cuba newinter americansystem uc preciado

7/23/2019 Cuba NewInter AmericanSystem Uc Preciado

1/21

Jaime Antonio Preciado Coronado* and Pablo Uc**

CUBA AND THE NEW

INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM***

INTRODUCTION

Statements against the trade embargo imposed against Cuba by theUnited States since 1962 are no longer coming only from academicsand intellectuals, nor are they a mere expression of institutional con-demnation by multilateral bodies. The issue has taken a new turn inthe hemispheric agenda and in the agendas of countries in the region,both in Latin America and the United States. The geopolitical rhetoricof the Cold War era that warned of the Cuban threat to hemisphericand American stability and that rationalized international isolation ofthe country has faded and is now considered to be the most anachro-nistic aspect of US foreign policy.

* PhD in Latin American studies at University of Paris, France. Professor and re-searcher at the University of Guadalajara, Mexico. Research lines: geopolitics ofthe integration and democracy in Latin America; political geography and elec-toral processes; municipality, local government and decentralization. Memberof the National System of Researchers, Mexico. Co-director ofRevista Espiral;Studies of the State and Societyand collaborator in the Pblico-Milenionewspa-per.President of the Latin American Sociological Association (2007-2009).

** Research Fellow at the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO).

*** Text extracted from: Preciado Coronado, Jaime Antonio & Uc, Pablo 2011 Cubaand the new Inter-American System in Prevost, Gary & Oliva, Carlos Cuban

Latin American Relations in the Context of a Changing Hemisphere(New York:Cambria Press) pp. 73-100. Translated by Robert Kimpleton.


2/21

LATIN AMERICAN CRITICAL THOUGHT: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The lack of objective reasons for the policy led American nationalsecurity agencies to strike the Cuban threat from their list of strategicpriorities 10 years ago, a view supported by former President JimmyCarter. The embargo is now justified more as a matter of domestic pol-

itics than as part of Latin American policy and has become a divisiveissue among US interest groups. It has also come under serious ques-tioning by regional players who are demanding autonomy for theirown international affairs and policies. Although officially formulatedas a series of economic measures designed to promote democratiza-tion and greater respect for human rights (State Department, 1992),it has also led to the island nations exclusion from Inter-American re-lations and regional institutions with strong ties to the United States.Under this scenario, the embargo can be viewed as a policy geared

towards influencing the hemispheric balance of power.As the embargo approaches its fiftieth anniversary, Latin Ameri-can countries are virtually unanimous in their call for its cancellationand for Cubas full political and diplomatic reintegration into regionalaffairs. Foremost among these countries are those with leftist govern-ments, who have moved from issuing statements at multilateral forumsto carrying out an intensification of trade relations with Cuba, to thedispleasure of Washington. In the political sphere, the absence of anynormalization of Cuban-American relations has led these countriesto abandon negotiation forums such as the Organization of American

States (OAS) and the Summit of the Americas, which they consider to bedominated by a US vision of pan-American relations. At the same time,there is a growing group of countries that acquiesce to the US position,and linking the lifting of the embargo to the implementation of politicalreforms in Cuba. The most prominent among these are countries withnon-leftist governments such as Chile and Panama, as well as countriessuch as Honduras and Haiti where the US exerts direct influence.

The new Cuban role in inter-American relations requires thata number of variables and players involved in this reincorporation

be taken into consideration, as well as the terms under which it willtake place. First of all, it is necessary to examine the most significantchanges, both real and symbolic, that have taken place in the Cubanpolitical system since Raul Castro became president. Such changes in-clude new foreign policy initiatives that have led the Caribbean coun-try to reconfigure its ambitions with respect to new Latin Americanrealities as well as new global powers and alliances.

It is thus important to understand and assess the isolationist policypursued by the US against Cuba as well as the unsustainable exclusion

of Cuba from the inter-American system. We should also try to deter-mine whether the political capital that sustained the anti-Cuban agenda


3/21

Jaime Antonio Preciado Coronado and Pablo Uc

as an unquestionable feature of US foreign policy for both Republicanand Democratic administrations is running out, or whether the samepolicy towards Cuba will continue with only minor adjustments.

Making such a diagnosis will enable us to analyze the reintegration

of Cuba into the inter-American system at the end of the twenty-first cen-turys first decade from two perspectives. The first consists of an exami-nation of the new inter-American institutional system, whose validity ischallenged by the emergence of Cuba as a regional player. The secondentails a detailed analysis of the restructuring of the neo-conservativegeopolitical framework backed by the US as the basis for the structuralresistance that Cuba will face, contrasted with a new Latin Americanemphasis on autonomous regional integration which includes Cuba.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first offers an

analysis of internal changes on the island taking place at the end of thefirst decade of the twenty-first century and their impact on inter-Amer-ican relations, not only at the intergovernmental level but also in rela-tions between groups and social movements that resist and demandautonomy from the hegemony of US power. It also contextualizes thenew geopolitical status of Cuba, the prestige and international solidar-ity that it enjoys; its strengths in the fields of biomedical and geneticresearch and its quest for autonomy with respect to the European Un-ion and the strengthening its ties with Russia and especially China. Thesecond section sets out the contradiction inherent in the domestic andforeign policy of the United States regarding Cuba: the continuance ofthe embargo and the many ways in which the State Department im-poses isolation on multilateral, international, continental and regionallevels. It also underlines some signs of easing of pressure under the Re-publican administration of George W. Bush, frustration resulting fromthe failure of Barack Obama to fulfil some of the ideals articulatedduring his campaign and the transformations experienced by the pow-erful Cuban-American lobby and its power to affect US foreign policythrough domestic politics. The third section discusses Cubas role in

the transformation of inter-American relations and highlights its lead-ership in criticizing longstanding Pan-American power structures.

