Islamist Conservatism and the Demise of Islam Hadhari in Malaysia

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamida* and Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismailb

aSchool of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang, Malaysia; bCentre of History,Politics and Strategy, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Selangor, Malaysia

This article argues that Islam Hadhari, as a model for development officially inaugurated duringthe administration of Malaysia’s fifth Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–9),encountered failure. Its lack of success was significantly due to the rise of Islamistconservatives, who deliberately interpreted Islam Hadhari as a political instrument to imposeIslamization from above in a manner not conducive to living in a spirit of peacefulcoexistence in a multi-ethnic society. While on the one hand it promoted an Islam thatcherishes the values of inclusivity, moderation and inter-religious tolerance, on the otherhand Islam Hadhari unfortunately triggered defensive responses from Islamist conservatives.This ad hoc conservative alliance comprised religious leaders associated with the UnitedMalays National Organization (UMNO), state religious functionaries, scholars affiliated tothe opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS: Parti Islam SeMalaysia) and Islamist non-governmental organizations. The rise of this Islamist conservatism aggravated ethno-religious relations during Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s premiership, leading to the setbacksexperienced by his government in the general elections of 2008. By then, the death knellhad been sounded for Islam Hadhari. It was steadily consigned to the graveyard of historyby the administration of Najib Razak, who took over from Abdullah in April 2009.

Keywords: conservatism; Islamism; Islam Hadhari; Malaysia; Abdullah Ahmad Badawi

Introduction

Islam has been of significance in Malaysian society since its enunciation as the religion of theMalaysian federation in Article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution of 1957. Since its putativeresurgence in the 1970s, Islam has by and large been a permanent feature of the country’spolitical dynamics. During the premiership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003), the stateundertook piecemeal Islamization via incentives and measures to counterbalance the challengeemanating from such Islamist rivals as the opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS: PartiIslam SeMalaysia) and independent social movements, especially the Muslim YouthMovement of Malaysia (ABIM: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia), Darul Arqam and JamaatTabligh (see Nagata 1984). Muslim–non-Muslim relations became a perennial fault line withexplosive consequences for the whole polity.

Since Islam legally features as one of the constituent components of being “Malay” – acceptedas the indigenous ethnic group of Malaysia – a threat to Islam is widely regarded as an ethnicallycharged peril to the unity and constitutionally enshrined special position of the Malays. Ensuingfrom its secure status as Malaysia’s official religion, Islam has emerged as an independentmobilizing force to be reckoned with, and has practically become the last bastion of Malayidentity (Nagata 1984, 57). Recognizing Islam’s usefulness, the United Malays NationalOrganization (UMNO) – the major component party of the Barisan Nasional (BN: NationalFront) ruling coalition, which has ruled the country almost uninterrupted since independence

© 2014 University of Birmingham

*Corresponding author. Email: afauzi@usm.my

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in 19571 – has not shied away from manipulating ethno-religious sentiments in concoctingpolitical discourse since the onset of Islamic revival. Although UMNO has been known for itsmoderate Islamic stance since the era of the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman(1957–70), Islamic resurgence and the ensuing UMNO-orchestrated Islamization process stillspread the jitters to non-Muslims, ever wary of a seemingly imminent attempt to imposeSharia (Islamic law) and Islamic culture on their lives (see Nagata 1980; Mohamad Abu Bakar1981; Barraclough 1983; Mauzy and Milne 1983). Such a fear, however, is not consonant withUMNO’s brand of modernist Islam, which conceives of being Islamist2 as a progressiveundertaking, unfettered by traditional interpretations that prioritize form over substance(Kessler 2008, 68; Ahmad Fauzi 2009, 168–169). Under Mahathir’s stewardship, Malaysiawas lauded as having successfully become “Islamic without being an Islamic state” (Nagata1994, 63). His authoritarian approach, notwithstanding its shortcomings, has been credited forslowing down conservative religious trends that were beginning to show in Malaysia (AhmadFauzi 2010, 168). For the 22 years of his premiership, Mahathir held reverently to the conceptof Asian Values – arguably the precursor of Islam Hadhari (civilizational Islam) (MohdAzizuddin 2013, 146, 152–157). As a reflection of conservatism, Asian Values propagatedsuch ideas as the importance of the strong state, continuity of development, inappropriatenessof Western-style democracy, greater emphasis on community rights vis-à-vis individual rights,respect for order and authority, rediscovery of traditional values and the assumption thatchange threatens development (Rodan 1996).

With this backdrop, this article seeks to discuss Islam Hadhari, the scheme inaugurated byAbdullah Ahmad Badawi during his tenure as prime minister (2003–9), from the perspectiveof conservatism – an ideology generally understood as opposing change and inclined topreserve traditional elements present in a particular socio-political order.3 Employing thecontextual paradigms developed by Mannheim (1966, 95–96) and O’Sullivan (1976, 9, 12),conservatism may be understood, respectively, as the doctrine espoused by those bent uponpreserving vegetative patterns or embedded aspects of society, and that adopted by thosedetermined to fight radical and comprehensive changes in society. As an ideology,conservatism has been largely consigned to the periphery of political discourse.4 In theMalaysian context, in spite of being frequently referred to in relation to the ideological make-up of Malaysia’s dominant BN–UMNO regime, conservatism has not been employed byscholars as an analytical tool in the admittedly monotonous discursive frameworks ofcontemporary Malaysian studies (see Abdul Rahman 2010, 10–11, 114). We recognize,however, that conservatism is a fluid concept, without a precise yardstick by which to measurethe degree of a particular individual’s conservatism. Even Mahathir Mohamad started off asnational leader with a liberal image before being transformed into a conservative. In an earlierarticle, the present authors divide UMNO conservatives into four factions on the basis of theirlevel of responsiveness to reform and transformation (Ahmad Fauzi and Muhamad Takiyuddin2012).

Past accounts of Islam Hadhari, despite referring to it as tainted with doses of religiousconservatism, have not situated their arguments within a distinctive conservative paradigm(see, for example, Kessler 2008, 71–76; Hoffstaedter 2009; Bustamam-Ahmad 2011, 109–116;Muhamad Ali 2011; Mohd Azizuddin 2013). This article proposes to analyse Islam Hadharifrom the perspective of its role as an instrument to countervail the adverse impact of religiousconservatism. As contextual indicators of an Islamic-based “religious conservatism,” wepropose five characteristics, namely possessing a great desire to adhere to the originalteachings of the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad; displaying absoluteness andintolerance in decision-making; exhibiting patriarchal attitudes towards women; having afixation with the jurisprudential aspects of Islam as if they were more important than the

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scripture itself; and, finally, demonstrating rigidity with respect to law and punishment at theexpense of inner Islamic consciousness and missionary considerations (see Nagata 1980, 406;Derichs and Fleschenberg 2010, 8; and Chandra Muzaffar, interviewed in Petaling Jaya,December 29, 2009).

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s background

A stark difference between Abdullah Badawi and all four prime ministers before him was hisreligious heritage. Born into a family with strong roots in the lineage of traditional ulama(Islamic scholars),5 Abdullah had a natural base of legitimacy for his political future. Added tothis was a seemingly impeccable individual character summarized in the sobriquet “Mr NiceGuy,” his demeanour being variously described as tolerant, non-confrontational, patient,humble, modest, composed, free from corruption and opposed to political aggression. After hisappointment as prime minister, this polished character became a major factor in attractingpublic support, especially from Malay-Muslims. In the era of Islamic resurgence, images of aleader willing to return to his ancestral home to seek blessings from his mother, and later tolead congregational prayer sessions with his ministerial colleagues, were not superficial(Ahmad Fauzi 2006, 114). During hustings for the eleventh general elections (GE11) inTerengganu, then under PAS rule, he won Malay-Muslim hearts by refusing to retaliate againstpersonal attacks from Chief Minister-cum-PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang, therebydistancing himself from the “holier than thou” attitude commonly associated with religiousfigures (Moten and Tunku Mohar Mokhtar 2006, 335–336). In the spirit of true Islamiccamaraderie, his compassionate gestures transcended political boundaries. When PAS Mursyidal-‘Am (General Guide)-cum-Chief Minister of Kelantan Nik Aziz Nik Mat was hospitalizedwith a heart attack, Abdullah ordered the best medical treatment to be provided for him and, inaddition, granted permission for Nik Adli, Nik Aziz’s son, detained under the Internal SecurityAct for alleged involvement in terrorist activities, to visit his father regularly.6

