangdihujahkan oleh peguam terpelajar Malaysian Muslim LawyersAssociation pemerhati diarah (watching brief), jika seseorangMuslim ingin keluar dari agama Islam, dia sebenarnyamenggunakan haknya di dalam konteks undang-undangsyariah yang mempunyai jurisprudennya sendiri mengenai isumurtad. Jika seseorang menganuti dan mengamalkan agamaIslam, sudah tentulah itu bererti dianya hendaklah mengikutiundang-undang Islam yang menetapkan cara memasuki Islamdan juga cara keluar dari agama Islam. Itulah ertinyamenganuti dan mengamal Islam. Dan apa yang telahdilakukan oleh pegawai JPN adalah hanya semata-mata untukmenentukan Perayu bukan lagi beragama Islam secara yangditetapkan oleh Islam. Justeru itu, saya tidak nampakbagaimana tindakan itu boleh dikatakan bertentangan denganPerkara 11(1) yang dengan sendirinya memperuntukkan

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keperluan mematuhi kehendak-kehendak agama itu sebelumdia keluar dari agama Islam. Menganuti dan mengamalkanagama Islam sudah tentu bererti mengamalkan bukan sajaaspek teologi dalam agama itu tapi juga undang-undangagama itu.

17.3 Perayu dalam kes Kamariah (supra) menghujahkan bahawaPerkara 11 itu bukan sahaja memberinya kebebasan untukmenganuti mana-mana agama, tetapi juga untuk keluar darimana-mana agama. Perayu menyatakan bahawa undang-undang tidak boleh menghalangnya berbuat demikian.Undang-undang mengikut perayu, tidak boleh memerlukan diamengikut sesuatu peraturan sama ada untuk memeluk ataukeluar dari sesuatu agama. Undang-undang seperti itu, ujarperayu, adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 11 dan oleh itutidak sah dan batal. Seksyen 102 Enakmen 1994 Kelantan,kata perayu, menghalang seorang Muslim mengakui bahawadia bukan Islam melainkan dia telah dapat pengesahanMahkamah. Ini, kata perayu, adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara11 dan kerana itu tidak sah dan batal.

17.4 Atas hujah perayu ini, Abdul Hamid Mohamad, HMR dalamkes Kamariah kata:

Jika itulah makna peruntukan itu maka bukan sahaja undang-undang yang menetapkan cara untuk seseorang itu memelukagama Islam dan keluar dari agama Islam tidak sah malahundang-undang yang menjadikan suatu kesalahan jika seorangIslam itu berzina, berkhalwat, tidak membayar zakat dan lain-lain itu juga semuanya tidak sah. Sebab, mengikut hujah itu,perkara 11 memberi hak kepada seseorang itu untukmengamalkan agamanya, maka terserahlah kepadanya samaada dia hendak mengamal mana-mana suruhan yang diahendak amalkan dan mana yang tidak, mematuhi mana-manalarangan yang dia hendak patuhi dan mana yang tidak. Olehitu, mengikut hujah itu, sebarang undang-undang yangmenghendaki seseorang itu melakukan sesuatu perkara ataumeninggalkan sesuatu perkara adalah bercanggah dengankebebasan yang diberi oleh perkara 11 dan oleh itu tidak sahsemuanya.

Pada pandangan saya, berkaitan dengan agama Islam (sayatidak memutuskan mengenai agama-agama lain), Perkara 11tidaklah boleh ditafsirkan sebegitu luas sehingga iamembatalkan semua undang-undang yang menghendakiseseorang Islam itu mengerjakan sesuatu kewajipan agama

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Islam atau melarang mereka melakukan sesuatu perkara yangdilarang oleh agama Islam atau yang menetapkan acara bagimelakukan sesuatu perkara yang berkaitan dengan agamaIslam.

Ini kerana kedudukan Islam dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuanadalah berlainan daripada kedudukan agama-agama lain.Pertama, hanya Islam, sebagai satu agama, yang disebutdengan namanya dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan, iaitusebagai ‘agama bagi Persekutuan’ (‘the religion of theFederation’) – Perkara 3(1).

Kedua, Perlembagaan itu sendiri memberi kuasa kepadaBadan Perundangan Negeri (bagi negeri-negeri) untukmengkanunkan Hukum Syarak dalam perkara-perkara yangdisebut dalam Senarai II, Senarai Negeri, Jadual Kesembilan,Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Senarai II’). Selaras dengankehendak Senarai II itu, Akta Mahkamah Syariah (BidangKuasa Jenayah) 1965 (‘Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction)Act 1965’) [*666] (‘Akta 355/1965’) dan berbagai-bagaienakmen (untuk Negeri-Negeri) termasuk yang disebut dalampenghakiman ini, telah dikanunkan.

Maka, jika undang-undang itu, termasuk s. 102 Enakmen 4/1994, tidak bercanggah dengan peruntukan Senarai II, dantidak bercanggah pula dengan peruntukan-peruntukan Akta355/1965, maka ia adalah undang-undang yang sah.

Peruntukan ini bolehlah dibandingkan dengan peruntukan-peruntukan mengenai nikah dan cerai. Hukum Syarakmenghendaki seorang lelaki dan seorang perempuan yanghendak bersekedudukan supaya bernikah mengikut syarat-syarat dan peraturan-peraturan tertentu. Keperluan semasamemerlukan undang-undang dibuat mengenainya, termasuk,antara lain, menghendaki nikah itu didaftarkan danpermohonan untuk bercerai dibuat di Mahkamah Syariah danperintah yang diberi, jika diberi, didaftarkan (bagi sayaundang-undang yang terakhir disebut ini yang kerapkalidipanggil ‘undang-undang pentadbiran’ itu, adalah sebahagiandaripada pembangunan (development) Hukum Syarak juga).Adakah undang-undang itu juga tidak sah dan batal atasalasan ia bercanggah dengan perkara 11 kerana, mengikuthujah itu, ia menghalang kebebasan beragama yang dijaminoleh perkara 11? Pada pandangan saya tidak.

17.5. Berasaskan otoriti-otoriti tersebut di atas ketara sekali bahawa:

(a) Isu pertukaran agama ini adalah secara langsungnya berkaitdengan hak-hak dan kewajipan-kewajipan perayu sebagaiseorang Muslim sebelum pertukaran itu berlaku;

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(b) Perkara 11(1) tidak wajar dihujahkan sebagai peruntukanyang memberi hak kebebasan yang tiada berbatas;

(c) Hak untuk menganut dan mengamalkan sesuatu agamahendaklah selalunya tertakluk kepada prinsip-prinsip danamalan-amalan yang ditentukan oleh agama itu.

