KAEDAH PENTAFSIRAN
PEKERJA DI BAWAH AKSP
1969
DISEDIAKAN OLEH :
YUZAIN MOHD YUSOF
PENOLONG PENGURUS
UNIT PENDAKWAAN
1
• Seksyen2(5) AKSP 1969
• Seksyen2(19) / 2(9) AKSP 1969
• Seksyen2(10) AKSP 1969
• Seksyen 3 AKSP 1969
PEMAKAIAN PERUSAHAAN
PEKERJAMAJIKAN UTAMA /
LANGSUNG
2
PEKERJA
tidak termasuk
seseorang yang diperihalkan
dalam Jadual Pertama;
nyata atau tersirat
kontrak perkhidmatan atau kontrak perantisan
lisan atau dengan bertulis,
diambil kerja dengan bergaji
3
“KONTRAK PERKHIDMATAN”
❑ Suatu persoalan fakta yang hanya boleh
diputuskan oleh Mahkamah yang kompeten
setelah mendengar, meneliti dan menilai
keseluruhan fakta yang berkaitan dan releven.
❑ Isu tersebut tidak boleh diputuskan hanya
berdasarkan “label” yang diletakkan oleh mana-
mana pihak.
❑ Walaupun wujud kontrak perkhidmatan
bertulis tetapi ianya adalah bukan penentu
mutlak status kontrak perkhidmatan. 4
Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor, (1996) 4 CLJ 687
• It is a question of fact;
• function of and the duty actually discharged;
• not merely the label that is attached to the
particular employ;
Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, (1968) 2 QB 497;
• and that if these were such that the relation is that of master and servant, it was irrelevant that the parties had declared it to be something else
Kuala Lumpur Mutual Fund Berhad v J Bastian Leo & Anor, (1988) 2 MLJ 526;
• Only the findings of a competent court of law that
the appellant was or was not liable to make such
contributions would bear any weight
5
GUAN HOE THYE TRADING & TRANSPORT SDN. BHD. v KETUA PENGARAH PERTUBUHAN KESELAMATAN SOSIAL RAYUAN SIVIL NO. MT3-11-19-2004
PEMBEKAL P&B SDN. BHD. v PP RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. B-09-315-10/2014
KENCANA MARINE SDN. BHD. v PERTUBUHAN KESELAMATAN SOSIAL SAMAN NO. 87-107-5/14 6
STATUS KEWUJUDAN
PERJANJIAN BERTULIS
Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah PerusahaanMalaysia & Anor, (1996) 4 CLJ 687;
“[3] The definition of “workman” applies to all contractsof service but not to independent contractors who areengaged under contracts for services. In all cases whereit becomes necessary to determine whether a contract isone of service or for services, the degree of control whichan employer exercises over a claimant is an importantfactor but may not be the sole criterion. It is a questionof fact. The capacity in which one is employed or thepurpose of the employment does not answer the questionof the definition of a “workman”. It is the function ofand the duty actually discharged by the particularclaimant that is important and not merely the labelthat is attached to the particular employment orindeed the purpose of the engagement.”
7
Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd vMinister of Pensions and National Insurance,(1968) 2 QB 497;
“In relation to cl. 30 of the Contract, whichdeclared that Mr. Latimer was an independentcontractor, HIS LORDSHIP observed that the questionwhether the relation between the parties to a contractwas of that of master and servant or otherwise was aconclusion of law dependents on the rights conferredand the duties imposed by the contract; and that ifthese were such that the relation is that of masterand servant, it was irrelevant that the parties haddeclared it to be something else.”
STATUS KEWUJUDAN
PERJANJIAN BERTULIS
8
Kuala Lumpur Mutual Fund Berhad v J Bastian
Leo & Anor, (1988) 2 MLJ 526;
“The fact that EPF contributions were not made by the
appellant Company is inconclusive. Only the findings
of a competent court of law that the appellant
was or was not liable to make such contributions
would bear any weight.”