Abdullah’s religious background and disposition were thus great assets in his endeavour toproject an Islam with a progressive and moderate face. This was significant in the wake ofrising conservatism in PAS following its success in wresting power in Terengganu in 1999.Although PAS had experienced a decisive shift towards greater emphasis on issues ofdemocracy and social justice following the imbroglio of former Deputy Prime Minister AnwarIbrahim’s ouster, beating, trial, conviction and imprisonment in 1998–99, it was not enough tocounter prevailing conservatism among its leadership. Furthermore, the ulama wingstrengthened its hold on PAS’s leadership during its 2003 General Assembly, when AbdulHadi Awang was officially declared president in place of the deceased Fadzil Noor (Welsh2004, 148–149). Upon assuming the reins of government, Abdullah sensed that theascendancy of PAS, which had capitalized on the Anwar Ibrahim saga, was a threat to thelegacy of moderate Islam he had inherited from his predecessors. To Khairy Jamaluddin,Abdullah’s son-in-law and reputed ideologue of his administration, such retrogressive actionsby the PAS governments of Kelantan and Terengganu as the introduction of separate paymentcounters for men and women at supermarkets and the drawing of the Islamic head covering onposters depicting women with their hair uncovered were indicative of the negative influence ofthe conservative ulama said to be dominating decision-making in PAS (Khairy Jamaluddin2003). Such narrow-mindedness could not be allowed to percolate through to UMNO. Despitethe prevalence of moderation among most members of the UMNO Supreme Council,conservative elements at the grassroots level were ever ready to sacrifice hallowed traditionsand principles for the sake of securing support. Herein lay Abdullah’s advantage: “Abdullahhas not fostered conservatism within UMNO; his scholar credentials have given him the space

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to avoid deepening the competition with PAS for religious legitimacy that Mahathir began in1982” (Welsh 2004, 147). His religious upbringing notwithstanding, Abdullah’s inclinationsince his youth had tended towards the reformist brand of Islam (Ungku Aziz 2006).

With these points in his favour, Abdullah was in a strong position to declare Islam Hadhari asthe official mantra of his administration. Although in existence since the later years of Mahathir’spremiership, Islam Hadhari did not take centre stage under Mahathir’s regime because of his lackof personal credentials and capacity (information from Mohd Yusof Othman, interviewed inBangi, November 21, 2009). In the midst of Western misperceptions of Islam following theattacks on the World Trade Center, New York, and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, IslamHadhari served as a useful counterpoint to President George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror.Yet close to a year had passed before Abdullah eventually outlined his 10 principles of IslamHadhari, on the occasion of the 55th UMNO General Assembly in September 2004. Of the 10precepts, five are generic, and have been explicitly practised by past UMNO-BN regimes.These are: faith and piety in Allah; freedom and independence of the people; a vigorousmastery of knowledge; a good quality of life; and strong defence capabilities. The remainingfive can be regarded as a fair reflection of Abdullah’s leadership aspirations: a just andtrustworthy government; balanced and comprehensive economic development; protection ofthe rights of minority groups and women; cultural and moral integrity; and safeguarding ofnatural resources and the environment (Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 2006a, 4, 44–45). Incomparison with other Muslim countries that have experimented with Islam in governance,Islam Hadhari was liberal in the sense of its general respect for hitherto marginalized aspectsof life and segments of the umma (global Muslim community), without changing the face andintegral character of Islam (Osman Bakar 2006). Within the Malaysian milieu, non-Muslims,women and environmentalists, for example, no longer feature as fringe groups, their agendahaving been subsumed by Islam Hadhari.

From its outset, PAS was convinced of the conceptual flaws in Islam Hadhari (Abdul Hadi2005). Despite Abdullah’s repeated insistence that the concept was merely about an attitude,the risk of attaching an adjective such as hadhari, which means “civilizational,” is gargantuanconsidering its interface with generally conservative-minded Malay-Muslims (ChandraMuzaffar 2009). On-going public discussions, via forums, academic seminars andcommissioned articles in the mainstream press, were not enough to prevent Islam Hadharifrom being perceived as potentially confusing. The fact that the discourse was presented to thepublic by overtly biased and defensive pro-government interlocutors did not help the cause.Preoccupied by such trappings of modernity as modern education, economic prosperity andrise in social status, lay Malay-Muslims were not yet receptive to the idea that Islam couldever be conceived outside its pristinely defined traditional boundaries. As propagated by PAS,such religious innovation was considered tantamount to heresy, hence the disdain poured ontoIslam Hadhari as a pathetic invention – “a new religion” (Ahmad Fauzi 2006, 116; ZainalKling 2006, 181). In fact, from its early days in 2004, academic-cum-social activist ChandraMuzaffar had warned Abdullah that Islam Hadhari was doomed to failure (Chandra Muzaffar,interviewed on December 29. 2009). Apart from having uncoordinated fundamentals(Muhammad Syukri Salleh 2005), Islam Hadhari suffered from the further weakness of lack ofsynchronicity between its lofty principles and the diverse emphases placed on them by theagents for its delivery and implementation, particularly the Islamic bureaucrats. There was aglaring disconnect between Islam Hadhari in theory, as enthused about in the official corridorsof power, and in practice, as applied to the ordinary man and woman on the street (Gatsiounis2006, 82–83, Hoffstaedter 2009, 137–138).

To the nation’s non-Muslims, Islam Hadhari’s most effective selling point lay in its moderate,inclusive and tolerant message. For a limited time, Abdullah managed to harness this impression

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to boost his image. Several studies of GE11 found that, alongside enthusiasm for a new leader –the “Pak Lah factor” – religious moderation made a significant contribution to BN’soverwhelming triumph at the 2004 polls. Non-Muslim voters had apparently reacted positivelytowards Islam Hadhari’s openness in contrast to PAS’s narrow emphasis on theimplementation of the Islamic criminal code of h.ud!d as its most prominent expression ofIslam (see Liow 2005; Ahmad Fauzi 2006; Moten and Tunku Mohar Mokhtar 2006).

As time passed, Islam Hadhari began to attract worldwide attention. In the West and Muslimcountries alike, Islam Hadhari was showcased as a model of tolerant and democratic co-existencebetweenMuslim and non-Muslim citizens. In contrast, Abdullah’s manoeuvres on religious issuescaused dismay among Islamists and Muslim conservatives (see Heim 2004; Marwaan Macan-Markar 2004; Matthews 2004). To Abdullah, the GE11 results were living proof that “aprogressive and moderate approach will defeat a conservative ideology and extremist ways”(Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 2004b) – the crux of the message delivered to US President GeorgeW. Bush during their meeting in July 2004. Abdullah also promoted Islam Hadhari as far asthe United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, Australia, Germany andeven at United Nations and Organization of Islamic Co-operation meetings (Abdullah AhmadBadawi 2006a, passim). In contrast to Mahathir’s critical way of berating fellow Muslimcountries for slow economic growth, Abdullah sought to rectify Western misconceptions ofIslam by marrying a steadfast commitment to Islamic faith with robust material development(Derichs 2007, 154). As the first Muslim leader to speak at the World Council of Churchesassembly in August 2004, he was forthright on the urgent need for moderation in religiousunderstanding and practice:

what we need more than ever today is a concerted effort to initiate inter-faith dialogue. We need to talkto one another openly about the issues that impact on all our lives. Let us go beyond arguing overdifferences in theology and religious practice. A meaningful dialogue will not be possible if we donot respect each other’s freedom of worship. Islam enjoins pluralism and we are reminded of it inthe Quranic verse “To you your religion, to me my religion.” (Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 2004a)

Abdullah’s willingness to attend a Christian function and openly advocate inter-faith dialogue wasno small feat. A slight mistake on Malaysia’s subtle ethno-religious terrain can cost one’s politicalcareer, as former UMNO Vice President Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah discovered during the 1990general election campaign, when he was caught on camera wearing a Sabahan tribal headdress towhich was attached what looked like a Christian emblem. Abdullah’s private life alsodemonstrated his pluralist credentials. Following the death of his wife Endon Mahmood in2005, Abdullah married Jeanne Abdullah, a Muslim convert who had been baptized aChristian and whose extended family remained Catholics. Given his religious credentials, sucha union powerfully symbolized Abdullah’s ethno-religious tolerance agenda.7 But it was notlong before Islam Hadhari sparked defensive reactions from conservative Islamists, many ofwhom had the mistaken impression that Islam Hadhari was merely a cloak for liberalizing Islam.

