chin going east sabah umno

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [Monash University Library]On: 7 January 2010Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 910831515]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Asian Journal of Political SciencePublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t741771145

Going east: UMNO's entry into Sabah politicsJames Chin a

a Leader, Political Science Programme, School of Social Sciences, University of Papua New Guinea,

To cite this Article Chin, James(1999) 'Going east: UMNO's entry into Sabah politics', Asian Journal of Political Science, 7:1, 20 — 40To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02185379908434135URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185379908434135

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t741771145

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185379908434135

http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

Asian Journal of Political Science Volume 7 Number 1 (June 1999)

Going East: UMNO's Entryinto Sabah Politics

James Chin*

Introduction

A lthough Malaysia is officially governed by the Barisan Nasional (NationalFront) coalition government, the United Malays National Organization(UMNO), the largest party in the coalition, is generally regarded by scholars1

and the Malaysian public as the real locus of power. UMNO has been the backbone ofthe Malaysian government since independence. The president of UMNO and hisdeputy, by convention, automatically becomes the prime minister and deputy primeminister of the country respectively. Roughly half of the federal Cabinet positions arealso held by UMNO and the party also holds about half the seats in Parliament. Withthe exception of Penang, UMNO nominees hold the post of chief minister (or menteri-besar) in all the peninsula states. Observers of Malaysian politics often remark that theUMNO party elections are more important than the general elections as the positionsof the prime minister and other senior ministers are decided by the party rather thanthe general public.

While UMNO holds unparalleled power in the peninsula, the situation wasmarkedly different in the Eastern Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Prior to 1990,UMNO did not even have a single branch in East Malaysia. This paper traces the entryof UMNO into Sabah politics and assesses its significance within UMNO and its impacton Sabah politics.

Sabah

Sabah's 2.1 million population is made up of about 30 different ethnic groups. Thelargest of these are the Kadazan-Dusun2 who constitute about 25%; Chinese 15%;

* James Chin, PhD, is Leader, Political Science Programme, School of Social Sciences,University of Papua New Guinea. The author would like to thank Lee Shaw Yun in KotaKinabalu for his kind assistance.

20

Downloaded By: [Monash University Library] At: 06:06 7 January 2010

James Chin • 21

Malays 9%; Bajaus 15%; Muruts 4%; Other Bumiputera 19%; and Other non-Bumiputera 12%.3 However, these figures are estimates as it is extremely difficult toget precise figures. In the 1980 census, a broad category pribumi was used to include allnative groupings (including non-natives who converted to Islam). Moreover, there is asizeable number of Sino-Kadazan, due to the high intermarriage rate among theKadazan and the ethnic Chinese, who do not easily fit into any existing category.Politically, it would be best to categorize the population as comprising 40% Muslimbumiputera (native Muslims), 40% non-Muslim bumiputera (non-Muslim natives) and20% others (mostly Chinese). The natives are also officially categorized as bumiputera(or "sons of the soil") which entitles them to preferential treatment by the stateeconomically, socially and politically. There is also a large number of illegal migrants inSabah (mostly from Southern Philippines and Indonesia) who are believed to numberbetween 750,000 to a million.

In recent history, the two main features of Sabah politics are patronage andshifting loyalties.4 It was common for those in power to use the state's naturalresources, especially by awarding timber concessions and business opportunities to loyalsupporters and financial backers, to cement political ties. "Money politics" or buyingvotes is also widespread during elections. Another feature was the rapid shifting ofelectoral loyalty. The ruling party in Sabah usually falls from power within a decade. Inthe 1970s, Sabah politics was dominated by Tun Mustapha Harun and his party, theUnited Sabah National Organization (USNO). Tun Mustapha governed Sabah from1967 to 1975 but he had to give way to Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Berjaya orPeople's Racially United Front of Sabah) after the 1975 election. Berjaya's rule lasteduntil 1985 when it was dislodged by Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS or Sabah Unity Party).The PBS government lasted until 1994 when defections caused its downfall. Since then,Sabah has been led by an UMNO-led BN coalition.

The Twenty Points

Before any discussion can take place on Sabah politics, it is crucial to understand theissue of the Twenty Points. Prior to the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Sabah (andSarawak) demanded some constitutional guarantees before they would agree to thefederation. In August 1962, the British and Malayan governments established the Inter-Government Committee (IGC), with representatives from Sabah and Sarawak, to workout these constitutional safeguards. Twenty meetings were held and four months later,the IGC report was ready. The main features of the safeguards (Twenty Points) were:5

(1) Islam's status as a national religion was not applicable to Sarawak and Sabah;(2) Immigration control was vested in the state governments of Sabah and Sarawak;(3) Borneanization of the civil service and English as the official language would

apply to both states;(4) No amendment or modification of any specific safeguards granted under the

Twenty Points can be made by the federal government without the agreement ofthe Sabah and Sarawak state governments;

(5) There would be no right to secede from the Federation.


22 • Asian Journal of Political Science

Since then, one of the key political debates in Sabah (and Sarawak) has been howthoroughly the federal government has kept to the promises made in the TwentyPoints. The federal government/UMNO's position was that these constitutionalguarantees were transitional in nature and would be scrapped in the future in theinterests of national integration.6 Many people from Sabah and Sarawak argue that thefuture of these rights are not up to the federal government but rather up to the peopleof Sabah and Sarawak. Critics in both states have long argued that the federalgovernment has not adhered to the Twenty Points and has circumvented many of theseguarantees, especially in areas of religion and Borneanization of the civil service. Islamwas made the official religion of Sarawak and Sabah despite the guarantee in theTwenty Points. Many senior officers in government departments in Sabah and Sarawakwere posted from Peninsular Malaysia despite the explicit promise made to give firstpreference to local civil servants under the Borneanization pledge.

Early Attempts

The first serious attempt by UMNO to move into Sabah occurred in the mid-1970s.Prior to that, UMNO did not see the need to enter Sabah as an UMNO proxy, TunMustapha Harun, was there to "keep an eye on things". Mustapha was a well-knownMuslim champion, and in UMNO's eyes, was capable of looking after the interests ofIslam and the Malay community, the sine qua non of UMNO's existence. Even beforeMustapha became chief minister in 1967, the federal government had alreadydispatched a senior UMNO figure, Syed Kechik Syed Mohammad, to act as Mustapha'smain adviser. Syed Kechik, a lawyer from Kedah and a political secretary, was asked byanother Kedahan, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, to go to Sabah and act as thefederal proxy. Within a short time, Syed Kechik became Mustapha's right-hand manand, in fact, ruled Sabah when Mustapha was out of the state. This was despite the factthat Syed did not hold any official post in the Sabah government nor was he a memberof the state legislative assembly. The only semi-official post he held was thedirectorship of the Sabah Foundation. 7

This cosy situation lasted until the early 1970s when Tun Abdul Razak, the thenMalaysian prime minister, became increasingly unhappy, to say the least, aboutMustapha's antics, both inside and outside Sabah. In particular, the federal governmentwas livid at the following events. First, Mustapha had blatantly rigged elections inSabah. In the May 1969 parliamentary polls, Mustapha kept his promise to the MalayanAlliance that he would "deliver" all of Sabah's 16 parliamentary seats.8 On nominationday, 11 seats were won because the opposition candidates had their papers rejected on"technical grounds". When the elections resumed in 1971,9 the other five constituencieswere easily won by Mustapha's USNO. In the 1971 state election and the 1974parliamentary election, Mustapha was even more visible. As chairman of the statesecurity committee, Mustapha held emergency powers of detention and he controlledthe police in Sabah. Just before the 1971 state election, all the potential oppositioncandidates were given a free "study tour" overseas and the election was held in theirabsence. On nomination day, all USNO and Sabah Chinese Association (SCA)10

candidates won unopposed.