[18] Berasaskan taakulan-taakulan yang dihuraikan di atasjawapan-jawapan saya kepada soalan-soalan tersebut di perenggan(1) di atas adalah seperti berikut:

(a) JPN berhak;

(b) JPN betul; dan

(c) Kes Soon Singh telah diputuskan dengan betulnya.

Dalam keadaan sedemikian, rayuan ini adalah ditolak tanpa perintahatas kos.

Richard Malanjum FCJ (dissenting):

Preliminary

[19] I had the privilege of deliberating with their Lordships thelearned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Dato’ Alauddin, FCJ on thedraft judgment for this appeal.

[20] With the greatest respect I am unable to concur with themon the final decision of this appeal. Hence, it is thus my task toexpress my views and reasons on what I think should be theoutcome of this appeal.

[21] Sworn to uphold the Federal Constitution (the Constitution),it is my task to ensure that it is upheld at all times by givingeffects to what I think the founding Fathers of this great nationhad in mind when they framed this sacred document.

[22] It is therefore my view that when considering an issue ofconstitutional importance it is vital to bear in mind that all otherinterests and feelings, personal or otherwise, should give way andassume only a secondary role if at all. The wise words of SallehAbas LP in Che Omar bin Che Soh v. PP [1988] 2 MLJ 55 arethus worthy of recall when he said this at p. 57:

... we have to set aside our personal feelings because the law inthis country is still what it is today, secular law, where moralitynot accepted by the law is not enjoying the status of law.

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[23] I would also say that the appeal before us is indeed not easyto resolve for it involves issues of critical importance in the heartsand minds of the people in this country. Cursory handling mayresult in unnecessary anxieties to the general public. Thus,intensive discussions and research works had to be done withgreat patience and sincerity before any conclusion could be made.

[24] In order to understand the real issues at hand I think it isnecessary to state and understand the important chronologicalfacts of this appeal.

Background Facts

[25] It is common ground that the appellant is a Malay womanborn on 8 January 1964. She was brought up as Muslim by herfamily and her given name is Azalina binti Jailani.

[26] On 21 February 1997 she applied to the NationalRegistration Department (NRD) (the first application) to changeher name to Lina Lelani. The reason she gave in her statutorydeclaration to support the application was that she had renouncedIslam for Christianity and that she intended to marry a Christian.

[27] Her application for name change was rejected by the NRDwithout any reason being given on 11 August 1997.

[28] However, she made a second application for name changebut this time to Lina Joy on 15 March 1999 (second application).In accordance with sub-regulation (1) of reg. 14 of the NationalRegulations 1990 (the Regulations), she again submitted astatutory declaration and stated that the reason for name changewas her conversion to Christianity.

[29] According to her, she received no reply and when she wentto enquire about her second application in July 1999 she was toldby an officer at the NRD office in Petaling Jaya that since heridentity card did not state her religion, to avoid any difficulty inprocessing her application she should not mention conversion asthe reason for name change.

[30] The appellant asserted that at that time it was not knownto the appellant then nor was she informed by NRD that theRegulations would shortly be amended and that her change ofname alone would be insufficient for her purposes. The amendmentthat was introduced shortly was to make it a requirement that inthe Identity Cards of Muslims the religion must be stated. In her

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affidavit in support of her originating summons in the High Courtthe appellant asserted that it was a “trick” or “muslihat” by NRDand the appellant was aggrieved over this.

[31] Such advice led the appellant to submit a further statutorydeclaration on 2 August 1999. In the new statutory declarationthere was no mention that the reason for the change of name wasdue to conversion of religion but stated her reason for change ofname as a matter of mere choice. The appellant resubmitted theapplication dated 15 March 1999 with a new statutory declarationsworn on 2 August 1999.

[32] On 22 October 1999, NRD wrote to her saying that herapplication for name change from ‘Azlina binti Jailani’ to ‘Lina Joy’was approved and she was asked to apply for a new replacementidentity card. This she did on 25 October 1999. However, by thetime she applied for the replacement card the appellant assertedthat unknown to her, the Regulations had been amended (videP.U.(A)70/2000) which came into force retrospectively on 1October 1999) to require that the identity card should state theparticular of religion for Muslims. Anyway, in the application formwhich asked her to state her religion the appellant stated herreligion to be Christianity.

[33] The application by the appellant for replacement identity cardwas rejected. The form as processed by NRD carried adepartmental entry by unnamed officer who wrote thus:

Arahan En. Rahim agama pemohon dikekalkan kepada Islam

(Translation: “Mr. Rahim instructed that the religion of theapplicant be retained as Islam”).

[34] On the notation it was later explained by the DirectorGeneral of NRD in this manner:

This notation was made because the informa tion contained in theNational Registration Department’s record showed that theApplicant is a Muslim and the Applicant had not forwarded anydocumentation from the Syariah Court nor any Islamic Authorityconcerned to prove her statement that she had renounced herIslamic faith.

[35] Consequently, her replacement identity card stated herreligion as Islam although the name change to Lina Joy waseffected. Her original name of Azalina binti Jailani was also statedon the reverse side of the replacement identity card. This was alsoas a result of the amendments introduced vide P.U.(A)70/2000.

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[36] The appellant then made a third application on 3 January2000 (third application) to NRD office in Petaling Jaya. Sheapplied to remove the word “Islam” and her original name fromher replacement identity card. She tendered a statutory applicationto support her application. The counter clerk however refused toaccept her application on the ground that it was incompletewithout an order of the Syariah Court to the effect that she hadrenounced Islam. The Director General attempted to deny thatthe application was rejected at the counter. However the Courtof Appeal accepted the version of the appellant.

[37] That is where the position of the appellant in her quest tochange her name completely and drop the reference to her originalreligion in the identity card came to a standstill.

Proceedings In The Courts Below

[38] By way of originating summons the appellant decided toseek relief in the High Court praying, inter alia, for severaldeclaratory orders against the Majlis Agama Islam WilayahPersekutuan (Majlis) and the Government of Malaysia in respectof her right to freedom of religion, the constitutionality of s. 2 ofthe Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) 1993, theapplicability of Syariah Enactments to her who professed thereligion of Christianity and the constitutionality of the state andfederal legislations that forbade conversion out of Islam.

[39] In addition she sought for an order that her name beentered in the Registry Book as having converted out of Islam.The appellant had joined the Majlis and sought the saiddeclaratory orders because she said that she entertained fear thataction would be taken against her by the religious authorities.