The ascendancy of Islamist conservatism: the Inter-Faith Commission and the questionof religious freedom

Taking the cue from Abdullah Badawi’s encouragement of inter-religious dialogue, in early 2005the Bar Council resuscitated efforts to establish an Inter-Faith Commission (IFC). However, thisinitiative, meant to provide a platform where representatives of all Malaysian religions could sittogether to sort issues out between them, was stridently opposed by PAS and a myriad of MuslimNGOs coalescing under the Allied Coordinating Committee of Islamic Non-GovernmentalOrganizations (ACCIN). ACCIN saw in the IFC a sinister conspiracy to undermine the powersof the state’s departments of Islamic affairs, by-pass Sharia courts in Islamic legal matters, and

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interfere in intra-Muslim affairs (accessed April 13, 2012. http://bantahifc.bravehost.com/). Inshort, all 14 of the demands made by the IFC were regarded as a threat to Islam’s exaltedposition as Malaysia’s official religion. On the government side, the IFC proposal found itsown supporter in Minister of Culture, Arts and Heritage Rais Yatim. Not only was Raissupposed to officiate at the opening of the IFC’s founding conference, but he also steadfastlymaintained that the IFC was necessary if Muslims were to understand other religions better(Rais Yatim 2005). Beleaguered by conflicting demands, Abdullah decided to abandon the IFCbut insisted on continuing closed meetings and dialogue with various religions (Mimi SyedYusof, and Ahmad Fairuz Othman 2005).8 Whilst the Bar Council agreed to postpone theestablishment of the IFC indefinitely and shift its priority to dialogue,9 the IFC impasse laiddown a marker for future stand-offs between Islamist conservatives on the one hand andliberal Muslim and non-Muslim civil society activists on the other.

The most contentious issues revolved around Article 121 of the Federal Constitution. Througha hurriedly passed amendment sanctioned by Prime Minister Mahathir in 1988, clause 1A wasinserted, specifying that civil courts could no longer interfere in the jurisdiction of Shariacourts. By raising the status of Sharia courts and judges to be on a par with their civilcounterparts, the amendment effectively created jurisdictional dualism in Malaysia’s legalsystem. While seemingly upholding Islam’s exalted position, this had worrying side effects,particularly as Malaysia’s overall legal structure remained secular in orientation (Anuar ZainalAbidin 2006). It continued ticking and exploded like a time-bomb during Abdullah Badawi’stenure as prime minister. First, upon the death of nationally famed mountaineer MoorthyManiam aka Muhammad Abdullah in December 2005, the Sharia court that heard anapplication from the Federal Territory Council of Islamic Affairs (MAIWP: Majlis AgamaIslam Wilayah Persekutuan) decided that Maniam’s secret conversion to Islam was legal, andso his body should be buried according to Islamic rites. In adherence to the Article 121 (1A)constitutional amendment, the High Court refused to hear the claim of S. Kaliammal,Moorthy’s widow, who contested that her husband had continued to live a Hindu lifestyle evenafter the date of the said conversion. If Kaliammal had declined to seek justice through theSharia courts, which was in any case a constitutionally flawed action since Sharia courts hadjurisdiction solely over Muslims, she would have been left with no recourse to justice.However, MAIWP’s resort to an ex parte application involving one side of the dispute, asopposed to an inter partes application involving both sides, strengthened the commonly heldnegative perceptions of religious bureaucrats (Aziz 2005).10 This purported denial of religiousfreedom, apparently approved by the highest law of the land, understandably alarmedconcerned non-Muslim religious and civil society groups.11 The situation was aggravated bythe verbal abuse hurled at Moorthy’s family at the Kuala Lumpur Hospital, whose mortuarywas holding his corpse pending the conclusion of the legal dispute.12

In response, nine non-Muslim federal ministers delivered a memorandum to Abdullah urginga re-examination of Article 121(1A). Such unprecedented boldness was preceded by their mutualdiscussion with the Malaysian Consultative Council for Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism andSikhism (MCCBCHS) – founded in 1983 as a body to counterbalance the Islamic resurgence.On the positive side, cooperation between government leaders and civil society activists inpressuring the Prime Minister was unprecedented in Malaysia (Ooi 2008, 98). Refusing toreview or abrogate Article 121(1A), Abdullah advised his nine ministerial colleagues thatfuture discussion of sensitive issues be confined to the cabinet. The memorandum wasconsequently withdrawn, even before Abdullah agreed to a joint meeting with five of the nineministers.13 But Abdullah’s giving audience to his rebellious non-Muslim colleagues triggereda backlash from Islamists wary of rising non-Muslim aggressiveness in fighting for their rights

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(Baharuddeen Abu Bakar 2006; Pawancheek Marican 2006).14 According to Shamsul Amri(interviewed in Bangi, March 12, 2010):

This issue was the point in time when the UMNO grassroots started to view Abdullah with suspicion.Logically to them, “if such a thing had happened during Mahathir’s era, the delegation would be farfrom getting an audience with the Prime Minister. Instead, they would be shown the exit. Abdullah, onthe contrary, listened to their grievances.”

Abdullah (interviewed in Putrajaya, March 18, 2010) nevertheless defended his action, construingit as “a different sort of political management. This is the standard in developed countries such asin Europe. It is an aspect of an increasingly mature society [wanting to negotiate and discuss].” Inthe medium term, the Moorthy saga contributed to rising mobilization among Malaysian Hindus,eventuating in the founding of the Hindu Action Rights Force (HINDRAF) whose demonstrationsrocked the country on November 25, 2007 (Willford 2013, 138–141).

A few days after the Moorthy issue erupted, the Sharia court in Negeri Sembilan decided thatthe funeral of the recently deceased Wong Ah Kiu aka Nyonya Tahir was to be conductedaccording to Buddhist rites, despite claims to her corpse that were made by the NegeriSembilan Department of Islamic Affairs. The decision was arrived at after testimony fromNyonya Tahir’s daughter on her mother’s lifestyle convinced the bench that Nyonya Tahir hadindeed died a Buddhist. Unlike the circumstances in the Moorthy case, Nyonya Tahir’ssurviving family was provided the opportunity to appear before the Sharia court to testifyregarding her religious beliefs, notwithstanding her religious affiliation at birth as stated on heridentity card.15

The verdict in Nyonya Tahir’s case, however, was not enough to assuage non-Malay andliberal Muslim fears. Mobilizing under the umbrella of Article 11, a coalition of liberal-secularNGOs, civil society activists organized forums in Petaling Jaya and Malacca in defence offreedom of religion as enshrined in the Federal Constitution. In May 2006, a similar forumheld in Penang was violently interrupted and cut short after being raided, despite policemonitoring of the event, by members of ACCIN and the Anti-IFC Action Body (BADAI:Badan Bertindak Anti-IFC) (Aliran 2006; see also Tan Ban Cheng 2006; Wong Fook Meng2006). The liberal-orientated Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Nazri Aziz, reactedby strongly chiding the Malay-Muslim protesters for being disrespectful of minority rights.16

Similarly, Abdullah Badawi also defended the rights of the organizers, who heeded advice tocontinue their session behind closed doors. Although expressing disapproval of the rough wayin which the forum was halted, Abdullah cautioned the organizers to be extra mindful of thereligious sensitivities connected with such meetings, and to avoid turning them into platformsto pressure the government.17 The next forum in Johor Baharu took place successfully on July22, 2006, amidst PAS-led demonstrations outside the venue.18 Three days later, Abdullahcalled for a complete stop to public discussions on religion and IFC-related matters.19

From the point of view of emergent conservative Muslim groups such as BADAI, it wasobligatory to challenge the Article 11 coalition’s struggle for its alleged advocacy of Muslims’“freedom to apostasize.”20 BADAI’s raid in Penang in May 2006 was based on rumours thatthe forum would discuss the IFC.21 Three months earlier, word spread that up to 250,000Malaysian Muslims had left their religion. The source of this staggering figure was the highlyrespected mufti of Perak, Harussani Zakaria.22 Hence, when the case of Azalina Jailani akaLina Joy was catapulted into the public arena in 2005–7, the siege mentality of many Malay-Muslims, buoyed by conservative Muslim groups, crystallized. Lina Joy, as she preferred to becalled upon her attempted conversion to Christianity, was born a Malay-Muslim and had beenapplying since 1997 to the National Registration Department (NRD) to remove the word“Islam” from her national identity card, but to no avail. She pursued the matter through the

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civil courts, but her repeated applications were consistently rejected by the High Court in 2001,the Court of Appeal in 2005 and finally the Federal Court in May 2007. Contentious as the issuewas, the last two verdicts were arrived at by a 2–1 majority, meaning that there was a dissentingopinion in each case. The basis of the courts’ decisions lay in their stout refusal to encroach on thejurisdiction of the Sharia courts, under whose authority matters concerning apostasy wereproperly situated (Kortteinen 2008, 217).23 In comparison with the Moorthy saga, the Lina Joyissue attracted more emotive comments and judgements from non-Muslim communities andreligious organizations (Tan and Lee 2008, passim).