James Chin • 23

In the 1974 parliamentary polls, only one opposition candidate, from thepeninsular-based Pekemas, managed to file his nomination papers.11 The other ninePekemas candidates were detained temporary until the nomination was over. All theother opposition candidates had their nomination papers rejected. Others werephysically prevented from filing their papers, and other methods of intimidation andbribery were used to ensure that USNO and its partner, the SCA, won uncontested.News reports about Mustapha's blatant use of force to cow the opposition greatlyembarrassed the federal government.

Second, Mustapha, who was born a Suluk in the Southern Philippines, began tosupport the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) openly. The Muslim MNLF, whowas fighting Manila for independence, started arriving in Sabah in large numbers, in theknowledge that Mustapha would grant them sanctuary and help. This action was indirect conflict with the federal government's prerogatives in matters of foreign policy.Mustapha's actions were especially sensitive given that both Malaysia and thePhilippines were members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).12

Third, Mustapha openly toyed with the idea of secession from the Malaysianfederation in 1974. Mustapha's plans was for Sabah to be a monarchy with himself asthe sultan of a Sulu state. At the meeting on 23 April 1975, Mustapha tabled a paperentitled "The future position of Sabah in Malaysia". The paper stated that:

It can be predicted that the future position of Sabah in Malaysia in the long run willonly be a loss to the state as one of the reasons is that Sabah will be producing moreof its products from agricultural resources and its timber industry.

Secondly, Sabah will be producing a large amount of its mineral resources suchas copper, iron, nickel, gold and oil. The autonomy state of Sabah will be graduallytaken by the federal government if the federal government thinks it is necessary to doso as it is clearly stated in the Constitution in respect to the agreement betweengovernments (inter-govemmental committee agreement) that after the 10th year ofSabah independence through Malaysia, the agreement will be reviewed. In fact thisagreement has actually been reviewed on official level on 28th October 1974.

... This paper is put forward ... so as to explain the position of Sabah in future... as to whether Sabah should continuously remain in the Federation of Malaysia orfor Sabah to have its own independence as Singapore, which has separated from theFederation of Malaysia.13

The paper attacked the federal government for not honouring the Twenty Points andsaid Kuala Lumpur had neglected Sabah's economy.

Fourth, Mustapha was openly flaunting his wealth and publicly misappropriatingthe public purse. He used state money to buy and maintain two Grumman jets for hispersonal use. During his administration, he utilized almost all of Sabah's reserves. Withthese jets, Mustapha began spending long periods overseas. In the later part of his rule,he spent more than half a year overseas, mostly in London and the Middle East.14

Reports about his extravagant lifestyle began to reach the general Malaysian public,embarrassing the federal government further.



Fifth, Mustapha came into open conflict with Tun Razak when he tried tonegotiate a huge foreign loan direct from Libya to pay for his conspicuous lifestyle in1974. Mustapha could not rely on timber money to sustain his lifestyle anymore as the1972-74 worldwide recession had started to affect Malaysia and Mustapha's economicmismanagement became more noticeable. In order to keep an eye on him, Razakoffered Mustapha the Defence Ministry in the federal government. Sensing that thiswas a plot to remove him from his fiefdom, Mustapha declined publicly, furtherembarrassing the prime minister.15

It was Mustapha's third antic that alarmed the federal government most. KualaLumpur was still recovering from the political trauma of kicking Singapore out of theMalaysian federation in 1965. Razak knew that the UMNO rank and file would notaccept another "Singapore". The federal government was also worried that Mustapha'sactions, if successful, would be followed by neighbouring Sarawak. The physical dividebetween the peninsula and East Malaysia made Mustapha's threat of secessioncredible.16 Under these circumstances, Razak decided that Mustapha needed to bereplaced by someone less embarrassing, more predictable and loyal to the federation.

Some senior UMNO members initially wanted the party to enter the state andchallenge USNO directly. Razak was not supportive of this idea for two main reasons.First, despite his antics, Mustapha and USNO were still part of the Barisan Nasional(BN) coalition, headed by UMNO. UMNO could not simply set up branches in Sabahand challenge its coalition partner openly. Second, there was no guarantee that USNOcould be beaten by UMNO. In fact the reverse was probably true. The Sabah peoplewere known to be politically parochial and would not take kindly to a party fromoutside Sabah. USNO was known to be particularly strong among Muslim voters, thetarget base of any potential UMNO entry.

The next best option was to find a new proxy, an option quickly accepted byRazak. Harris Salleh, a deputy president of USNO, was selected to undertake the task.Harris was flown to the federal capital and told by Razak to split from USNO and formhis own political party to challenge Mustapha.17 Harris, a minister in Mustapha'sgovernment, was selected because he had fallen out with Mustapha, his political mentor.Of Pakistani/Malay heritage, Harris had expected to be Mustapha's political heir, but hadbeen adeptly manoeuvred out of Mustapha's inner-circle of advisors by Syed Kechik.18

Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah or Berjaya was established shortly after themeeting with Razak. Harris's first target was other dissatisfied USNO members. As hehad federal support for his challenge to Mustapha, many were willing to join himbecause the general public consensus was that Mustapha had gone too far. FuadStephens, the Huguan Siou of the Kadazans, was also roped in after a talk with thefederal authorities to help Berjaya. Stephens resigned from his governorship and wasimmediately appointed the leader of Berjaya. Harris became his deputy. The federalauthorities calculated, correctly, that Stephens, as the paramount leader {Huguan Siou)would bring the Kadazan-Dusun vote to Berjaya. With federal support and Stephens atthe helm, half of Mustapha's Cabinet defected to Berjaya.

Despite all these, Berjaya performed below expectations. The results of the 1975elections were dose: USNO 20, SCA 0, Berjaya 28. USNO managed to hang on to aboutthree-quarters of the Muslim vote while almost all the non-Muslim vote went to Berjaya.19


James Chin * 25

Barely a year later on 6 June 1976, however, Stephens and several senior stateministers were killed in a plane crash. Harris Salleh succeeded Stephens. Harrisdisplayed his pro-federal credentials quickly when he ceded Labuan, a small island offthe Western coast of Sabah, to Kuala Lumpur without any compensation. With Harrisin control, UMNO and the federal government had no reason to enter Sabah.

The Rise of Kadazan-Dusun Nationalism

In March 1981, a state election was held and this time Berjaya performed as expected.Berjaya took 44 of 48 seats and USNO was decimated. With nearly total electoralvictory, Berjaya became more confident, and complacency and arrogance began to setin. Harris became increasingly dictatorial, displaying the same traits Mustapha showedat the height of his power. Two issues were to sweep Harris and Berjaya from power,forcing the federal government (UMNO) to rethink its policy of leaving Sabah alone.

The first issue that led to Berjaya's defeat was Harris's decision to cede thesovereignty of the island of Labuan to the federal government in April 1984. Harriscame from Labuan and was easily the island's biggest landowner. Thus there waslingering suspicion that Harris had arranged for the transfer as he would benefit fromthe accelerated development of Labuan. Harris argued that giving Labuan to the federalgovernment displayed Sabah's commitment to national integration. The Sabah publicbecame more aghast when it became known that Sabah would only get a nominal sumfor Labuan. In contrast, when Kuala Lumpur was ceded by Selangor to the federalgovernment, it received several hundred million dollars as compensation. The publichad already formed the opinion that Harris was too federal and the Labuan issue wasthe last straw: it compromised Harris as a federal lackey who was willing to "sell" Sabahto Kuala Lumpur.