I. CHANGES IN THE CUBAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE CONTEXT

OF A NEW REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SCENARIO

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuba turned its gaze to the newLatin American reality of change and resistance, and not with an eye to-wards promoting armed movements, but with the aim of strengtheningthe anti-establishment movements and governments that emerged from

elections with broad popular support. Similarly, on the worldwide level,improvements during the Special Period (1991-1997) during which the


4/21


Cuban economy was reorganized to cope with the hardships that ensuedfollowing the termination of Soviet Union support resulted in a strength-ening of trade relations with the European Union, Eastern Europe, Rus-sia and particularly with China. The weakening of old export sectors

such as sugar made feasible the strategy of including Cuba in the newdynamic of international relations that favoured tourism, extraction ofraw materials and energy resources of Latin American countries.

THE INTERNALDOMESTIC SPHERE

The ascent of Raul Castro to the Cuban presidency in February 2008brought a number of liberalization measures, reforms and changesthat could be interpreted as a response to internal and external expec-tations for a transition administration yet which in reality did not

break with the historical ideals of the Cuban Revolution. In addition,several of these measures can be taken as an attempt to adapt to theregional, hemispheric and global realities of Latin America in the firstdecade of the twenty-first century.

In the area of domestic policy, the following measures takenduring the first weeks of the current administration (BBC,2008) arenoteworthy:

- Allowing Cubans living on the island access to tourist hotels.

- Making cell phone service available to all Cubans.- Liberalization of the sale of computers and appliances within

the country.

- Streamlining procedures for civil servants to buy houses be-longing to government agencies.

- Transferring land to private farmers and cooperatives to stimu-late the production of food, coffee and tobacco. This measurewill boost agricultural output, reduce the prices of products

and increase the purchasing power of wages.- Cancellation of farmer debts and increasing prices the statepays for milk and meat.

- Increasing pension payments and salaries for employees of thejudiciary, from May 2008.

- Commuting all death sentences, with the exception of threeprisoners incarcerated for terrorism.

Other more comprehensive measures, including those related to theproperty system, dual currency, low wages and allowing foreign eco-


5/21


nomic investment, will certainly take more time to implement, butthey have been greeted with enthusiasm by the international commu-nity and some Cuban-American dissidents (Hernndez, 2009).

In the economic sphere, one sign of a turn by the new administra-

tion was the appointment of several senior military officers directlyassociated with Raul Castro to economic affairs posts for the purposeof optimizing efficiencies, which has been achieved to the greatest ex-tent in companies run by the armed forces. These measures can becompared with the tight state control of the economy undertaken byChina before adopting an open-market approach (Sader, 2009).

After two years of such measures, it is possible to make a criticalanalysis of the extent to which they have affected the re-positioning ofCuba within the inter-American and international system and influ-

enced changes in Cuban diplomacy on the regional and global levels.

STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY MOVES

The beginning of Raul Castro presidency was marked by two deci-sions which greatly impacted the Cuban international agenda: the dis-missals of Carlos Lage, who served as a kind of prime minister, andFelipe Prez Roque, the young chancellor who was noted for his closeassociation with the political ideas of Fidel Castro. These changes, inspite of the controversial circumstances that precipitated them, wereinterpreted as signs of openness to dialogue with the US, and aboveall as harbingers of a new era in Cuban diplomacy that would coincidewith changes in the extra-regional and extra-continental spheres. Ac-cording to journalist Lissette Bustamante (2009) [m]ost analysts andobservers of the Cuban issue in the US believe that the changes imple-mented by Ral Castro strengthen the economy and set the stage for anew chapter in relations between both countries.

Important steps have been taken towards reactivating relationswith the European Union and the international community. South-south relations have been strengthened, particularly with two major

regional players: Venezuela and Brazil. Harmonious relations havebeen re-established with the government of Mexico after the diplo-matic break that occurred under the administration of former presi-dent Vicente Fox Quezada (the first such rupture in 45 years). Inaddition, an interesting approach has been taken regarding closer re-lations with China and Russia, which includes strengthened strategicrelations with Venezuela and the prospect for triangulated negotia-tions in energy and military matters.

Cuba, the largest island in the Antilles, was the first nation in the

Western Hemisphere to establish diplomatic ties with the China ofMao Zedong (1961), a country which is now its second largest trading


6/21


partner for sugar and nickel after Venezuela. On the occasion of thevisit of Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2009, Cuba obtained a deferralof several debt payments to China and a $70 million loan for the repairand renovation of the Cuban hospital network.

Havana has also renewed relations with Moscow. In 2006, the twocountries signed 30 cooperation agreements, which according to theRussian Ministry of Finance included more than $350 million in loansand aid for the island. Russia was among the first countries to providedisaster assistance to Cuba for three hurricanes that struck in 2008(Grogg, 2009).

In the geopolitical sphere, Russia expanded its military coopera-tion with Cuba as a result of US support for the uprising in SouthOssetia in August 2008 and conducted joint military manoeuvres

with the Venezuelan army later that year. All of this contributes to thestrengthening of Cubas strategic defence and national security.

THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

The economic, commercial, trade and financial embargo is the mostserious difficulty faced by the Cuban government and people at theinternational level. The United Nations General Assembly has over-whelmingly voted to condemn the embargo 19 times since 1992. Mostrecently, on October 26, 2010, 182 countries voted in favour of endingthe embargo, while 2 voted against and 3 abstained. Cuban Foreign

Minister Bruno Rodriguez said on that occasion: The direct economicdamage that the embargo has inflicted on the Cuban people amountsto 751 billion dollars at current exchange rates.

Aynel lvarez Guerra and Anet Pino Rivero (2010) offer the back-ground to this situation: The embargo against Cuba was imposed bythe US government on February 3, 1962 through Presidential Proc-lamation 3447. This decision, based on the legal authority affordedpresidents under section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,established a total embargo on all trade between the US and Cuba,

even though the US had already been applying economic measuresagainst the young Cuban Revolution since 1959. They then conclude:

The legal structure of the embargo is a flagrant violation of humanrights of the people of Cuba, citizens of third countries and Americancitizens themselves. Its provisions also violate US law, and it has alsoreceived condemnation for violating fundamental provisions and ten-ets of international law related to the political, economic, commercialand financial relations between states.

Internationally, in other controversial UN debates, Cuba agreed to hu-man rights discussions with Spain (resulting in the release of several


7/21


political prisoners) and promised to sign United Nations protocolson civil rights in 2008. Earlier that same year it resumed cooperativeinitiatives with the European Commission through a joint declara-tion signed by Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid

Louis Michel and then Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Felipe PrezRoque at a ceremony in Havana.

The declaration establishes a general framework to guide bothparties through the gradual development of their future cooperation.In addition, both parties agreed to continue to explore potential areasof cooperation in which Cuba excels such as the environment, sci-ence and technology, trade, cultural exchanges and natural disasterpreparedness. European Commission funding, which totalled 20-25million, could be invested in these areas (Europa Press/IP, 2008).

Internationalization strategies left over from the Cold War pe-riod have been adapted to prevailing circumstances and included inthe integration process, mainly through the Bolivarian Alliance forthe Peoples of Our America (ALBA). In December 2004, Cuba andVenezuela signed their first ALBA statement and agreement, consoli-dating a strategic alliance with the symbolic backdrop of ideologicaland political opposition to the longstanding strategy of US-imposedisolationism, amidst the present reality of already strong ties betweenCaracas and Havana.

Joining ALBA has given Cuba a higher profile among governments

in the region, and it has also become a key factor in updating its imagein Latin America. The move has drawn key support from networksof social movements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean,mostly in the Southern Cone. Support from organizations through-out Latin America has been expressed at the post-2004 editions of theWorld Social Forum and at Peoples Summit sessions held in parallelto official presidential meetings, such as the Summit of the Americas,where the rejection of Cubas isolation has been a constant demand.

It should be noted that Cuba provides doctors and health tech-

nology to Venezuela as part of Mission Barrio Adentro, as well asstrategic advice regarding the design of Venezuelan anti-poverty pro-grams. In return, Cuba receives 60,000 barrels of oil per day (Trinku-nas, 2006). In 2006, following the victory of Evo Morales in Bolivia,the Andean country became a full member of ALBA, followed byNicaragua after Daniel Ortegas victory in 2007. In 2008, Dominica

joined ALBA as a full member, followed by Honduras in October ofthat year, although the participation of Honduras was thwarted bythe June 2009 coup. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines joined in April

2009, followed by Ecuador in June, giving ALBA its current member-ship of eight countries.


8/21


We should also mention the importance of the media project Tel-evisora del Sur, better known as Telesur, which was founded in 2005by the governments of Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and Cuba to off-set the quasi-total monopoly of Anglo-American media corporate em-

pires and the national economic elites and their impact on the politi-cal (de)-stabilization of Latin American countries that have adoptedpolicies unfavourable to their interests (Villamil, 2009).

The establishment of contacts between progressive leftist govern-ments and civil society organizations has resulted in a subtle but im-portant step towards ownership of the initiative in terms of both thepragmatic aspects of international political relations and alternativecivilian actors in Latin America. While pragmatism is associated withpolitical realism, that which is doable or feasible, without considera-

tion for the means to achieve the goals, the policy of social agencies isseen as an ethical stance which subordinates the type of means usedto the validity of the purposes.

In this context, there has been growing momentum behind propos-als for Peoples Trade Agreements (TCPs). These proposals were initiallydriven by Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba in 2006 and then gradually takenon by a number of social movements as part of an advocacy for fair tradeand in opposition to the neoliberal and orthodox versions of other FreeTrade Agreements (FTAs) (Gudynas, 2006). This has been a fundamen-tal factor in linking Cuban political development to that of the rest ofLatin America. It has expanded historical support from certain sectorsof Latin American civil society associated with the traditional left joinedby new generations and expressions of resistance and a global leftistmovement contributing new ideas to the anti-neoliberal struggle. Theseinitiatives champion regional integration initiatives as alternatives toneo-Pan American initiatives, and with the express inclusion of Cuba.

ALBAs strategic focus covering the Caribbean ring, which encom-passes Havana, Caracas, Managua and extends all the way throughthe Amazonian-Andean region to La Paz, has enabled the creation of

a platform for the negotiation of strategic alliances in areas such asenergy, economics, trade and to a great extent ideology.

These factors take on geopolitical significance when we considerthe interest that the United States has in making Central Americaand the Caribbean part of its primary security perimeter as definedby USNORTHCOM, the push to adopt the Central America-Domini-can Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) andits ongoing support for the idea of giving Mexico a pivotal role as aregional hub and geopolitical linchpin between the US and Central

America through the Mesoamerican Initiative, which replaced thePuebla-Panama Plan.