Yet another cause célèbre was that of Rayappan Anthony, a Christian convert to Islam whohad returned to Catholicism in 1999 in accordance with NRD procedures. Upon his death inNovember 2006, the Selangor Islamic Affairs Department (JAIS: Jabatan Agama IslamSelangor) claimed his body through an ex parte application. During ensuing discussionsbetween Rayappan’s family and JAIS officials, the latter’s lack of transparency forced thefamily of the deceased to apply for recourse to the High Court. When the case attracted theattention of cabinet members, JAIS’s enthusiasm to pursue the claim dwindled, and theyeventually abandoned it, ostensibly due to lack of evidence. Needless to say, JAIS’s fumblingthroughout the Rayappan episode elicited criticism not only from non-Muslims but also fromthe Sharia Lawyers Association of Malaysia, who considered such uncouth behaviour on thepart of JAIS officials as embarrassing, an abuse of due process and a burden on the bereavedfamily.24

Islamist conservatives in UMNO

As far as the ruling elites’ foregrounding of Islam in the public sphere was concerned, 2006 was awatershed year (Hoffstaedter 2013, 478). As the UMNO General Assembly of 2006 approached,two separate events stimulated the rise of ethno-religious sentiments among Islamistconservatives. The first was the publication of a report by the Islamic Consumer Associationof Malaysia (PPIM: Persatuan Pengguna Islam Malaysia) regarding a biscuit product thatallegedly bore a cross. PPIM was adamant that the manufacturer should be called on toremove this Christian symbol (see Loh 2010).25 The second was the Muslim siege of a churchallegedly planning to baptize Muslim children with the collusion of national yachtsman AzharMansor, who was also rumoured to have renounced Islam. The gossip went viral over theshort message system (SMS) mobile network, implicating Harussani Zakaria as the source ofthe news (Marzuki Mohamad 2008, 179–180).26 Both Harussani and Azhar later denied anyknowledge of the rumour, but the dramatic association of both figures with the episode raisedthe profile of Islamist conservatism, whose influence was steadily making its way up to thehighest decision-making level of the country’s political hierarchy.

During the 2006 UMNO General Assembly, the first to be telecast live on mainstreamtelevision channels, Malay ethnocentrism mixed with tinges of Islamist conservatism waseloquently displayed, spearheaded by delegates from UMNO Youth (Ramakrishnan 2006;Zubaidah Abu Bakar 2010). Its leader, Hishamuddin Hussein for the second time insuccession, kissed and waved the keris, a traditional Malay dagger, while sternly warning boththe IFC and the Article 11 coalition against playing with Malay religious sentiments. UMNOYouth Information Chief, Azimi Daim, asserted the readiness of Malay fighters to shed bloodshould conditions become unbearable. The frightening scenario of an impending bloodbathwas stressed further by Hasnoor Sidang Hussein, representative from Malacca. Perlis delegateHashim Suboh joined in by rhetorically asking whether the keris waved by Hishamuddinwould be used, and if so, when? For no clear reason, UMNO veteran Mohamed Rahmat thenreminded all and sundry that Malays were notorious for running amok at critical times.27

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UMNO Senator from Kedah, Tajul Urus Md Zain, followed suit by calling for Azhar Mansor to bebeheaded should allegations of his apostasy prove true (Wan Hamidi Hamid 2006a). Penangdelegate Shahbudin Yahya chastised the Konrad Adenauer Foundation – sponsor of theabandoned IFC founding conference, and the liberal women’s rights group Sisters in Islam(SIS) for spreading religious pluralism and liberalism, undermining the powers of the Shariacourt and bringing Islam down to the same level as other religions.28

The projection of a religious conservative discourse in full view of the nation marked theascendancy of the Islamist conservatives. So worried was Abdullah Badawi by theuncontrollable developments that his keynote address was used to admonish certain partyelements who had misinterpreted Islam Hadhari to justify adopting radical and ultra-conservative positions, and to disavow their intolerance of deep-rooted customs and traditionsof Malaysian society (Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 2006b). But Abdullah’s concerns fell on deafears. A year later, two UMNO Members of Parliament (MPs) from Johore, Syed Hood SyedEdros and Mohamad Aziz, openly expressing abhorrence of Christian symbols displayed inthe vicinity of missionary schools, requested their removal.29

Islamist conservatives in opposition parties

For the opposition Islamists in PAS, the victories of progressive leaders such as Deputy-PresidentNasharuddin Mat Isa (2005–11) and Vice President HusamMusa (2005–9 and since 2011), do notmean that conservative influence via its ulama and youth wings has subsided (Ahmad Fauzi 2011,89–91). Islamist conservatives in PAS have zealously backed controversial actions and stances ofMalaysia’s Islamic officialdom such as the Federal Territory Department of Islamic Affairs’(JAIWP: Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan) raid on the Zouk nightclub in January2005, the demand for a ban on SIS, participation in demonstrations against the Article 121(1A) constitutional amendment, protests against forums held by the Article 11 group andremonstrations against outdoor concerts by local and foreign entertainers. Yet, even within theso-called progressive group of opposition politicians, there runs a seemingly oppositeconservative streak. For example, it was Nasharuddin Mat Isa, once touted as the new face ofPAS, who warned of a covert design, allegedly masterminded by Christian leaders of theDemocratic Action Party (DAP) – PAS’s partner in the multi-racial Pakatan Rakyat (PR:People’s Pact) coalition – to turn Malaysia into a Christian state (Lim 2012). On the otherhand, one of the chief demonstrators against the Article 11 roadshow in 2006, Mohd RashidHasnon, then leader of the NGO Society for Islamic Reform (JIM: Jamaah Islah Malaysia)(Hoffstaedter 2013, 482), is today Deputy Chief Minister30 of Penang – which has been ruledby a DAP-led PR government since 2008. Mohd Rashid joined the Anwar Ibrahim-ledPeople’s Justice Party (PKR: Parti Keadilan Rakyat) in 2010 and won the Pantai Jerejak statelegislative assembly seat in the thirteenth general election (GE13), held in 2013, in spite of apast association with JIM, which elements in the Penang government had once linked toreligious extremism (Tan Sin Chow 2009).

Working hand in glove with PAS conservatives were occasional Islamists from other parties,such as former PKR MP for Kulim-Bandar Baharu, Zulkifli Nordin, and former InternationalIslamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) lecturer Dr Badrul Amin Baharon. Both had playedprominent roles in the Islamist raid on a Bar Council-organized “Forum on Conversion toIslam” in August 2008 (Muda Mohd Noor 2008; Zulkifli Nordin 2008). As a member of theLawyers for the Defence of Islam (PPI: Peguam Pembela Islam), Zulkifli was an anomalywithin the PKR’s multi-ethnic framework, as was Dr Badrul Amin, although to a lesser extent.Both had been staunch supporters of Anwar Ibrahim since the days of the Reformasi(reformation) upheavals in 1998–99, but brought with them the baggage of conservatism from

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their long history of Islamist activism. When Zulkifli went against the party line, criticizing theuse of the word “Allah” by non-Muslims, which had been allowed by the High Court, he wasduly sacked by the PKR in March 2010 and became a BN-friendly MP (Samy 2010). In May2013, Zulkifli, by now Deputy President of the Malay rights NGO Organization forEmpowered Indigenous Peoples of Malaysia (PERKASA: Pertubuhan Pribumi PerkasaMalaysia) went on to contest the Shah Alam parliamentary seat in GE13 on a BN ticket,losing to PAS’s progressive leader Khalid Samad. As for Dr Badrul Amin, in February 2012he suffered the embarrassment of being arrested by Pahang religious officials for allegedlycommitting khalwat (close proximity) with another man’s wife in the wee hours of themorning – a crime he vehemently denied and ascribed to a political plot.31 In GE13, BadrulAmin lost in the fight for the Silam parliamentary seat in Sabah.