The second issue that plagued the second Berjaya administration was theemergence of Kadazan-Dusun nationalism.20 The Kadazan-Dusun community, easilythe single largest ethnic grouping in Sabah, had been unhappy since their politicalpower was effectively destroyed by the death of their Huguan Siou, Fuad Stephens, in aplane crash in 1976. Although a Kadazan, James Ongkili, was made deputy chiefminister in the Harris administration, but he was deemed ineffective as thecommunity's spokesperson in the government. Ongkili, a historian who taught atUniversiti Malaya before entering politics, was widely seen by the Kadazan-Dusun asbeing too accommodating to the Muslims under Harris.21 The Kadazan-Dusuncommunity was increasingly worried about four main issues: Islamization,discrimination in the civil service, the pribumi label and the influx of Muslim Filipinos.The Kadazan-Dusun community began to earnestly look for a new Huguan Siou.

Although high-handed tactics at Islamization ceased with the defeat of Mustaphain 1976, subtle attempts at Islamization were still being carried out among the non-Muslim bumiputera under Harris. The Kadazan-Dusun were mostly Roman Catholicsand animists. Harris's near total victory in the 1981 elections had made pro-Islamicelements in Berjaya more assertive. The election results also indicated that Berjaya hadmanaged to capture the Muslim votes (21 of 44 successful Berjaya candidates in 1981were Muslims). The Muslims in Berjaya thus controlled about half of all the party seats



and they began to agitate for more pro-Islamic policies. Pressure and intimidation wereput on non-Muslim bumiputera to convert and big conversion ceremonies began toappear in non-Muslim areas, the same sort of ceremonies that were held duringMustapha's reign.22

The Kadazan-Dusun also felt uneasy about their political status. Although theywere officially classified as bumiputera and hence eligible for special constitutionalbenefits such as university places, scholarships, bank loans and recruitment into thecivil service, in reality they were discriminated in favour of Muslim bumiputera. ManyKadazan-Dusun, hence, felt that they were "second-class" bumiputera.2^ There wasanger in the community that all the senior positions in the Sabah civil service were heldby Peninsular Malays and that there was an active unofficial policy of discriminationagainst them in the higher echelons of the civil service.24

The Kadazan-Dusun sense of being "second-class" bumiputera was compoundedby Harris's decision to lump the Kadazan-Dusun with other indigenous groupings inthe 1980 census. Prior to 1980, the Kadazan were categorized as a separate entity butin the 1980 census, they were simply classified as pribumi, a collective term for allindigenous groupings in Sabah. To add insult to injury, the Berjaya administration alsochanged the character of the Kadazan-Dusun Harvest Festival (Tadau TagazoKaamatari) by relegating it into a Testa Rakyat, open to all races. These moves wereseen by the Kadazan-Dusun as blatant attempts to diminish and dilute their strongethnic and cultural identity.

The unhappiness was exacerbated by the influx of Muslim Filipinos. TheKadazan-Dusun (and the Chinese) were worried that the Muslim Filipino could alterthe delicate balance between the Muslim and non-Muslim community in Sabah.Although the non-Muslims were the majority in Sabah, the large influx of MuslimFilipinos, numbering anywhere between 750,000 to a million, were reducing the gapbetween the Muslims and non-Muslims, significantly and quickly. Berjaya's excuse fornot stopping the influx of Muslim Filipinos was that border and security issues wereunder the purview of the federal government. Harris argued, moreover, that it wouldbe physically impossible to send all the Filipinos home.

All these four issues were raised repeatedly at the state Cabinet level by a youngKadazan minister, Joseph Pairin Kitingan. Pairin had demanded that the MuslimFilipinos be forcefully repatriated and that the Sabah government should give somefinancial assistance to Church activities, in the same way that state funds were grantedto the dakwah (missionary work) of the Sabah State Muslim Organization (MUIS).Pairin's reputation for raising these issues earned him the respect of many Kadazan-Dusuns, especially the influential educated Kadazan-Dusun middle class. Pairin beganto revive the Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA), a powerful grassroots organizationand in 1982, he was designated Huguan Siou, the first Kadazan to hold the title sincethe death of Stephens. In other words, the Kadazan-Dusun community had a new andwidely recognized champion since 1976.

Pairin's disagreement with Harris boiled over in the 1983 Berjaya party congress.Earlier, in July 1982, Harris had sacked Pairin from the state Cabinet. Pairin againraised the grievances of the Kadazan-Dusun and non-Muslim communities in hisspeech at the party congress, prompting Harris to expel him immediately. Harris pulled


James Chin • 27

out the undated letter of resignation Pairin had signed when he was elected in 1981.This forced Pairin to stand as an independent for the Tambunan seat. The by-electionwas held in December 1984 and the result was never in doubt. Pairin's emotional callto Kadazan-Dusun nationalism in the face of Kadazan-Dusun identity erosion meantthat the Berjaya candidate, Roger Ongkili, a nephew of Pairin, never stood any chance.Ongkili was beaten by a margin of four to one.

The humiliation for Harris was too much to bear and he publicly punished thepeople of Tambunan by withdrawing Tambunan's status as a district. Tambunan wasthen placed under the control of the Keningau District Office and all governmentfacilities in Tambunan were withdrawn.25 This action reinforced the Kadazan-Dusun1 sresentment against Berjaya and the feeling that the whole community was beingpersecuted by Harris.

The 1985 Elections

With the Kadazan-Dusun ground highly sympathetic to Pairin and to prevent furthererosion of support, Harris decided to call a snap election in April 1985. Harris wantedto move quickly as Pairin had already applied for registration of a new Kadazan-Dusun-based political party, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS).26

On 5 March 1985, Kuala Lumpur approved PBS's application. Although UMNOhad watched PBS's call to Kadazan-Dusun nationalism with alarm, they did notperceive Pairin as a real threat as he had made overtures to the federal leadershipbeforehand. Pairin had assured them that he had no intention of creating a stategovernment outside the BN coalition model. Pairin, in fact, openly stated that hewanted PBS to join the BN. These moves helped to allay the fears of UMNO and tosecure the registration of PBS.27 Moreover, UMNO thought that Berjaya still had thesupport of the Sabah people and saw no reason to intervene directly.

The PBS's symbol, two hands clasped together over a map of Sabah, was meantto symbolize friendship and cooperation among the peoples of Sabah. The symbol,however, was politically potent for another reason: it was almost an exact copy of thesymbol used earlier by the congregation of Sabah's Catholic parishes, with only thecross missing. The meaning was clear to the Catholic/Christian community: althoughPBS was multiracial, PBS would fight for the rights of the non-Muslim community afteryears of suppression by successive Muslim-led governments. The tone of the campaign,Muslims vs non-Muslims, helped Berjaya's old foe: USNO. USNO, always thechampion of Islam, suddenly came alive as Muslims across Sabah became alarmed bythe rise of Kadazan-Dusun nationalism with its Christian overtones.

By early March, the lines were clear: USNO stood for Islam and PBS stood forthe Kadazan-Dusun and the non-Muslims. Berjaya was caught in-between: Berjayacould only offered economic prosperity and development. This was, however, notenough. Pairin and Mustapha had warned the voters that the very survival of the non-Muslim and Muslim communities, respectively, was at stake. Under such threats,Berjaya's offer of economic prosperity was simply ignored. One Sabah politiciansummed up the campaign as follows: "When the survival of your race and religion wasat stake, who cares about economic development?"28



The Berjaya campaign floundered further when Harris made the decision toimport UMNO politicians to help campaign for Berjaya. PBS had made "state-rights" asone of its key platform and promised in its manifesto that it would fight for these state-rights contained in the Twenty Points in addition to the return of Labuan. When PrimeMinister Mahathir publicly endorsed Harris by stating that the federal governmentwould "sink or swim" with Berjaya and that "if any other party rules there will be nosupport from the BN government", it diminishes rather than increases support forBerjaya. Many Sabahans were insulted that "outsiders" were again telling them what todo. The opposition claim that Sabah was a mere "colony" of Kuala Lumpur began tosound plausible.