STATUS KEWUJUDAN
PERJANJIAN BERTULIS
9
Guan Hoe Thye Trading & Transport Sdn. Bhd. v
Ketua Pengarah Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial
Yang Arif Hakim Tuan Abdul Aziz Bin Khalidin,
Pengerusi Jemaah Rayuan Keselamatan Sosial:
“Dalam perbicaraan ini pemohon (SP1) memberi
keterangan bahawa pada 31.7.1996 Azman telah
menandatangani suatu kontrak untuk perkhidmatan
dengan syarikat. Menurut kontrak tersebut Azman
dikehendaki memberi perkhidmatan sebagai pemandu
untuk memandu lori syarikat bagi mengangkut barang-
barang kepunyaan pelanggan syarikat untuk tempoh
31.7.1996 ke 30.7.1999.”
STATUS KEWUJUDAN
PERJANJIAN BERTULIS
10
Bagi menjawap kewujudan kontrak perkhidmatan
tersebut Yang Arif Tuan Pengerusi Jemaah Rayuan
Keselamatan Sosial telah memutuskan bahawa
“Jemaah setuju bahawa ketiadaan bayaran EPF dan
caruman PERKESO dan pemakaian “label” “kontrak
untuk perkhidmatan” tidak mengikat Jemaah ini
untuk mengisytiharkan kontrak itu sebagai kontrak
untuk perkhidmatan. Sebaliknya Jemaah hendaklah
meneliti terma-terma kontrak itu secara keseluruhan
dan mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi sebelum
memutuskan samada kontrak itu merupakan kontrak
perkhidmatan atau kontrak untuk perkhidmatan”11
“Kesimpulannya walaupun pada zahirnya kontrak
tersebut menggunakan perkataan syarikat dan
kontraktor bebas untuk menggambarkan ia suatu
kontrak untuk perkhidmatan tetapi alasan-alasan
yang telah dibincangkan di atas jelaslah pada
hakikatnya kontrak tersebut adalah sebenarnya
merupakan kontrak perkhidmatan. Jemaah
berpendapat bahawa syarikat sebenarnya
berselindung disebalik perkataan kontraktor
bebas dan kontrak untuk perkhidmatan sebagai
samaran untuk melindungi syarikat daripada
sebarangan tanggungan sebagai majikan
kepada Azman.”
12
Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial v Pembekal
P&B Sdn Bhd, Kes Saman (Jabatan) No: 87-
324-2011
“…..OKS hanya bergantung kepada label
“kontraktor bebas” sepertimana di dalam
perjanjian tersebut. …..Mahkamah ini berpendapat
bahawa penentuan status perkhidmatan seseorang
itu adalah bergantung kepada keseluruhan fakta
yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah dan bukannya
semata-mata kepada pengisytiharan daripada
pihak ketiga.”
STATUS KEWUJUDAN
PERJANJIAN BERTULIS
13
CIRI-CIRI PEKERJAAN
Great Eastern Mills Bhd v Ng Yuen Ching & Ors,
“.... They were paid remuneration or commission according tothe trips they made.”
Lian Ann Lorry Transport & Forwarding Sdn Bhd vGovindasamy Palanimuthu, mukasurat 82 Ikatan OtoritiPihak Pendakwa;
“… The learned trial judge held that because the respondent wasemployed as a daily paid worker and not as a permanent employeeof the appellants he was therefore not employed under a contractof service as envisaged by the Act. In our view, the duration andnature of an employment, be it temporary or permanent, isimmaterial for the purpose of determining the existence ofa contract of service. As long as there exists a relationship of amaster and servant or that of an employer and employee, the lawwill infer a contract of service existing between them,notwithstanding the fact that the service or the employment isintended by the person in the position of master to be temporary orof a short duration only.”
