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    **Caribbean LNG DA**

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    1NC- Caribbean LNG DA

    Trinidad and Tobago are set to recover but on the brinkplan blocks LNG exports

    Judith Gold et al 3/15/2012 (Judith Gold, Mario Mansilla, Hunter Monroe, Machiko Narita, and JoelOkwuokei, Western Hemisphere Department of the IMF, "Trinidad and Tobago"

    www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12128.pdf)

    Trinidad and Tobagos energy sector remains at the center of the countrys economy. It has benefitted from acycle of high energy prices thanks to significant investment in previous decades. The country has moved to update its fiscal regime and

    increased the frequency of bidding rounds after virtually no bidding activity in the second half of the last decade. It has also promoted

    downstream investment to increase value added and to strengthen linkages between the energy sector and the rest of the economy. After a lull

    of several years, there are substantial planned investment projects. 17. The energy sector is poised to recover, but it is also

    facing significant risks. Notwithstanding a number of setbacks in recent years, natural gas output is expected to

    rebound in 2012 as upgrade and maintenance work in the upstream sector is completed. The

    petrochemical sector is also forecast to resume operating at more normal levels with a recovery in the

    availability of gas. Refinery output is expected to benefit from increased capacity and more environmental friendly products as a result of

    the Gas Optimization project. In the short term, there are upside risks associated with high global energy prices and

    market diversion of LNG exports, but also downside risks from the aging infrastructure requiring frequent maintenance, whichcould lead to more disruptions in the supply of natural gas. Over the longer term, increased exploration in Trinidad and Tobago could reverse

    the downward trend in oil and gas reserves. However, uncertainties in the global gas market, on account of the

    potential of rapid growth of shale gas production worldwide, pose a challenge for the development of

    longer-term investment plans.

    Thats key to the economy and regional stabilityprevents terrorism

    Jason Kelshall 2005 (Naval Postgraduate School, "Natural gas and energy security in Trinidad andTobago and their impact on US energy policy and Caribbean stability"

    www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf)

    A major attack on Trinidad and Tobagos energy sector apart from the economic effects described above could also seriouslycurtail Trinidad and Tobagos significant contributions to the stability and security of the widerCaribbean region. Trinidad and Tobagos strategic location as the first island off the Latin American coast makes itextremely important in curtailing the flow of arms and narcotics to the other smaller islands whose

    capability for defense is constrained by limited resources. Trinidad and Tobagos oil wealth has allowed itto purchase, operate, and maintain some of the most sophisticated security equipment in the region to

    address these local and regional threats. It is Trinidads strategic location and the sophisticated security systems it maintains

    which make Trinidad and Tobagos contribution to the region important and significant. Any significant reduction in the revenue

    stream from the energy sector reduces Trinidads ability to mount the best possible defense. This

    translates to procuring and employing the most modern equipment and techniques against thesesecurity threats within the territorial boundaries of the island and the wider Caribbean.

    Extinction

    Speice, 6 (Patrick, JD 2006 from College of William and Mary, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, lexis)

    The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction

    in the United States are truly horrifying.A terrorist attackwith a nuclear weaponwould be devastating in terms of

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    immediate human and economic losses.49Moreover,there would be immense political pressurein the United

    Statestodiscover the perpetrators andretaliate with nuclear weapons,massively increasing the number of casualties and

    potentiallytriggering a full-scale nuclear conflict.50

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    2NC- Impact Overview

    Most likely scenario for extinction--

    Caribbean is a unique flashpoint for terrorismglobal gateway to most trade paths

    causes draw in

    Curtis Ward 2010 (Writer for the NDU press, "Regional threats: security capacity imperatives in theCaribbean" www.ndu.edu/press/regional-threats.html)

    The over 15,000,000 containers that are offloaded and transited through the region each year to the

    United States and elsewhere. The Caribbean is not only providing major containerized transshipment

    ports for U.S. exports and imports, but also sitting astride the shipping lanes from South America and

    providing through-passage for ships navigating the Panama Canal toward North America, Europe, and

    other northern destinations. As the volume of maritime traffic continues to increase each year, the Caribbean has become a

    soft target for transnational crime. Securing the supply chain from possible contamination is of great concern toboth the United States and the Caribbean.