Although PBS was barely a month old, it swept to power winning 25 seats of the48-seat state legislature. In reality, PBS took 26 seats when the only successful Pasokcandidate, Ignatius Malanjun in Moyong, joined PBS immediately after the polls. Therejuvenated USNO won 16 seats and Berjaya was left with a mere 6 seats. The electionresults signalled the political death of Berjaya. Harris himself was defeated by KadohAgundong in the Tenom constituency. Before defecting to PBS, Kadoh was secretary ofBerjaya Tenom Branch and had worked intimately with Harris. The PBS victory wasgenerally seen as a personal blow to Mahathir as he had earlier pledged to "sink orswim" with Berjaya.

The PBS Administration 1985-94

PBS had a difficult time in itsfirst year. As the results were announced, it was revealedthat Mustapha, with the support of Berjaya, had coerced the governor, Tun AdnanRoberts, into appointing him the chief minister. The two parties, USNO and Berjaya,which together held 22 seats, argued that with the extra six appointed members of thestate legislature,29 the USNO-Berjaya coalition "had" 28 assemblymen to PBS's 26. Oneof the reasons why USNO-Berjaya decided to take power was the mistaken belief thatthe federal government would back them. They thought that UMNO would simply notallow an anti-federal Christian to take power in Kota Kinabalu.

To his credit, the acting prime minister, Musa Hitam, interceded and Kitinganwas sworn in on 22 April 1985.30 Mustapha then filed a suit against the Pairinadministration claiming that he was the legitimate chief minister. The case was to lastslightly more than a year before the High Court ruled in favour of Pairin. Around thistime, a series of bomb explosions occurred in Kota Kinabalu. These disturbances wereorchestrated by radical USNO and Berjaya elements31 and were generally believed to becarried out by Muslim Filipinos. The rationale was that with a breakdown of security inthe state, the federal UMNO-led government would have to declare a state ofemergency and rule Sabah directly, thus bringing Pairin down indirectly.32 Theseactions were supported by certain UMNO factions who would not accept a non-Muslim-led Sabah government. The bombs were also used to pressure Pairin intoaccepting Kuala Lumpur's proposal of a PBS-USNO coalition government.33 Unwillingto accept the proposal, Pairin opted for another election in May 1986.

The results this time were crystal clear: PBS increased its majority from 26 to 34seats. PBS gained one extra seat when the only successful Sabah Chinese Consolidated


James Chin • 29

Party (SCCP) candidate in Sri Tanjung, James Ku Hien Kiang, defected to PBS.34 PBS'sshare of its popular votes substantially increased from about 34.8% in 1985 to 52.4%.Not only had the Kadazan-Dusun vote remained firmly behind Pairin, the Chinese andabout half of the Muslims backed Pairin. 35

After its second convincing electoral victory and for reasons of politicalexpediency, PBS was admitted into the BN. UMNO clearly did not want Sabah to beheld by an opposition party. Sabah was again in a unique position where onecomponent of the BN party, PBS, was in power while another BN component, USNO,was its main opposition. With PBS in the BN, the political situation stabilized althoughrelations between Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu remained cool. PBS's strong state-rights stand pertaining to the Twenty Points had made a smooth working relationshipwith the UMNO-led federal government difficult.

In the July 1990 state election, the UMNO-led federal government publicly tooka neutral position in the PBS-USNO tussle, although UMNO was privately backing theMuslim-based USNO with substantial financial support. PBS easily won re-election,again with near total support from the non-Muslim and Chinese communities. PBStook 36 of the 48-seat state assembly — with 53.92% of the votes — while USNO tookthe other 12.36

Umno's Entry

The uneasy relationship between PBS and UMNO was to manifest itself suddenly whenPBS withdrew from the BN just five days before the October 1990 general electionand, threw its support behind Mahathir's arch rival, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah.Razaleigh's opposition coalition, Gagasan Rakyat, which included the DemocraticAction Party (DAP) and the Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), had promised to recognizethe Twenty Points as the basis of Sabah's position in the Malaysian federation and alsoto revert the island of Labuan back to Sabah. This was too much for Mahathir (hecalled PBS's action "a stab in the back") and immediately announced that UMNOwould spread its wings in Sabah.37 Because PBS abandoned the BN coalition just daysbefore polling, UMNO was unable to field any candidates. It, however, announcedfinancial backing for USNO and any other parties or independents who were standingagainst PBS candidates. Predictably, the results were along ethnic/religious lines. PBStook 14 of Sabah's 20 parliamentary seats. USNO took the other six. PBS won in all thenon-Muslim constituencies while USNO won only in Muslim majority constituencies.

There were several reasons why UMNO abandoned its long policy of using a localMuslim proxy to further its political interests in Sabah.

First, by 1990, the two Sabah Muslim parties successfully used by UMNO toprotect Muslim and Malay interests, USNO and Berjaya, were extremely weakpolitically. Mustapha and Harris were discredited personalities, especially after theirattempt to grab power in 1985 failed. PBS's strong state-rights stand were attractingconsiderable support among the Sabah Muslim community. UMNO's strong emphasison the Malay race had alienated many Sabah Muslims as the majority of them were notethnic Malays. Moreover, many Sabah Muslims held strong regional sentiments andwere politically parochial, they believe more in strong state rights than solidarity with



their Muslim counterparts in Peninsular Malaysia. In some way, the Sabah Muslimswere similar to the Kelantanese. Although the Kelantanese are Malays and Muslims,they do not get along with Malays or Muslims from outside Kelantan, regardingthemselves as "different".38

Second, time was the essence. PBS's sudden exit from the BN meant thatMahathir had no time to rehabilitate USNO or Berjaya politically. PBS withdrew fromthe BN coalition on the 15 October 1990, mid-way through the campaign period.Polling took place five days later on 20 October 1990.

Third, there was no credible alternative Sabah Muslim party available. Asmentioned, USNO and Berjaya were a spent force. Under such circumstances,Mahathir probably calculated that UMNO could do no worse than USNO or Berjaya ifit were to set foot in Sabah.

To forestall PBS's argument that UMNO was out to "colonize" Sabah, Mustaphawas persuaded with financial inducements to leave USNO and was appointed UMNOSabah liaison chief. UMNO, however, failed to convinced Mustapha to dissolve USNO.USNO came under the control of his son, Amirkahar Tun Mustapha. Mustaphaprobably refused to disband USNO for sentimental reasons. After all, he foundedUSNO and led it for more than 30 years. Furthermore, many USNO members refusedto follow Mustapha, seeing UMNO's entry as an intrusion in Sabah politics by an"outsider" and also an attempt to destroy USNO and replace USNO as the mainpolitical party representing Sabah Muslims. Although the Sabah Muslims had Islam as acommon factor with the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia, the regional sentiments meantthat many Sabah Muslims saw themselves as "Sabahan" first and foremost.39 In order togive him official powers of patronage, Mustapha was appointed the Federal Minister forSabah Affairs in 1992, a portfolio unfilled since the 1970s. Federal development fundswere now channelled through Mustapha's ministry and other federal agencies,bypassing the PBS state government.

Meanwhile, the federal government began their political offensive against Pairinand the PBS. Within months of the 1990 parliamentary polls, Pairin was charged withthree counts of corruption. Pairin's younger brother, Jeffrey Kitingan, who heads thetimber-rich Sabah Foundation, was detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA] forallegedly plotting Sabah's secession from the Malaysian federation. Jeffrey was alsocharged with corruption involving his chairmanship of Sabah Foundation.40 Tiesbetween Kota Kinabalu and Kuala Lumpur deteriorated rapidly after that and thefederal government began to penalize Sabah further. From 1990 onwards, Sabah'seconomic growth has consistently been below the national average and it was widelyacknowledged that the Sabah economy was suffering from Kuala Lumpur's induced"political recession".