14
Bata Shoe Company (Malaya) Ltd v EmployeesProvident Fund
“In the present case, by virtue of cl 3 of the agreement the company hasconsiderable control over its shop managers. The only fact which seems tosuggest that the manager is an independent contractor is that he is notpaid a salary but a commission and that it is he and not the company whohas to pay certain expenses incurred in the running of the shop, includingthe wages of the retail staff. However, a servant may be paid hisremuneration by way of commission rather than by way of a fixedsalary (see Pauley v. Kenaldo [1953] 1 All ER 226). Payment by themanager of expenses, including wages of salesmen employed byhim, out of the commission which he gets from the company underthe agreement, does not necessarily constitute him an independentcontractor. It is all a matter of arrangement for the sake ofconvenience and expediency, so that in effect the manager'sremuneration boils down to what is left over after he has paid outall such expenses out of his commission. Taking all the facts intoconsideration, I am of the opinion that the shop manager is a servant ofthe company and is in fact so regarded by the company by reason of theamount of control which the company exercises over him.”
CIRI-CIRI PEKERJAAN
15
Market Investigation Ltd v Minister of Social
Security, Cooke J memutuskan
‘The fact that there is no provision for sick pay
and holidays is merely a reflection of the fact that
the contract is of very short duration. If a man
engages himself as an extra kitchen hand at a hotel
for a week in the holiday season, there will be no
provision for sick pay and holidays but the contract
will almost certainly be contract of service.’
CIRI-CIRI PEKERJAAN
16
Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial v Pembekal P&B Sdn Bhd,Kes Saman (Jabatan) No: 87-324-2011
“2. Waktu kerja yang tidak tetap.
Adalah menjadi hujahan peguambela bahawa waktu kerja semuapemandu lori adalah tidak tetap dan tidak sama dengan waktupejabat. Atas alasan tersebut, pemandu lori ini tidak bolehdikategorikan sebagai seorang pekerja tetapi hanyalah kontraktorbebas. Mahkamah berpendapat disini bahawa, bersesuaian dengankeadaan dan sifat jenis kerja sebagai pemandu lori yang bekerjatanpa waktu yang ditetapkan malah bergantung kepada trip yangdibuat. Tambahan pula, bayaran juga adalah tertakluk kepadajumlah trip dan penghantaran barangan yang perlu dibuat.Walaupun masa penghantaran tidak ditetapkan, masih wujudelemen kawalan terhadap pemandu lori kerana penghantaranbarangan kepada pelanggan memerlukan ketepatan masa dankesegeraan. SP1 dan SD1 juga mengakui bahawa jadual dan masapenghantaran adalah ditentukan oleh syarikat.”
CIRI-CIRI PEKERJAAN
17
Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial v Pembekal
P&B Sdn Bhd, Kes Saman (Jabatan) No: 87-324-
2011
“Mahkamah berpendapat di sini bahawa, faktor
ketiadaan faedah diberikan seperti cuti sakit bergaji,
cuti tahunan dan sebagainya bukanlah faktor utama
penyumbang kepada penentuan status pekerja.”
CIRI-CIRI PEKERJAAN
18
PERALATAN
Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi Keung & Anor, dimana Mahkamah telahmenyatakan bahawa;
“… The appellant did not provide his own equipment, the equipment wasprovided by his employer. … He had no responsibility for investment in, ormanagement of, the work on the construction site, he simply turned up forwork …He was simply told what to do and left to get on with it… Theappellant ran no risk whatever save that of being unable to find employmentwhich is, of course, a risk faced by all employees. In particular, it is a riskfaced by casual employees who move from one job to another, and such casualemployees are specifically covered by the Ordinance.
Mat Jusoh v Syarikat Jaya Seberang Takir Sdn Bhd, (1982) 2 MLJ 71;
“Another test was suggested by Lord Wright in Montreal v Montreal LocomotiveWorks Ltd. As being appropriate in some cases. This is a composite test involvingelements of (1) control, (2) ownerhip of the tools, (3) chance of profit and (4) risk ofloss. In other words the test which can be applied should be wide enough to coverthe taking of account of investment and risk. Thus he who owns the assets andbears the risk is unlikely to be acting as an agent or servant. Such person infact could be described as carrying on his own business. Ready Mixed Concrete vMinister per Mackenna J. At page 521.”