    Caribbean terror unique threat to the United States

    Anthony Bryan and Stephen Flynn 10/21/2001 (director of the North-South Center's CaribbeanProgram, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Terrorism, porous borders, and homeland

    security: the case for US-Caribbean Cooperation" www.cfr.org/border-and-ports/terrorism-porous-

    borders-homeland-security-case-us-caribbean-cooperation/p4844)

    Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages betweendrug

    trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in theCaribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum

    refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of

    the worlds methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerabletargets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at

    U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one

    considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United

    States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be

    flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a

    Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to

    move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countrieshave suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again,

    Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within nationalborders.

    Ensures lash out

    Robert Ayson 2010 Center for Strategic Studies -- Victoria University @ Wellington (Studies in Conflict& Terrorism)

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    A Catalytic Response: Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the

    country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to

    wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. Acontrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the

    sovereign states that possess these weapons in s ignificant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would

    fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be

    admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is

    always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclearworldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that

    some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of eventsleading to a massive

    exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrowsterrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were

    seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late

    1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of

    imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war.

    For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could

    plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of

    terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily

    threaten them as well. Downloaded By: [Michigan State University] At: 13:38 14 July 2010 584 R. Ayson Some possibilities, however remote, do

    suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of

    nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct

    attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al.

    that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes itdetectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the

    materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclearterrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at

    all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably

    Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps I ran if its program

    continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo?

    In particular, ifthe act ofnuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension inWashingtons relations

    with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and

    political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increaseif the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other

    from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a

    nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could

    Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of

    the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soilmight also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear

    aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist

    nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal,

    on a higher stage ofalert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that

    Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear

    force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must

    be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

    T&T is the center of the Caribbean economygas is the crucial tie

    Jason Kelshall 2005 (Naval Postgraduate School, "Natural gas and energy security in Trinidad andTobago and their impact on US energy policy and Caribbean stability"

    www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf)

    If attacking energy targets is an integral part of linked militant Islamic groups strategy, then the country ofTrinidad and Tobago may be a reasonably accessible and vulnerable target for the application of this strategy. The

    local energy infrastructure is vulnerable, and is tied to the economy of the Caribbean region, and

    Trinidad and Tobago has recently been described as the energy and financial capital of the Caribbean.

    The local energy sector accounts for forty percent of the islands economy and exports from Trinidad

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    and Tobago account for 84% of the regions inter-island trade. Revenue from Trinidad and Tobagos gasrents have also underwritten stability and economic development in the smaller islands through loans,

    grants, subsidies, and financial assistance. More important, exports from it form a key part of the energy security strategy of theUnited States and it presently exports 88% of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) used in the United States.

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    ImpactBrazilian Hardliners

    Caribbean instability empowers Brazilian hardliners

    Richard Millett 2002 (Ph.D., Senior Fellow at the North-South Center, Oppenheimer Chair of ModernWarfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Professor Emeritus of History at Southern

    Illinois University at Edwardsville, Oct. Strategic Studies Institute, Colombia's Conflicts: The Spillover

    Effects of a Wider War)

    While the spillover of Colombias conflicts has exacerbated the problems of the region significantly andhas reduced the resources available to confront mounting political and economic dilemmas, it is by nomeans the principal cause of these problems. The economies and/or the political leadership of every one of Colombias neighbors are injeopardy. In part, this stems from global economic problems further fueled by volatile commodity prices, the U.S. recession and the Argentine

    economic collapse, declines in investor confidence, and the difficulties of adjusting to a globalized economy. Even more, it reflects the failure of

    political leadership, dogged by traditions of corruption and divisive politics. In Ecuador and Brazil, no party can count on a

    majority in Congress, and high levels of uncertainty cloud upcoming presidential elections. The governmentsin Peru and Panama must deal with the heritage of past corruption, with a growing perception of them as weak and 28 incompetent, and with