The 1994 Election: UMNO's First Electoral Outing

In January 1994, Pairin Kitingan had valid reasons for calling an early election.41 First,his corruption trial had just been completed. The court found him guilty of corruptionand fined him RM1,8OO, short of the RM2,000 fine which would have legally barredhim from political office. The verdict was widely seen as a vindication by the courts


James Chin • 31

that the charges against Pairin were politically motivated by the federal government.Pairin calculated that an early election would win the sympathy votes of ordinarySabahans for what was perceived as a personal vendetta by the federal governmentagainst Pairin for standing up for state rights. Second, Pairin's brother Jeffrey had beenreleased in January 1994 after being detained for two years under the ISA. Third, Pairinwanted an early election to protest the federal government's plan to re-delineate theboundaries of the state constituencies, which no doubt would benefit and consolidateMuslim votes. Fourth, PBS pulled off a major political coup when it managed to drawUSNO into a coalition government in early 1992. The PBS-USNO alliance controlled41 of the 48-seat state legislature. Shortly afterwards, USNO was deregistered by thefederal-controlled registrar of societies. Six USNO state legislators went over to SabahUMNO while the rest joined the PBS. With USNO deregistered, all USNO candidateshad to stand as PBS candidates in the coming polls. Thus Pairin calculated that PBSstood a fair chance of securing the Muslim vote.

The PBS campaign slogan was "Sabah for the Sabahans", a not-too-subtle appealto regional sentiments and "state rights". PBS clearly wanted the people to associateSabah UMNO as the "new colonizers" from the peninsula. The key PBS demands were:an increase in petroleum royalties from 5% to 15%, a university, a separate TV station,the return of the island of Labuan and a crackdown on the large number of illegalimmigrants from the southern Philippines.

The BN's big carrot was massive economic development. Its manifesto "A NewSabah" promised huge infrastructural projects as well as the state's first university if itwere elected. To blunt PBS's "new colonizers" charge, Mahathir personally promisedthat if the BN was elected, the chief minister's post would only be filled by a Sabahan.To allay fears and to entice the non-Muslims, Mahathir further announced that theSabah chief ministership would be rotated every two years equally between Muslimbumiputera, non-Muslim bumiputera and Chinese leaders. The triumvirate system wassupposed to stop the one leader, one group grab-all mentality practised in Sabah for along time. There was also widespread vote buying by BN candidates. The BN campaignwas significantly boosted by several key PBS defectors. PBS vice-president ClarenceBongkos Malakum stood as an independent against a PBS candidate.42 Another PBSvice-president, Yong Teck Lee, left and formed a new party, the Sabah ProgressiveParty (SAPP), to pitch at the Chinese voters.43 SAPP was immediately accepted intothe BN coalition.

Defections, however, were not unidirectional only. Mustapha Harun, the long-time champion of the Sabah Muslims surprised everyone when he defected to PBS justafter Pairin announced the dissolution of the state assembly. The PBS thought, thoughincorrectly, that with Mustapha on their side, half of the Muslim votes would go to thePBS. Despite the millions spent by BN, the results of the election were surprisinglyclose: PBS won 25 seats while the remaining 23 were won by the BN (Sabah UMNO18; SAPP 3; LDP 1; AKAR I).4 4 Sabah UMNO performed much better thananticipated. PBS's coalition partner, USNO, which was expected to hold on to itstraditional Muslim vote was decimated by Sabah UMNO when only its president,Amirkahar Tun Mustapha, was returned. The decline of USNO in the Muslim areas isbest illustrated in Mustapha's own seat at Usukan, where his son Badaruddin stood as a



PBS candidate. Although the 75-year-old Mustapha campaigned extensively for his son,Usukan was won by first-time Sabah UMNO candidate, Mohamed Salleh Tun Said.Sabah UMNO took almost all the Muslim constituencies.

With such a narrow victory, it was obvious that Pairin's government was underthreat from defections. Pairin immediately exercised his constitutional right tonominate six assemblymen, thus bringing PBS's majority to eight. This was a fruitlessexercise as the BN had already started to lure PBS legislators. Barely two weeks afterthe election, three PBS legislators defected. The going rate was said to be three millionringgit.45 To prevent more defections, Pairin sought to dissolve the state assembly —which has yet to sit — and to call for fresh elections. But the governor refused todissolve the state assembly, arguing that it was too soon to call a new election and sinceBN had the numbers, it should be given a chance to form a government. The governorwas biased against Pairin because his son, Mohamed Salleh Tun Said, had just beenelected as a Sabah UMNO candidate.

By this time it was too late anyway: Jeffrey Kitingan, Pairin's younger brother,also left PBS; PBS's secretary-general, Joseph Kurup, left and formed the Parti BersatuRakyat Sabah (PBRS); former PBS deputy chief minister, Bernard Dompok, formedParti Demokratik Sabah (PDS).46 PBRS and PDS were immediately accepted ascomponent parties of the BN. By the time the defections ended, PBS was left with onlyfive state legislators.

The UMNO/BN "Rotation" Administration

The new chief minister naturally had to come from Sabah UMNO and Sakaran Dandaiwas sworn in as the new chief minister on 17 March 1994. The federal governmentimmediately announced that the state's first university, Universiti Sabah Malaysia,would be established and that more than seven billion ringgit in development fundswere forthcoming.47 Sakaran served for a few months until he was made Sabahgovernor in December 1994.48 He was replaced by another Sabah UMNO nominee,Mohd Salleh Tun Said Keruak, the son of the previous governor.

In March 1996, after Sabah UMNO had held the chief ministership for twoyears, it was the turn of the Chinese to take over under the rotation system. Thiscreated a mini-crisis when Sabah UMNO decided that it was unwilling to give upthe office. After all, Sabah UMNO had the single largest number of legislators inthe state assembly. They were also not keen to see a Chinese taking over the mostpowerful office in the state. Mahathir had to force Sabah UMNO to give up thepost. Mahathir knew that one of the key reasons why the BN did well in the 1994state election was the promise of a rotation system for the chief minister. If thispromise was not kept, there was a real likelihood that the voters would turn againstBN, and especially Sabah UMNO, in the next election. Mahathir's then deputy,Anwar Ibrahim, had to go to Kota Kinabalu personally to persuade Sabah UMNOto drop its objections.49

The Sabah UMNO representatives finally agreed to drop their objections whenMahathir promised them that Sabah UMNO could still exert major influence in thestate government through the number of Cabinet posts given to Sabah UMNO. Sabah


James Chin • 33

UMNO was promised the largest share in the state Cabinet with four full ministers,including the deputy chief ministership.

More importantly, Sabah UMNO demanded that the bulk of the chief minister'sdiscretionary powers be transferred to the Cabinet. Prior to UMNO's entry, theposition of Sabah chief minister was all powerful — the chief minister could decide onland matters single-handedly without going to the state Cabinet. This gave the chiefminister tremendous political patronage — it was common practice for the chiefminister to grant mining, land and timber concessions as a political reward, to cementpolitical ties or simply to raise money for elections.50 In June 1996, four bills —Forestry Enactment Amendment, the Mining Ordinance, the Sabah Land OrdinanceAmendment and the Delegation of Powers Ordinance — effectively stripped the chiefminister of his power when it came to land matters and the granting of mining andtimber concessions. Obviously, Sabah UMNO wanted to make sure it could stillinfluence "who gets what" once it was out of the chief minister's office. This was theprice the Chinese and the non-Muslim bumiputera community had to pay if theywanted the rotation system to continue.51

SAPP's Yong Teck Lee was sworn in as chief minister on 28 May 1996 and twoweeks later, on 18 June, the four amendments clipping the powers of the chief ministerswere passed in the state legislative assembly. Yong served a full two years before hehanded power over to Bernard Dompok on 29 May 1998. Dompok was chosen byMahathir to be the non-Muslim bumiputera chief minister under the rotation system.

