the politics of merdeka - some aspects of communialism in ... file"malayan union" wh ich,...

Hak Cipta Terpelihara © 1977 – Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia


THE POLITICS OF MERDEKA

- Sume AspeeLS of Communalism in pre-independence Malayan Poli tics

by

Kamarudin JaHar j&baan Saini Polilik

Univenili Keb:tIliI.l, .. n "'hllYlia

Toward the middle of 1953 the Deputy High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, Sir Donald MacGillinay, announced that the Covernment, with the concurrence of The ir High nesses the Malay Rulers, was going to appoint a Committee "to examine the question of elections to the Federal Legislative Council and future constitutional changes arising from there; and to make recommen· dations".( I ) This announcement led to a \'ery intensive political de\'elopment in Malaya and culminated in the Federal dections o f 1955 from which the Alliance Party emerged as Ihe undisputed leader on the Malayan political scenc, This study will attempt to analy~ the events during the first haH of the 1950s and explain the success of the Alliance Pany in the 1955 election in Ihe light of the analysis,

The brief J apanese occupat ion ( 1942-45) during the 2nd World War and the subsequent return of the British both contributcd to further worsening th" ddicatc politi cal situation in Malaya which '\faS caused by its multiracial popu· lation.(2) The J apancsc did not cncourage harmony between the races du rin g their occupat ion of M:llaya; in fact their polic)' cou ld

12

be said to be clearly that of favouring the Malays at the expense of the other races, The British post,war proposal in 1946 for a "Malayan Union" wh ich, interalia, would abolish the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers and bestow Malayan citiz.ens hip on the immigrant non-Mala)'s relativel), easily, resulted in a sun den upsurge of Mala)' nationalism, More im, portant still, as a reaction to these proposals, which were abandoned as a result, the t>.falays formed an organisation to light for their rights and this organisation was named ID1I\'O - The United ~'f ala)'s' National Organiz.ation,

Oato Onn bin Jaafar, the Pre· sident of UMNO,' led the party to achieve its goals successfully - the most notable of which was the

(t) ~"~In~ Council Debllu 61h and 71h May 1953, Frd.. of Maiaya, 285-286 quotrd in G,P, Mum.,/tfIlUryJianPolitiLl, London, 1970, lima)' b( nOlCd thai Ih( nlHing Frderal l....t'1J .. lative Council, formed b)' Ih( Fedrralion of Mlbya Alu......,nl of 1948. CQn';n(d of Iwenl)" lix Ilrililh Offici..ai.a and fifty ' Unofficiall' appoim(d by Ihe lI~h Commiuion(, 10 aprrl(nl "UioUI communilic, and (conornicinlCre'Ii,

(2) .'(d.. of MlbYI t 9S7 Oruu.1 Rrporl shows Ihal OUI of the total population of 6,278,763 Ih( Mala)' , eonnitulrd juu under 50"'; Chil'leK, 37"'; tndianl 12" Ind 'Olhen' O,~



T"".II" A bd,,{ Rahm"" Pl.,.,,, A I-H.i" UI" fin"""" lPn:clt d"n""" 111, 19j5,menU tUcriof1.lcllmp,,1,rL

13



creation of the Federation o f Malaya. in place of Malayan Union, in 1948 - until he resigned five years later in August 1951. His resignation came about aJter his failure to ge t the party to change its co nstitution in order to allow its membership to be open to the non· Malays. In September 1951 he formed the non·communal Inde· pendence of Malaya Party (IMP) which believed that "uni ty through communal co·operation was the only road to independence for Malaya".(!) However, this new party failed to attrac t tither the Malays or the non·Malays. Siman· djuntak attributed this failure to "Dato Onn's leadership and to the du al allegiance of othe r leaders in the party" .(4) To the majority of the Malays Dato Onn was still th ought of as the UMNO leader whi le the more sophistica ted Malay s and non-~talays were suspicious of Govemment backing since Dato Onn was then the 'Member' (i.e. Minister) for Home Affairs. On the dual allegiance of the o ther leaders, the best example was probably that of Tan Cheng Lock, the President of Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), who, in this speech as the chairman of the inaugural meeting of IMP, made " an earneS! personal appeal"(5) to MCA members to "§i\.e their full and active support't( ) to the new party while, at the same time urging them to main tain the part y's (i.e. MCA) existence and its semi· political character. However, the strenght and popUlarity of Da to Onn and IMP vis·a·vis UMl\'O and o ther politi cal parties had yet to be tested.

