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WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak, Malaysia 8-7-2014

Email: ppm@pmo.gov.my 5 Cc: Datuk Azharuddin Abdul Rahman (DCA) director-general

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION, MALAYSIA

No. 27 Persiaran Perdana Aras 1-4 Blok Podium, 62618 Putrajaya

Tel : +60388714000 Fax : 603 - 8890 1640 Email : azhar@dca.gov.my 10

Mr Tony Abbott MP (Commonwealth of Australia) Tony.Abbott.MP@aph.gov.au

Re: 20140708-G. H .Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Datuk Seri Najib Razak Prime Minister of Malaysia &

Mr Tony Abbott PM- Re: MISSING PLANE

Sir, 15

I understood that MH380 a 737 had previous problems when on a flight from Australia to

Kuala Lumpur. At least that is what I understood from a television program about 737 rudder

problems. While missing flight HM370 is a 777 it doesn’t mean that a problem that may have

occurred in one model (737) may not eventuate in a new model (777). While I understand that

MH 380 had its flight from Kuala Lumpur to Guangzhou nevertheless as I recall the program to 20

refer to MH380 - 737 having this rudder problem when flying from Australia to Kuala Lumpur I

hold it important to remain open minded. Also, the fact that reportedly (see quotation below)

Malaysian Airlines may have financial difficulties one has to consider if then for insurance

purposes MH370 disappeared as to be ab le to obtain some cash. It may be held to be a ridiculous

consideration but not really when one may consider other factors regarding highly skilled person 25

awaiting approval of a patent, etc, word huge amount of monies and reportedly valuable cargo.

And it seems to me utterly ridiculous that the Malaysian Air Force, etc, didn’t bother to check

out a mysterious plane as after all by this it placed the lives of Malaysians unduly at risk.

In my view, as I referred to within 48 hours of the plane going missing, one must consider the

radius that the plane could have flown (and that is without even refuelling) and then eliminate 30

every possible issue that may be considered by disproving it. If it cannot be disproven then so to

say it should remain on the cards.

That were real human beings on that plane and we owe it to them and all future air

travellers to not stop investigating every possible option.

As was shown with the altitude and the auto pilot error in many planes that crashed (2009), such 35

as the Turkeys airliner just short of Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport if you ignore proper

investigation then people can and will lose their lives.

Was such or similar problem existing with the 777 but no one really realized it to be a problem?

Was MH370 by radio control or otherwise set on a pre-programmed course of destruction?

As for the air safety report Central Air Safety - Accident Investigation (see below) 40

http://cf.alpa.org/mec/aaa/docs/newmectoday/arc/airwaves/aw9904/9904ntsb.htm the real reason

was establish about 5 years later to be a jam in the cylinder (operating the rudder) that

eventuated at a certain height. It was when a third plane had the same problem but I understood

being MH380 737 leaving Australia safely landed that the problem could be established by using

hot and cold temperatures on the cylinder, even so neither Wikipedia or the Accident 45

Investigation report refers to this (see quotations below).

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http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20140703-Miracle-workers/Business/How-radical-can-a-

stateowned-Malaysia-Airlines-change QUOTE

July 3, 2014 12:00 am JST 5 Loss-laden Malaysia Airlines faces hard choices

A Malaysia Airlines jet sits on the tarmac at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The carrier has posted big losses for three straight years. © Reuters

KUALA LUMPUR -- Malaysia Airlines, hit with the loss of one of its flights in 10 March, is also under pressure from shareholders to sort out its finances.

Malaysia Airlines CEO Ahmad Jauhari Yahya meets the press June 25 after the annual general meeting in Kuala Lumpur. © Reuters 15

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At a shareholders meeting June 25, the national carrier admitted that it needs to drastically change the way it does business but offered scant details on what it has in mind. When the floor was opened for questions, management faced quite a barrage.

According to attendees, most of the queries focused on why the company has 5

performed so badly, posting huge losses for three consecutive years. This despite a number of business plans crafted with the goal of escaping the doldrums.

Another key topic was the financial impact of flight MH370, which went missing en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing with 239 people aboard, more than half of whom were Chinese nationals. And shareholders demanded to know how 10

management intends to get the business back on track.

Executives assured the stockholders that the ill-fated flight was insured, barring the damage to the carrier's reputation. Malaysia Airlines has seen a 60% drop in business from China since the plane was lost March 8.