19
Ketua Pengarah Pertubuhan Keselamatan
Sosial v. Tham Tian Siong (2008) 8 CLJ 341
dimana Mahkamah memutuskan pendekatan yang
seharusnya diambil
(1) ESSA 1969 is primarily aimed to protect employees and
among others to provide with benefits within their scheme of
insurance. It is a social legislation. Social legislation must be
liberally construed and in almost all cases the court is likely to
lean in favour of the beneficiary provided it does not violate
any provisions of the Act. (para 8)
“PURPOSIVE APPROACH”, ‘‘SOCIAL
LEGISLATION’ DAN ‘LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION’
20
DYTM Tengku Idris Shah Ibni Sultan SalahuddinAbdul Aziz Shah V Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor(2002) 2 MLJ 11 Yang Amat Arif Hakim MahkamahPersekutuan telah membincangkan berkaitan pendekatantujuan dan matlamat disebalik sesuatu Akta:
“(6) Pendekatan yang menitikberatkan tujuan statuttersebut telah diberikan pengiktirafan berkanun oleh Parlimendalam menggubalkan s 17A Akta-Akta Pentafsiran 1948 dan1967, yang memperuntukan bahawa: ‘dalam pentafsiransesuatu peruntukan suatu Akta, pembentukan yangakan memajukan tujuan atau matlamat disebalik Aktatersebut (samada tujuan atau matlamat itu telahdinyatakan dengan nyatanya dalam Akta tersebut atautidak) akan lebih diutamakan berbanding suatupembentukan yang tidak akan memajukan tujuan ataumatlamat itu’.
21
“In all cases now in the interpretation of statutes, we
adopt such a construction as will ‘promote the
general legislature purpose’ underlying the
provisions.”
“… It will give statutory force to the courts to look the
policy speech of the Minister or the promoter of the Bill
in Hansard for the purpose of an aid to the
interpretation of statutes”.
22
Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd;Bhagat Singh Surain & Ors. (Interveners), (1996) 4 CLJ 52
“[1] Whilst s. 5(1) of the HDA does not expressly provide that a contractentered into in contravention of the HDA is illegal, it is the duty of theCourt to investigate the substance of the legislation to ascertain whether ornot the contract is expressly prohibited. If the Court ascertains that thecontract is prohibited by the HDA, then the result is that the contract (inthe instant case, the charge) is void and unenforceable under s. 24 of theContracts Act 1950.
[2] A contract will also be void and unenforceable and, perhaps, illegal, ifit infringes against public policy. A contract to commit a common law orstatutory crime is illegal if it is entered into with the intention ofcommitting the crime. In such a case, the question of intention is notso important as the contract is illegal ex facie because of thecontravention of the statute. The Court will take judicial notice of thatfact and refuse to enforce the contract, even though its illegality is notpleaded by the defendant. The fact that the HDA is a legislation with theprimary intention of protecting the consumer makes the contract clearlyone which ‘on its face’ is illegal.
KEESAHAN PERJANJIAN BERTULIS DAN
KEBERGANTUNGAN TERHADAP NIAT
23
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
“Buruk Siku”
Caruman telah dibayar dan diterima kemudian
pihak PERKESO memutuskan bahawa ‘pekerja’
tersebut adalah bukan pekerja dalam maksud
seksyen 2(5) AKSP 1969.
Pengarah Syarikat;
Kontrak Untuk Perkhidmatan.
Bayaran FHUS telah dibuat kepada OB, siasatan
FHUK mendapati bahawa kemalangan adalah
bukan ‘bencana kerja’.
24
Public Textiles Berhad v. Lembaga Letrik
Negara (1979) 2 MLJ 58 dimana di dalam kes
Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa:
“(2) the plea of estoppel by representation cannot be
pleaded against a public corporation on which there is
imposed a statutory duty to carry out certain acts in
the interest of the public.
(3) such public corporation cannot indirectly do, by
placing itself under the disability of estoppel, what it
could not have directly done by reason of statutory
prohibition.”
25
PENENTUAN KONTRAK
PERKHIDMATAN
Ujian Kawalan;
Ujian Intergrasi& Organisasi;
Ujian Keusahawanan;
Ujian Komposit.