[40] The respondents filed a striking out application. However,the learned High Court Judge heard originating summons itself anddismissed it completely without granting any of the remedies theappellant sought. She appealed.

[41] In the Court of Appeal, the parties by consent narroweddown the issues and the relief sought for significantly. Theconstitutional issues were abandoned and the appeal focusedpurely on an issue of administrative law, that is, whether theDirector General of NRD correctly exercised the discretion vestedin him under the law.

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[42] With the consent of the Court of Appeal, the DirectorGeneral was added as a respondent. The questions that wereposed to the Court of Appeal stated as follows:

(i) whether reg. 14 of the 1990 Regulations required only astatutory declaration and nothing else, and therefore theDirector General, in asking for the Syariah Court order orcertificate, was imposing additional requirement to theregulation; if so,

(ii) whether the imposition of such additional requirementamounted to Wednesbury unreasonableness on the part of theDirector General or the National Registration Department.

[43] However these questions were subsequently summarizedthus:

whether the NRD was right in law in rejecting the appellant’sapplication under reg. 14 of the National Registration Regulations1990 (“the 1990 Regulations”) to have the statement of herreligion as “Islam” deleted from her NRIC and in requiring acertificate and/or order from the Syariah Court.

[44] By majority the Court of Appeal answered the summarizedquestion in the affirmative.

Proceeding Before This Court

[45] Arising from the answer by majority of the Court of Appealthe appellant sought for leave to appeal to this court.

[46] On 13 April 2006 after hearing the respective submissions ofcounsel for the parties leave to appeal was granted on threequestions for consideration by this court. The questions are:

a. Whether the National Registration Department (NRD) isentitled in law to impose as a requirement for deleting theentry of Islam in the Applicant’s Identity Card (IC) that sheproduce a certificate or a declaration or an order from theSyariah Court that she has apostatized?

b. Whether the NRD has correctly construed its power underthe National Registration Regulations 1990, in particular reg.4 and reg. 14, to impose the requirement as stated abovewhen it is not expressly provided for in the Regulations?

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c. Whether Soon Singh was rightly decided when it adopted theimplied jurisdiction theory propounded in Md Hakim Lee v.Majlis Agama [1997] 4 CLJ Supp 419 in preference to NgWan Chan v. Majlis Agama (No. 2) [1991] 3 MLJ 487 andLim Chang Seng v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam [1996] 3 CLJ231 which declared that unless an express jurisdiction isconferred on the Syariah Court, the civil courts will retaintheir jurisdiction?’

[47] When hearing of the appeal proper began learned counsel forthe parties herein initially agreed to approach the matter purely fromthe administrative law aspect. However, upon being allowed toexpress their views during the hearing proper learned counsel for thevarious interested non-governmental bodies appearing on watchingbrief raised some constitutional issues which the appellant andrespondents agreed to skip earlier on. Hence, in fairness to theappellant and respondents this court allowed their learned counsel tosubmit on those constitutional issues in reply.

[48] I propose to deal with the first two Questions together anddeal with the third Question separately.

Questions 1 And 2

[49] These Questions appear to be substantially an administrativelaw issue. However beneath it lurks fundamental constitutionalissues involving fundamental liberties and in the context of theconstitutional arrangement in Malaysia the division of powersbetween the State and Federal authorities.

Fundamental Legal Principles

[50] I therefore begin by restating some well-entrenched legalprinciples which may seem obvious to many yet often overlooked.

[51] Article 3(1) of the Constitution placed Islam to a specialposition in this country. However, art. 3(4) clearly provides thatnothing in the article derogates from any other provision of theConstitution thereby implying that art. 3(1) was never intended tooverride any right, privilege or power explicitly conferred by theConstitution. (See: Che Omar bin Che Soh v. PP (supra)). Indeedthis is consonant with art. 4 of the Constitution which placesbeyond doubt that the Constitution is the supreme law of thiscountry. Article 4 thereof is abundantly clear. It follows that tobe valid all laws whether federal or state legislations of any kindand whether they are pre or post Merdeka must be in conformity

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with the provisions of the Constitution including those dealing withfundamental liberties. (See: Surinder Singh Kanda v. Govt. of theFederation of Malaya [1962] 28 MLJ 169; Aminah v. Supt. OfPrisons [1968] 1 MLJ 92; City Council of George Town v Govt. ofPenang [1967] 1 MLJ 169; Nordin Salleh v. Dewan UndanganKelantan [1992] 2 CLJ 1125; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 72).

[52] Legislative bodies, whether Parliament and State Assembliesdo not therefore have independent and sovereign legislative powermerely on the basis of the Legislative Lists in Schedule 9 of theConstitution. In fact such legislative powers are derived from theConstitution itself. Hence, one is not wrong to say that theLegislative Lists are subordinate to the fundamental libertiesprovisions enshrined in the Constitution. (See: PP v. MohamedIsmail [1984] 2 MLJ 219).

[53] Just as any legislation or any part thereof will be struckdown if it fails to conform with any of the provisions of theConstitution so too with administrative, departmental and executivediscretions, policies and decisions. In other words they too mustnot infringe any of the provisions of the Constitution. (See: PP v.Su Liang Yu [1978] 2 MLJ 79; Madhavan Nair v. PP [1975] 264).In addition, administrative, departmental and executive discretions,policies and decisions must also be within the ambit of theenabling legislations otherwise they too will be struck down forbeing ultra vires the legislations. (See: Ghazali v. PP [1964] 30MLJ 159). Of course it goes without saying that the enablinglegislation must also be in conformity with the provisions of theConstitution. (See: PP v. Mohamed Ismail (supra)).

[54] In order to supervise and monitor the exercise ofadministrative, departmental or executive discretions our courtshave followed with modifications where necessary the legalprinciples pronounced by the courts in other common lawjurisdictions. For instance, to be valid administrative, departmentalor executive discretions must not suffer any of the three categoriesof legal infirmities, namely, illegality, irrationality and proceduralimpropriety. (See: CCSU v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3All ER 935; Persatuan Aliran Kesederaran Negara v. Minister of HomeAffairs [1988] 1 MLJ 442).