9/21


In spite of such geopolitical determinants, the multi-faceted po-litical and diplomatic agenda of Cuba is opening doors to the possi-bility of it becoming key player in regional debate. The intensity withwhich the Cuban government is going forward with its Latin Ameri-

can foreign policy, through its presence in forums that are not directlycontrolled by the United States (Rio Group, Latin American and Eu-ropean Ibero-American forums and the So Paulo Forum), is puttingan end to past isolationism and helping to consolidate and amplifyits stance against US imperialism. As a result, Cuba has attained thecooperation of some Latin American countries for the coordinationof political and trade negotiations with Washington, in a way thatstrengthens Latin American regional autonomy.

Ending the US embargo is at the top of the list of demands pre-

sented before other regional organizations such as the South AmericanUnion of Nations (UNASUR) and the Caribbean Community (Caricom)and even continental bodies such as the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS), with historical implications to be dealt with below.

THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND MORAL PRESTIGE ASSOCIATED

WITH THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

The abovementioned political and diplomatic efforts, combined withthe quality of Cuban international solidarity projects made possibleby its scientific and technological development, have contributed tothe ethical and moral prestige of the Cuban Revolution in Latin Amer-ica and throughout the world. Cuban literacy brigades have helped toeradicate illiteracy in Venezuela and Nicaragua and mitigate it in sev-eral other countries in the region. Operation Miracle, which providesspecialized eye surgery, has returned sight to hundreds of thousandsof senior citizens throughout the region, and without such care be-ing based on ideological considerations of any kind. And in the caseof Cuba, the humanitarian aid provided to countries that have fallen

victim to natural disasters is not a question of giving what one has left

over, but sharing what one has. This attitude is reflected in the valuesof solidarity that lead Cuba to cooperate in natural disaster relief eventhough providing this international assistance involves making sacri-fices on the domestic front.

A case in point is the prestige gained by Cubas integrated securitysystem against risks, a social safety program that has helped LatinAmerican countries overcome catastrophic damage from hurricanesthat have killed in endemic fashion in the Caribbean region. Cubasprestige is reaffirmed not only by its response to disasters in Latin

America, but also by the evident hypocrisy of international disasterrelief and the way preparedness is managed elsewhere.


10/21


Some specific cases illustrate this view. In early July 2005, Hur-ricane Dennis, a Category 4 hurricane, as was Katrina, struck Cuba(De Belder, 2005). Cuban authorities evacuated 1.5 million people in atimely and orderly manner. In the case of Hurricane Ivan, a Category

4 hurricane and the fifth most powerful storm ever to have struck theCaribbean, two million people were evacuated, 100,000 within the firstthree hours, and casualties were kept to a minimum. While deathsresulting from natural disasters in other countries, including the US,have numbered in the thousands, in Cuba there have not been morethan a few dozen. This record has given the Cuban disaster prepared-ness system recognition as a model for all countries in the region,according to the Office of Humanitarian Affairs of the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP).

The role of Cuban cooperation in natural disaster relief in Hai-ti confirms the humanitarian intensions of their international soli-darity (Carpineta, 2010): They came when the hurricanes struck in98 as a health care contingency. After the earthquake struck, theywere examples to other physicians. Over 12 years, 744 Cuban doc-tors have treated more than 34,500 patients. Of the 2,728 operationsperformed, 1,297 were highly complex surgeries, 380 were upperlimb amputations and 644 of the lower limbs. A total of 744 doctors,nurses and laboratory technicians, worked on 18 surgical teams inthree hospitals in Port-au-Prince and in care centres throughout the10 departments of Haiti.

In the first weeks after the disaster, professionals from Spain,Chile, Venezuela, Colombia and Germany joined the effort in hospitalsoperated by Cubans. So did about 400 Haitians recently graduated orabout to finish their medical studies in Havana. The US, however, re-fuses to reach out to the Cubans. Not counting the UN peacekeepingmission, the US and Cuba are the two countries with the most peopledeployed in the devastated country (Carpineta, 2010). The earthquakein Haiti questions the depth of international humanitarian coopera-

tion and the funding of official development assistance. This situation,illuminated by Cuban foreign policy initiatives, begs a rethinking andreorientation of international financial assistance for natural disasters.

II. THE WANING OF THE AMERICAN POLICY OF CUBAN ISOLATION

THE NORMALIZATION OF CUBANLATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

The normalization of diplomatic relations between Costa Rica and ElSalvador with Cuba in March 2009, which had been suspended since

1961, resulted in Cuba having diplomatic relations with more coun-tries in the Americas that it had ever had since gaining full independ-


11/21


ence in 1902. At the same time, this milestone also made the US isthe only country in the hemisphere that has no formal relations withCuba. In other words, the most powerful country in the Americas isutterly alone in its policy towards Cuba.

In 2009, Costa Rica and El Salvador re-established diplomatic tieswith Cuba, after having been the only two countries in Latin Americanot to have such relations. This breakthrough allowed all of the re-gions political cooperation agreements to be implemented, includingthe Latin American Economic System (SELA), in which Cuba has par-ticipated since it began, and the Rio Group, which it joined in 2009at the request of Mexico, which served as Pro Tempore Secretariat atthat time. Still pending is membership in the Organization of Ameri-can States (OAS), which in June, 2009 reversed the 1962 decision bar-

ring Cuba from OAS membership (Collins, 2009). The Cuban govern-ment declined the invitation on the grounds that the spurious originsof the OAS had not been overcome.