26
27
28
Waktu kerja
Arahan kerja / seliaan
Permohonan cuti;
Pematuhan kepada terma
Peralatan
Faedah-faedah pekerjaan
Cuti tahunan / cuti sakit;
Bonus;
Kenaikan gaji;
Elaun.
Tindakan disiplin;
Penamatan
ELEMEN KAWALAN
29
UJIAN KAWALAN
Market Investigation v Minister of Social Security,(1963) 1 WLR 441;
‘No exhaustive list has been compiled and perhaps noexhaustive list can be compiled of the considerations whichare relevant in determining that question, nor can strictrules be laid down as to the relative weight which thevarious considerations should carry in particular cases. Themost that can be said is that control will no doubt alwayshave to be considered, although it can no longer beregarded as the sole determining factor; and that factorswhich may be of importance are such matters as whetherthe man performing the services provides him his ownequipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree offinancial risk he takes, what degree of responsibility forinvestment and management he has, and whether and howfor he has an opportunity of profiting from soundmanagement in the performance of his task.’ 30
Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia &Anor, (1996) 4 CLJ 687
“In all cases where it becomes necessary to determine whether acontract is one of service or for services, the degree of controlwhich an employer exercises over a claimant is an importantfactor, although it may not be the sole criterion. The terms ofthe contract between the parties must, therefore, first be ascertained.Where this is in writing, the task is to interpret its term in order todetermine the nature of the latter’s duties and functions. Where itis not then its term must be established and construed. Butin the vast majority of cases there are facts which to show thenature, degree and extent control. But in the vast majority of casesthere are facts which go to show the nature, degree and extent ofcontrol. These include, but are not confined, to the conduct of theparties at all relevant times. Their determination is a question offact. When all the features of the engagement has been identified, itbecomes necessary to determine whether the contract falls into onecategory of the other, that is to say, whether it is a contract of serviceor a contract for services.”
UJIAN KAWALAN
31
Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi Keung & Anor
“Upon these findings of fact their Lordships would have hadno hesitation, if sitting as a Court of first instance, inconcluding that the appellant was working for the respondentas an employee and not as an independent contractor. All thetest, or perhaps it is better to call them indicia, mentioned byCooke J point towards the status of an employee rather thanan independent contractor. The appellant did not providehis own equipment, the equipment was provided by hisemployer. He did not hire his own helpers; this emergedwith clarity in his evidence when he explained that he gavepriority to the first respondent’s work and if asked by the firstrespondent to do an urgent job he would tell those he wasworking for that they would have to employ someone else; ifhe was an independent contractor in business on his ownaccount, one would expect that he would attempt to keep bothcontracts by hiring others to fulfil the contract he had toleave.”
UJIAN KAWALAN
32
Great Eastern Mills Bhd v Ng Yuen Ching & Ors,(1998) 3 CLJ 847
“In the circumstances of this case, there are ample evidenceboth oral and documentary (see letter at p. 172 of record)before the Industrial Court to support that the respondentswere workmen under the Act. They were the lorry driversfor the applicant and some of them were in the service ofthe applicant for more than 20 years. They were paidremuneration or commission according to the trips theymade. Lorries with fuel were provided andmaintained by the applicant. The respondents wereinsured by the applicant against personal accident. Eventhough there are no written contracts between theapplicant and the respondents, these undisputed facts arenevertheless sufficient evidence to imply that there werecontracts of service between them.”
UJIAN KAWALAN
33
Employees Provident Fund Board v MS Ally & Co. LTD., (1975)
2 MLJ 89
“one instance is the indirect form of control the Board of Directorshad in allotting tha “ratio” each year which determines how much aWorking Assistant will earn. Again a Working Assistant can bedismissed for dishonesty with or without notice. If a WorkingAssistant misappropriated company’s fund or was disloyal, theManaging Director could warn him or terminate his service bynotice.
Yet again according to the Statement of Agreed Facts, the Board ofDirectors could engage and dismiss Working Assistant.
