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    Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

    Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic

    Affairs, Volume 36, Number 2, August 2014, pp. 206-231 (Article)

    DOI: 10.1353/csa.2014.0020

    For additional information about this article

    Access provided by Nanyang Technological University (24 Nov 2014 22:40 GMT)

    http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csa/summary/v036/36.2.mohamed-osman.html

    http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csa/summary/v036/36.2.mohamed-osman.htmlhttp://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csa/summary/v036/36.2.mohamed-osman.html
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    206

    Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 20631 DOI: 10.1355/cs36-2b

    2014 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

    Salafi Ulama in UMNO: PoliticalConvergence or Expediency?

    MOHAMED NAWAB MOHAMED OSMAN

    The Salafi ulama (religious scholars) in Malaysia have seen their

    religious and political influence amplified over the last five years.

    Operating within a newly formed organization, the Pertubuhan Ilmuwan

    Malaysia (ILMU) and the newly augmented United Malays National

    Organizations (UMNO) young ulama wing, Salafi scholars play a key

    role in providing Islamic legitimacy to the government and defending

    it against the opposition Islamist party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic

    Party (PAS). The decision by Salafi scholars to support the Malaysian

    government is striking given their hardline views on the implementation

    of Islamic laws and their opposition to democracy. This paper seeksto understand the reasons for the Salafi ulamas support for UMNO.

    It argues that the Salafi ulamas involvement in UMNO is due to

    a convergence of interest between the two groups and as part of a

    strategy by the Salafi ulama to expand their influence at both the

    state and societal levels. The paper examines the religious-political

    positions of the Salafi ulama on issues such as the Islamic state, the

    implementation of Islamic laws and democratic political system, and

    argues that they are opposed to the current state of religious affairs

    and the political structure of the Malaysian state. Nevertheless, the

    ulama are working within UMNO to change the political system. For

    UMNO leaders, the Salafi ulama form an important group that could

    defend the party against religious attacks from PAS and provide the

    party with greater religious credence.

    Keywords: Ulama, UMNO, Salafi, PAS and Islam.

    MOHAMED NAWAB MOHAMED OSMAN is an Assistant Professor andCoordinator of the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies (RSIS), Blk S4, Nanyang Ave, Level B4 NanyangTechnological University, Singapore, 639798; email: [email protected].

    Reproduced from Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs Vol. 36, No. 2 (August

    2014)(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014). This version was obtained electronically direct from the

    publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior

    permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at

    http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/
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    Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency? 207

    The terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in the United States on September 11,2001, and the subsequent arrests of members of its Southeast Asian

    affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), have cast a negative light on theSalafi interpretation of Islam. Salafi ideology was alleged to haveinspired JI members to carry out violent attacks against targets inthe region. In Southeast Asia, Salafi scholars and groups cameto be viewed with trepidation by governments because of theirsupposed ideological links with violent movements such as Laskar

    Jihad and JI.1 In Malaysia, due to Salafis puritan interpretation ofShariah (Islamic laws), and its uncompromising attitude in seeking theimplementation of these laws, it has been categorized as extremist bythe countrys religious bureaucracy. Yet despite the Salafis hardlinestance on religion, the group has made inroads within the government.In fact today a group of younger Salafi ulama form the bulwark ofthe ruling United Malays National Organizations (UMNO) ulamawing (a wing comprising Muslim religious scholars). This seeminglycontradictory position of the state vis--vis the Salafi ulama is thesubject of enquiry of this paper.

    This article argues that the Salafi ulamas involvement inUMNO is due both to a convergence of interest with UMNO andas a strategy to expand its influence at both the state and societallevels. The aim of this paper is threefold. First, to examine the

    beliefs of the Salafis and provide an historical background of theSalafi movement in Malaysia. Second, to identify key religiousscholars with an inclination towards Salafism and examine theirreligious-political thinking and attitudes. In particular their viewson issues such as the implementation of Islamic laws and Islamicgovernance in Malaysia is examined. Third, to analyse the factorsthat have encouraged Salafi ulama to render their support to UMNOand how the Salafi influence in UMNO is likely to affect future

    government policies related to Islam. The research for this paperis based mainly on primary sources including speeches by andinterviews with Salafi ulama scholars.2 This article contributes tothe existing, but limited, scholarship on the contemporary Salafimovement in Malaysia.3