As for a turnaround, management would only say it is looking at all options. 15

"Malaysia Airlines should revamp everything," shareholder Chang Tek Huat, 65, told reporters. He added that the board should take responsibility for the weak results that have plagued the company for 15 years.

20

During the meeting, minority shareholders voted down one of eight resolutions, covering payment of directors' fees amounting to 396,000 ringgit ($123,000). The resolution was subsequently passed through the polls by the majority shareholders who have control over 70% stake, but the directors ultimately decided to decline the remuneration. 25

Uncertain path

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With business dwindling and cash running low, analysts have drawn up a few possibilities for recovery, including bankruptcy. Malaysia Airlines is extremely reluctant to go that route.

"We will consider bankruptcy if we are insolvent, but we are not," Chairman Mohamad Nor Yusof said after the meeting. The airline, he said, is still able to pay 5

its debts, with cash reserves of about 3 billion ringgit.

Khazanah Nasional, the majority shareholder, said last month it will unveil a rescue plan in about a year. The national investment fund owns 69% of the airline.

The carrier says fuel accounts for more than 40% of its operation costs, followed by salaries paid to its nearly 20,000 employees. A Malaysian brokerage has 10

suggested that the airline slim down by reducing flights and manpower.

RHB Research Institute, in a recent note, projected that the airline would be able to cut its losses to 349 million ringgit in fiscal 2015 "at the expense of a one-off mutual separation scheme." This downsizing, RHB said, would entail an upfront cost of 750 million ringgit. 15

In its 42 years of incorporation, Malaysia Airlines has gone through a series of ownership changes. It went from being a wholly owned state company to private hands, and then in 2000 it reverted to majority government ownership. Excessive reliance on the government is considered part of the company's problem.

Whatever happened, there was always "a grandfather to fall back on," said an 20

analyst at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, a local think tank.

(Nikkei)

END QUOTE

http://airlineroute.net/2012/08/17/mh-w12update2/ 25 QUOTE

Kuala Lumpur – Guangzhou 28OCT12 – 17FEB13 Airbus A330-300 replaces -200, 1 daily eff 18FEB13 Introduction of 2nd Daily service (MH380/381). All 2 daily flights operated by Boeing 737-800 30 MH376 KUL0930 – 1335CAN 738 D MH380 KUL2005 – 0010+1CAN 738 D

END QUOTE

http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/other-asian-australian-south-pacific-airlines/1465641-mh-a380-35

kul-lhr-f-mini-tr.html QUOTE

MH A380 KUL-LHR F Mini-TR May 9, 13, 11:46 am

END QUOTE 40

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues QUOTE

Boeing 737 rudder issues

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 45

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Jump to: navigation, search

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this

article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged

and removed. (March 2008)

Starting in 1991, a number of accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737 were the result of

uncommanded movement of their rudders. The rudder is controlled by the Power Control Unit

(PCU). Inside the PCU is a dual servo valve which helps direct hydraulic fluid in order to move

the rudder. The PCU is manufactured by Parker Hannifin. 5

Contents

[hide]

1 Accidents

2 Other suspected 737 rudder PCU malfunction

3 SilkAir controversy 10

4 Boeing 737 rudder upgrade directive

5 Cultural references

6 References

7 External links

Accidents[edit] 15

On March 3, 1991, United Airlines Flight 585, a 737-200, crashed in Colorado Springs, CO,

killing 25 people.

On September 8, 1994, USAir Flight 427, a 737-300, crashed near Pittsburgh, PA, killing 132

people.

During the course of the investigation of Flight 427, the National Transportation Safety Board 20

(NTSB) discovered that the PCU's dual servo valve could jam and deflect the rudder in the

opposite direction of the pilots' input, due to thermal shock caused when cold PCUs are injected

with hot hydraulic fluid. As a result of this finding, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

ordered that the servo valves be replaced and new training protocol for pilots to handle

unexpected movement of flight controls. [1] 25

Other suspected 737 rudder PCU malfunction[edit]

On June 6, 1992, Copa Airlines Flight 201, a 737-200 Advanced, flipped and crashed into the

Darien Gap jungle, killing 47 people. Initially, investigators believed that the flight experienced

loss of rudder control, but after an exhaustive investigation, they concluded that the crash was

caused by faulty instruments readings. 30

On April 11, 1994, Continental Airlines pilot Ray Miller reported his aircraft rolled violently to

the right; it landed safely.[2]

On June 9, 1996, Eastwind Airlines Flight 517, a 737-200, experienced loss of rudder control

while on approach to Richmond, VA.