As regards the absence of set hours of work, this seems in my view tobe consistent with the general pattern of laxity of control overmanagerial staff, without a complete abrogation of the right of control.After all, as learned counsel for the appellant has submitted, there issufficient power vested in the company to deal with the situation wherea Working Assistant chose to over exercised his right, by way ofwarning, reduction of the annual “ratio” which should mean reductionin income, and finally dismissal.”
UJIAN KAWALAN
34
Guan Hoe Thye Trading & Transport Sdn. Bhd.v Ketua Pengarah Pertubuhan KeselamatanSosial
“Setelah meneliti kontrak tersebut, Jemaah dapatiada kawalan dalam bentuk sekatan dankawalan secara tidak langsung keatas pemandu.Pemandu sebenarnya tidak bebas untukmenggunakan kenderaan Syarikat untuk tujuanmemberikan perkhidmatan kepada syarikat lain.Sebaliknya pemandu mestilah memberikanperkhidmatannya semata-mata kepada syarikat.Nampaknya kebebasan kepada pemandu hanyalahkebebasan membawa lori balik kerumahnya danuntuk diletakkan di kawasan rumahnya sahaja”
UJIAN KAWALAN
35
Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial v Pembekal P&B Sdn Bhd,Kes Saman (Jabatan) No: 87-324-2011
“2. Waktu kerja yang tidak tetap.
Adalah menjadi hujahan peguambela bahawa waktu kerja semuapemandu lori adalah tidak tetap dan tidak sama dengan waktupejabat. Atas alasan tersebut, pemandu lori ini tidak bolehdikategorikan sebagai seorang pekerja tetapi hanyalah kontraktorbebas. Mahkamah berpendapat disini bahawa, bersesuaian dengankeadaan dan sifat jenis kerja sebagai pemandu lori yang bekerjatanpa waktu yang ditetapkan malah bergantung kepada trip yangdibuat. Tambahan pula, bayaran juga adalah tertakluk kepadajumlah trip dan penghantaran barangan yang perlu dibuat.Walaupun masa penghantaran tidak ditetapkan, masih wujudelemen kawalan terhadap pemandu lori kerana penghantaranbarangan kepada pelanggan memerlukan ketepatan masa dankesegeraan. SP1 dan SD1 juga mengakui bahawa jadual dan masapenghantaran adalah ditentukan oleh syarikat.”
UJIAN KAWALAN
36
UJIAN INTERGRASI & ORGANISASI
Pekerjaan yang dilakukan adalah sebahagian penting,penyumbang utama dan berkait-rapat dengan jenisperniagaan yang dijalankan oleh majikan dan bukan hanyapenambahan sahaja kepada perniagaan tersebut.
Stevenson Jordan & Harrison Ltd. v Macdonald & Evans, (1952)
1 TLR 101;
“under a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the businessand his work is done as an integral part of the business, whereasunder a contract for service , is work although done for the business, isnot integrated into it but is only accessory to it”.
Bank Voor Handel en Scheepvaart NY v Slatford & Anor, (1953)
1 QB 248;
“In this connexion, I would observe that the test of being a servant doesnot rest nowadays on submission to orders. It depends on whether theperson is part and parcel of the organization….”
37
Employees Provident Fund Board v MS Ally & Co.LTD., (1975) 2 MLJ 89
“Although there was a laxity of control, an indirect form ofcontrol existed as the board of directors of the company coulddecide the amount that a working assistant got from hisshare of the profits”.
“I would with respect say having considered the evidence, thecorrect conclusion to be drawn is that there is a sufficiency ofcontrol of if one is to apply the test employed by Denning LJin Bank Voor Handel en Scheepvart NV vs Slatford & Anorand Stevenson (or Stephenson) Jordan & Harrison Ltd vMacdonald, working assistants are “part and parcel” of theorganization’ that they employed as part of the business andtheir work is done as (an) integral part of and not as anaccessory to the business”.