Muslim non-governmental organizations: an Islamist civil society in the making

In its formative phase, Malaysia’s Islamist civil society comprises disparate elements. On the onehand, Islamists with an anti-government bent share their non-Islamist civil society’s diagnosis ofthe multitude of shortcomings with respect to issues of governance and leadership, but differ onthe prescribed remedy. To them, the antidote lies in more Islam, whereas non-Islamist civil societyis more inclined to adopt liberal secular solutions congruent with Malaysia’s liberal democraticand plural society (Ahmad Fauzi 2008, 220–221). On the other hand, Islamist civil society ismade up of independent NGOs which sprang up to defend punitive actions and judicialdecisions carried out by the Malaysian state’s Islamic arm, which have enjoyed a certaindegree of autonomy and immunity in recent years. Following the JAIWP raid on the Zouknightclub, 53 liberal NGOs launched a campaign against moral policing, which was deemedan invasion of personal privacy. Support for the campaign was forthcoming not only fromopposition parties such as the DAP, PKR and the Socialist Party of Malaysia (PSM: PartiSosialis Malaysia), but also from liberal UMNO ministers such as Shahrizat Jalil, Rais Yatim,Nazri Aziz, Zaid Ibrahim and Azalina Othman Said. Other influential advocates included theSIS-affiliated daughters of Mahathir Mohamad and Abdullah Badawi, Marina Mahathir andNori Abdullah respectively. Nori was also wife of Khairy Jamaluddin, UMNO Youth Chiefsince 2009, MP for Rembau, Negeri Sembilan, and current Minister of Youth and Sports inNajib Razak’s administration.

It is within the context of such opposition that 40 Islamic NGOs mobilized efforts in defenceof Islamic morality laws and their enforcement (Syed Nadzri 2005).32 Further moves werecoordinated at the behest of the newly established ACCIN and BADAI, which had previouslybacked Harussani in calling for the proscription of joint religious celebrations.33 In the wakeof the Lina Joy case, PPI was formed to clarify to the public matters concerning theconstitutional position of Islam. PPI acted to counterbalance the Bar Council, which wasconsidered to be unduly biased against Islam.34 This was followed by the founding of theOrganizations for the Defence of Islam (PEMBELA: Pertubuhan-pertubuhan Pembela Islam),which brought together 80 Islamic NGOs. Headed by the then-president of ABIM, YusriMohamad, PEMBELA raised the awareness of Muslims regarding the imminent threat toIslam lurking in their midst. Among other things, PEMBELA organized public forums,collected over 700,000 signatures on a petition to be presented to the Council of Malay Rulersand the Prime Minister, launched a website for networking purposes and cooperatedreligiously with state mufti offices and departments of Islamic affairs.35 ABIM’s conspicuousrole in PEMBELA was directly related to its vision of re-invigorating the struggle for Malay-Islamic interests after years of slumber encountered by dakwah (propagation) movements inthe twilight years of Mahathir’s era (Ahmad Fauzi 2008, 229–231).

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Yet another purportedly Islamist NGO that acquired popularity under Abdullah Badawi’sauspices was the Islamic Welfare and Missionary Association of Malaysia (PEKIDA: PertubuhanKebajikan & Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia). As patron of PEKIDA, Abdullah attended its officialfunctions, but its reputation was overshadowed by allegations of covert involvement ingangsterism and morally deviant activities.36 At grassroots level, PEKIDAwas amongst the mainmovers of the raid against the Forum on Conversion to Islam in August 2008. The concertedaction had witnessed unprecedented cooperation by Islamists from diverse backgrounds, includingopposition Islamists from PAS and PKR, 29 NGOs and UMNO conservatives. Panel membersfrom JAIWP and the government think-tank the Institute of Islamic Understanding of Malaysia(IKIM) had to cancel their prior agreement to participate in the forum. In contrast with Abdullah’sown conception of Islam Hadhari, dialogue was not part of PEKIDA’s agenda.37

Muslim proponents of liberal Islam and feminist Muslims have been favourite targets ofcriticism by Islamist conservatives. Liberal Muslims are activists driven by universalhumanitarian considerations, without being shackled by ethno-religious priorities andconservative interpretations of religious laws. They endeavour to redefine the public role ofIslam in a more modern and inclusive paradigm, ever mindful of Malaysia’s multi-ethnicbackground (Marzuki Mohamad 2008, 155–158). To the Islamist conservatives, liberal Islamis no better than a “deviant teaching in modern form” while its adherents are deemed “non-Sunnis.” Among social activists alleged by Islamists to belong to this category are SIS founderZainah Anwar, Bar Council strongman Haris Ibrahim, academics Chandra Muzaffar and FarishNoor, the reform group Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN), the Institute for Policy Research(IKD: Institut Kajian Dasar) led by Khalid Jaafar and patronized by Anwar Ibrahim, theacclaimed film director Yasmin Ahmad and former Mingguan Malaysia columnist and editor-in-chief of Al Islam magazine, Astora Jabat. As for politicians, the names that crop up on thelist are PKR MP for Balik Pulau Yusmadi Yusof, Minister in the Prime Minister’s DepartmentNazri Aziz, former Minister-cum-Puteri UMNO chief Azalina Othman Said, and former defacto Law Minister who defected to the PKR and later became president of the NationalHuman Well-being Party (KITA: Parti Kesejahteraan Insan Tanahair) Zaid Ibrahim (see IdrisZakaria 2006; Zamihan 2008; Fadhlullah Jamil 2009; Mohammad Ariffin Ismail n.d.).

As a Muslim women’s rights group, SIS incorporates elements of both liberal Islam andfeminist Islam. At a glance, SIS should have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with IslamHadhari, whose tenets included protection of the rights of minority groups and women. Inemphasizing a modern and progressive Islam, SIS’s and Abdullah Badawi’s agendas arguablyconverged (Osman Bakar 2004, 19).38 Short of openly supporting SIS, Abdullah’s legitimationof SIS was manifested in his late wife Endon Mahmood’s and daughter Nori’s patronage ofSIS-associated programmes (Perlez 2006; Zainah Anwar 2008; Chow 2009). In March 2003,for example, Endon became patron of the Coalition on Women’s Rights in Islam, whichactively campaigned for monogamy as the ideal form of marriage in Islam. This was inresponse to the Perlis state government’s announcement that it had forsaken the requirementfor Muslim men to obtain consent from their first wives before entering into polygynousunions. However, to all intents and purposes, Abdullah’s strategy backfired. His associatingwith feminist Islam alienated sections of the Islamist civil society previously drawn to hisulama reputation. As things stood, Islamist conservatives were still far from including genderissues in their discourse on Islam (Ting 2007, 95).

From Islamic to Islamist religious bureaucracy

In truth, it was not altogether unexpected that such a quixotic scheme as Islam Hadhari wouldencounter inertia from within state structures. Not even a year had passed after its inauguration

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when public intellectual Fathi Aris Omar brusquely anticipated the failure of Islam Hadhari at thehands of none other than the state-administered Islamic officialdom (Fathi Aris Omar 2004).Other critical observers included IKIM Director in 2005–9, Dr Syed Ali Tawfik Al-Attas. ToSyed Ali Tawfik, son of renowned philosopher Syed Naguib Al-Attas, the prevalent narrow-mindedness among contemporary ulama and judicial officers in Malaysia is manifested in theirquotidian emphasis on ritualistic and legalistic matters, to the extent that they impose theirmisplaced interpretations on aggrieved non-Muslims. Lacking knowledge of the variety ofshades of opinion and plurality of views allowed in Islam, their anger was understandablydirected towards Islam Hadhari, which was being aggressively promoted by the state (Al-Attas2006, 2007; Hoffstaedter 2009, 130–131).

In many ways, the Islamist transformation of the Islamic Centre, the hub of the federalgovernment’s Islamic bureaucracy upgraded to the Department of Islamic Advancement ofMalaysia (JAKIM: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia) in 1997, can be traced back toMahathir’s early campaign to inculcate Islamic values into his administration. In 1982, hepaved the way for the entree of cohorts of ulama into his administration. When AbdullahBadawi succeeded Mahathir, the Islamic bureaucracy had acquired a dynamic of its own,perennially slanted towards defending the religious status quo, and enveloped by a falsepretence of sanctity bordering on infallibility (Mohamed Nawab 2006; Norani Othman 2006,344; Ahmad Fauzi 2010, 166–168). As embodied at the highest level by the Article 121(1A)constitutional amendment, the gradual codification of the Sharia and its streamlining across thedifferent Malaysian states served as very strong instruments of centralization and investedunprecedented powers in the hands of a privileged bureaucracy. Bureaucratization proceededhand in hand with the expansion of Sharia jurisdiction and the augmentation of enforcementauthority; ironically, the whole process of formalizing the Sharia into the country’s legalcorpus not only made it more rigid but also secularized it (Maznah Mohamad 2010; AhmadFauzi 2012, 264–265). Worse still, officers entrusted with its implementation were not trainedin the art of hikmah (wisdom), which gives a degree of flexibility to the practice of Sharia.Quite unsurprisingly, therefore, embarrassing incidents took place, for which Abdullah Badawias chief executive of the government had to shoulder responsibility. Among the faux pascostly to Malaysia’s image as a moderate modern Muslim nation state were: the khalwat raidon a foreign non-Muslim couple on the tourist island of Langkawi in October 2006;39 thefatwa outlawing yoga to Muslims;40 the cancellation of the Building Bridges Global InterfaithSeminar scheduled for May 7–11, 2007, despite Abdullah’s support and the agreement ofrenowned Muslim and Christian scholars and leaders to participate (Fauwaz Abdul Aziz, andSoon Li Tsin 2007; Soon Li Tsin 2007); the leaking via the internet of confidential pictures ofimproperly dressed couples arrested during a khalwat raid; sexual extortion by religiousofficials investigating women accused of khalwat; and the arraignment of a Sharia High Courtjudge in Perak for accepting bribes (Ahmad Fauzi 2009, 180–181).41 Lamentably, thetransmutation from an Islamic to an Islamist bureaucracy happened at the expense of Islamicintellectual growth, as evidenced by the priority placed on banning rather than debatingunorthodox literature. Islamic modernist and spiritual discourses bore the brunt of suchproscription, some of which arguably flout human rights, as proven for instance by the civilcourt’s lifting of the ban on SIS scholar Norani Othman’s book, Muslim Women and theChallenge of Islamic Extremism (Marina Mahathir 2007; Surin 2007; Gooch 2010).