    steadily declining levels of popular support. In Venezuela, President Chavez came to power largely because of a massive public rejection of thetraditional political class, but he has become a symbol of divisiveness instead of unity, facing the constant threat of ouster by constitutional or

    by unconstitutional means. This mix of political and economic crisis provides the fertile ground in which the

    alliance of political and criminal violence thrives. It undermines efforts to stabilize democracy and install

    anything approaching the rule of law. An August 2002 poll showed this trend widespread throughout Latin America. Citizens

    increasingly blamed the political class for their problems and halfsaid they wouldnt mind if anauthoritarian government came to power. Support for free market economics also showed a sharp decline.98 Venezuelaspolitical crisis is the ultimate wild card in efforts to promote any regional response to Colombias conflicts. Until that is resolved, finding any

    common agenda will be nearly impossible. Brazils regional power ambitions, combined with its suspicions of anyoutside involvement in the Amazon Basin, the traditional enmity between Peru and Ecuador and between Venezuela and

    Colombia, and the extreme weakness of the Panamanian security apparatus, are also obstacles which will be difficult to

    overcome.

    Nuclear war

    Donald Schulz 2000 (Ph.D., Chair of Political Science at Cleveland State U., fmr. Research Professor ofNational Security at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army College, March 2k. Strategic Studies

    Institute, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future)

    Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the

    Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively

    pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing

    nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership

    transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes.

    They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each othermost notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards

    agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy 26 Agencyand have

    joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the

    military application of Brazils nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than onpolitical will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier isnot insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazils nuclear and space technologies will be primarily

    political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazils nuclearprogram towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to

    previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the

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    current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders

    necessarily less militaristicor more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Perus Fujimori comes immediately tomind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only

    producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would

    have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial

    missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift

    or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazilat a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the

    development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, 27 severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason

    Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism,

    imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could

    present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as

    domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which

    would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international

    community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. Foryears, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of foreign intervention. Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa CruzAbreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a new Vietnam if developed countriestried to internationalize the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provokedan angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57

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    ImpactRegional Instability

    T&T economy key to regional stabilityisolated downturn causes widespread ripple

    effectJason Kelshall 2005 (Naval Postgraduate School, "Natural gas and energy security in Trinidad andTobago and their impact on US energy policy and Caribbean stability"

    www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf)

    Trinidad and Tobagos energy driven economy is a critical node in the Caribbeans networked economy

    and any incident that significantly affects the economy of Trinidad and Tobago will have a negative

    ripple effect in the region. Its status as an oil/gas rich country, has thrust the twin island state into

    assuming many obligations towards the regions economic development and stability, which it has consistentlyfulfilled. In the following sections, we will look at how Trinidad and Tobago has shouldered its perceived obligation to less

    developed economies within the greater Caribbean economy, in terms of general exports, petroleum products

    and in providing development funds and loans to the wider Caribbean economy. We will then look at the effectsof a disruption of revenue in Trinidad and Tobagos energy sector and its potential negative effects on the economic stability and security of theregion.

    Instability alone causes extinction

    Max Manwaring 2005 (Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics atDickinson College, VENEZUELAS HUGO CHVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE,October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

    The Issue of State Failure. - President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security

    challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding

    ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed

    massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they involve

    criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these

    conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping,

    corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can

    spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women

    and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic

    cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and

    spill overinto regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities

    that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of

    South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps

    that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, inaddition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts areaimed at progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its

    national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically onselected Latin American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions ofcorruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of

    the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and

    social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed

    states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is

    that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a

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    consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In

    connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies

    will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longerdysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endangerglobal security, peace, and prosperity.65

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    ImpactUS Leadership

    Instability in the Caribbean exposes the US to a loss of leadership and terrorist attacks

    Ivelaw Griffith 11/16/2004 (Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Honors College at the

    University of Florida, Visiting Fellow Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and Former PresidentCaribbean Studies Association, Mr. President, the Caribbean is Still a Strategic Zone, National DefenseUniversity Seminar

    http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Repository/INSS_Proceedings/Colleagues_for_the_Americas/Colleagues_200