On February 23, 1999, MetroJet Flight 2710, a 737-200, experienced a slow deflection of the 35

rudder to its blowdown limit while flying at 33,000 feet above Salisbury, Maryland.

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SilkAir controversy[edit]

On December 19, 1997, SilkAir Flight 185 crashed in Indonesia, killing 104 people. While the

Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee, the lead investigating agency, could not

determine the cause, the U.S. NTSB, which also participated in the investigation, concluded in a

report issued in 2000 that there was no mechanical failure (based on Parker-Hannifin's own 5

examination of the suspected PCU/dual-servo unit recovered from the crash), and that accident

was a murder-suicide by a pilot, most likely the captain, intentionally crashing the aircraft by

applying sustained nose-down control pressure.[3][4]

In 2004, following an independent investigation of the recovered PCU/dual-servo unit, a Los

Angeles jury, which was not allowed to hear or consider the NTSB's conclusions about the 10

accident, ruled that the 737's rudder was the cause of the crash, and ordered Parker Hannifin, a

rudder component manufacturer, to pay US$43 million to the plaintiff families. Parker Hannifin

subsequently appealed the verdict, which resulted in an out-of-court settlement for an

undisclosed amount.[5][6]

Boeing 737 rudder upgrade directive[edit] 15

The FAA ordered an upgrade of all Boeing 737 rudder control systems by November 12, 2002.[7]

Cultural references[edit]

The Boeing 737 rudder control issue, and the two documented crashes associated with it, were

profiled in The History Channel show Engineering Disasters 19.

The TV series Mayday also profiled these crashes in the episode "Hidden Danger". The Mayday 20

episode included details on Eastwind Airlines Flight 517, which led to NTSB investigators

issuing a finding in the earlier events.

References[edit]

1. Jump up ^ NTSB summary

2. Jump up ^ The Seattle Times: Safety at issue: the 737 "Nightmare over Honduras", 25 October 28, 1996

3. Jump up ^ SilkAir 185 - Flight Safety Australia Feb 2008

4. Jump up ^ ASN Accident description of SilkAir Flight 185

5. Jump up ^ Jury blames rudder, not pilot

6. Jump up ^ Jones Day Parker Hannifin settlement 30 7. Jump up ^ B-737 rudder design defect upgrade, , November 12, 2002.

External links[edit]

Aviation portal

1990s portal

How the 737 rudder works

Boeing 737 Rudder Design Study

Abstract of Final Report - USAir 427 35

<img src="//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1" alt="" title="" width="1" height="1"

style="border: none; position: absolute;" />

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Boeing_737_rudder_issues&oldid=613233379"

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Categories:

Airliner accidents and incidents caused by design or manufacturing errors

Airliner accidents and incidents in the United States

END QUOTE

5

http://cf.alpa.org/mec/aaa/docs/newmectoday/arc/airwaves/aw9904/9904ntsb.htm QUOTE

Central Air Safety - Accident Investigation

NATIONAL TRANSPORATION SAFETY BOARD Public Meeting of March 23-24, 1999

Abstract of Final Report (Subject to Editing)

USAir flight 427

Boeing 737-300, N513AU

Aliquippa, Pennsylvania

September 8, 1994

This is an abstract from the Safety Board’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for the conclusions,

probable cause and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from

which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent

safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached

information is subject to further review and editing.

Accident summary

On September 8, 1994, about 1903:23 eastern daylight time, USAir (now US Airways) flight 427, a Boeing 737-

3B7 (737-300), N513AU, crashed while maneuvering to land at Pittsburgh International Airport, Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania. Flight 427 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a

scheduled domestic passenger flight from Chicago-O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, to Pittsburgh.

The flight departed about 1810, with 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 127 passengers on board. The airplane

entered an uncontrolled descent and impacted terrain near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. All 132 people on board were

killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for

the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The safety issues addressed in this report are Boeing 737 rudder malfunctions, including rudder reversals; the

adequacy of the 737 rudder system design; unusual attitude training for air carrier pilots; and flight data recorder

(FDR) parameters.

Safety recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Also, as a result of this accident, the Safety Board issued a total of 17 safety recommendations to the FAA on

October 18, 1996, and February 20, 1997, regarding operation of the 737 rudder system and unusual attitude

recovery procedures. In addition, as a result of this accident and the United Airlines flight 585 accident (involving

a 737-291) on March 3, 1991, the Safety Board issued three recommendations (one of which was designated

"urgent") to the FAA on February 22, 1995, regarding the need to increase the number of FDR parameters.