The Perak mufti Harussani Zakaria’s claim that Malay-Muslims were being besieged with all-out attempts to induce their youth to leave their birth religion had polarized Malaysian societyalong ethno-religious lines at an alarming rate since Mahathir’s era. But Harussani was notnew to such controversy. From the beginning of Abdullah’s administration, he unabashedlycondemned entertainment events such as TV3’s Sure Heboh carnival as unlawful in Islam. He

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also proposed that those diagnosed with AIDS be quarantined on remote islands, and that thehitherto unproblematic practice of joint-religious celebrations be reviewed on the basis ofSharia (Johan Jaafar 2006).42 But figures compiled from actual research showed that fewerMuslims had left Islam than was originally thought to be the case (Selvarani 2006). Moreover,there was a relatively low turnover rate at the faith rehabilitation centre in Ulu Yam, Selangor,operated by JAKIM under the Prime Minister’s Department (Zainah Anwar 2006). AbdullahBadawi, somewhat ensnared by his own indulgence of conservative ulama, flatly rejectedHarussani’s proposal to ban joint religious festivals on the basis that they were social ratherthan religious functions (Vasudevan 2006). But at the societal level, the damage was moreserious than anticipated. Just four months later, a Sharia department official of the insurancefirm Takaful Malaysia created a furore by sending an email exhorting fellow Muslims to ceaseoffering greetings to their Hindu friends on the Hindu festival of Divali (better known inMalaysia as Deepavali, following South Indian usage).43

Still to recover from the few “body-snatching” episodes that pitted them against various facesof the burgeoning Islamic bureaucracy, the passions of Malaysian Hindus were permanentlyinflamed by the forcible destruction of temples to make way for development. This put themat loggerheads with the UMNO-dominated local authorities. Mobilizing under the banner ofthe unregistered HINDRAF, Hindus claimed that from early 2006 until June 2007 alone, up to79 temples in several states had been razed to the ground or served with demolition notices.On June 30, 2007, HINDRAF protested via a petition sent to the office of the Attorney-General.44 The reputation of BN-UMNO state administrations as caring governments waspermanently damaged, however, when on October 30, 2007, the municipal authorities toredown a historic temple in Kampung Rimba Jaya, Shah Alam, Selangor, despite AbdullahBadawi’s poignant plea to defer the demolition, and MIC President Samy Vellu’s protests,especially since Divali was only one week away.45 The explosive HINDRAF demonstrations,starting from the hallowed Hindu site in Batu Caves, Selangor, on November 25, 2007, was bythen a fait accompli. Islamist conservative elements within the bureaucracy had prevailed evenover ruling politicians, with frightening ramifications for ethno-religious relations.

The demise of Islam Hadhari

As Abdullah Badawi’s administration staggered on from 2006, it became ever clearer that IslamHadhari’s failure was inevitable, given its disappointing disconnect between theory and practice,between what was portrayed as lofty civilizational ideals and poor implementation by religiousofficials who had neither a knowledge-driven appreciation of it nor concern for its future. Inshort, even before Abdullah’s tenure as prime minister had reached its expiry date, IslamHadhari was already a spent force. His leading of the BN and UMNO to disastrous electionresults in 2008 tarnished his reputation forever, practically putting an end to Islam Hadhari. Assoon as it became obvious that Islam Hadhari would not be able to survive Abdullah’sembattled premiership, its death knell was sounded by outspoken figures from the religiousbureaucracy and from all sides of the political divide.46 Enthusiasm to pursue its cause swiftlyevaporated as the certainty of Abdullah’s exit from power inched nearer. Yet, in retrospect,even in its honeymoon period, Islam Hadhari was richer in hype than in substance, neverwholeheartedly embraced by ordinary Malaysians of all persuasions, although parroted out ofdeference to authority. No tears accompanied its steady demise. Najib Razak’s assurance thathe would continue Islam Hadhari after assuming the premiership was given more out ofrespect for Abdullah than for any programmatic reason (Shahanaaz Habib 2008).

Today, Islam Hadhari is unheard of even as a government slogan, having been overtaken byNajib’s One Malaysia scheme. Only Abdullah, in his intermittent statements to the media, speaks

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of it approvingly.47 At the international level, only Malaysia’s Western allies recognized IslamHadhari as reassuring evidence that Malaysia was not going down the path of extremism in aglobal order increasingly influenced by the US-led Global War on Terror. The response fromMiddle Eastern heartlands of Islam was lukewarm at best (Alles 2010, 19–20). In his finalpress conference as prime minister, Abdullah did not hide his disappointment that IslamHadhari had metamorphosed into a seemingly repressive mechanism:

It is a big problem – overseas the idea is welcome. Even Indonesia. But here it is all in a mess. Becausewe are fighting each other politically. Some PAS members do not like the idea. It is a battle that goeson. Changing of the mind. To do anything like that is not easy. (Cheah 2009)

Abdullah’s quoting the example of Indonesia is significant in view of the atmosphere of moreopen appreciation of diverse Islamic discourses there, as shown by the productiveness of its“liberal Islam” scholars. Small wonder, though, that some conservatives viewed Islam Hadharias no more than a reincarnation of liberal-cum-neo-modernist Islam as propagated in Indonesia(Bustamam-Ahmad 2011, 113–114; Muhamad Ali 2011, 20–21).48 Abdullah’s foregroundingof Islam Hadhari was seen in a similar manner to the indulgence of former presidentsB. J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid in neo-modernist Islamic discourses whose genealogyruns to prominent thinkers Nurcholish Majid (1939–2005) and Harun Nasution (1919–98)(Ahmad Fauzi 2012, 257–262). Unfortunately for Abdullah, however, the Islamistintelligentsia entrusted with making Islam Hadhari a success lacked both the intellectualsophistication and the fortitude required to present and apply the grand scheme in universalterms (Ahmad Fauzi 2008, 232–233). While the roots of liberal and neo-modernist Islam canbe traced back to genuine intellectual stirrings at grassroots level, even if from a somewhatisolated segment of society, Islam Hadhari, by contrast, “woefully unexplained andunelaborated… discursively underdeveloped and intellectually impoverished” as it was(Kessler 2008, 73), lacked popular legitimacy by having originated from and being fullyreliant on the government for its implementation (Bustamam-Ahmad 2011, 122).

Since Najib Razak’s assumption of the premiership in April 2009, Islamist conservatism hascontinued to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims. Issues involving Christians havebeen particularly worrying. The High Court decision of December 2009 permitting the use of thenomenclature “Allah” in Catholic Malay language publications triggered arson attacks onchurches around the Klang valley in January 2010 (Maznah Mohamad 2010, 521–523).Christian discontent was caused by the Home Affairs Ministry’s confiscation of Malay-language Bibles, which were finally released but only after being stamped with the words “ForChristianity” in large print (Aruna 2011; Carvalho 2011). Following Utusan Malaysia’sheadline news on an alleged conspiracy by opposition politicians and some priests to makeChristianity Malaysia’s official religion, PEMBELA issued a statement claiming that Islamwas under grave threat from aggressive Christian evangelization (Shazwan Mustafa Kamal2011). Raising tension further, PERKASA declared its readiness to launch a crusade againstsubversive Christian influence (Aidila Razak 2011).