The 1999 State Election

In March 1999, after much delay, a state election was finally held. The polls wereoriginally scheduled for the second half of 1998.52 The delay was caused by two factors.First, the Sabah BN was unsure about its support from the Kadazan-Dusun andChinese voters. Three election "dry runs" held in 1997 suggested that the BN were onlysafe in Muslim constituencies — the homebase of Sabah UMNO. In the non-Muslimareas, support for the PBS remained strong. Second, seat allocation became a majorobstacle as there were simply too many parties in the BN coalition — nine. With only48 seats up for grabs the coalition faced a major hurdle in deciding which partyrepresented the BN in the individual constituencies. The problem was compounded bySabah UMNO's insistence that it be given all the Muslim majority constituencies — 26seats. There were three Kadazan-Dusun parties in the coalition (PDS, PBRS, AKARBersatu) each claiming to represent the Kadazan-Dusun community while SabahMCA, LDP and SAPP were after the four Chinese-majority constituencies. SabahGerakan and Sabah MIC did not ask for any seats. Sabah MIC could not claim any seatas there were no Indian-majority seat in Sabahl

Sabah UMNO's strength can be seen when it was allocated 24 of 48 seats tocontest; this was just one short of a simple majority needed to rule Sabah alone. Therewas some initial excitement when Harris Salleh attempted a political comeback. Hetook over a near-defunct party, Party Bersekutu, and proclaimed that he alone hadMuslim support. Nevertheless, the real contest was over the Kadazan-Dusun votes. TheBN Kadazan-Dusun had to show that they had the support of the community they seek



to represent. All had been elected under PBS in the 1994 polls before they defected tothe BN. The issue of kataks or "political frogs", i.e. PBS defectors, dominated much ofthe campaign. The PBS platform was simple: PBS stood for state rights and votingagainst the BN, especially the "political frogs", was the best way to ensure furthererosion of state rights. The entire BN campaign was based on economic developmentand continuity of the rotation system. The BN promised more money for the economyif elected, or economic stagnation if PBS won. The BN countered PBS's assertion thatthe Kadazan-Dusun's identity was under threat by introducing Kadazan-Dusunlanguage as a course in 147 primary schools and a chair in Kadazan-Dusun studies atthe new Universiti Malaysia Sabah. The BN also promised to continue with the rotationsystem, ensuring that all the three major communities will get a chance to "rule".

Sabah UMNO employed Islam blatantly. In a speech before a gathering of thestate's Islamic officials and missionaries, Sabah deputy chief minister, Osu Sukam, statedthat it was fardhu kifayah (social obligation) for Muslims to vote for a BN governmentbecause BN was led by Muslims and Islam can only flourish under Muslim (read UMNO-led] rule.53 Osu was no doubt referring to PBS being led by Pairin, a Roman Catholic.This message was repeated in all the Muslim areas and it appeared to have worked.

The results were: BN 31 (Sabah UMNO 24, LDP 2, SAPP 3, PDS 1), PBS 17. Theleaders of the BN Kadazan-Dusun parties (PDS, PBRS and AKAR) were all defeated bythe PBS. The casualties included the incumbent chief minister, Bernard Dompok, leaderof the PDS and Joseph Kurup, the leader of the PBRS. Sabah UMNO won all its 24 seatsand this indicates that Sabah UMNO had successfully taken over the Muslim bloc vote inSabah while PBS retains its stranglehold over the Kadazan-Dusun vote. It may alsoindicate that the Sabah Muslims have finally come to accept Sabah UMNO as a localentity. We may have to wait until the next state election to see if Sabah UMNO's successamong Muslim voters in the 1999 election will be repeated, which would indicate realacceptance. What is clear is that with a Muslim majority in 26 of 48 constituencies,whoever wants to win control of Sabah must win the Muslim vote, and therefore, SabahUMNO has an inbuilt advantage as long as it can retain the Muslim vote.

Consequences for UMNO

The establishment of Sabah UMNO has led to several significant changes withinUMNO. The most significant change was the entry of a sizeable number of Christianbumiputeras. Hitherto, almost all UMNO members were Malays, and by legaldefinition, Muslims as well.54 The problem faced by UMNO was that many potentialSabah UMNO members were Christian bumiputera. The single largest bumiputeragrouping in Sabah, the Kadazan-Dusun, were mostly Roman Catholics and animists.The Malay community in Sabah constituted a small minority among the Muslimcommunity there. In fact a significant number of Muslims in Sabah are made up ofethnic Bajau and Suluk. Sabah UMNO leaders, like Mustapha Harun, were not ethnicMalays; Mustapha was from Sulu in the Southern Philippines. The admittance of non-Malays and non-Muslims from Sabah, unfortunately, did not change UMNO's rhetoricnor its raison d'etre, the Malay race and Islam. The UMNO general assembly was stillfull of speeches about the need to protect Islam and the Malay race.55 Non-Muslim and


James Chin • 35

non-Malay bumiputera, such as the Kadazan-Dusun, were simply expected to put upwith the party's ideological base.56 In any case, with more than 90% of UMNOmembers professing the Islamic faith, the non-Muslims in UMNO were always going tobe a minority.

Another significant change within UMNO was the political weight of SabahUMNO. Sabah UMNO had 20 party divisions with about 300,000 members, makingSabah UMNO the state with the largest number of delegates (and votes) to UMNO'striennial party elections. In 1996, there were 165 divisions in UMNO, thus SabahUMNO alone represented 12% of the total vote. Delegates from the same state tendedto vote as a single bloc. This meant that potential UMNO leadership aspirants had towoo support from Sabah UMNO if they sought top positions in UMNO. Theimportance of Sabah UMNO can be seen in 1993 when Anwar Ibrahim challengedGhafar Baba, the former deputy prime minister, for the deputy presidency of UMNO.Both Anwar and Ghafar spent an extraordinary amount of time and energy in trying towin the support of the Sabah delegates.57

The importance of the Sabah UMNO delegates' votes became even moreimportant from 1999 onwards. In December 1988, UMNO amended Article 7.6 of itsparty constitution.58 Article 7.6 relates to the percentage of nominations required forcontesting UMNO Supreme Council seats, the highest decision-making body inUMNO. Under the percentage system, those contesting the party presidency mustreceive at least 50 nominations from the 165 divisions (30%); the post of deputypresident, 33 divisions (20%); the vice-presidency 17 divisions (10%) and eightdivisions (5%) for Supreme Council seats. Thus the 12% of delegates' votes held bySabah UMNO will be paramount to those wishing to climb the UMNO hierarchy.

Consequences for Sabah

The single most important political impact of UMNO's entry into Sabah was the lossof local autonomy over the appointment of the Sabah chief minister.59 Previously,Sabah politicians choose the state's chief minister without much interference fromKuala Lumpur. They simply submitted their choice to the Sabah governor andinformed the prime minister, who was expected to agree. This is in stark contrastwith the practice in Peninsular Malaysia. All the chief ministers and menteri besars ofthe 11 peninsula states are selected by the prime minister/UMNO president. Withthe exception of Penang, the ten other chief ministers and menteri besars are all fromUMNO. The chief minister of Penang has always been a nominee of Gerakan. Inreality, however, Gerakan's nominee must seek consent from Penang UMNO andMahathir as UMNO has more seats than Gerakan in the Penang state legislature.When the BN moulded the state government with the PBS defectors in 1994, it wasMahathir who decided who was to be Sabah's chief minister. It was also Mahathirwho picked the Chinese and non-Muslim bumiputera candidates who became theSabah chief minister under the rotation system.