Conclusions

[NOTE: Because the Safety Board’s analysis of this accident also included analysis of the United flight 585

accident and the Eastwind flight 517 incident, some of the findings below pertain to these two events.]

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1. The USAir flight 427 flight crew was properly certificated and qualified, and had received the training

and off-duty time prescribed by Federal regulations. No evidence indicated any preexisting medical or

behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the flight crew’s performance during the

accident flight. 2. The USAir flight 427 accident airplane was equipped, maintained, and operated in accordance with

applicable Federal regulations. The airplane was dispatched in accordance with FAA- and industry-

approved practices. 3. All of USAir flight 427’s doors were closed and locked at impact. 4. USAir flight 427 did not experience an in-flight fire, bomb, explosion, or structural failure. 5. Neither a midair collision with other air traffic, a bird strike, clear air turbulence, nor other atmospheric

phenomena were involved in the USAir flight 427 accident. 6. Asymmetrical engine thrust reverser deployment, asymmetrical spoiler/aileron activation, transient

electronic signals causing uncommanded flight control movements, yaw damper malfunctions, and a

rudder cable pull or break were not factors in the USAir flight 427 accident. 7. Although USAir flight 427 encountered turbulence from Delta flight 1083’s wake vortices, the wake

vortex encounter alone would not have caused the continued heading change that occurred after 1903:00. 8. About 1903:00, USAir flight 427’s rudder deflected rapidly to the left and reached its left aerodynamic

blowdown limit shortly thereafter. 9. Analysis of the human performance data shows that it is likely that the first officer made the first pilot

control response to the upset event and manipulated the flight controls during the early stages of the

accident sequence; although it is likely that both pilots manipulated the flight controls later in the

accident sequence, it is unlikely that the pilots simultaneously manipulated the controls (possibly

opposing each other) during the critical period in which the airplane yawed and rolled to the left. 10. Analysis of the human performance data (including operational factors) does not support a scenario in

which the flight crew of USAir flight 427 applied and held a full left rudder input until ground impact

more than 20 seconds later. 11. Analysis of the CVR, Safety Board computer simulation, and human performance data (including

operational factors) from the USAir flight 427 accident shows that they are consistent with a rudder

reversal most likely caused by a jam of the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary slide to the servo

valve housing offset from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide. 12. The flight crew of USAir flight 427 could not be expected to have assessed the flight control problem and

then devised and executed the appropriate recovery procedure for a rudder reversal under the

circumstances of the flight. 13. The flight crew of USAir flight 427 recognized the initial upset in a timely manner and took immediate

action to attempt a recovery, but did not successfully regain control of the airplane. 14. It is very unlikely that the loss of control in the United flight 585 accident was the result of an encounter

with a mountain rotor. 15. Analysis of the CVR, computer simulation, and human performance data (including operational factors)

from the United flight 585 accident shows that they are consistent with a rudder reversal most likely

caused by a jam of the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset

from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide. 16. The flight crew of United flight 585 recognized the initial upset in a timely manner and took immediate

action to attempt a recovery, but did not successfully regain control of the airplane. 17. The flight crew of United flight 585 could not be expected to have assessed the flight control problem

and then devised and executed the appropriate recovery procedure for a rudder reversal under the

circumstances of the flight. 18. Training and piloting techniques developed as a result of the USAir flight 427 accident show that it is

possible to counteract an uncommanded deflection of the rudder in most regions of the flight envelope:

such training was not yet developed and available to the crews of USAir flight 427 or United flight 585. 19. During the Eastwind flight 517 incident, the rudder reversed, moving to its right blowdown limit when

the captain commanded left rudder, consistent with a jam of the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary

slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide. 20. It is possible that, in the main rudder PCUs from the USAir flight 427, United flight 585, and Eastwind

flight 517 airplanes (as a result of some combination of tight clearances within the servo valve, thermal

effects, particulate matter in the hydraulic fluid or other unknown factors) the servo valve secondary slide

could jam to the servo valve housing at a position offset from its neutral position, without leaving any

obvious physical evidence, and combined with a rudder pedal input, could have caused the rudder to