UJIAN INTERGRASI & ORGANISASI
38
Lian Ann Lorry Transport & Forwarding SdnBhd v Govindasamy Palanimuthu, (1982) CLJ(Rep) 173
“And the law will imply the existence of suchrelationship where a person is hired by another as anintegral part of the latter’s business. Stevenson Jordanand Harrison Ltd. v. MacDonald and Evans[1952] 1TLR 101. Ready Mixed Concrete (South East)Ltd. v.Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2QB 497, 524. The circumstances of this caseclearly show that there was a contract of servicebetween the appellants and the respondentbecause the respondent was employed as part ofthe appellants’ transport business;”
UJIAN INTERGRASI & ORGANISASI
39
40
UJIAN KEUSAHAWANAN
Market Investigation v Minister of SocialSecurity, (1963) 1 WLR 441; Lee Ting Sang vChung Chi Keung & Anor,
“The fundamental test to be applied is this ‘is a personwho has engaged himself to perform these servicesperforming them as a person in business on his ownaccount? If the answer to that question is “yes” thanthe contract is a contract for service. If the answer is“no” then the contract is a contract of service ..... whatdegree of responsibility for investment andmanagement he has, and whether and how far he hasan opportunity of profiting from sound management inthe performance of his task” 41
Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi Keung & Anor
“… All the test, or perhaps it is better to call them indicia, mentionedby Cooke J point towards the status of an employee rather than anindependent contractor. The appellant did not provide his ownequipment, the equipment was provided by his employer. He did nothire his own helpers; this emerged with clarity in his evidencewhen he explained that he gave priority to the firstrespondent’s work and if asked by the first respondent to do anurgent job he would tell those he was working for that theywould have to employ someone else; if he was an independentcontractor in business on his own account, one would expectthat he would attempt to keep both contracts by hiring othersto fulfil the contract he had to leave. He had no responsibilityfor investment in, or management of, the work on theconstruction site, he simply turned up for work and chipped offconcrete to the required depth upon the beams indicated to him on aplan by the first respondent. There is no suggestion in the evidencethat he priced the job which is normally a feature of the businessapproach of a sub-contractor; he was paid either a piecework rate or adaily rate according to the nature of the work he was doing.
UJIAN KEUSAHAWANAN
42
It is true that he was not supervised in his work, but this isnot surprising, he was skilled man and he had been told thebeams upon which he was to work and the depth to whichthey were to be cut and his work was measured to see that heachieved that result. There was no question of his beingcalled upon to exercise any skill or judgment as to whichbeams required chipping or as to the depths that they were tobe cut. He was simply told what to do and left to get on withit as, for example, would a skilled turner on a lathe who wasrequired to cut a piece of metal to certain dimensions.Taking all the foregoing considerations into account thepicture emerges of a skilled artisan earning his living byworking for more than one employer as an employee and notas a small business-man venturing into business on his ownaccount as an independent contractor with all its attendantrisks. The appellant ran no risk whatever save that of beingunable to find employment which is, of course, a risk facedby all employees. In particular, it is a risk faced by casualemployees who move from one job to another, and suchcasual employees are specifically covered by the Ordinance.”
43
Mat Jusoh v Syarikat Jaya Seberang Takir Sdn Bhd,
(1982) 2 MLJ 71
“Another test was suggested by Lord Wright in Montreal v
Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. As being appropriate in
some cases. This is a composite test involving elements of (1)
control, (2) ownerhip of the tools, (3) chance of profit and (4)
risk of loss. In other words the test which can be applied
should be wide enough to cover the taking of account of
investment and risk. Thus he who owns the assets and
bears the risk is unlikely to be acting as an agent or
servant. Such person in fact could be described as carrying
on his own business. Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister per
Mackenna J. At page 521.”
UJIAN KEUSAHAWANAN
44
45
UJIAN KOMPOSIT
Mat Jusoh v Syarikat Jaya Seberang Takir SdnBhd, (1982) 2 MLJ 71
“..... I do not think that the learned judge was right indeciding that purely on a test of control withouthaving regard to the test integral part of organizationpropounded by Lord Denning in 1952 in Stevenson,Jordan & Harisson Ltd v Macdonalds and in 1953 inBank Voor Handell en Scheepvaart N. V . Slatfordand Lord Wrights fourfold composite test in Montrealv Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. (1967) and thestatement of Lord Parker C.J on the diminishedimportance of test control in Morren v SwintonPendlebury B.C.” 46
BORANG SOAL SELIDIK KONTRAK
PERKHIDMATAN [PKS(U) 91]
Garispanduan untuk memudahkan pegawai
pemeriksa membuat keputusan berkaitan status
kontrak perkhidmatan.