Another fundamental demonstration of Cubas full incorporationinto regional dynamics is the fact that 40% of Cubas current tradeis with other Latin American countries, an unprecedented statistic(Surez Salazar, 2009). These factors reinforce its imminent integra-tion into the contemporary Latin American scenario, and even itssymbolic leadership, as argued in the preceding section.

THE EFFECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CUBANAMERICAN LOBBY

With the exception of local-level concerns in southern Florida, Cuba nolonger has priority status within US foreign or domestic policy. At pre-sent, the old embargo coexists with recent liberalization initiatives pro-moted by powerful American business interests. The Republican Partyitself has organized new pro-dialogue lobbies in Louisiana, Iowa, Texas,North Carolina, Nebraska, Minnesota, and other agricultural states.

However, [S]ince George W. Bush assumed the presidency of theUnited States in 2001, the budget to create a social opposition move-

ment in Cuba allied to the interests of Miami and the White Houseballooned from $3.5 million in 2000 to $45 million in 2008 (Pertierra,2010). In 2003, Bush created the Presidents Commission for Assis-tance to a Free Cuba, whose aim was to identify ways to quickly bringthe Cuban regime to an end and organize a transition. The policies ofPresident Barack Obama follow the patterns laid down by this body:To implement measures to train, develop and strengthen the opposi-tion and civil society in Cuba (Pertierra, 2010).

In spite of such high-level support, as of this writing millions

of dollars in funding have not yet been released to this commission.Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) questioned the use of that


12/21


funding, citing concerns of misuse by Cuban residents of Florida andechoing an audit in 2006 by the Government Accountability Office(GAO) which documented such corruption. In 2009, Kerry, as chair-man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked for a review

of the project, which now has $20 million budgeted for 2010. Con-sequently, the State Department temporarily froze the sizeable funduntil, following a new enquiry concluded in March 2010, plans wereannounced to release $20 million in anti-Cuban funding, arguing thatthe program had been restructured in such a way that the funds wouldarrive clandestinely to certain Cubans on the island and not to certainothers in Miami (Pertierra, 2010).

Meanwhile, the international community has become increasing-ly persistent in its calls for the reintegration of Cuba into the interna-

tional system. From a critical perspective, many see reintegration asa solution to the problems of democratization and respect for humanrights, issues on which the United Nations Human Rights Commis-sion has been adamant.

Cuba is not a threat to any country, yet it remains on the list ofterrorist states, even though no US allies consider it to be such eventhe UK refuses to blacklist Cuba. Several Cuban and American politi-cal analysts have found a direct relationship between progress towardsdtente in Cuban-American relations and the level of belligerence ofthe Cuban-American lobby (Landau, 2010): In 2010, Washington con-tinues to adopt a provocative attitude towards Havana currently fornot saving apolitical prisoner, Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died froma hunger strike. Zapata, arrested on charges of assault, decided to be-come a dissident while in jail. There are videos showing him beinghospitalized by Cuban authorities. Another video showed him receiv-ing top-level medical care without anyone asking for his insurance pol-icy. Anotherdissident, Guillermo Farias, then began his own hungerstrike at home demanding that Cuba to release all political prisoners.When he collapsed, Cuban authorities rushed him to hospital.

According to Landau (2010), tense situations such as these can belinked to a hardening of US policy toward Cuba, steered by the Cubanlobby: Ronald Reagan privatized the American policy toward Cuba,leaving it in the hands of a minority group in Miami who had no de-sire to see things improve. Every step forward, such as the migrationtalks in February, was met with a step backwards, thanks to the powerof the anti-Cuban contingency. A hunger striker dies, and another aris-es to steal the headlines. Maybe things will change when oil begins toflow from Cuban offshore platforms (Landau, 2010).

We should clarify at this point that the Cuban-American lobby is infact a diverse group of actors that can be classified into three categories:


13/21


1. Those who are most reluctant to open the door to negotiationsbetween Cuba and the US government, and who influence theUS Congress and Senate by applying political pressure throughtheir elected representatives. Prominent political figures associ-

ated with this contingency have included the likes of brother con-gressmen Lincoln and Mario Diaz-Balard of the state of Florida.

2. A second group takes a position which is apparently more opento negotiation but which in reality promotes horizontal rela-tions between the civilian populations of both countries to theexclusion of the Cuban government. This group, which has tieswith the Cuban American National Foundation, has influencedthe policies of the Department of State and the White Houseunder Barack Obama. This group also supports corporate in-

terests that attempt to dissuade governments of agriculturalexporting states from exporting to Cuba.

3. Although not formally identified as a group, a broad networkof social agencies, unions, human rights advocates, representa-tives and personalities from the American cultural and intel-lectual communities are calling for end to the embargo and forthe establishment of US-Cuba diplomatic relations.

Of course, operating independently of such groups in the United

States are a number of diverse forces in Latin America and the Carib-bean which have broadened the autonomy of the region over the pastdecade and led to enhanced political, economic and institutional con-

vergence in which Cuba is a participant, and who through a numberof forums continue to challenge the justification for Cubas isolation inthe political, economic, financial, trade, immigration and informationtechnology spheres.

III. TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: RESTRUCTURING OF THE

INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM

THE PANAMERICAN SYSTEM AND US DOMINANCE

From the first half of the nineteenth century, and in the midst of in-dependence movements in places that would become the new nation-states of Latin America, the United States gradually consolidated itsposition under the ideas of the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the geopoliti-cal fulcrum of the pan-American project inspired by pan-Americanideas that would shape the western hemisphere (clearly laid out in the

Manifest Destiny doctrine). This point of view, which reflects Haush-ofers geopolitical model of pan-regions, defines Latin America as an


14/21


appendix subordinated to that power (Cairo, 2008), whose primaryfunction was to provide the natural resources needed by American in-dustrialization and serve as an immediate consumer market for Amer-ican products. In other words, Latin America would be the greater

market of the emerging hegemonic power, to use the geo-economicterm of Alfred Weber.

Surez Salazar (2008) classifies inter-American affairs into a num-ber of periods: 1) from the Haitian Revolution to the American CivilWar; 2)the Spanish-American War (in which the US, as new worldpower, snatched independence from Cuban liberators) and the Treatyof Paris of 1898 to the Great Depression; 3) the good neighbour pe-riod following the end of World War II until the Cuban Revolutionin 1959; 4) the beginnings of the Cold War and the ongoing efforts

to promote a Cuban counter-revolution during the current new post-Cold War period. Thus, the construction of the inter-American hemi-spheric order in the twentieth century was the institutionalization ofa Neo Pan-American system supported by the implementation of anatural area of control by the United States, anxious to counter anypolitical, identity-related or inter-regional projects in Latin America orthe Caribbean perceived as being against its interests.

This system of Pan-American ideas and regimes supported by thehistorical triangulation of the Organization of American States (OAS)in the political sphere, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)in the business and financial sector, and the Inter-American Treatyof Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), with the help of the Inter-AmericanDefense Board in the military field, expelled Cuba from the Pan-Amer-ican institutional system. This isolationism became a cornerstone forthe maintenance of unfettered US dominance in the region and a wayto avoid any type of regional contamination from the Cuban threat.Sustained under a double argument of reward (carrot diplomacy) andpunishment (gunboat diplomacy), the US has implemented a parallelforeign policy which makes use of instruments of power (hard power)

and deterrence (soft power) (Nye, 2003). Such policies became the ba-sis of many forms of direct and indirect involvement in Latin Americaduring the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Barack Obamas campaign promise to combine soft power andsmart power has not materialized in the area of inter-American rela-tions. Although the internationalist Joseph Nye, who was the first todefine hard power (the power of coercion by military means) and softpower (obtaining consensus, acceptance and support) proposed add-ing the trait of intelligence and concluded that the Obama campaigns

new synthesis could be called smart-soft power. Unfortunately, Cubais proof that this proposal falls into the category of empty rhetoric


15/21


used in presidential campaigns that is never put into practice by thewinners once in office.

Events and movements in Latin America and the Caribbean overthe last decade, and in particular Cubas reintegration into the inter-

American system, represent a break in both symbolic and practicalterms with the scheme of unrestricted domination described above.

THE ROLE OF CUBA IN THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM

Signs of questioning and a potential weakening of the Pan-Americanscheme can be surmised from the following:

- The failure of the original format of the Free Trade Area of theAmericas (FTAA). The rejection of the FTAA in its originalformat at the 4th Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata,Argentina in 2005 prevented the US from creating a deregu-lated and homogeneous institutional framework in which thestate does not intervene to influence market forces. A uniformframework of continental integration based on free tradewould have favoured its expansionary business practices andgiven it access to a main supply market for natural resources.ALBA and Mecosur member countries led an opposition drivethat has kept the Monroe doctrine at bay in the twenty-firstcentury (Oliva, 2008).

- Without Cuba, the OAS is an anachronistic institution. As pre-viously stated, at its 39th General Assembly in June 2009 theOAS rescinded Resolution VI, which had been adopted onJanuary 31, 1962 and condemned Cuba to regional isolation.The move to rescind the resolution taken in San Pedro Sula,Honduras does not stipulate specific conditions but does is-sue a request for dialogue with the Cuban government anda willingness for it to address fundamental principles of se-curity, democracy, self-determination, non-intervention, hu-

man rights and development, ideals which the institution hastraditionally championed.

It is important to point out that the Cuban government ex-pressed disinterest in returning to the body, while recognizingthat the General Assembly debating Cubas return to the in-stitution is a heroic deed of Latin American rebellion (Castro,2009). Meanwhile, the decision to drop the exclusion of Cubafrom the OAS prompted seven US congressmen, mostly Repub-

licans, to introduce a bill to suspend their countrys financialcontribution to the OAS if Cuba was readmitted as a member.


16/21


- Cuba influences both South-Latin Americanism and Latin Amer-icanism. With respect to South America, Cuba offers key ele-ments for the consolidation of the ALBA project, namely newmechanisms for cooperation in the area of oil through Petro-

caribe, in alliance with Venezuela, and it also maintains closecooperation with the Union of South American Nations (UN-ASUR), an organization which supports a post-neoliberal andautonomous regionalism.

Special mention should be made of the newly established Com-munity of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), anorganization that will undoubtedly influence the restructuringof the inter-American system. This community was created

during the 2nd Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit,held in Mexico in February 2010. For the first time since gain-ing independence, the countries of the region agreed to createtheir own body, without the presence of any former colonialpowers, as was the case for events such as the Summit of theAmericas, led by the United States, the Ibero-American Sum-mit, presided over by Spain, and the Caribbean-European Un-ion Summit, led by the European Union.

This quest for Latin American autonomy has its roots in two organiza-tions: the Rio Group, which provided a space for intergovernmentalpolicy dialogue and consensus and recently welcomed Cuba, at therequest of Mexico, making it the most inclusive organization in theregion, and the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on In-tegration and Development, held since December 2008, which bringstogether all national leaders of Latin America and the Caribbean with-out the presence of the United States or Canada.