In the aftermath of GE13 in May 2013, which saw the BN continuing in the doldrums with itsfailure to regain a two-thirds parliamentary majority, tension has accelerated with regard to analleged intensification of Christian missionary activities among Muslims and abuse of Muslimprayer facilities for non-Muslim worship purposes.49 On October 14, 2013, the Court ofAppeal momentously overturned the High Court’s 2009 verdict allowing the use of the word“Allah”’ to refer to God in the Malay language section of The Herald, enforcement of whichhad been delayed pending the government’s appeal against it. In ruling otherwise, the three-judge bench opined that the term “Allah” was not integral to the faith and practice ofChristianity. The verdict immediately put the vast numbers of indigenous Christians of Sabah

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and Sarawak in a dilemma, as they had been using the term in their native language liturgies forgenerations, even before the incorporation of their states into Malaysia. Catholic ArchbishopMurphy Pakiam was forthright in denouncing the ruling as amounting to a persecution ofChristians.50 Fearing a backlash from Sabahan and Sarawakian Christians, who hadoverwhelmingly backed the BN in the two most recent general elections of 2008 and 2013,cabinet members from the Borneo states sought to assure them that the verdict applied only toThe Herald, and did not affect their religious practices in local churches.51 The Home AffairsMinister and the Prime Minister later joined the damage limitation exercise by affirming thelimited applicability of the verdict,52 but such antics were dismissed by opposition figures aslip service to merely salvage the Sabahan and Sarawakian votes,53 besides being disputed byveteran legal experts.54

Concluding remarks

This article has outlined the vicissitudes undergone by Islam Hadhari, the scheme that became themainstay of the administration of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, from its beginning until its end. Byfocusing on the relationship between Islam and conservatism, we have argued that the failure ofIslam Hadhari may be attributed to the rise of reactionary Islamist conservatives, made upessentially of four groups: UMNO ultra-conservatives; opposition party Islamists; a nascentcivil society; and religious bureaucrats. On some issues, they combined as a united forceagainst the inclusive, moderate and tolerant message presented by Islam Hadhari. Theycontributed in no small measure to the erosion of Islam Hadhari’s legitimacy, as demonstrablyreflected in the BN’s, UMNO’s and Abdullah’s own loss of popular support in the twelfthgeneral election in 2008.

Since his elevation to the premiership, Abdullah Badawi’s successor, Najib Razak, has been atpains to mollify Islamist conservatives, who at times seem to threaten the inclusive path of hisOne Malaysia scheme. His primary concern has been to satisfy all political stakeholders, eachwith his or her own vision and interpretation for Malaysia and its political variables, oftencompeting with one another. Up to now, Najib has preferred ambivalence and rhetoric,emphasizing his reformist credentials on the one hand and placating conservative factionswithin UMNO and the Islamist civil society on the other. In the meantime, Islamistconservatives have become increasingly united in their stance that Malaysian Islam is undersiege despite constitutional provisions safeguarding it, as allegedly indicated by the existenceof a carefully designed plan to encourage Muslim youngsters to leave Islam.55 The Islamistconservatives, for their part, generally support the unofficial dogma of Malay supremacy,which Najib neither clearly disowns nor espouses. Najib prefers to hold the middle ground,contributing to the prevailing state of what anthropologist Shamsul Amri Baharuddin oncecalled “stable tension” (Shamsul 2004, 121). With belligerent perceptions dominatinginteraction between Malay-Muslims and non-Muslims, ethno-religious conflict does not showany encouraging signs of receding in the near future. By contrast, Islamist conservatism isenjoying its heyday in Malaysia.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented as a conference paper at the Eighth InternationalMalaysian Studies Conference (MSC8), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi,Selangor, Malaysia, July 9–11, 2012.

Both authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for valuable input towardsimproving this article. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid expresses gratitude to USM for an

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incentive grant which facilitated research for this article. Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail wishes toacknowledge receipt of UKM’s Young Researcher Grant 2013-040 and Research DevelopmentFund 2013-189 for funding research for this article.

Notes

1. From 1957 until 1969, the ruling coalition was known as the Alliance (Perikatan), comprising UMNO,the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). Following racialriots in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969, a state of emergency was declared, parliament was suspended and aNational Operations Council (MAGERAN:Majlis Gerakan Negara) took over the reins of governmentuntil the restoration of parliament in 1971. Since 1974, the coalition has been renamed as BarisanNasional, with the inclusion of smaller component parties from Sabah and Sarawak.

2. ‘Islamist’ here refers to advocates of organized political action designed to establish Islam as thesupreme creed of a polity and social order (see Ahmad Fauzi 2010, 170 n. 1).

3. On a spectrum of religio-political thought, conservatism and fundamentalism bear similar traits.Nonetheless, the present authors feel that, in the Malaysian context, conservatism better captures themood on the ground, not to mention the highly pejorative connotations conveyed by the term“fundamentalism.”

4. Cf. “Conservatives had been among the most powerful political actors in many societies during the 20thcentury and there seems no reason for a substantial change in the coming years. But the scholar interestto Conservatism still remains weak and Conservatism is mostly neglected as an ideology or a theoreticaltool to interpret socio-political phenomena,” Conference of Conservatism Studies tagline, “NewConservatisms and New Approaches,” Prague, May 14–15, 2010. http://www.conservatismconference.org/call.html.

5. Abdullah’s paternal grandfather, Mecca-born Haji Abdullah Fahim (1870–1961) – a towering figure inUMNO’s religious section – has been credited with having chosen the date of Malayan independence,August 31, 1957, based on its equivalent date in the Islamic calendar. Abdullah’s father, Haji AhmadBadawi (1907–78), was a religious teacher who represented UMNO as Penang state legislativeassembly member for Kepala Batas from 1959 until his death.

6. As noted in the article “PM doakan Nik Aziz pulih segera.” Utusan Malaysia, July 23, 2004. http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/info.asp?y=2004&dt=0723&pub=utusan_malaysia&sec=dalam_negeri&pg=dn_03.htm&arc=hive

7. “Elite Malays and Mixed Marriage.” Asia Sentinel, July 27, 2007. http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/elite-malays-and-mixed-marriage/; “In Conversation: All Mixed Up.” The Edge, March 15, 2010.

8. See also “No: Postponement of Proposed IFC Is Not a Setback, Says Abdullah.” The Sun Daily, March24, 2005. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/179018

9. “Khutubul: Bar Council to Focus on Inter-faith Dialogue.” The Sun Daily, March 7, 2005. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/179279

10. See also “Lawyers’ Body Asks Syariah Court to Provide Remedy for Non-Muslims.” Bernama,December 30, 2005. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-145511092/lawyers-body-asks-syariah.html.

11. See “Plea to Curb Shariat Courts’ Powers in Malaysia.” The Hindu, December 30, 2005. http://www.hindu.com/2005/12/30/stories/2005123001550900.htm.

12. See “KL Hospital Retains Moorthy’s Body Pending High Court Decision.” Bernama, December 23,2005. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-145410538/kl-hospital-retains-moorthys.html.

13. See “Kemukakan dalam mesyuarat, bukan memorandum – PM.” Utusan Malaysia, January 21, 2006;“121 (1A) kekal – PM.” Utusan Malaysia, January 21, 2006; “Jangan jadikan isu – PM.” UtusanMalaysia, January 22, 2006; Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, interviewed in Kuala Lumpur, March 18, 2010.

14. See also ‘NGO Islam sepakat tolak cadangan pindaan perlembagaaan.” Siasah, January 20, 2006.15. See “Jheains to Abide by Syariah Court Ruling on Woman.” Daily Express, January 23, 2006. http://

www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=39720; “Nyonya Tahir a non-Muslim.” The Star,January 24, 2006; “Nyonya Tahir – a Landmark Judgment.” Malaysiakini, January 24, 2006. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/46151.

16. See “Minister Condemns Muslim Protest as ‘Stupid’.” Malaysiakini, May 16, 2006. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/51104.

17. See “Pak Lah: Forum Okay…But Be Careful.” The Star, May 17, 2006.

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18. See “Article 11 Forum Ended Peacefully amid Noisy Protesters.” The Sun Daily, July 24, 2006. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/173338

19. See “Hentikan perbincangan isu agama – Abdullah.” Utusan Malaysia, July 26, 2006.20. See “Penegasan BADAI berhubung Aktiviti Kumpulan Artikel 11/IFC.” http://bantahan-ifc.tripod.com/

penegasanBadai.htm.21. See “Disrupted Forum Never Planned to Discuss Inter-Faith Commission.” The Star, May 17, 2006.22. See “Mufti Perak dakwa 250,000 murtad di negara ini?” Harakah Daily.Net, February 14, 2006. http://

harakahdaily.net/v2/index.php/utama_lead/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=791:mufti-perak-dakwa-250000-murtad-di-negara-ini&catid=1:utama&Itemid=50.