    4_11.pdf)

    As a global power, the US has several national interests beyond the Caribbean in which it is engaged. Global counter-terrorism, especially in the

    Afghanistan and Iraq theatres, concerns the US greatly. Improving relations with Europe, engagement in Israel and Palestine post-Arafat,

    containing Iran and North Korea, and focusing on Mexico, the Andean and the Southern Cone countries are also highly important national

    interests. However, national interest also dictates that the Caribbean not be forgotten. Global engagement

    must actively consider this region. Four fulcrums of national interest, or value arenas, make theCaribbean a zone of strategic importance. These are democracy, geopolitics, geo-economics, and geo-

    narcotics. Democracy is a core US political value and national interest. Unfortunately the pursuit of this goal often conflicts with other

    interests, creating a mixed record. For instance, the US has both worked against unacceptable democratic expressions within some countries,

    and has also supported weak democracies in other countries. Parts of the Caribbean are bastions of electoral democracy. Despite strong

    procedural democracy, a number of dangers must be resolved. Low and declining voter turn-out, electoral fraud, and drug money in campaign

    financing endanger the credibility of the democratic process in some places in the region. Moreover, several factors undermine confidence in

    democracy. These include poverty, corruption, and dysfunctional judicial systems. Involvement mitigates the risks these problems pose to US

    core national interests. The second fulcrum is geopolitics. Location and proximity make a difference, especially if they

    coexist with a strategic resource that is important commercially and militarily. Six Caribbean Basin countries,including Venezuela, produce oil. Chavez and his policies are significant in how the US does business. But the importance of hydrocarbons goes

    beyond production to refinement. Six other countries refine oil, and provide a significant quantity to service the US market. Bauxite is

    another strategic resource, and a significant proportion of Unites States imports of this commodity

    comes from the Caribbean Basin. Used in circuitry, airplane components, and aluminum products, the

    proximity of the source as well as cheap import costs place access to this resource from the Caribbean

    an element of US national interest.As another aspect of geopolitics,

    the Caribbean is vital in US worldwideengagement as a part of the security network. This is the southern flank or strategic rear or thirdborder. Military Assistance Advisory groups and Military Liaison Offices coordinate force presence. Beyond this, there are Forward

    Operating Locations in the Caribbean that are vital to the prosecution of missions against drug

    production and trafficking, and terrorism. From the Caribbean vantage point, the military bases are an important part of their

    economy. While the rents may not represent much money for the US, they can do a lot for the countries concerned. Hence, strategically,

    the US and Caribbean countries rely on each other.

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    ExtensionTerror

    Terrorist attack in T&T likelylocal groups and connections to wider Al Qaeda cells

    Jason Kelshall 2005 (Naval Postgraduate School, "Natural gas and energy security in Trinidad andTobago and their impact on US energy policy and Caribbean stability"

    www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf)

    What is the possibility of terrorist activity taking place in Trinidad and Tobago? In July 1990, Islamic Militantsknown as the Jamaat al Muslimeen (JAM), attempted to establish the first Islamic state in the Western Hemisphere, in Trinidad and Tobago, by

    armed revolution. Twenty-six people died and hundreds were wounded in the bombing, shooting and hostage crisis that played out in the

    countrys Parliamentary Chamber and state television station. Security forces eventually took control and forced the surrender of the militantssome six days after the attempt was initiated. While the Government was able to resolve the immediate crisis by providing an amnesty that

    freed the militants involved, the threat posed by radical Islamic elements continues until this day. Terrorist activity in the

    Caribbean, while generally perceived not to be of strategic importance to the United States has

    increased within the last decade. Terrorist groups with confirmed links to the Al Qaeda network are

    believed to operate in Venezuela and Margarita. Venezuela lies just seven miles from Trinidad and Tobago,

    and this proximity makes it feasible that an attack could be planned and initiated from these cells.