    Understanding Salafism

    In most of Southeast Asia, the term Wahhabi is used interchangeably

    with Salafi. While the two groups are similar in most aspectsof their religious adherence, there are also important differences

    between the two. The Wahhabi orientation can be traced to the

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    208 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

    scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (170392), a fervent readerof Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780855), one of the founders of the

    four schools of jurisprudence that are dominant in Sunni Islam, andTaqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Al-Taimiyyah (12631328), a fourteenth-century scholar known for his strict puritan interpretation ofIslam.4 Al-Wahhab was perhaps best known for his role as theco-founder with Muhammad Ibn Saud (d 1765) of the first Saudistate, and who provided religious legitimacy to Ibn Sauds struggleto form a unitary state on the Arabian Peninsula. In return forhis efforts, he was awarded control over the Saudi religiousestablishment.5Al-Wahhab argued that many Muslims at that time haddeviated from the teachings of their pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih)and adopted practices akin to the period of ignorance (jahiliyyah)which precedes Islam. In his view, these practices such as thereverence of saints practised by Sufis and the doctrines espoused

    by Shiite Islam ran counter to the teachings of Islam. However,Al-Wahhab was less clear about where he stood on theologicalissues. While in theory he was against the tradition of taqlid (blindimitation) of past practices of traditional scholars and advocated theestablishment of ijtihad(open interpretation on religious matters), inpractice he subscribed to the Hanbali School of jurisprudence whichhad a more literal reading of the Quran.6The religious teachings ofAl-Wahhab received political support when Muhammad Ibnu Saud,chief of the prominent Ibn Saud tribe on the Arabian Peninsula, sworea traditional Muslim oath whereby he promised to work together withAl-Wahhab to establish a state run according to Islamic principles.By 1765, when the first Saudi kingdom was established, Al-Wahhabconsolidated his position as the religious guide to the kingdom.The Wahhabis have thus been loyal to the Ibnu Saud led kingdomsince its formation. Outside of the Saudi state, most Wahhabis have

    generally maintained a quietist position on political matters.7Nevertheless, some Wahhabis are privately opposed to the factthat many Muslim governments do not impose strict Islamic lawsin their countries, even though they are unlikely to play an activerole to change this.8

    Salafism can be traced to the 1920s reformist movement (Salafi)started by Sayyid Jamal-al-Din Al-Afghani (183997) and MuhammadAbduh (18491905). Both individuals were highly critical of thepractice of blind imitation of the past and strict adherence to

    one particular school of jurisprudence.9 They viewed the practicesof Sufis with disdain and blamed many of the problems of theMuslim world on religious scholars.10 One of Abduhs students,

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    Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency? 209

    Rashid Rida (18651935) merged reformist religious ideas withanti-colonialism, and was also responsible for transforming Salafism

    into a more conservative movement akin to Wahhabism.

    11

    In thereligious realm, little separates the Salafis from the Wahhabis.However unlike the Wahhabis, who are generally Hanbalite in mattersof jurisprudence, the Salafis reject all schools of jurisprudencearguing instead for individual ijtihad on all matters related tojurisprudence. In the 1960s, Saudi King Faisal gave refuge to manyIslamist figures from the Muslim Brotherhood movement as wellas Muslim reformist scholars after they were forced to flee theircountries following intense repression by Arab nationalist rulers.12The anti-establishment political ideas and cultures brought bypolitical figures such as Muhammad Qutb (a key Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood leader and brother of Sayyid Qutb) and Saeed Hawa(a key Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader) encountered the strictWahhabi Islamic doctrine resulting in some Muslim Brotherhoodleaders and members adopting Wahhabis religious doctrines. Onthe other hand some Wahhabis began to subscribe to more activepolitical positions, as described in the next section of this paper.As a result of this encounter, there was more convergence betweenthe Salafi and Wahhabi Islamic ideologies. This is described by alegalistic interpretation of Islamic law that is inflexible and highlyintolerant of differences as well as a rabid anti-Sufi and anti-Shiiteposition. Those who subscribe to the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology areoften harsh in their criticism of other Muslims, even branding manyof their co-religionists as infidels.13