23. See “Lina Joy Loses Appeal to Drop ‘Islam’ from Her NRIC.” The Sun Daily, May 30, 2007. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/170212.

24. See “I Have to Perform the Last Rites, as His Lawful Wife.” The Sun Daily, December 1, 2006. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/171965; Vasudevan and Ahmad 2006; Fung And 2006; “Lawyers CriticiseIslamic Council.” New Straits Times, December 8, 2006.

25. Crown Prince of Perak, Raja Nazrin Shah reacted strongly: “I am very sad that people can be so petty.These are unnecessary distractions when there are more pressing matters that deserve our attention”(Wan Hamidi Hamid 2006b).

26. See “Mariner Azhar: I Have Not Renounced Islam.” The Sun Daily, November 17, 2006. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/172091.

27. See “Race Politics Is Out, Warns Hishammuddin.” New Straits Times, November 15, 2006; “UmnoDelegate: Don’t Provoke Us.” Malaysiakini, November 16, 2006. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/59629; “Jangan sentuh hak orang Melayu.” Utusan Malaysia, November 16, 2006; “Hisham;The Keris Is Here to Stay.” The Star, November 26, 2006.

28. See “KAF and SIS under Fire.” The Sun Daily, November 17, 2006. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/172095.

29. See “Demolish Statues, Destroy Crosses in Missionary Schools Says UMNO MP Parit Sulong.”December 2, 2007. http://blog.thestar.com.my/permalink.asp?id=11870.

30. Penang has two Deputy Chief Ministers, the other being Dr P. Ramasamy of DAP.31. See “PKR Leader Caught for Khalwat in Kuantan.” February 25, 2012. http://www.freemalaysiatoday.

com/2012/02/25/pkr-leader-caught-for-khalwat-in-kuantan/; “Terkini – Penjelasan Ustaz BadrulaminBaharon dan akan menyaman mereka yang memfitnahnya.” February 26, 2012. http://sharpshooterblogger.blogspot.com/2012/02/terkini-penjelasan-ustaz-badrulamin.html.

32. See Nurul Nazirin 2005a; “Keeping Morality a Private Affair.” The Sun Daily, March 26, 2005. http://www.thesundaily.my/node/178991; Nurul Nazirin 2005b.

33. “BADAI sokong gesaan kaji semula amalan kongsi raya.” Malaysiakini, June 15, 2006. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/52590.

34. See “Muslim Lawyers Form Group to Defend Islam ‘from Attacks’.” The Star, July 14, 2006. http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?file=%2F2006%2F7%2F14%2Fnation%2F14835401&sec=nation.

35. “Memorandum dan Kempen Tanda Tangan Diserahkan kepada Seri Paduka Baginda Yang diPertuanAgong dan DYMM Raja-raja Melayu serta YAB Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, PerdanaMenteri Malaysia.” Demi Masa, September 29, 2007. Accessed April 13, 2012. http://bantahifc.bravehost.com; http://membelaislam.bravehost.com.

36. “Program Pemutihan.” Harian Metro, December 14, 2008; “Pekida bukan samseng.” August 23, 2010.http://gempakz.org/showthread.php?tid=506.

37. See “Pekida piket jika forum diteruskan.” Utusan Malaysia, August 7, 2008; Pragalath 2008.38. For SIS’s views and general activities, see Norani Othman (2006).39. See Sira Habibu 2006; “Moderate Malaysia Has No Place for Snoops.” The Sunday Star, February 25,

2007. http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?file=%2F2007%2F2%2F25%2Ffocus%2F16972499&sec=focus.

40. See Mazwin Nik Anis 2008; “Yoga Fatwa on Hold.” The Star, November 25, 2008. http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?file=%2f2008%2f11%2f25%2fnation%2f2636425; “PM: Yoga for Exercise CanGo Ahead.” Malaysiakini, November 26, 2008. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/93796.

41. The Sharia High Court judge in question, Hassan Basri, was found guilty in December 2010 and finedand sentenced to 10 years in prison.

42. See “Mufti Perak cadang penghidap AIDS, Selesema Burung dikuarantin.” Bernama, April 22, 2005.http://www.jpvpk.gov.my/html/news/archives/Malay/Apr05%2022b.htm; Mazni Mustafa 2006; “Ulamamahu amalan kongsi raya dikaji semula.” Utusan Malaysia, June 14, 2006.

43. See “Takaful Apologises over E-mail.” The Star, October 14, 2006.

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44. See “Century-old Hindu Temple in KL Torn Down.” Malaysiakini, April 21, 2006. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/50088; Theophilus 2006; Yoges Palaniappan 2007.

45. See “Samy: Stop Temple Demolitions or Risk Indian Votes.” Malaysiakini, October 31, 2007. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/74206; Fauwaz Abdul Aziz 2007; “But Samy Says It’s Khir’s Fault.”Malaysiakini, April 29, 2008. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/82096.

46. See “Rasmi: Tiada lagi Islam Hadhari.” Malaysiakini, June 9, 2008. http://www.malaysia-today.net/archives/archives-2008/8609-rasmi-tiada-lagi-islam-hadhari; Zieman 2008.

47. See “Kemiskinan, ekstremis cabaran utama dunia.” Utusan Malaysia, January 19, 2012; “IslamicStudies Should Comprise Knowledge from Various Fields’, Borneo Post, February 22, 2012. http://www.theborneopost.com/2012/02/22/islamic-studies-should-comprise-knowledge-from-various-fields/

48. See “Sanusi kritik Abdullah, Khairy.” Harakah, July 16, 2006.49. See the statement by Dr Abdul Shukor Hussein, Chairman of the National Fatwa Committee,

“Denigration of Islam is rising in this country because of lax law enforcement. As a result, adherentsof other religions are not afraid of mocking Islam which is this country’s official religion” (“Percayakes hina Islam dirancang.” Berita Harian, August 13, 2013).

50. “Statement on the Court of Appeal Ruling – Archbishop Tan Sri Murphy Pakiam.”MSN News, October21, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/tmi/statement-on-the-court-of-appeal-ruling-%e2%80%93-archbishop-tan-sri-murphy-pakiam.

51. “Allah Not Exclusive to Muslims, Government Declares Ban Only Applies to Herald.” MSN News,October 15, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/malaysia-news/allah-not-exclusive-to-muslims-government-declares-ban-only-applies-to-herald; “Court’s Ruling on Allah Does Not Affect EastMalaysia, Say Sabah Ministers.” MSN News, October 17, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/regional/court%e2%80%99s-ruling-on-allah-does-not-affect-east-malaysia-say-sabah-ministers; “Okayfor Bahasa Services in Peninsula Churches to Continue Using Allah in Worship, Says Minister.”MSN News, October 21, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/tmi/okay-for-bahasa-services-in-peninsula-churches-to-continue-using-allah-in-worship-says-minister.

52. “Home Minister Insists Allah Ban Exclusive to Herald.” MSN News, October 21, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/tmi/home-minister-insists-allah-ban-exclusive-to-herald; “Najib Breaks His Silenceon Allah Issue, Reiterates 10-Point Solution for East Malaysia.” MSN News, October 21, 2013.http://news.malaysia.msn.com/tmi/najib-breaks-his-silence-on-allah-issue-reiterates-10-point-solution-for-east-malaysia-1.

53. See “Wan Junaidi’s Remark on Allah Issue Is ‘Complete Trash’, Says Tony Pua.” MSN News, October16, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/malaysia-news/wan-junaidi%e2%80%99s-remark-on-allah-issue-is-%e2%80%9ccomplete-trash%e2%80%9d-says-tony-pua.

54. “Allah Judgment Flawed, Can Jeopardise Najib’s Job, Say Jurists.”MSN News, October 16, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/malaysia-news/allah-judgment-flawed-can-jeopardise-najib%e2%80%99s-job-say-jurists; “Allah Decision Binding on All Malaysians, Says Retired AG Abu Talib.” MSN News,October 19, 2013. http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/allah-decision-binding-on-all-malaysians-says-retired-ag-abu-talib; “Putrajaya Desperately Back-Pedalling Over Allah Issue, SayConstitutional Lawyers.” MSN News, October 21, 2013. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/malaysia-news/putrajaya-desperately-back-pedalling-over-allah-issue-say-constitutional-lawyers.

55. “Strategi murtad terancang.” Berita Harian, August 18, 2013.

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