    Caribbean accesses terror risks from multiple regions

    Curtis Ward 2010 (Writer for the NDU press, "Regional threats: security capacity imperatives in theCaribbean" www.ndu.edu/press/regional-threats.html)

    As noted above, the Caribbean is astride the major shipping lanes from South America to North America and

    Europe. Though one of the Caribbean region's greatest assets, the region's geographic position and

    construct increase its vulnerability and pose even greater security challenges. Drug traffickers moving

    cocaine from South Americaespecially from Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the world's largest cocaine producers

    have taken advantage of the ease of transit through the region and the porous, unprotected borders of the islands.Illicit arms trafficking and money laundering, which support the drug trade, have contributed significantly to

    increased crime and violence and raised the security risks and threat levels in a number of Caribbean societies.

    T&T is a hotbed for terror groupseconomic status makes it attractive

    Jason Kelshall 2005 (Naval Postgraduate School, "Natural gas and energy security in Trinidad andTobago and their impact on US energy policy and Caribbean stability"

    www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf)

    Several other affiliated mosques were raided later on November 10 th 2005, in an apparent government crackdown. During this later raid,

    weapons, ammunition and grenades were seized at the groups headquarters at Mucurapo, but no explosive materials or bombing suspects

    were found, or charged. It must be noted that Trinidad and Tobago also hosts a number of other radical

    Islamist groups apart from the Jamaat Al Muslimeen.10 If the Jamaat is not behind the recent spate of bombings in Port of

    Spain, then the other alternative is more alarming, that is, the mobilization of another group that has the capability and

    the willingness to use explosives and arms to disrupt the security, stability and economy of Trinidad and

    Tobago. What these incidents suggest is that there is a wide scale of confirmed and suspected terrorist

    activity taking place in and around Trinidad and Tobago. The inability of the local security forces to date

    to prevent, or arrest, the perpetrators of recent activity also alludes to the ease with which local or

    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdfhttp://www.ndu.edu/press/regional-threats.htmlhttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdfhttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdfhttp://www.ndu.edu/press/regional-threats.htmlhttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf
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    2NC- Link Wall

    Gas exports keyany fluctuation in new markets could pop the bubble and ensure

    downturn

    Jason Kelshall 2005 (Naval Postgraduate School, "Natural gas and energy security in Trinidad andTobago and their impact on US energy policy and Caribbean stability"

    www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf)

    It must be remembered that Brazil is one of the largest countries in the world, and its economy dwarfs Trinidad and Tobagos, therefore the

    effects of a similar incident would be much larger in Trinidad and Tobago. The local economy has been characterized as

    inflated by a gas boom and real estate bubble, loosely regulated and lacking in data collection, in order to accurately assessmacroeconomic shocks. Jwarla Rambaran74 contends that real estate prices in Trinidad and Tobago are linked to the expatriate community and

    the present gas boom. This has caused a related construction boom and increased consumption generally by

    increased foreign exchange earnings spent in the local economy. Any major disruption in the energy

    sector or expatriate flight could cause the bubble to burst. He indicates systemic weakness in the local financial

    system, mainly weak data gathering capabilities and loosely regulated finance houses and lending and construction agencies, can cause

    crisis in the financial system in such an environment. He contends that there was a precedent for thisprediction because a very similar situation unfolded in the late 1980s during the collapse of Trinidadsfirst oil boomwhen oil prices plummeted. Certainly a major attack will cause all of the planned projects timelines to be extended orreconsidered, incurring further costs and penalties. Most of the government planned initiatives will be hamstrung, including elaborate plans to

    relocate the Port of Spain port and expand the capital through the construction of a boardwalk and several high-rise buildings on the water line

    it presently occupies.