[55] Indeed check on the exercise of administrative, departmentalor executive discretions in this country is critical otherwise theacclaimed observance to the rule of law will just be a hollowedstatement. A clear caution and advice on the danger was given by

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none other than his Lordship Raja Azlan Shah CJ (as His Majestythen was) in Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v.Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135 where hisLordship said this at p. 148:

Every legal power must have legal limits, otherwise there isdictatorship. In particular, it is a stringent requirement that adiscretion should be exercised for a proper purpose, and that itshould not be exercised unreasonably. In other words, everydiscretion cannot be free from legal restraint; where it is wronglyexercised, it becomes the duty of the courts to intervene. Thecourts are the only defence of the liberty of the subject againstdepartmental aggression. In these days when governmentdepartments and public authorities have such great powers andinfluence, this is a most important safeguard for the ordinarycitizen: so that the courts can see that these great powers andinfluence are exercised in accordance with law. I would once againemphasise what has often been said before, that “public bodiesmust be compelled to observe the law and it is essential thatbureaucracy should be kept in its place.

[56] It is thus with the salutary caution and advice by HisMajesty in mind that I proceed to consider the thorny andsensitive legal problems presented to this court for judicialdetermination in the form of Questions 1 and 2.

The Scope Of regs. 4 And 14 Of The National RegistrationRegulations 1990 And Their Implementation

[57] The relevant portions of reg. 4 of the National RegistrationRegulations 1990 as amended reads:

Any person who is required to register under Regulations 3(1) or3(2) or to re-register under regulation 18 or 28 or who appliesfor a replacement identity card under regulation 13 or 14 shall:

(a) …

(b) …

(c) give the following particulars to the registration officer asaforesaid, namely:

(i) his name as appearing in his Certificate of Birth or suchother document or, if he is known by different names,each of such names, in full;

(ii) his previous identity card number, if any;

(iii) the full address of his place of residence within Malaysia;

(iv) his race;

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(iva) his religion (only for Muslims); w.e.f. 1.10.1999;

(v) his place of birth;

(vi) his date of birth and sex;

(vii) his physical abnormalities, if any;

(viii) his status as a citizen of Malaysia or other citizenshipstatus;

(ix) such other particulars as the registration officer maygenerally or in any particular case consider necessary forthe purpose of identification, and

(x) produce such documentary evidence as the registrationofficer may consider necessary to support the accuracyof any particulars submitted.

[58] For reg. 14 of the National Registration Regulations 1990the un-amended version is relevant and it reads:

14(1) A person registered under these Regulations who:

(a) changes his name;

(b) acquires the citizenship of Malaysia or is deprived of hiscitizenship of Malaysia; or

(c) has in his possession an identity card containing anyparticular, other than his address, which is to hisknowledge incorrect,

shall forthwith report the fact to the nearest registration office andapply for a replacement identity card with the correct particulars.

(2) Any person registered under these Regulations who applyfor a change of name under subregulation (1) shall furnish theregistration officer with a statutory declaration to the effect thathe has absolutely renounced and abandoned the use of his formername and in lieu thereof has assumed a new name and the reasonfor such change of name shall also be stated in the statutorydeclaration.

[59] Thus, reg. 4(c) stipulates, inter alia, when any person appliesfor a replacement identity card the Registration officer has to besupplied with the particulars stated therein and ‘such otherparticulars as the registration officer may generally or in anyparticular case consider necessary for the purpose of identification…’ and ‘produce such documentary evidence as the registrationofficer may consider necessary to support the accuracy of anyparticulars submitted.’

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[60] Besides supplying the required particulars under reg. 4 aperson applying for change of name is also required under reg. 14to furnish a statutory declaration declaring ‘to the effect that hehas absolutely renounced and abandoned the use of his formername and in lieu thereof has assumed a new name and the reasonfor such change of name’.

[61] Having considered therefore regs. 4 and 14 in their entiretyvis-à-vis the adopted policy or the requirement imposed by NRDand having the Constitution in the forefront of my mind andhaving considered the submissions of learned counsel for theparties and those allowed by this court to address, I think somepertinent conclusions can be derived in relation to the twoQuestions.

[62] First, relevant in considering the foregoing regulations is art.8(1) of the Constitution which proclaims that ‘all persons areequal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of thelaw’. Simply put it means that it requires all persons in likecircumstances should be treated alike. It applies to both legislativepowers and administrative discretion as well as to substantive andprocedural rights and duties. (See: Lachmandas v. State of Bombay[1952] SCR 710). And art. 8(2) prohibits any form ofdiscrimination against citizens unless expressly authorized by theConstitution itself on the ground only of religion, race, descent orplace of birth or gender in any law ... In other words all forms ofdiscrimination are forbidden unless it is explicitly permitted by theConstitution and that classification of people is permitted providedit is reasonable classification and not based on constitutionallyforbidden grounds or on arbitrary or irrational differences. Hence,classification must be based on intelligible differentia whichdistinguishes those that are grouped together from the others thatare left out. (See: Datuk Haji Harun Idris v. PP [1977] 2 MLJ155; Pathumma v. State of Kerala A [1978] SC 771). Only art.8(5) provides that art. 8 does not invalidate or prohibit anyprovision regulating personal law which generally means domesticrelations, family matters, succession, marriage, divorce and so forth.With respect the registration and identity card regulations are notprovisions governing or regulating personal law.

[63] Regulation 4, in particular sub-regulation 4(c) (iva), has,however, singled out Muslims for additional procedural burdensand impediments which are not connected to personal law. Itrequires that any registrant or person applying who is a Muslimhas to state his or her religion. The requirement does not apply

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to non-Muslims. There is therefore a differential treatment forMuslims. Hence, in my view this tantamount to unequal treatmentunder the law and in the absence of any exception found to justifythe discrimination the said sub-regulation has infringed art. 8(1) ofthe Constitution. In other words it is discriminatory andunconstitutional and should therefore be struck down. For thisreason alone that the relief sought for by the appellant should begranted namely, for a declaration that she is entitled to have anNRIC (Identity Card) in which the word ‘Islam’ does not appear.

[64] I am also unable to accede to any suggestion that the sub-regulation is covered by art. 8(5) of the Constitution. Theregulation has nothing to do with regulating personal law of aMuslim.

[65] Second, regs. 4 and 14 provide the mechanics by which aperson can apply for replacement identity card, that is, theapplicant has to supply particulars as stipulated and such otherparticulars necessary for the purpose of identification and toproduce documentary evidence to support the accuracy of anyparticulars submitted. (emphasis added).

[66] However, in the matter before us it is not in dispute thatNRD insisted, based on its policy when there is nothing expressedin the two regulations, for the production of an apostasycertificate by the appellant from the Federal Territory Syariahcourt or some Islamic authority before her third application couldbe processed.