Another important change to Sabah politics with the entry of UMNO was theshift in pattern of Sabah Muslim politics. Previously, Muslims in the state had a widechoice of Muslim-based and non-Muslim parties to support. Parties such as USNO,



UPKO, Berjaya, Pasok and even PBS were all courting Muslim support to varyingdegrees of success. Up to 1990, the Sabah Muslims shifted their support from one partyto another at almost every election. With the formation of Sabah UMNO, the patternappeared to have changed. With USNO deregistered and Berjaya relegated to the statusof a "mosquito" party, Sabah UMNO was now the undisputed champion of the Malaysand Muslims in Sabah. UMNO's constant emphasis on Islam and race has alsosharpened the ethnic and religious divide among the different groups in Sabah.

The third significant shift in Sabah politics was the dilution of the powers of theSabah chief minister. As mentioned above, Sabah UMNO forced amendments to theSabah Constitution. Several key discretionary powers of the chief minister relating toland and natural resources were transferred to the Cabinet where Sabah UMNO holdsthe largest number of Cabinet posts.

The fourth significant shift was the entry of other peninsula-based BN parties,such as MCA, Gerakan and MIC, into Sabah. None of these parties had branches inSabah prior to UMNO's entry. They used UMNO's entry as the pretext for enteringSabah. The end result was that they compete for support with existing Sabah-based BNparties. The entry of these Peninsular BN parties also added to the large number ofcoalition members in the Sabah BN. At the time of writing, there were nine componentparties in Sabah BN, making Sabah BN the state with the largest number of componentparties. The component parties of BN coalition in Sabah are Sabah UMNO, PartiDemokratik Sabah (PDS), Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah(PBRS), Akar Bersatu, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), MCA, Gerakan and MIC. Thelast three are not even represented in the state legislative assembly.

The fifth significant shift was the approval of a large number of political partiessince UMNO's entry in 1990. The registrar of societies, directly under Mahathir whowas also home minister, have registered at least half a dozen parties from 1990 until1994 when the BN was in the opposition. Most of these parties were approved simplybecause they were established by PBS renegades or defectors. It was obvious thatUMNO wanted to weaken the PBS government, hoping that these parties willweaken the PBS's hold over the non-Muslim and Chinese vote. The parties includeAKAR, PDS and PBRS (targeting non-Muslim bumiputerd], SAPP and LDP (targetingChinese voters).

Conclusion

The entry of UMNO into Sabah politics can be divided into several distinct phases:

• In the first phase, from 1963-85, UMNO's involvement in Sabah politics wasthrough local Muslim proxies. The main UMNO proxies during this period wasUSNO (under Mustapha Harun) and Berjaya (Harris Salleh). UMNO expectedtheir Sabah proxies to maintain Malay/Muslim political supremacy within theBN framework. Both proteges failed because, essentially, (a) they becamedictatorial and (b) they pushed Islamization of the state too blatantly, and (c) theregional sentiments of the Sabah electorate contributed to the protege's failuresince they were invariably seen as federal lackeys.


James Chin ' 3 7

• In the second phase, 1985-90, the federal government/UMNO's position was toaccommodate the rise of Kadazan-Dusun nationalism within the BN framework.The PBS was allowed to rule Sabah as long it did not challenge UMNO'ssupreme position within the BN and Sabah's position in the federation, i.e. theTwenty Points. This period of cohabitation failed when the PBS suddenlywithdrew from the BN in 1990. By this time, for reasons mentioned, UMNO hadno choice but to expand into Sabah.

• In the third phase, from 1990 onwards, Sabah UMNO has actively worked tryingto get the Sabahans to accept Sabah UMNO as a "local", and not as a semenaggung(peninsula) party or an outsider. In electoral terms, Sabah UMNO has been quitesuccessful in the Muslim constituencies. Sabah UMNO's successes, however, wasnot repeated in the non-Muslim areas.

Politically, the most significant change brought by UMNO's entry was the lost ofautonomy over the selection of Sabah's chief minister.60 Since 1994, the choice lies inthe hands of the prime minister, who is also UMNO president. This is in line with thepractice in Peninsular Malaysia where the prime minister chooses all the chief ministersand merited besars.

Sarawak is now the only state left in the Malaysian federation where statepoliticians pick their own chief minister. Sarawak is also the only state in the federationwhere UMNO has no branches nor official members. UMNO's entry into Sabah is thefirst step of UMNO's plan to extend itself throughout the federation. There is littledoubt that UMNO is targeting Sarawak next. Sarawak remains the only state in thefederation where UMNO does not exist. With Sabah UMNO firmly established,UMNO's dream of extending into Sarawak and becoming a truly national organizationis fast becoming a reality. In all probability, when the current Sarawak chief ministergoes, UMNO will move into Sarawak.

Notes

1 For example, see G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore,Oxford University Press, 1991) and Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996).

2 Anthropologically speaking, the Kadazan and Dusun are separate ethnic entities. However,politically, they have always been seen to be one.

3 Sabah Department of Statistics, Buku Tahunan Perangkaan, 1994 (Kota Kinabalu, 1995).

4 Sabah politics during the independence period up to the early 1970s can be found in R.S.Milne and K.J. Ratnam, Malaysia — New States in a New Nation: Political Development ofSarawak and Sabah in Malaysia (London: Frank Cass, 1974); Margaret C. Roff, The Politicsof Belonging: Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UniversityPress, 1974) and Edwin Lee, The Towkays of Sabah: Chinese Leadership and IndigenousChallenge in the Last Phase of British Rule (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1976).

5 Government of Malaya, Malaysia Report of the Inter-governmental Committee, 1962 (KualaLumpur: Government Printer, 1963).

6 For a fuller discussion on the conflict between the federal government and the state



governments of Sabah and Sarawak over the Twenty Points, see James Chin, "Politics ofFederal Intervention in Malaysia, with-reference to Kelantan, Sarawak and Sabah", Journalof Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 35, no. 2 (July 1997), pp. 96-120.

7 Syed Kechik's role was documented in Bruce Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism: SyedKechik in East Malaysia (Singapore: Bruce Ross-Larson, 1976).

8 Milne & Ratnam (1974), o p . cit., Chapters 4 & 7; Ross-Larson (1974), op. cit., Chapter 8.

9 The 1969 parliamentary election was suspended because of the May 1969 riots.

10 The SCA was USNO's junior partner in the Mustapha-led state government. As the namesuggests, it represented the Sabah Chinese.

11 The Pekemas candidate lost. Pekemas was a political party led by Tan Chee Khoon, aPeninsular Malaysian Chinese. The party faded away in the mid-1970s when it was unableto win any real support among the electorate. It has never won a seat in Sabah.

12 It was an unwritten agreement between Kuala Lumpur that both would not antagonizeeach other openly. The Philippines had a long standing claim to Sabah which it did notpursue openly when it became a member of ASEAN. It thus expected Kuala Lumpur notto support the Muslim secessionists in the Southern Philippines.

13 Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1975.14 For a colourful description of Mustapha's lifestyle see Ed. Hunter, Misdeeds of Tun

Mustapha (Hong Kong: Ed Hunter, 1976).

15 See Robert Tilman, "Mustapha's Sabah 1968-1975", Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 6 (June1976), pp. 495-509.

16 See Chin (1997), op. cit.

17 Harris's account of his clandestine meeting with Razak and the entire event can be found inPaul Raffaele, Harris Salleh of Sabah (Hong Kong: Condor, 1986) and Bill Campbell, Sabahunder Harris : A Collection of Speeches by Datuk Harris bin Mohd Salleh as Chief Minister ofSabah, 1976-1985 (Kuala Lumpur: Warisan, 1986).