The opportunity ,\'as prm<ided

14

by the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections in February 1952. Despite its poor general response, Kuala Lumpur still offered IMP an ideal electorate to caIT)' the elec tions through. Being the capital of Malaya, victory in the Kua.la Lumpur elections was vital ror the future of the competing political parties. For the IMP, Kuala Lumpur o ffert=d them a distinct advantage ove r the o ther parties because "tht= Malays, the Chil1t=se and the Indians had es tablished good rdations, and the people or the city were general. ly conceded to be more liberal in their communal attitudes than those in most other areas of Malaya".( 7) Another advantage was Ihat IMP was launched in K.L and many of its strongest supporters we re the governme nt se rvants attached to the Federal rlepart· menu. With the other parties being regarded as cons iderably weaker, ,;ctory for the L\1P set= med assured since as early as five weeks before the elections. (8)

Howe\'er, on J anuary 8, 1952, the Selangor branches of UMNO and MCA made a most unexpected joint declaration that the two pa.rties would can fest the K.L elections together in a common front. Simandjuntak reft=rred to lhe " 1:1It=nt hos tility" bt=twecn the local branches of UMNO and MCA on

(') B. Simandjunta.t.. M..,.,<171 "'cdcrJism 194H;J. our, Kuab Lumpur, 1969, p-66.

('1 llotd..p.61.

('I 11otd..p.66.

(61 Ibid..

(11 Mnru,op.cit.. p. 1".

(') Ibid.



the one side and the local branch of IMP on the other as the cause for this move.(S) A better explaination for the UMNO·MCA alliance, how. ever. was the common fear of an i?"tP victory. To UMNO, an IMP victory would imply a proportional reduction in its strength and the acceptance of Data Onn as the to.blay political leader. The MCA, on the other hand, were beginning to suspect that Dato Onn's proposal for extending citizenship to the non-Malays might be a Malay·based one, that is his tendency to define a 'Malayan' by refere~ce to the Malays.(IO) Afterall in late 1951 Dato Onn made a bitter attack on the Chinese by describing them as "a community which desires to control the destiny of this country on the ground of its economic and financial innuences".{J I)

Another reason that made this UMNO·MCA alliance possible was the existence of a personality clash. It has been suggested that Col. H.S. Lee. the MCA Sclangor President, did not sec eye to eye with Data Onn. On the contrary, the forrnl'r was on friendly terms with Ule UMNO Kuala Lumpur President, Yahya.(12)

In contrast to L1o,1P's non· communal stand. the ad hoc Alliance still retained the communa! appeals of the two constituent parties. The communal strategy of the Alliance was dearly shov.TI in that the MCA candidates contested in constituencies where the Chinese were in majority while the UMNO candidates contested the predominantly .1o.blay constituencies.

The outcome of the elections was a resounding victory for the

15

Alliance inter·communal experi· ment, for they won nine or the twelve scats contested. The two seats which were won by IMP were actually MIC (The Malayan Indian Congress) candidates contesting on IMP tickets while the twelfth seat went to an Independent, a Sinhalesc, who contested in a strong lndian ward.(U)

These elections results were to playa very decisive role in shaping the pattern of Malayan politics and political parties during the sub· sequent years. To the Alliance their victor" was a clear signal of the utility of the strategy and therefore led them to put a permanent seal on their partnership. As will be seen later, the area of compromise expanded from allocation of scats based on communal factors to allocation of scats based on intercommunal factors, a change which was very fundamental to the estab· lished aims of cach constituent party_

To Dato Onn his defeat to the communal strategy of the Alliance was a severe blow to his noncommunal ambitions. A direct reaction to this was a reappraisal of his non-communal policies and, as will be observed later, a return to his UMNO·days stand, while, it is interesting to note, UMNO itself had by then left that stage.

(9) Simandjunt.1r.,op. ciL, Po 68.

(10) MnOl,op.ciL. p.I".

(Ii) II. Milkr. I'n'rll:t .",d hemin (london. i9~9). p. 110, quoled in Sil'nandjuntak, op. cit.. p. 68.

(i2) The .ulhQr U grateful 10 Prof. Zain.al Abidin Ab_ W.hid for enlislhlening him on Ihis poim.

(13) Simandjuntak.,ibkt



Besides converting MCA into a complete politi cal party, converting the Alliance into a permanent entity and making IMP reverse: its policies, the 1952 K.L Municipal elections can also be said to have quickened the staging of the first Federal elections in Malaya. This is due to the fact that both the Alliance and lAW had their own reasons to believe that an immediate Federal election would bring victOry to their respective parties. The Alliance interpreted the polling returns at the KuaJa Lumpur eJections as reflective of the country's support for them. Dato Onn and I~W, on the other hand regarded the Ulo.1NO·MCA Alliance as being merd}' a Kuala Lumpur phenomenon and were also hoping to usc their majority in the nominated Federal Legislative Council to draft election ordinances which would suit their party. It was not surprising therefore that immediately after the Kuala Lumpur elections were over both parties started agitating for elections to the Federal Legislature.