[67] Learned Senior Federal counsel appearing for the 2nd and3rd respondents had the same view on the point when it wassubmitted ‘that para (c)(ix) and (x) of reg. 4 empowers theregistration officer to call for additional information as well asdocumentary evidence from the appellant when she applied tocorrect her particulars pertaining to the word “Islam” in her ICunder reg. 14(1)(c). Therefore, there was nothing illegal in theNRD requesting the appellant to produce a certificate and/ororder from the Syariah Court or any other relevant Islamicauthority.’

[68] Learned Senior Federal counsel also relied on an impliedpower of NRD officers duly appointed by virtue of the NationalRegistration Act 1959 the authority to enforce certain conditionswhich they consider reasonably necessary in performing theirduties and functions under the National Registration Act 1959and the regulations made there under.

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[69] Such submission however can only be sustained if the thirdapplication of the appellant is considered in isolation for it is truethat in her identity card issued after the second application theword ‘Islam’ appeared consequent to the amendment P.U.(A)70/2000 which came into force retrospectively on 1 October 1999.

[70] The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal agreed withthe approach taken by NRD when it said this:

… I believe that the NRD adopts the policy that a mere statutorydeclaration is insufficient for it to remove the word “Islam” fromthe identity card of a Muslim. It is because the renunciation ofIslam is a matter of Islamic law on which the NRD is not anauthority that it adopts the policy of requiring the determinationof some Islamic religious authority before it can act to remove theword “Islam” from a Muslim’s identity card. The policy of theNRD is stated in paragraph 14 of the Director General’s affidavitdated 27 January 2005. In view of the considerations that I haveset out I am of the view that the policy is a perfectly reasonableone.

[71] With respect, I am unable to agree with the majorityjudgment of the Court of Appeal and the submission of thelearned Senior Federal counsel. I think the minority judgment ofthe Court of Appeal took the correct approach in the constructionof those regulations when it said this:

In her statutory declaration dated February 21, 1997 stated,among other matters: (i) that she had never professed orpracticed Islam as her religion since birth; (ii) that she hadembraced Christianity in 1990; and (iii) that she intended to marrya Christian. Her later statutory declaration dated March 15, 1999affirmed in support of her application dated January 3, 2000 addslittle to what she had previously declared. The form sheattempted to submit on January 3, 2000 makes it clear in column31 that she no longer wished to be a Muslim. In thesecircumstances, an order from the Syariah Court does nothing tosupport the accuracy of the particular that the appellant is aChristian. However, the baptismal certificate dated May 11, 1998produced by the Appellant in evidence amply supports theaccuracy of the particular that the Appellant is a Christian. Thisconclusion is amply supported by examining the way in whichRegulation 14(2) is constructed. That Sub-regulation requires theapplicant to state in his or her statutory declaration the reason forthe change of name. In the appellant’s case, she stated that herreason for the change of name was that she was now a Christian.Accordingly, there is nothing in Regulation 4(cc) (xiii) (sic) (to

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read Regulation 4(c)(x)) that supports the action of the DirectorGeneral in this case. It follows from what I have said thus farthat an order or certificate from the Syariah Court is not arelevant document for the processing of the appellant’s application.It is not a document prescribed by the 1990 Regulations. Nor isit a particular that a registration officer is entitled to call for as aparticular under Regulation 4(cc) (xiii)’ (sic) (to read Regulation4(c)(x))

[72] I would add that NRD overlooked the point that theapplication of the appellant should be considered within thecontext of the requirements of regs. 4 and 14 only and should notbring in any extraneous factor such as retrieving information fromits record. In the form submitted by the appellant she stated herreligion to be Christianity. This fact was known by NRD as earlyas 21 February 1997. Hence the third application should havebeen processed and considered only on that basis and to construethe series of applications by the appellant as one continuousepisode. And to my mind if the appellant has satisfied therequirements of regs. 4 and 14 NRD has no option but to allowher application. It is not the function of NRD to add in furtherrequirements which have not been stipulated in those regulations.It is also not the function of NRD to ensure that the appellanthas properly apostatized. Such matter should be left to therelevant religious authorities to take up any action deemednecessary or appropriate. NRD has not shown that one of itsstatutory duties is to ensure that a person has properly renouncedthe Islamic faith in accordance with the requirements by theIslamic authorities. I would therefore think that in coming to itsdecision to reject the application of the appellant on account ofnon-production of an order or a certificate of apostasy from theFederal Territory Syariah Court or Islamic authorities NRD hadasked itself the wrong question and had taken legally irrelevantfactor into account and excluded legally relevant factor.

[73] Accordingly, I am inclined to agree with the submission oflearned counsel for the appellant that ‘in requiring production of adocument that is not provided for nor authorised by the regulationNRD had acted ultra vires its powers under the regulations’ andhence acted ‘illegally’ in the context of principle enunciated inCCSU v. Minister for the Civil Service (supra) because it has notunderstood correctly ‘the law that regulates (its) decision makingpower’.

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[74] Lord Diplock in the CCSU case (supra) said this:

By ‘illegality’ as a ground for judicial review I mean that thedecision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates hisdecision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he hasor not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in theevent of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom thejudicial power of the state is exercisable.

[75] Third, there is merit in the contention by learned counsel forthe appellant that the insistence by NRD for a certificate ofapostasy is not consonant with the requirement of reg. 4(c)(x)because ‘the call for proof of renunciation of religion does not fallwithin the meaning of the words “particulars submitted”. The only“particulars submitted” by the appellant was her status as aChristian or of her conversion to Christianity … NRD was onlyempowered to call for such documentary evidence that itconsidered “necessary to support the accuracy of any particularssubmitted”. The relevant “particulars submitted” was that theappellant was a “Kristian”. Thus the NRD could call fordocumentary evidence to support the accuracy of that particular(“Kristian”) which the appellant had submitted. However, theNRD could not call for documentary evidence that the appellantwas or was not a Muslim. This is because the appellant had notsubmitted any particular that she was a Muslim.