18 Raffaele (1986), op. cit., pp. 190-209.

19 Han Sin Fong, "A Constituional coup d'état:: An Analysis of the Birth and Victory of theBerjaya Party in Sabah, Malaysia", Asian Survey, vol. 19, no. 4 (April 1979), pp. 379-389.

20 The rise of Kadazan nationalism is also discussed by Loh Kok Wah (Francis),"Modernisation, Cultural Revival and Counter-hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the1980s", in Joel Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), Fragmented Vision: Culture andPolitics in Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia inassociation with Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 225-253.

21 Ongkili's analysis of the breakdown in the PBS-federal relationship can be found in JamesOngkili, "Federalism and Parochialism: Relations between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah",Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 22, no. 4, 1992.

22 Many non-Muslim bumiputera civil servants in Sabah were openly told that their careerpath upwards depended on their conversion to Islam.

23 This term "second class bumiputera" was emphasized to me by a non-Muslim Kadazan stateassemblyman. "First-class bumiputera" refers to Muslim bumiputera.

24 i See Joseph P. Kitingan, "Territorial Integration, a Personal View", in Bonding of a Nation:Federalism and Territorial Integration in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic andInternational Studies Malaysia (ISIS), 1986). For his view on related matters, see Stan Yee,J. Pairin Kitingan, The Making of a Malaysian: A Collection of Speeches by Datuk JosephPairin Kitingan during his first two terms of office as the Chief Minister of Sabah, 1985-1990(Kuala Lumpur: Foto Technik, 1992).


James Chin • 39

25 See Daily Express (Kota Kinabalu), 1 January 1985.

26 A summary of the 1985 and 1986 state elections can be found in Marvis Puthucheary,Federalism at the Crossroads: The 1985 Election in Sabah and their Implications for theFederal-state Relations (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1985) and K.T. Kalimuthu "TheSabah State Election of April 1985", Asian Survey, vol. 26, no. 7 (July 1986) pp. 815-837.Two sympathetic accounts can be found in Bala Chandran, The Third Mandate (KualaLumpur: Bala Chandran, 1986) and Tan Chee Khoon, Sabah: A Triumph for Democracy(Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1986).

27 Under normal circumstances, it would be difficult for an opposition party to secureregistration. Under current legislation, the registrar of societies (ROS) has the absolutediscretion whether to approve or reject an application to register a political party. It is notunknown for opposition parties to wait up to three years to secure registration whilegovernment-friendly parties can secure registration quickly, in some cases, within a week.A former PBS MP told the writer that Pairin flew to Kuala Lumpur at least twice to lobbythe federal government to approve PBS's registration. One of the figures Pairin lobbied wasMusa Hitam, the then deputy prime minister.

28 Quoted in Raffaele (1986), o p . cit., pp. 230.

29 One of the legacies of the colonial government was the creation of six appointed membersof the Sabah state assembly. Successive Sabah governments have used this oddity toappoint senior party members who lost in elections into the state legislature or as a rewardto senior political figures or main party financial backers.

30 See New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 23 April 1985 and Daily Express (Kota Kinabalu),23-25 April 1985. Mahathir at that time was overseas. Musa probably had no choice but toback Pairin. A former PBS MP told this writer that had the federal government allowedMustapha to take power, there would be "bloodshed" on the streets.

31 The senior USNO and Berjaya members, including the former USNO secretary-general,who were involved in the 1985 bombing campaign admitted their involvement 14 yearslater in 1999. See Daily Express, 14 January 1999.

32 There were two precedents for this route. In 1966, the federal government declared a stateof emergency in Sarawak and removed a stubborn anti-federal chief minister. Similarly, in1977, the federal government declared a state of emergency in Kelantan to get rid of theopposition PAS-led state government.

33 Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 April 1986 and Audrey Kahin, "Crisis on the Periphery: TheRift Between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah", Pacific Affairs, vol. 65, no. 1 (Spring 1992) p. 41.

34 The PBS candidate in Sri Tanjung had his nomination papers rejected. The PBS then decidedto support James Ku when he promised that he would join the PBS after the election.

35 In interviews with several Chinese leaders in Kota Kinabalu, they said the disturbancesoccurred mainly in the urban areas where the majority of the Chinese lived. The Chineseblamed USNO and Berjaya for the disturbances which had caused their businesses tosuffer. As a consequence, they decided to backed the PBS.

36 A short summary of the 1990 polls can be found in Sabihah Osman, "Sabah State Elections:Implications for Malaysian Unity", Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 4 (1992), pp. 386-391.

37 UMNO's main partners in the Peninsular, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) andthe Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) followed UMNO's lead into Sabah. Sabah UMNO'sfirst branch was only officially inaugurated four months after Mahathir's announcement on11 February 1991. The delay was mainly due to mainly to logistics. UMNO wanted USNOto disband first (more later).

38 See James Chin (1997), op . cit.; Clive Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan


40 * Asian Journal of Political Science

1838-1969 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) and Alias Mohammad, PAS' Platform:Development and Change 1981-1986 (Petaling Jaya: Gateway, 1994).

39 In fact, it was for these two very reasons that in 1992, USNO joined PBS in a coalition stategovernment. In revenge, USNO was subsequently deregistered as a political party by thefederally-controlled registrar of societies and all USNO candidates were forced to stand asPBS candidates in the 1994 polls.

40 Jeffrey Kitingan had been charged with accepting hundreds of thousands of dollars in cashand company shares in return for political and business favours, some allegedly doled out inhis capacity as director of the state-owned Sabah Foundation. The charges were quietlydropped when he defected to the BN in 1994.

41 For details on the 1994 polls, see James Chin, "Sabah Election of 1994: End of KadazanUnity", Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 10 (October 1994), pp. 904-915.

42 He lost to a PBS candidate.

43 In contrast to the opposition parties' problem of getting registered (see above), SAPP'spapers were approved within a week.

44 Both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat (Justice Party orAKAR) were established earlier by PBS defectors. The LDP and AKAR target the Chineseand Kadazan-Dusun community respectively.

45 This was the figure given by Pairin himself. Of course, those who defected later did not getthis large sum. The early defectors were paid more than the latecomers.

46 Again, because both parties were going to join the BN, they were registered in record time,less than a week.

47 See Daily Express (Kota Kinabalu), 21 March 1994.

48 A post he still occupies.

49 Anwar met with all Sabah UMNO legislators at the Kota Kinabalu airport. See Daily Mail(Kota Kinabalu), 4 May 1996.

50 Interviews with senior PBS figures. See also Daily Express, 10-20 June 1996, on thecontroversy generated by the bills.

51 Interview with a PBS figure.

52 Personal communication from a senior PDS figure.

53 Daily Express (Kota Kinabalu), 6 March 1999.

54 In the Malaysian Constitution, a Malay is defined as a person who professes the Islamic faith.

55 i For example, see speeches made during UMNO General Assembly in New Straits Times,10-13 October 1996.

56 Interestingly enough, the sudden entry of a large number of non-Muslim and non-Malaybumiputeras may have benefited non-Muslim Thais living along the border with Thailand asthey too have been admitted into UMNO (Straits Times (Singapore), 5 March 1999). Evenin the past, UMNO was never fully a Malay only political party. Many mamak (IndianMuslims) from Penang were admitted as UMNO members but were simply classified as"Malays". The most prominent UMNO mamak is of course the current prime minister,Mahathir Mohamad.

57 See William Case, "The UMNO Party Election in Malaysia: One for the Money", AsianSurvey, vol. 34, no. 10 (1994), pp. 916-930.

58 New Straits Times, 14 December 1988.

59 This was repeated to this writer by several Sabah politicians in different interviews.

60 This point was mentioned by several Sabah MPs and state assemblymen in several interviews.


chin going east sabah umno

Documents