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move opposite to the direction commanded by a rudder pedal input. 21. The upsets of USAir flight 427, United flight 585, and Eastwind flight 517 were most likely caused by

the movement of the rudder surfaces to their blowdown limits in a direction opposite to that commanded

by the pilots. The rudder surfaces most likely moved as a result of jams of the secondary slides to the

servo valve housings offset from their neutral position and overtravel of the primary slides. 22. When completed, the rudder system design changes to the Boeing 737 should preclude the rudder

reversal failure mode that most likely occurred in the USAir flight 427 and United flight 585 accidents

and the Eastwind flight 517 incident. 23. Rudder design changes to Boeing 737-NG series airplanes and the proposed retrofit of the remainder of

the Boeing 737 fleet do not eliminate the possibility of other potential failure modes and malfunctions in

the Boeing 737 rudder system that could lead to a loss of control. 24. The dual-concentric servo valve used in all Boeing 737 main rudder PCUs is not reliably redundant. 25. A reliably redundant rudder actuation system is needed for the Boeing 737, despite significant

improvements made in the system’s design. 26. The results of this investigation have disclosed that the Boeing 737 rudder system design certificated by

the FAA is not reliably redundant. 27. Transport-category airplanes should be shown to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after a

jammed flight control in any position, unless the jam can be shown to be extremely improbable. 28. Pilots would be more likely to recover successfully from an uncommanded rudder reversal if they were

provided the necessary knowledge, procedures, and training to counter such an event. 29. A neutral rudder pedal position is not a valid indicator that a rudder reversal in the Boeing 737 has been

relieved. 30. The training being provided to many Boeing 737 flight crews on the procedures for recovering from a

jammed or restricted rudder (including a rudder reversal) is inadequate. 31. The continued use by air carriers of airspeeds below the existing block maneuvering speed schedule

presents an unacceptable hazard, and the existing block maneuvering speed for the flaps 1 configuration

provides an inadequate margin of controllability in the event of a rudder hardover. 32. The FDR upgrade modifications required by the FAA for existing airplanes are inadequate because they

do not require the FDR to be modified to record yaw damper command voltage, yaw damper and standby

rudder on/off discrete indications, pitch trim, thrust reverser position, leading and trailing edge flap

position, and pilot flight control input forces for control wheel, control column, and rudder pedals. 33. Based on the rudder-related anomalies discussed in this report, FDR documentation of yaw damper

command voltage, yaw damper and standby rudder on/off discrete indications, and pilot flight control

input forces for control wheel, control column, and rudder pedals is especially important in the case of

the 737, and these parameters should be sampled on 737 airplanes at frequent intervals to provide optimal

documentation. 34. The FAA’s failure to require timely and aggressive action regarding enhanced FDR recording

capabilities, especially on Boeing 737 airplanes, has significantly hampered investigators in the prompt

identification of potentially critical safety-of-flight conditions and in the development of

recommendations to prevent future catastrophic accidents.

Probable cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the USAir flight 427 accident

was a loss of control of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder surface to its blowdown limit. The

rudder surface most likely deflected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots as a result of a jam of

the main rudder PCU servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and

overtravel of the primary slide.

Safety recommendations

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following

recommendations: —to the Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Require that all existing and future 737s have a reliably redundant rudder actuation system.

2. Convene an engineering test and evaluation board to conduct a failure analysis to identify potential

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failure modes; a component and sub-system test to isolate particular failure modes found during the

failure analysis; and a full-scale integrated systems test of the rudder actuation and control system of the

Boeing 737 to identify potential latent failures and to validate operation of the system without regard to

minimum certification standards and requirements in FAR Part 25. Participants in the board should

include the FAA, NTSB technical advisors, the Boeing Company , other manufacturers as appropriate,

and experts from other government agencies, industry, and academia. A test plan should be prepared that

includes installation of original and redesigned Boeing 737 main rudder PCUs and related equipment and

exercises all potential factors that could initiate anomalous behavior (such as thermal effects, fluid

contamination, maintenance errors, mechanical failure, system compliance, structural flexure, etc.) The

work of the engineering board should be completed by March 31, 2000, and should be published by the

FAA.

3. Ensure that future transport category airplanes certificated by the FAA provide a reliably redundant

rudder actuation system.

4. Amend 14 CFR Section 25.671(c)(3) to require that transport-category airplanes be shown to be capable

of continued safe flight and landing after jamming of a flight control at any deflection possible, up to and

including its full deflection, unless such a jam is shown to be extremely improbable.

5. Revise AD 96-26-07 so that procedures for addressing a jammed or restricted rudder do not rely on the

pilots’ ability to center the rudder pedals as an indication that the rudder malfunction has been

successfully resolved, and require Boeing and U.S. operators of Boeing 737s to amend their Airplane

Flight Manuals and Operations Manuals accordingly.