    Cubas right behind T&T productionfailing oil industry is the difference

    Anthony Bryan 4/11/2013 (Writer for the Dominican Today, "The dash for deep-water oil and gas inthe Caribbean: what's at the finish line" www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2013/4/10/47266/The-

    dash-for-deepwater-oil-and-gas-in-the-Caribbean-Whats-at-the-finish)

    Cuba has so far proved to be a disappointing deepwater frontier province. It has identified 59 blocksinits exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and there is significant hydrocarbon exploration. However, Repsol, Petronas,

    Gazpromneft and PDVSA all drilled dry (or not commercially feasible) exploration wellsduring 2012. Venezuelas PDVSA

    and Angolas Sonangol were expected to drill wells again by the end of 2012 but the results have not been publicized. Cuba is the second

    largest oil producer in the Caribbean islands (after Trinidad and Tobago) producing 52,000 barrels per day from landand shallow water. Cubas most promising areas appear to be towards the Gulf of Mexico and Southwest coast of Florida, and the forelandbasin from the

    T&T shifting their contracts to the Caribbean now

    Nick Snow 10/29/2012 (Washington Editor for the Oil and Gas Journal, "Trinidad and Tobago energy

    minister outlines LNG export changes" www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-10d/general-interest/trinidad-and-tobago-energy-minister-outlines.html)

    Trinidad and Tobago, a major LNG exporter in the Western Hemisphere, is changing its emphasis from spot sales to large

    Atlantic Basin customers to contracts with Caribbean and South American nationseager to move to gas

    from imported diesel and fuel oil for electricity generation, the country's energy minister said.

    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdfhttp://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2013/4/10/47266/The-dash-for-deepwater-oil-and-gas-in-the-Caribbean-Whats-at-the-finishhttp://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2013/4/10/47266/The-dash-for-deepwater-oil-and-gas-in-the-Caribbean-Whats-at-the-finishhttp://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-10d/general-interest/trinidad-and-tobago-energy-minister-outlines.htmlhttp://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-10d/general-interest/trinidad-and-tobago-energy-minister-outlines.htmlhttp://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-10d/general-interest/trinidad-and-tobago-energy-minister-outlines.htmlhttp://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-10d/general-interest/trinidad-and-tobago-energy-minister-outlines.htmlhttp://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2013/4/10/47266/The-dash-for-deepwater-oil-and-gas-in-the-Caribbean-Whats-at-the-finishhttp://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2013/4/10/47266/The-dash-for-deepwater-oil-and-gas-in-the-Caribbean-Whats-at-the-finishhttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf
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    Ending US dependence necessarily trades-off with T&T exports

    Michael Edghill 5/23/2013 (Professor of US Government and Caribbean Affairs, "The significance ofTrinidad and Tobago to the US" www.americasquarterly.org/content/significance-trinidad-and-tobago-

    us)

    While it is not the oil exporter that Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela are, Trinidad and Tobago falls just behind Ecuador and Brazil, on average, asa Western Hemispheric supplier of crude oil. Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago is the largest supplier ofliquefied natural gas

    (LNG) to the United States. Trinidad and Tobagos position as an energy exporter becomes even moresignificant in the context of the U.S. goal to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern supplies of energy.

    http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/significance-trinidad-and-tobago-ushttp://www.americasquarterly.org/content/significance-trinidad-and-tobago-ushttp://www.americasquarterly.org/content/significance-trinidad-and-tobago-ushttp://www.americasquarterly.org/content/significance-trinidad-and-tobago-us
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    A2- Energy Not Key

    Energy sector major source of revenuecritical to economy of country

    Jason Kelshall 2005 (Naval Postgraduate School, "Natural gas and energy security in Trinidad andTobago and their impact on US energy policy and Caribbean stability"

    www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf)

    In summary Trinidad and Tobagos energy sector provides the majority of revenue to government anddrives economic growth in the island. This sector provides the resources that are the top earning exports for

    Trinidad and Tobago and the sector also was the main generating force of FDI in the islands and several new

    projects are planned to further develop the islands industrial base and capture new foreign investment. In 2004, this sector

    contributed approximately 34.1% to the countrys GDP, 85.5% to merchandise exports, 70% of foreignexchange earnings and 37.1% to government revenues. Current U.S. FDI flows in the island are estimated at $600 MillionUSD per annum. In the following section, we will see just how vulnerable this crucial sector is to terrorist attack.