A first challenge for this community is to define itself with respectto the United States. Here two governmental discourses intersect: creat-

ing a counterweight to areas in which the US is dominant, and comple-menting or strengthening negotiation capacity in the presence of asym-metrical relations with the US. The Cuban situation is one of the mostrepresentative cases of this balancing act. On the one hand, it supportsand strengthens the Latin American forums and meetings that serve asa counterweight to US hegemony, while on the other hand it strength-ens its international negotiating skills through unconditional participa-tion in ALBA and the promotion of Peoples Trade Agreements, as thealternative format to free trade model. As demonstrated by the 39th

General Assembly and at the 5th Summit of the Americas, althoughdominated in part by the resounding speech of Barack Obama, who


17/21


promised a new relationship with Latin America based on cooperation,the wildcard in the area of making demands for Latin American au-tonomy turned out to be Cuba (Malamud and Garca-Calvo, 2009).

From a strategic perspective CELAC faces three major issues in

inter-American relations: modifying the US doctrine of militarized se-curity, promoting a policy that overcomes the limitations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, now under US influence, andtransforming the Ibero-American Democratic Charter from a mere cer-tificate of good conduct issued by the United States to a charter that ac-knowledges a democracy which is plural, representative, participatoryand community-based, as now reflected in the Bolivian constitution,and that also recognizes the particular nature of democracy in Cuba.

It is also important to consider that in terms of the development

agenda, it is risky for countries like Mexico, Colombia, Peru and theCAFTA-DR signatories to equate economic autonomy with more freetrade agreements, as this situation would limit the recognition of ALBAor Peoples Trade Agreements, in which Cuba is a participant. Preferableare schemes that emulate community formats of a reciprocal, gradual na-ture and which emphasize selective trade liberalization and strengtheningpathways towards the development of alternatives to neoliberalism.

CONCLUSIONS

Although there are clear signs that Cuba is finding itself in a new phaseof the inter-American system and within the framework of a regionalintegration initiative which is attempting to achieve unprecedented au-tonomy from the US and other globally-imposed processes, we shouldalso consider the geopolitical scenario where Latin American geopoliti-cal trends meet structural resistance from hard power forces.

We must also make a realistic assessment of the new US adminis-tration almost a year and a half after Barack Obama became presidentof the United States. The emergence of a renewed US foreign policyagenda based on good neighbour principles (Surez Salazar, 2010)

as articulated by the New Partnership for the Americas initiative hasmet with significant structural limitations imposed by the Americanpolitical system (interest groups, lobbyists, the military-industrialcomplex). Among the few initiatives that seem to enjoy support is theliberalization of remittances and some easing of travel restrictions forCubans who have family ties on the island. However, proposals fortrade liberalization in areas such as medicine, construction materialsand spare parts have not gained any traction. The State Departmentinsists that relations between the civil societies of both countries may

be intensified, while discounting the possibility of any negotiation in-volving the Cuban government.


18/21


This less than positive scenario has been worsened by occasionalpolitical miscalculations by the Obama administration, which has fur-ther called into question US leadership potential in Latin America,particularly regarding more cordial relations with Cuba. As noted by

Nye (2009), a key aspect that should be driving US diplomacy duringa historic period when its leadership is widely questioned is the useof smart power. Yet despite the Obamas novel proposal to re-estab-lish new leadership for the Americas based on a new good neighbourframework, the exercise of hard power has been more than explicitsince his arrival to the presidency. Some examples:

a. Strengthening of the US military presence in the region throughexisting military bases (casus belli), seven new bases in Colombia

and the redeployment of the Fourth Fleet in the South Atlantic.b. The Mrida Initiative, which complements the Plan Colombia

(now called the Mesoamerican Initiative) and provides the pretextfor the war on drugs, has militarized the state and politics in Co-lombia, Mexico, Panama, Central American countries and Peru.

c. The coup in Honduras (June 28, 2009), which demonstratedthe inconsistency of Obamas policy towards the Americas.Even though he condemned it a few hours after it occurred,the State Department was leaning towards backing the coup.

d. The earthquake in Haiti (January 12, 2010), which was usedto reinforce the Pentagons military presence in the Caribbean,with more than ten thousand marines deployed to control theinternational humanitarian aid and all logistical and militaryaspects on the island.

e. American think tanks and lobbies are showing contradictorytrends, as conciliatory policy reforms aimed at easing US-Cu-ban relations are torpedoed by the right-wing Cuban-Americanlobby (hard power).

f. The resurgence of right-wing governments and elite groups inseveral Latin American countries, as well as the Cuban-Amer-ican lobby, who may promote belligerency towards Cuba andLatin America (Bolivia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Colombia, Peru,Panama, Honduras) in the second decade of the twenty-firstcentury through their relationship with the US.

Although the prospects for a policy favouring changes in hemisphericrelations during the Obama administration are clearly limited, theprogress made towards the reincorporation and leadership by Cuba


19/21


in the inter-American system is indisputable. It is a reinsertion thatdoes not paint Cuba as a regional military power connected to pro-cesses of national liberation in Africa and Third World countries, buta cultural regional power in areas of international cooperation and

solidarity. Furthermore, diversification of Cubas trade relations withthe world market and to some Latin American countries with whichit has close relations, such as Venezuela and the Mercosur countries,has strengthened its negotiating hand with respect to other countriesand international institutions. This relatively successful reintegration,which has also occurred in the areas of medical, educational and bio-genetic research, has allowed Cuba to take a moral and intellectualleadership role in Latin American projects.