6. Require all 14 CFR Part 121 air carrier operators of the Boeing 737 to provide their flight crews with

initial and recurrent flight simulator training in the "Uncommanded Yaw or Roll" and "Jammed or

Restricted Rudder" procedures in Boeing’s 737 Operations Manual. The training should demonstrate the

inability to control the airplane at some speeds and configurations by using the roll controls (the

crossover speed phenomenon) and include performance of both procedures in their entirety.

7. Require Boeing to update its Boeing 737 simulator package to reflect flight test data on crossover speed;

then require all operators of the Boeing 737 to incorporate these changes in their simulators used for

Boeing 737 pilot training.

8. Evaluate the Boeing 737’s block maneuvering speed schedule to ensure the adequacy of airspeed margins

above crossover speed for each flap configuration; provide the results of the evaluation to air carrier

operators of the Boeing 737 and the Safety Board, and require Boeing to revise block maneuvering

speeds to ensure a safe airspeed margin above crossover speed.

9. Require that each 737 airplane operated under 14 CFR Parts 121 or 125 that currently has a FDAU be

equipped, by December 1999, with a flight data recorder system that records, at a minimum, the

parameters required by FAA Final Rule 121.344, 125.226 dated July 17, 1997, applicable to that airplane

plus the following parameters: pitch trim, trailing edge flaps, leading edge flaps, thrust reverser position

(each engine), yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off discrete, standby rudder on/off discrete, and

control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces (with yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off

discrete, and control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces sampled at a minimum rate of twice-

per-second).

10. Require that all 737 airplanes operated under 14 CFR Parts 121 or 125 not equipped with a FDAU be

equipped, at the earliest time practicable, but no later than August 2001, with a flight data recorder

system that records, at a minimum, the parameters required by FAA Final Rule 121.344, 125.226 dated

July 17, 1997 applicable to that airplane plus the following parameters: pitch trim, trailing edge flaps,

leading edge flaps, thrust reverser position (each engine), yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off

discrete, standby rudder on/off discrete, and control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal forces (with

yaw damper command, yaw damper on/off discrete, and control wheel, control column, and rudder pedal

forces sampled at a minimum rate of twice-per-second).

Back to Article US AIRWAVES - April 1999

END QUOTE

5

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USAir_Flight_427 QUOTE

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USAir Flight 427

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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USAir Flight 427

A USAir Boeing 737-3B7 similar to the one involved.

Occurrence summary

Date September 8, 1994

Summary Rudder malfunction

Site

Hopewell Township,

Beaver County, Pennsylvania

40°36′14″N 80°18′37″W40.60393°N

80.31026°WCoordinates: 40°36′14″N

80°18′37″W40.60393°N 80.31026°W

Passengers 127

Crew 5

Fatalities 132 (all)

Survivors 0

Aircraft type Boeing 737-3B7

Operator USAir

Registration N513AU

Flight origin O'Hare International Airport

Stopover Pittsburgh International Airport

Destination West Palm Beach Int'l Airport

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USAir Flight 427 was a scheduled flight from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport to Pittsburgh, with a final

destination of West Palm Beach, Florida. The flight crashed on Thursday, September 8, 1994, killing 132 on board.

The Boeing 737-3B7 flying the route, registered N513AU, and previously registered as N382AU, was approaching

runway 28R of Pittsburgh International Airport, located in Findlay Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,

which was at the time the largest hub for the airline. 5

Contents

[hide]

1 Crash

2 Investigation

3 Dramatization 10 4 See also

5 References

6 External links

7 Books

Crash[edit] 15

The sister aircraft of N513AU, a USAir (rebranded and repainted as US Airways) Boeing 737-3B7, registration

N527AU.

Captain Peter Germano, 45, was hired by USAir in February 1981. First Officer Charles B. "Chuck" Emmett III, 38, 20 was hired in February 1987 by Piedmont Airlines. Both the captain and first officer were regarded as excellent

pilots. They were both very experienced, with approximately 12,000 flight hours and 9,119 flight hours,

respectively. Flight Attendant Stanley Canty was hired in May 1989 by Piedmont Airlines. Flight Attendant April

Slater was hired by Piedmont in March 1989. Flight Attendant Sarah Slocum-Hamley was hired in October 1988.