In December 1952, six muni· cipalities in the Federation held their municipal elections which resulted in UMNO·MCA winning 26 sealS while IMP on ly managed to retain one seat in Kual a Lumpur out of a total o f 37 sealS. lI ") The continuing victory of the Alliance and humiliating ddeat of Ir..IP set the stage for a bitter struggle ill 1953 between the 'elected majori. ty' and 'nominated government'.

Even before the 'second round' of municipal elections, in Septem· ber 1952, both the IMP and UMNO had already dr;lfted their proposals for the the attainment of Malayan

16

independence.(I~) In the following two years both parties stepped up their demands for ~1crdeka (independence) with mure practical actions, with UMNO being far more militant in their tactics.

1953 saw three important events occuring on the Malayan political scene. They were the Malayan National Conference called by IMP leaders, the Federal elections announcement made by Sir D. MacGilJi\Tay and the Na tional Com·ention led by liMNOMeA. The National Conference, which was called and led by the Menteris Besar (Chief Ministers), who were all L\iP supporters, demanded an elected minority in the Federal Legislative Council, the election for which should be held toward the end of 1956. 1161 The Alliance·organised National Can· vention, held in the latter part of 1953, demanded a three-fifths elected majority in the Legislative Council the election for which shou ld be held not later than 1954. nle Convention also called for the extension of the franchise to all adults who were either citizens, subjects of the Rulers, British subjec ts or born in Malaya and who had lived in "'1a1aya for five years. 1I7 ) TIl esc Alliance demands were in fa ct early indications of the party's emerging multi·racial stand; the cal l for an extension of the franchise, for example, if imple. mented, result in greatl)' increased number of Chinese \'oters. The IMP

(H) ~k"r ... op. cil. p t H.

( t ~) !bid.. p. 141.

(16) IbWl... p. 14'.

( t7)lbiJ...p.IU.



leaders, on the other hand, finding that they could neither attract a significant number of political parties to participate in the Conference nor were the few participating non· Malay parties (e.g. MIC) impressed by their stand. decided to be more explicit in their pro· Malay attitude by launching a new party in place of IMP. The name chosen for this new party, which was launclu:d in Febmary 195-1, was Parti Negara. (18) This name was designed to attract the ~1al:tys who always associated their political detl'lands with nado. nalism.(19)

The third evcnt in 1953 was Ma cG illivray's announcement which is quoted in the early part of this paper. Since the Election committee members were drawn from the Federal l1gisiati\'e Council, ilS rcport, presented in January 1954 naturally reflected the com· position of the Council. Hence the Majority Report was very similar to the that of the IMP-led National Conference while the minority proposaJs were \'el)' similar to that of the Alliance-led National Con· \·enlion.

The situation again provided the Alliance with the opportun ity to display to the electorate its mililant anti·colonial government policy. The Alliance demanded that the minority proposals be accepted and backed up this demand with an impressive series of actions which induded the reconvening of the National Convention, desp3tching of a three·man Alliance delegation to London to meet the Colonial Se ere ta ry despite the 13tter's publicly announced refusal for such negotiations, and a boycott of all

17

go\'ernment councils and officials bodies by Alliance members. Finally, on 7 July 1954, MacGillivray, who was by now the new High Commissioner, laid down a compromise solution which gave an elected majority of six and the right of the elected majority to be con· suited over the appointment of five nominated members. This decision .... '3S interpreted as another victory to the Alliance though, in actual fact, it met, half·way, to only one of Ole Alliance six·point demand. Parti Negara whose demands were similar to the colonial government's initial stand had again appeared to the emerging Malayan electorate to be defending British views,

Hence, by August 1954. when the Bill concerning the introduction of Federal elections was passed; the Alliance had shown its ability to win elections, its willingness to orfer a 'fair deal' to the non·Malays and its staunch determination to obt3in independence as early as POlisible. Parti Negara, on the other hand, became too pro·Malay to be attractive to lhe non-Malays and too much identified with lhe British to win Malay support. These qualities of the respective parties were 10 play an important role in determining their manifestos, their candidates ,md the results or the first Federal elections which were held on 27th July 1955.

The Alliance c3mpaign cenued around the call for 'Merdeka'. (20)

(l8) ":"iqV1l" mu.ru 'Nlion' or 'natio~',

(I9) for a dcfinicion of 'Maby NatioRl!r d, Ralllall\, Com" .. ",oli"n .nd 1M Politic"l ProUH I" MaUry", (K.L.. 1965). fOOlnotc

l

!I9,p.2',

(20}/bid., P. 19 ...