[76] The majority judgment of the Court of Appeal circumventedthe above contention by holding thus:

The appellant’s misfortune lay in the fact that by the time theNRD approved her application, the retrospective requirement oflaw that the identity card of a Muslim should state his religionhad started to be implemented, so that the religion ‘Islam’ had tobe stated in the appellant’s replacement identity card. I bear inmind that the appellant in her application for the replacementidentity card after the approval of her change of name did stateher religion as Christianity. Dato’ Cyrus Das in his oralsubmission said that it was unreasonable for the officer concernedto direct, as stated under item 37 of the application form, that theappellant’s religion remain as Islam, seeing that the change ofname, which was approved, was due to change of religion. Butwith the substitution of the statutory declaration, the change ofname was no longer sought on the basis of change of religion andwas not considered and approved on that basis. According to therecords of the NRD the appellant was a Muslim. The questionof change of religion did not arise for the NRD at that stage. Itwas therefore not unreasonable for the officer concerned to direct

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that the appellant’s religion remain as Islam. I may mention thatin para 13.3 of the appellant’s affidavit in support of heroriginating summons she said that the advice that she shouldsubmit another statutory declaration was a trick or tactic(muslihat) and there seems to be a suggestion in para 13.4 thatthe NRD deliberately delayed approving her application until afterthe implementation of the new requirement so that when thereplacement identity card came to be issued it would, whilebearing the new name that the appellant desired, neverthelessshow her to be a Muslim, but this allegation of trickery or tactichas not been followed up in the appellant’s submission in thisappeal. In any case, as I said, since the administrative lawquestion that has been framed for this appeal is concerned withthe appellant’s third application, and is not concerned with thesecond application, any criticism of the NRD’s manner of handlingthe second application is irrelevant.

…

In the appellant’s third application in Form JPN 5/2, under items29, 30 and 31 she in effect stated that the error in her identitycard was in the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’, whichtherefore she wanted removed. It amounted to her saying that shehad renounced Islam. The NRD could therefore, under para (x),require her to produce documentary evidence to support theaccuracy of her contention that she was no longer a Muslim.

[77] With respect, the holding in the majority judgment of theCourt of Appeal completely disregarded the fact that the appellantmade several applications for a change of name. Surely thoseapplications should be regarded as part of a continuing act on thepart of the appellant. To confine the matter to the third applicationonly is completely ignoring the history of the plight of theappellant in her dealings with NRD. I am inclined to agree withthe submission that ‘if the NRD had correctly acted on theappellant’s choice of religion for the replacement I.C. in October1999, and had not rejected it on the ground that she had notproduced an apostatisation order, there would have been nonecessity for the third application to correct the particulars asregards entry of “religion”’.

[78] In fact the ‘compartmentalized approach’ adopted by themajority judgment of the Court of Appeal led it to distinguish thepresent appeal from the unreported case of Ismail bin Suppiah v.Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara (R-1-24-31 of 1995). In themajority judgment the case of Ismail bin Suppiah was ruled to beonly concerned with change of name whereas in the present

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appeal the central issue relates to removal of the word ‘Islam’from the identity card of the appellant. With respect I am unableto agree with the distinction made. Such an approach could onlybe correct if the history of the present appeal is omitted.Otherwise both cases are premised on the same reason.

[79] Fourth, there is justification to say that NRD being thedecision-maker ‘had misunderstood the provision under which hehad to act and denied relief to the appellant. The decision-makercannot by misconstruing the provision decide on something that isnot provided for. The decision-maker is confined to the mattersprescribed for in the statute and not to “base their decision onsome matter which is not prescribed for”. (See Anisminic Ltd v.Foreign Compensation Tribunal [1969] 1 All ER 208). I would saythat there was an abuse of power on the part of NRD when itfailed to take into consideration a legally relevant factor, namelythe statutory declaration and the documents submitted by theappellant, preferring its policy of requiring a certificate of apostasyfrom the Federal Territory Syariah Court which in the first placeis not stipulated in the regs. 4 and 14 thereby taking legallyirrelevant factor into consideration in making a decision. (See alsoR v. Inner London Education Authority ex parte Westminster CityCouncil [1986] 1 All ER 19; Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union[1971] 1 QB 175; Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuanv. Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd (supra)).

[80] In the majority judgment it was said that the policy adoptedby NRD was reasonable and that it was justified for NRD torequest for a certificate of apostasy since ‘“renunciation of Islamis a question of Islamic law” and that it “is not within thejurisdiction of the NRD and that the NRD is not equipped orqualified to decide”’.

[81] With respect I would say that the majority judgment erredin considering an issue which should not have been there in thefirst place, namely affirming the insistence by NRD for a certificateof apostasy when the appellant had in fact met all therequirements stipulated in regs. 4 and 14.

[82] Further, the conclusion in the majority judgment that theimpugned policy adopted by NRD was reasonable within the testof Wednesbury Corporation v. Ministry of Housing [1966] 2 QB 275has unfortunately missed one cardinal principle. The implementationof the policy has a bearing on the appellant’s fundamental

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constitutional right to freedom of religion under art. 11 of theConstitution. Being a constitutional issue it must be given priorityand independent of any determination of the Wednesburyreasonableness. A perceived reasonable policy could well infringe aconstitutional right. Hence, before it can be said that a policy isreasonable within the test of Wednesbury its constitutionality mustbe first considered. The majority judgment failed to carry out suchan exercise before coming to its conclusion on the NRD policy.

[83] Another aspect of the majority judgment which, with respect,I am inclined to disagree is its holding that the Director Generalof NRD was right in stating that apostasy is exclusively within therealm of the Syariah Court. In my view apostasy involves complexquestions of constitutional importance especially when some Statesin Malaysia have enacted legislations to criminalize it which in turnraises the question involving federal-state division of legislativepowers. It therefore entails consideration of arts. 5(1), 3(4), 11(1),8(2), 10(1)(a), 10(1)(e), 12(3) and the Ninth Schedule of theConstitution. Since constitutional issues are involved especially onthe question of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitutionit is of critical importance that the civil superior courts should notdecline jurisdiction by merely citing art. 121(1A). In my view thesaid article only protects the Syariah Court in matters within theirjurisdiction which does not include the interpretation of theprovisions of the Constitution. Hence when jurisdictional issuesarise civil courts are not required to abdicate their constitutionalfunction. Legislations criminalizing apostasy or limiting the scope ofthe provisions of the fundamental liberties as enshrined in theConstitution are constitutional issues in nature which only the civilcourts have jurisdiction to determine.

[84] Fifth, it is worthy to note that while a public authority isallowed to adopt departmental policies and to broadcast them toall concerned, it must not allow its policies to override its statutoryduty to act in the public interest. A public authority must alsohave the legal authority when it wishes to impose a substantiveor procedural requirement to those who come before it.Administrative powers cannot be utilized to achieve collateral orunauthorized purposes no matter how noble or well-intended thesepurposes or policies might be. (See Pyx Granite v. Ministry ofHousing [1959] 3 All ER 1; Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture [1968]1 All ER 694).