Piedmont merged with USAir in 1989. 25

During its arrival into Pittsburgh, Flight 427 was sequenced behind Delta Airlines Flight 1083, a Boeing 727-200. At

no time was Flight 427 closer than 4.1 miles from Delta 1083, according to radar data.[1] During the approach, Flight

427 encountered wake turbulence from Delta 1083; however the FAA determined "the wake vortex encounter alone

would not have caused the continued heading change that occurred after 1903:00."[2] At 7:02:57 PM, there were

three sudden thumps, clicking sounds, a louder thump, and then the 737 began to bank and roll to the left. The 30 aircraft stalled, and rolled upside down. Germano exclaims, "Hold on" numerous times, as Emmett says "Oh sh*t"

frequently. Germano says, "What the hell is this?" As air traffic control noticed Flight 427 descending without

permission, Germano, keyed the mic and stated, "Four-twenty-seven, emergency!" The aircraft then rolled back

upright, but after a few seconds on its side, the aircraft continued to roll while pitched nose down at the ground.

Germano and Emmett began frantically shouting, "God", "No!" and screaming. At 7:03:25 PM, the 737 slammed 35 into the ground and exploded, in an 80 degree nose down position, while banked 60 degrees to the left, and traveling

at 300 mph (480 km/h) in Hopewell Township, Beaver County,[3] near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, killing all 127

passengers and 5 crew members. The plane just barely missed the Green Garden shopping plaza, and the Aliquippa

exit of the Beaver Valley Expressway (I-376, then PA-60), which was crowded with cars of people driving home

from work, crashing onto a private gravel driveway and hillside on Pettita Lane in an area protected against 40 trespassing. There is a memorial that has been put on the site where the aircraft impacted.

Flight 427 has the third highest death toll of any aviation accident involving a Boeing 737-300 after the crash of

Flash Airlines Flight 604 and China Southern Airlines Flight 3943. When it occurred, it was the second deadliest

accident involving a Boeing 737 and is currently the sixth deadliest. It was also the seventh deadliest aviation

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disaster in the history of the United States at the time it occurred; as of 2012, it now ranks ninth.[citation needed] In the

period from 1989 to 1994, it was the company's fifth crash.[4]

After the crash, USAir encountered difficulties in determining who was on board the aircraft. The company faced

confusion regarding five or six passengers. Several employees of the U.S. Department of Energy had tickets to take

later flights, but used them to fly on Flight 427. One young child was not ticketed.[4] Due to the severity of the 5 impact, the bodies of the passengers and crew were severely fragmented, leading investigators to declare the site a

biohazard.

Investigation[edit]

After one of the longest accident investigations in aviation history — lasting more than four and a half years — the

concluding statement said: 10

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the USAir flight 427 accident was a

loss of control of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder surface to its blowdown limit. The rudder

surface most likely deflected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots as a result of a jam of the main

rudder power control unit servo valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset from its neutral position and

overtravel of the primary slide.[5] 15

The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that similar rudder problems caused the previously mysterious

March 3, 1991 crash of United Airlines Flight 585 and the June 9, 1996, incident involving Eastwind Airlines Flight

517, both of which were Boeing 737s. As a result of the investigation, pilots were warned of and trained how to deal

with insufficient aileron authority at an airspeed at or less than 190 knots (352 km/h), formerly the usual approach

speed for a Boeing 737. Four additional channels of information — pilot rudder pedal commands — were 20 incorporated into flight data recorders, while Boeing redesigned the rudder system on 737s and retrofitted existing

craft until the affected systems could be replaced. The United States Congress also required airlines to deal more

sensitively with the families of crash victims.[6]

US Airways 427 is no longer a valid flight number on US Airways as of January 2011.

Flight 427 was the second fatal crash in a little over two months at the company (the other being USAir Flight 1016 25 at Charlotte-Douglas Airport in July 1994). The crashes contributed to the financial crisis USAir was experiencing at

the time.[7]

Among the victims of the crash was noted neuroethologist Walter Heiligenberg.[8]

Dramatization[edit]

The accident was featured on the Discovery Channel Canada/National Geographic Channel television series Mayday 30 (also known as Air Emergency or Air Crash Investigation in various countries) series 4 episode entitled "Hidden

Danger" ("Mystery Crashes"), alongside United Airlines Flight 585 and Eastwind Airlines Flight 517.

See also[edit]

Pittsburgh portal

Aviation portal

Disasters portal

1990s portal

Boeing 737 rudder issues

United Airlines Flight 585 35 Eastwind Airlines Flight 517

American Airlines Flight 1

Northwest Airlines Flight 85

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References[edit]

1. Jump up ^ http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1999/AAR9901.pdf

2. Jump up ^ http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/USAir427/usa427%20ntsb%20findings.pdf

3. Jump up ^ "28 Seconds of Horror," Pittsburgh Tribune-Review

4. ^ Jump up to: a b "28 Seconds: The Mystery of USAir Flight 427 Part One: Zulu." 4. Retrieved on 5 December 31, 2012.