    Energy sector key to T&T economymajor percentage of GDP and other industriesJudith Gold et al 3/15/2012 (Judith Gold, Mario Mansilla, Hunter Monroe, Machiko Narita, and JoelOkwuokei, Western Hemisphere Department of the IMF, "Trinidad and Tobago"

    www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12128.pdf)

    The energy sector is critical to the economy of Trinidad and Tobago. The energy industry accounted for

    44 percent ofnominal GDP (2010), 83 percent of merchandise exports (2010), and 58 percent of government

    revenue (2010/11). The sector is comprised ofexploration and production of crude oil and natural gas (47 percent of energysector GDP), petrochemicals (24 percent), refining (15 percent), and services (13 percent) (Figure 1). Notwithstanding its central role in the

    economy, the sector employs only 3 percent of the labor force.

    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdfhttp://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a443036.pdf
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    A2- Other Countries Trigger Link

    No global shale gasother countries lack the private capacity for development

    Andrew Revkin 7/4/2012 (Quoting Victor, University of California, San Diego, energy and climate policyresearcher, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/a-greenhouse-gift-if-china-follows-u-s-shift-

    from-coal-to-gas/)

    Indeed, theres lot ofinterest in shale gas in Europe, India and China. In the real world I suspect that thissource of gas will emerge slowly because none of these markets has the conditions in place to

    encourage the kind of private sector drive that has made the gas revolution so dramatic in the US . Its also

    important to remember that there are lots of other sources of gas. China, for example, is still struggling to tap its

    coal bed methane and other sources of gas, and a viable large-scale business model for gas doesnt fullyexist in that country. Shale gas is still down the list of the best ways for China to boost its gas supplies.

    The same is true of India, where a nightmare of gas pricing regulations and pipeline troubles hobble gas of any kind. In Europe, somecountries are embracing shale; others, such as France, have banned fracking.

    http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/a-greenhouse-gift-if-china-follows-u-s-shift-from-coal-to-gas/http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/a-greenhouse-gift-if-china-follows-u-s-shift-from-coal-to-gas/http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/a-greenhouse-gift-if-china-follows-u-s-shift-from-coal-to-gas/http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/a-greenhouse-gift-if-china-follows-u-s-shift-from-coal-to-gas/
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    **A2- Caribbean LNG DA**

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    2AC- Caribbean LNG

    Non-uniquenatural gas sector already threated

    Justin Jacobs 1/7/2013 (Writer for Caribbean 360 News, "Trinidad economy threatened by the rise ofUS shale says analyst" www.caribbean360.com/index.php/business/664364.html#axzz2Xwm7uKpc)

    Trinidad and Tobagos oil and natural gas resources has made it one of the economic powerhouses ofthe Caribbean, but a recent analysis in Petroleum Export suggests that the twin islandrepublics economicsecurity could be under threat from one of its major export markets . According to writer Justin Jacobs, the

    Caribbean producer could suffer more than most other energy producers with the rise of shale output

    by the United States. Jacob writes that the surge in US shale-gas production, a wave of new liquefied natural gas

    (LNG) export projects around the world and major gas discoveries offshore east Africa and elsewhere

    have ushered in a new era for the gas sector, which he suggests threatens to undermine the security of

    Trinidad and Tobagos markets. While it has adapted in the short term, to secure its place in the new-look global gas market,Trinidad and Tobago must develop a new, long-term strategy, Jacobs reports.

    No impact or its inevitableT&T will just increase sales to China

    BOFIT 6/7/2013 (Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, "China emerges as a majortrading partner for many Latin American countries" www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/seuranta-

    aineisto/pages/vw201323_6.aspx)

    President Xi Jinping spent this week on a tour of Latin America. He began with a visit to Trinidad and Tobago

    to talk about cooperation in the energy sector. Trinidad and Tobago has large natural gas deposits and

    would like to find new export markets for its liquefied natural gas (LNG) since the shale gas boom is reducing the US gas imports.

    China, which is interested in developing natural gas fields in the Caribbean region,promised to build a childrenshospital in the capital city of Port of Spain. In Costa Rica, China agreed to provide almost two billion dollars in financing for modernisation of an

    oil refinery, highway improvements and a public transport project. Mr. Xi is currently in Mexico, after which he travels to the US.