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[85] The consequence of the approval by the majority judgmentof the Court of Appeal to the policy adopted by NRD is tocondone the unlawful delegation of authority by NRD to someother third body when it is not sanctioned by the law. (SeeJackson Stanfield v. Butterworth [1948] 2 All ER 358; Lavender v.Minister of Housing [1970] 3 All ER 871; Isman bin Osman v. Govt.of Malaysia [1973] 2 MLJ 143). In fact I think the majorityjudgment has permitted NRD to extinguish its statutory discretionby a self-imposed fetter.

[86] Sixth, by voluntarily abdicating its discretionary power undera federal law to an outside religious body NRD had acted withirrationality in the sense as described in CCSU case (supra). Iwould say that NRD had unlawfully agreed to act under thedictation of another. It is well accepted in administrative law thata decision maker or body is entitled to consult and seek advicefrom any source, provided it retains the ultimate authority to makethe final decision. It must retain its power to act independently inpursuance of the statutory purpose of the law. (See De Smith,Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th edn at p. 309). Indeeda public authority is obliged to make its own decision and not acton the dictates of another. (See Bread Manufacturer of New SouthWales v. Evans [1986] 56 ALJR 89; Commissioner of Police v.Gordhandas Banji AIR 1952 SC 16; P Patto v. Chief Police Officer,Perak & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 204).

[87] Seventh, in the present appeal the insistence by NRD for acertificate of apostasy from the Federal Territory Syariah Court orany Islamic Authority was not only illegal but unreasonable. Thisis because under the applicable law, the Syariah Court in theFederal Territory has no statutory power to adjudicate on theissue of apostasy. It is trite law that jurisdiction must come fromthe law and cannot be assumed. Thus the insistence wasunreasonable for it required the performance of an act that wasalmost impossible to perform. (See Wednesbury Corporation v.Ministry of Housing (supra); Oriental Insurance Co Ltd & Anor v.Minister of Finance [1992] 2 MLJ 776).

[88] Another aspect of the unreasonableness of the policy ofNRD is in its consequence if followed. In some States in Malaysiaapostasy is a criminal offence. Hence, to expect the appellant toapply for a certificate of apostasy when to do so would likelyexpose her to a range of offences under the Islamic law is in myview unreasonable for its means the appellant is made to self-incriminate.

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[89] Eighth, it is a settled principle in administrative law that apublic authority must not act mechanically. It must consider eachcase on its own merits. It must retain the discretion to departfrom its policy whenever public interest so demands. (See R v.Windsor Licensing ex parte Hodes [1983] 2 All ER 551). Howeverin the present appeal it was shown by the appellant that herrepeated applications were rejected across the counter in amechanical way by giving effect to the extra-legal policy.

[90] Ninth, I would also say that in rejecting the application ofthe appellant without giving her a fair hearing and assigningreasons for the decision, NRD had failed to observe the principlesof natural justice, a procedural impropriety that could be a basisto nullify any judicial, administrative, departmental or executivedecision. (See J P Berthelsen v. Director General Immigration [1987]1 MLJ 134). The need becomes critical when the constitutionalright of the appellant under art. 11(1) is involved, that herlegitimate expectations were raised when her name change wasallowed, that she had spent many years to try to resolve herproblem with NRD including her compliance with an advice givenby a staff of NRD and that it was the inclusion of the word‘Islam’ in her new identity card that led her to seek for judicialreview.

[91] Tenth, there is also the duty of NRD to act fairly towardsthe appellant. In appropriate cases there may be a duty to actfairly prior to the making of delegated legislations. (See R v.Secretary for Health ex parte United States Tobacco International Inc.[1991] 3 WLR 529). In the case of the appellant there was nochallenge to her assertion that at the time she was advised tomake the third application she was not informed or given anynotice that reg. 4 would be amended. In my view there istherefore a reasonable suspicion that reg. 4, although formulatedin 2000, was deliberately amended retrospectively to 1 October1999 in order to target and to prejudice the third application ofthe appellant made on 23 October 1999. The duty to act fairlyand thus observing the rules of natural justice was not done byNRD. The least that NRD could have done was to notify theappellant of the impending amendment when advising her tosubmit the third application as only NRD would have known ofthe impending amendment which had definite impact to the thirdapplication of the appellant. In my view NRD had failed to complywith one aspect of the rules of natural justice.

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[92] Thus, for the foregoing reasons my answers to the first twoQuestions are therefore in the negative.

Question 3

[93] This third Question is focused on this Court’s decision inSoon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia(PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 2 CLJ 5 where this court wasof the opinion that:

the jurisdiction of the syariah courts to deal with the conversionout of Islam, although not expressly provided in the StateEnactments, can be read into them by implication derived fromthe provisions concerning conversion into Islam. It is a generalrule of construction that if the meaning of a statute is not plain,it is permissible in certain cases to have recourse to a constructionby implication and the court may draw inferences or supply theobvious omissions … altering the jurisdiction of courts of law,which in the words of Tindal CJ in Albon v. Pyke [1842] 4 M &G 421 at p. 424: ‘the general rule undoubtedly is, that thejurisdiction of the superior courts is not taken away, except byexpress words or necessary implication’. In the instant case, inour opinion, the general rule of construction applies and the courtcan have recourse to a construction by implication. Implicationmay arise from the language used, from the context, or from theapplication of some external rule. They are of equal force,whatever their derivation (Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation (2ndedn) p 362). It is quite clear to us that the legislative purpose ofthe State Enactments and the Act is to provide a law concerningthe enforcement and administration of Islamic law, the constitutionand organization of the syariah courts and related matters.Therefore, when jurisdiction is expressly conferred on the syariahcourts to adjudicate on matters relating to conversion to Islam, inour opinion, it is logical that matters concerning conversion outof Islam (apostasy) could be read as necessarily implied in andfalling within the jurisdiction of the syariah courts. One reason wecan think of is that the determination of a Muslim convert’sconversion out of Islam involves inquiring into the validity of hispurported renunciation of Islam under Islamic law in accordancewith hukum syarak (Dalip Kaur). As in the case of conversion toIslam, certain requirements must be complied with under hukumsyarak for a conversion out of Islam to be valid, which only thesyariah courts are the experts and appropriate to adjudicate. Inshort, it does seem inevitable that since matters on conversion toIslam come under the jurisdiction of the syariah courts, byimplication conversion out of Islam should also fall under thejurisdiction of the same courts.