Their manifesto, a booklet entitJed '111e Road to Independence', promised independence within fOllr years. On the question of citizen· ship, the manifesto called for the setting up of a 'Special Independent Commission' to study the situation. The Alliance partners also (which now included the MIC) pledged themsel\'es to safeguard the special position of the Mala)'s and to uphold the position of the ~'Ialay rulers as constitutional heads of their respective states. A very striking feature of the Alliance manifesto was, as Ratnam put it, "the fact that the more controversial issues, such as tJlose pertaining to education and language, re m a i n cd conspic uously vague" (21)

In contrast to the Alliance, Parti Negara's campaign focused upon Malay demands and "practically ignored the cxi~tence of the non-Malay electorate". \:t2J As earl)' as March 1955, their leaders proposed a motion in the Legislative Council making MaJa)' the sole official lanRUage_ In its manifesto it proposed immigration restrictions to avoid the growing "imbalance between the three major races" because "\VC are against an)' attempt at domination by a section of the Chinese community in this country". (U) In his speech over Radio Malaya on July 5, Data Onn explained his immigration res· trictions proposal in the light of the increasing binh rate among the Otinese and Jndian communities and of the Malay desire to "avoid the fate of being made a racial minority in their own coun· try".(24)

In the selection of candidates,

18

AJliance and Negara again displayed their contrasting views. The 1955 e lectorate was highly Malaydominated - in terms of percentage, the Malays constituted 84.2 per cent; Chinese 11.2 per cent; and Indians 4.6 per cent. In terms of constituencies. of the total of 52, the r..lalays were in the majority in fifty constituencies and making up more than 7.r.. per cent in thiny-seven of them. (2~)

Had the Alliance wanted to conlest the elections on strict communal lines, it would have fielded its non-Malay candidates in on ly the two non-Malay dominated constituencies, while fielding Malay cand idates in the o thers. However, UMNO, the strongest partner in the Alliattce, decided to abide by their inter·communaJ policy by allocat ing itself onJy thirty·five seats, with MCA being allocated fifteen seats and MIC t .... ·o. Party Ne6ara. on the other hand, put up thiny c;mdidates of whom twenty·nine were Malay and one Chinese. This racial com position of their candi· dates was a clear indication of Negara's reliance on communal voting.

When the polling results were known, the Alliance won 51 seats with the remaining seat going to the Pan·Malayan Islamic Pany (PMIP) who ddeated on Alliance candidate with a narrow margin of 450 Vales. The Alliance obtained 79.6 per cent of the total votes while Parti Ne~ara

(21) Ibid.

(22) Mtaru.op.eiL. p,UII.

(23)1bid..p..1S9.

(24) Ralrwn.OP. e'L.p. 192.

(2~) Ibid.. pp. 186-7.



obtainerl only 7.6 Rer cent.(26) Data Onn himself faced the humi· liation of obtaining only 22.4 per cent of the votes in his home cons· tituenC)' of Johon: Bahru.127)

The results showed clearly that the electorate voted for a. party which could satisfy their 'national' as well as communal interests. The Alliance won because of their im· pressive record as a mil itant party in demanding a quick Merdeka from the British and as a inter· communal party on other national issues. Equally important, howe\'er, is the fact that the Alliance, through their communal cons· tituent parties, succeedc;d in meeting 1/1e communal demands of the country's three major com· munities.

Parti Negara's defeat. similarly, was due to their failure to satisfy the dual interests of the electorate mentioned above. The party's views on Merdeka were seen as being 'soft' and could easily be identified .... ;th those of the British them· selves. On communal issues, Negara's explicitly pro-Malay stand did not SCl."m to attract the domi-

19

nantly Malay electorate, let alone the non-Malay voters. This poor Malay response to Negara's communal stand was pt"rhaps due to the community's confidence in the ability of UMNO which promised a 'special' position for the MaJays in an early independent Malaya, and a lingering distrust for Dato Onn who had left UMNO to form the noncommunal IMP. An interesting feature III pre·mdependent Malayan politics, then, was the 'double turnabouts' by Data Onn - from being the father of Malay rights in m-fl'JO to attempting to become a noncommunal Malayan statesman in IMP and later returning to the role of a MaJay communalist politician in Pani Negara - while at the same time UMNO itself had moved from possessing a pure·and·simple communal interest to having an intercommunal and national out1on~ through the formation of the Alliance.

(26) Rllrwn,op. cit.. p. 196. (27) Man .. op. rit.,p. 167.

the politics of merdeka - some aspects of communialism in ... file"malayan union" wh ich,...

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