The three pillars that have supported the Inter-American sys-

tem have come into disuse: the Organization of American States isexperiencing a crisis of legitimacy and lags behind transformationalevents that call into question US hegemony in several Latin Americancountries; the Rio Treaty (known more formally as the Inter-AmericanTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or TIAR) does a bad job of hiding themilitarization of the continent under the guise of a counter-terrorismand anti-narcotics strategy promoted by the United States; and theFree Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) has failed in its continen-tal aspirations and now has an adversarial relationship with the newdemocratic leftist governments in Latin America.

However, the return of Cuba to the Rio Group, combined withthe growing force of social movements demanding autonomy and na-tional sovereignty, builds on the expectations generated by the Com-munity of Latin American and Caribbean States (CEALC) as the firstregional organization that was created without the intervention ofany external power.

Such trends will strengthen Cuban autonomy and sovereignty ifa newly integrated Latin America accepts the notion that to defendCuba is to defend all of Latin America.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

lvarez Guerra, Aynel & Rivero, Anet Pino 2010 Anlisis jurdicosobre la ilegalidad del bloqueo impuesto a Cuba por los EstadosUnidos available at consulted in March, 2010.

Bustamante, Lissette 2009 Miami ve con buenos ojos los cambios deRal Castro. Expertos en Cuba creen que se fortalece el sectoreconmicoPblico(Madrid, Espaa), March 3.

Cairo, Heriberto 2008 A Amrica Latina nos modelos geopolticosmodernos: da marginalizao preocupao com sua


20/21


autonomia in Caderno CRH(Salvador-Bahia, Brazil), Vol. 21, N53: Amrica Latina no Seculo XXI, May-August.

Carpineta, Mara Laura 2010 Entrevista a Carlos Alberto GarcaDomnguez, jefe de la misin medica cubana en Haiti: Vamos

a estar cuando todos se hayan ido in Pgina/12(Buenos Aires,Argentina). Available at consulted in March, 2010.

Castro, Fidel 2009 Caballo de Troya in Granma (La Habana, Cuba).Available at consulted in March, 2010.

Ceresola, Carlos 2008 Exilio cubano quiere fin del embargoavailable at consulted in April, 2010.

Collins, Michael 2009 Obama Takes Step-by-Step Approach toEnding Obsolete Cuba Policies available at consulted in February, 2010.

De Belder, Bert & Busselen, Tony 2005 Bush, Katrina y los pobresavailable at consulted in July, 2009.

Grogg, Patricia 2009 Cuba-China. Nuevas puntadas a relacionesde 50 aos available at consulted in February, 2010.

Gudynas, Eduardo 2006 Se lanza Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos

in Tercer Mundo Econmico (Montevideo, Uruguay) N 205, June.Hernndez, Jorge 2009 Procesos electorales y poltica latinoamericana

de Estados Unidos: algunas claves metodolgicas para su anlisisin Preciado, Jaime & Medina, Ignacio (eds.)Las elecciones

estadounidenses de cara a las Amricas(Buenos Aires: Elaleph,coleccin Insumisos Latinoamericanos).

Landau, Saul 2010 Otra vez los Derechos Humanos?(Santiago deChile: Instituto para Estudios de Poltica-Universidad Nacionalde Chile).

Malamud, Carlos & Garca Calvo, Carola 2009La V Cumbre de lasAmricas: las relaciones entre Cuba y Estados Unidos se juegan enla Isla(Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano).

Marn, Emilio 2009 Reflejando la debilidad poltica de EE.UU. en laregin. La OEA anul por unanimidad la vieja resolucin queexclua a Cuba de la entidad available at consulted in March, 2010.

Nye, Joseph 2003La paradoja del poder norteamericano(Madrid: Taurus).

Oliva, Carlos 2008 Algunas consideraciones generales sobre las

polticas exteriores de Amrica Latina en los aos recientes.


21/21


La regin frente a la poltica exterior de Estados Unidosin Preciado, Jaime & Medina, Ignacio (coord.)Anuario de

Integracin Regional 2007(Guadalajara: REDIALC).Pertierra, Jose 2010 La guerra contra Cuba: Nuevos presupuestos

y la misma premisa available at consulted in February, 2010.

Sader, Emir 2009 Amrica Latina y el perodo histrico actualavailable atconsulted in February, 2010.

Surez Salazar, Luis & Garca Lorenzo, Tania 2008Las relacionesinteramericanas: continuidades y cambios(Buenos Aires:CLACSO).

Surez Salazar, Luis 2009 Interview: EE.UU. est aislado inBBCMundo.

Surez Salazar, Luis 2010 Las estrategias inteligentes de BarackObama contra el ALBA-TCP: un anlisis preliminar in

Encuentro(La Paz: Fundacin Boliviana para la DemocraciaMultipartidaria).

Trinkunas, Harold 2006 What is really new about VenezuelansBolivarian Foreign Policy? in Strategic Insights(Monterey, CA)Volume V, N 2: 3.

US State Department 2008 Title XVII Cuban Democracy Act of1992 available at consulted in March, 2010.

Various Authors 2008 La Comisin Europea y Cuba relanzan sucooperacin inEuropaPress (Brussels)IP/08/1578, October, 24.

Villamil, Jenaro 2009 Concentracin meditica y lavado de cerebrosen Amrica Latina inLe Monde Diplomatique(Mexico/CentralAmerica/US) N 9, May.

cuba newinter americansystem uc preciado

Documents