Berdasarkan kepada norma kebiasaan persoalan
status yang seringkali dibangkitkan.
Soalan-soalan asas yang digubah dan diolah untuk
memastikan pencarian fakta bagi memutuskan
ianya berdasarkan kepada ujian-ujian penentu
kontrak perkhidmatan.47
Dibahagikan kepada beberapa kategori bagi
mengelakkan kekeliruan fakta memandangkan
setiap pekerjaan mempunyai fakta eksklusifnya
yang tersendiri.
Pegawai pemeriksa hendaklah memahami dan
mempertimbangkan keseluruhan fakta secara
menyeluruh dan bukan hanya tertumpu kepada
satu-satu fakta tertentu semata-mata.
Keputusan hendaklah disokong dengan bukti-
bukti dokumentari dan fakta-fakta yang relevan.
BORANG SOAL SELIDIK KONTRAK
PERKHIDMATAN [PKS(U) 91]
48
ENTITI MAJIKAN
49
PENGARAH SYARIKAT
Prinsip asas di bawah undang-undang pengarahadalah ‘bukan pekerja’.
Pertalian ‘fudiciary’ bukan ‘master andservant’.
Pengarah dibayar ‘fee’ pengarah samadatahunan atau bulanan.
Terdapat keadaan pengarah adalah juga pekerja;
Pertalian master & servant;
Sebelum ini merupakan pekerja di syarikat;
Dibayar gaji bulanan (pengesahan daripada resolusisyarikat / setiausaha syarikat);
Borang pengisytiharan cukai.
Seksyen 108A AKSP 1969 50
“(24) “gaji” ertinya semua saraan yang kena
dibayar dengan wang oleh majikan kepada
pekerja termasuk apa-apa bayaran berkenaan
dengan cuti, kelepasan, lebih masa, dan kerja
tambahan pada hari kelepasan tetapi tidak
termasuk—”
51
Chong Kim Sang v. Metatrade Sdn Bhd
[3] It was not in dispute that the claimant received monthly
wages/salary under his contract of service/employment with the
company, and that the company had also contributed to his
Provident Fund all along. An employee of a company may well
be appointed as a director of that company; nonetheless, he
remains an employee of the company so long as his
contract of service is not terminated and he continues to be
paid his wages. (pp 453 f-h &
454 a)
52
“…Whilst carrying out his duties and functions as executivedirector, he still had to “report to and be responsible tothe Managing Director”. He was also required to carry outother duties and responsibilities “assigned by the ManagingDirector from time to time”. He clearly fell within thecontemplation of the meaning of “workman” under the Act.The Industrial Court had considered irrelevant facts inarriving at the conclusion that it did. For example, theresolution of the respondent’s board of directors with regardsto his appointment as executive director seems to suggestthat his salary as executive director need not have theapproval of the respondent in general meeting. Hisremuneration as director, viz., in the form of director’s fees,would need the approval of the respondent in generalmeeting. In this respect, we would agree with the contentionof the appellant’s counsel that the appellant was wearing twohats, namely, one as director and one as employee and thathe was terminated as an employee.”
53
Syarikat 3M Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Nik
Kamaruddin bin Ismail [1990] 1 MLJ 365
“I am inclined to think that the Industrial Court was not concerned with
nomenclature or position held by the claimant, but was concerned to get
the truth of he claimant’s duties and functions in the company. In
this case in order to determine whether the claimant was or was not a
workman, the Industrial Court had heard oral evidence, and perused
documents submitted to it, and came to the conclusion that from the
duties and functions performed by the claimant, he could not be said
to be the mind and brain of the company. A figure-head director
who merely signs document as directed by the company’ board
of directors certainly cannot be said to be a part of the mind and
brain of the company.”
54
SEKIAN, TERIMA KASIH
55