5. Jump up ^ NTSB summary

6. Jump up ^ Remarks from acting NTSB Chairman, 2002

7. Jump up ^ Halvonik, Steve. "Disaster only one in a string of setbacks for troubled company."

Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. Sunday September 5, 2004. Retrieved on January 1, 2012. 10 8. Jump up ^ "List of Crash Victims." Wilmington Morning Star. September 10, 1994. 4A. Google

News (28 of 49). Retrieved on October 3, 2009.

External links[edit]

www.airliners.net - picture of N513AU painted in USAir's brown, orange, and red livery

NTSB Accident Investigation Docket (Archive) 15 AVweb article

AVweb supplement

Accident description at the Aviation Safety Network

28 Seconds Four-part article from the Saint Petersburg Times

Boeing 737 Rudder Design Defect 20 "Remembering Flight 427." Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. (Archive)

Pre-Crash accident photos from Airliners.net

Schaarsmith, Amy McConnell. "Mourners remember at 15th anniversary." Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.

September 9, 2009.

Memorial location 25

Books[edit]

Bill Adair, The Mystery of Flight 427: Inside a Crash Investigation, ISBN 1-58834-005-8

Gerry Byrne, Flight 427: Anatomy of an Air Disaster, ISBN 0-387-95256-X

[hide]

v

t

e

← 1993

Aviation accidents and incidents in 1994

1995 →

Jan 3 Baikal Airlines Flight 130

Jan 7 Atlantic Coast Airlines Flight 6291

Feb 28 Banja Luka incident

Mar 17 Iranian Air Force C-130 shootdown

Mar 20 British Army Lynx shootdown

Mar 23 Aeroflot Flight 593

Mar 23 Green Ramp disaster

Apr 04 KLM Cityhopper Flight 433

Apr 14 Black Hawk shootdown

Apr 26 China Airlines Flight 140

Jun 02 RAF Chinook crash

Jun 06 China Northwest Airlines Flight 2303

Jun 24 Fairchild Air Force Base B-52 crash

Jun 30 Airbus Industrie Flight 129

Jul 01 Air Mauritanie Flight 625

Oct 12 Iran Aseman Airlines Flight 746

Oct 31 American Eagle Flight 4184

Nov 03 SAS Flight 347

Nov 22 TWA Flight 427

Dec 11 Philippine Airlines Flight 434

Dec 13 Flagship Airlines Flight 3379

Dec 19 Nigeria Airways Flight 9805

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Apr 06 Assassination of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira

Apr 07 Federal Express Flight 705 Jul 02 USAir Flight 1016

Jul 19 Alas Chiricanas Flight 901

Aug 21 Royal Air Maroc Flight 630

Sep 08 USAir Flight 427

Dec 21 Air Algérie Flight 702P

Dec 24 to Dec 26 Air France Flight 8969

Dec 29 Turkish Airlines Flight 278

<img src="//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1" alt="" title="" width="1" height="1"

style="border: none; position: absolute;" />

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=USAir_Flight_427&oldid=613863229"

Categories:

Airliner accidents and incidents caused by design or manufacturing errors 5 Aviation accidents and incidents in 1994

1994 in Pennsylvania

Airliner accidents and incidents in Pennsylvania

Beaver County, Pennsylvania

US Airways accidents and incidents 10 Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing 737

END QUOTE

Even if in this case the rudder system could not have been an issue with the 777 (MH370)

nevertheless it might be worthwhile to check other 777’s as to any kind of reported problems 15

they may have experienced, even if no fatalities eventuated, so that a possible connection might

be made to explain the strange way MH370 was going.

For example was the Auto Pilot reprogrammed and by this once engaged took over the plane and

then was beyond the control of either pilot to restore the plane back under their control if the 20

switch was deactivated to switch of the Automatic Pilot, and so the pilots were aware the plane

was doomed and they had no way to stop it? In the alternative it landed beyond their control, and

they are held or were executed after landing.

We cannot and must not give up on those missing of flight MH370 nor can we ignore the 25

problems that may eventuate if this plane was hijacked and the same could eventuate with

any other plane because authorities fails to investigate appropriately.

Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL® 30

(Our name is our motto!)