    No chance of T&T economic collapseresilient local networks and product diversity

    ensure a rebound capability

    At worst, aid loans solve

    Stephen Gregory 6/5/2013 (Writer for the Epoch Times, "Xi Jinping Courts Nations in America'sBackyard" www.theepochtimes.com/n3/93197-xi-jinping-courts-nations-in-americas-backyard/)

    While in Trinidad and Tobago, Xi held bilateral meetings with the leaders of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas,Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Suriname and Jamaica, which the Peoples Daily pointed out are Caribbean countries with diplomatic ties with

    China. The small nations were rewarded, as during the meetings Xi promised US$3 billion in aid to the nine

    countries in the form of loans offered below cost, Trinidads prime minister told ABC. The PRCs ambassador toTrinidad and Tobago said the loans were something that will be increased in the future, according to ABC.Xis manner charmed the Caribbean leaders. Domincas prime minister spoke approvingly of how Xi had taken them seriously, and Bahamasprime minister felt Xi had treated him no differently than Xi would treat Barack Obama, according to Singapores Channel NewsAsia.

    http://www.caribbean360.com/index.php/business/664364.html#axzz2Xwm7uKpchttp://www.caribbean360.com/index.php/business/664364.html#axzz2Xwm7uKpc
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    No regional stability impactdrug crime violence escalating

    Randal Archibold 8/24/2011 (Writer for the New York Times, "Trinidad and Tobago DeclaresEmergency Over Drug Crimes"

    www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/world/americas/25trinidad.html?ref=trinidadandtobago&_r=0)

    The island nation ofTrinidad and Tobago has imposed a nightly curfew and sent troops to cope with a rash of

    violent crime associated with gangs, one of the starkest signs of worry in the Caribbean region over a

    spike in drug trafficking. Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, in a nationally televised address on Sunday night,

    announced what she called a limited state of emergency. It includes a 9 p.m.-to-5 a.m. curfew in major cities and townsand broader powers for the police to make searches and issue arrests, with 5,000 members of the

    military assisting them. Her speech followed a weekend of mayhem that left 11 people dead. The measures have slowed the pace ofdrug-related killings and led to the arrest of 58 gang leaders, the foreign minister, Surujrattan Rambachan, said in a telephone interview on

    Wednesday. Its a limited intervention to deal with gangs and get guns off the streets, he said. He added that after about two weeks, thestate of emergency could be extended for 90 days with approval from Parliament. The operation, he said, has not affected the airport or resorts

    in a country that is heavily dependent on foreign tourism. Drug smugglers shipping cocaine from South America to North America and Europe

    have long used Caribbean islands as way stations, though much of the traffic has shifted to Central America and Mexico. A United States

    Congressional report in May said that 95 percent of the drugs destined for the United States flowed through Mexico, with about 60 percent ofthat first crossing Central America. Still, officials in the Caribbean have raised the alarm at what they believe to be an increase in smuggling by

    sea after law enforcement agencies increased the use of radar to clamp down on trafficking by plane. Several islands have

    complained of a spike in violent crime that they associate with drug gangs, either established ones or

    new groups, as smugglers seek to exploit weaknesses in law enforcement.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/world/americas/25trinidad.html?ref=trinidadandtobago&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/world/americas/25trinidad.html?ref=trinidadandtobago&_r=0
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    ExtensionChina Influence

    China already courting T&Tnatural gas contracts

    Stephen Gregory 6/5/2013 (Writer for the Epoch Times, "Xi Jinping Courts Nations in America'sBackyard" www.theepochtimes.com/n3/93197-xi-jinping-courts-nations-in-americas-backyard/)

    Of course, Xi was not in Trinidad and Tobago just to give away things and make friends. China needs natural

    gas, and Trinidad and Tobago has large reserves. With the boom in natural gas production in the United

    States, Trinidad and Tobagos number one market for its chief export is drying up. The expected completion of awidening of the Panama Canal in 2014 makes possible the easy shipment of liquefied natural gas to the PRC.