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[94] But the final conclusion in the above case was preceded bythis statement:

In this regard, we share the view of Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ(Malaya) in Dalip Kaur that ‘clear provisions should beincorporated in all State Enactments to avoid difficulties ofinterpretation by the civil courts,’ particularly in view of the newcl. (1A) of art 121 of the Constitution which as from 10 June1988 had taken away the jurisdiction of the civil courts in respectof matters within the jurisdiction of the syariah courts.

[95] I am aware that Soon Singh case was also decided by thiscourt. I also noted that their Lordships in that case were wellaware of the views expressed in at least two other cases by thelearned judges of this court. (See Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai PolisDaerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1991] 3 CLJ2768; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 77 and Mohamed Habibullah binMahmood v. Faridah bte Dato Talib [1993] 1 CLJ 264). But theirLordships preferred to follow the reasoning of the High Court inMd Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, KualaLumpur [1998] 4 CLJ Supp 419.

[96] In view of the approach taken by their Lordships in SoonSingh case I think there is nothing to prevent this court hearingthis present appeal to reconsider the views expressed in thosecases referred to above and the cases in the High Courts.

[97] In Ng Wan Chan v. Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan& Anor (No 2) [1991] 3 MLJ 487 Eusof Chin J (as he then was)who incidentally was also in the panel that decided Soon Singhcase said this at p. 489:

The Federal Constitution, Ninth Schedule List II – State List,specifically gives powers to state legislatures to constitute Muslimcourts and when constituted, ‘shall have jurisdiction only overpersons professing the Muslim religion and in respect only of anyof the matter included in this paragraph’.

Therefore, a syariah court derives its jurisdiction under a statelaw, (for Federal Territories – Act of Parliament) over any matterspecified in the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the FederalConstitution.

If state law does not confer on the syariah court any jurisdictionto deal with any matter stated in the State List, the syariah courtis precluded from dealing with the matter. Jurisdiction cannot bederived by implication.

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[98] And in Lim Chan Seng v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam PulauPinang [1996] 3 CLJ 231 the learned High Court Judge was ofthe view that art. 121(1A) by itself did not automatically conferjurisdiction on the syariah court, even on matters that fell underthe State List of the Ninth Schedule. It was the view of thelearned Judge that the state legislature must first act upon thepower given it by arts. 74 and 77 of the Constitution and theState List and thus enact laws conferring the jurisdiction.

[99] In Dalip Kaur case his Lordship Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ(Malaya) expressed his view thus:

We are of the view that clear provisions should be incorporatedin all the state Enactments to avoid difficulties of interpretation bythe civil courts. This is particularly important in view of theamendment to art. 121 of the Federal Constitution made by ActA704 of 1988. The new cl. (1A) of art. 121 of the Constitutioneffective from 10 June 1988 has taken away the jurisdiction of thecivil courts in respect of matters within the jurisdiction of thesyariah courts. But that clause does not take away the jurisdictionof the civil court to interpret any written laws of the statesenacted for the administration of Muslim law … If there are clearprovisions in the State Enactment, the task of the civil court ismade easier when it is asked to make a declaration relating to thestatus of a person whether such person is or is not a Muslimunder the Enactment. A clear provision can, for example, be inthe form of a provision imposing obligation on the relevantauthority to keep and maintain a register of converts who haveexecuted a deed poll renouncing Islam.

[100] His Lordship Harun Hashim SCJ in Mohamed Habibullah binMahmood v. Faridah bte Dato Talib (supra) at p. 268 stated this:

I am therefore of the opinion that when there is a challenge tojurisdiction, as here, the correct approach is to firstly see whetherthe syariah court has jurisdiction and not whether the statelegislature has power to enact the law conferring jurisdiction onthe syariah court.

[101] The views expressed in the last two cases decided by theapex court of this country came from eminent judges of our timewhich should therefore be given the weight they deserved. And Ican appreciate the approach adopted by the learned High CourtJudges in Ng Wan Chan and Lim Chan Seng.

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[102] Hence, I am in agreement with those views in thatjurisdiction must be express and not implied. The doctrine ofimplied powers must be limited to those matters that are incidentalto a power already conferred or matters that are necessary for theperformance of a legal grant. And in the matters of fundamentalrights there must be as far as possible express authorization forcurtailment or violation of fundamental freedoms. No court orauthority should be easily allowed to have implied powers to curtailrights constitutionally granted.

[103] In my view to rely on implied power as a source ofjurisdiction would set an unhealthy trend. For instance under List1, Item 15 Schedule 9 of the Constitution, Parliament isauthorized to pass laws relating to ‘social security’. To date no lawhas been passed governing minimum wages in this country. If theimplied jurisdiction doctrine is adopted there is nothing to preventthe Industrial Court from assuming jurisdiction relying on Item 15and thus adjudicating on matters pertaining to minimum wages. Ifthat were to occur then all that is required will be a list of whatParliament or the State Assembly can enact and that will entitlethe courts to have jurisdiction on such matters irrespective ofwhether there is any specific legislation enacted.

[104] I am therefore inclined not to follow the reasoning in SoonSingh case. My answer to Question 3 is therefore in the negative.

Other Issues

[105] I have indicated earlier on in this judgment that learnedcounsel who submitted before us during the hearing were giventhe opportunity to submit on other issues other then those agreedupon by the appellant and the respondents.

[106] I have given those points due consideration. However, I amof the view that on the facts and circumstances of this appealparticularly in the manner in which it was argued by the partiesearlier on I need not have to make any definite findings on themin order to come to my final conclusion. Perhaps they can bedeliberated on another occasion.

Conclusion

[107] For the reasons that I have given above my answers to thethree Questions are all in the negative. Accordingly, I am satisfiedthat the appellant has succeeded in establishing the merits of herappeal. I would therefore allow her appeal and grant her the

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declaration on those terms as she prayed for in that she is entitledto have an NRIC (Identity Card) in which the word ‘Islam’ doesnot appear. I would therefore direct the Director General toforthwith comply with the terms of the said declaration. Costs tothe appellant here and below.

Alauddin Mohd Sheriff HMP:

[108] Saya telah berpeluang meneliti penghakiman-penghakimanYAA Ketua Hakim Negara dan YAA Hakim Besar Sabah danSarawak dan saya bersetuju dengan alasan-alasan dan keputusanyang telah dikemukakan oleh YAA Ketua Hakim Negara.

a lina joy · (6) mengenai isu kuatkuasa kebelakangan, kes sim seoh beng @ sin sai beng & anor...

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