    Another result of this encounter is the myriad of differentpositions on political engagement that began to emerge amongSalafis. The first is the infamous Salafi-jihadi ideology represented

    by Al-Qaeda. This ideology can be traced to the political position

    advocated by Sayyid Qutb (190666), a key ideologue of the MuslimBrotherhood in Egypt.14Qutb famously promoted the twin concept ofhakimiyyah(Gods sovereignty) andjahiliyyah(idolatrous condition)in which he argued that given the fact that most of the regimesin the Muslim world are in a state of jahiliyyah, it is the dutyof all Muslims to rebel using violence to uphold hakimiyyah.15This ideology has been used to justify rebellions against variousgovernments such as that by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) inEgypt and the terrorist actions of Al-Qaeda. The second political

    position of the Salafis emerged from interactions between the MuslimBrotherhood and Wahhabism. This political position is known asthe al-Sahwa al-Islamiya (Islamic Awakening).16 The advocates

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    of this political position, commonly referred to as the Sahwas,include Saudi preachers Safir Al-Hawali and Salman Al-Ouda.17

    The Sahwas stress the need to attain political power through non-violent means, including election to public office. The El-Nourparty in Egypt is an example of the Sahwa movement. The thirdposition is known as the political quietist Salafism. Much likeWahhabism, these Salafis argue that it is forbidden for Muslimsto participate in civil strife and that obedience to a Muslim ruleris religiously mandated. These Salafis tend to focus their attentionon education and proselytization.18 The leading scholars withinthis school of thought include Nasir Al-Din Al-Albani (191499)

    and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz (191099). In this regard, beingpolitical quietist does not mean that these Salafis are apolitical.In fact, much like the other Salafis, they seek political power inthe long run so as to implement their version of Islamic laws. Ingeneral the politically quietist Salafis are also supportive of theSaudi regime.

    It must be added that the boundaries between the three politicalpositions are porous and that Salafis can move easily from onegroup to another. This could be seen from the example of the

    GIA which began as a Salafi-jihadi group but became quietist aftersigning a peace agreement with the Egyptian government in 2003and quickly moved to form a political party following the collapseof the Hosni Mubarak regime in 2011. Similarly the Salafi movementin Indonesia, Laskar Jihad led by the preacher Jaafar Umar Thalib,was a politically quietist movement that quickly transformeditself into a Salafi-jihadist movement following the collapse of theSoeharto government in 1998.19While the two doctrines have somedifferences, as noted earlier, for the purposes of this paper, the

    term Salafi will be used since both Wahhabis and Salafis describethemselves as Salafis.

    Salafism in Malaysia

    Salafism first arrived in the Malay states in the 1920s. SeveralMalay students studying in Cairo were influenced by the ideas ofAl-Afghani and Abduh.20 Upon returning to the Malay states, they

    began propagating these ideas. The most important figure within

    this group was Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin (18691956). He was anavid reader of the Al-Manar journal published by Rida and waspersonally acquainted with him. He published a journal called

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    Al-Imam, together with several reformist figures such as SayyidSheikh Al-Hady (18671934), which discussed issues of religiousreform within the Malay world.21 This reformist group, knowncollectively as the Kaum Muda, was opposed to many Sufi ritualswithin the Malay world which they perceived as contrary toIslamic teachings. They also advocated for the introduction ofmodern subjects into the education system and the emancipation ofwomen in Malay society.22 Several Kaum Muda figures also playedimportant roles within the religiousbureaucracies in several Malaystates. For instance, Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin took up the positionof Mufti of Perak and Haji Abbas Taha was a kadi (Islamic judge)in Singapore.23Their involvement in state religious institutions wasin line with their attempts to change the system. The Kaum Mudawas opposed by both traditional leaders and religious scholars(known as the Kaum Tua) who viewed them as political andreligious threats.24

    The Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua conflict dominated much of thereligious discourses in the early twentieth century. By the mid-twentieth century, however, the discussions and debates had dissipatedand the Kaum Muda had failed in their attempt to challenge theauthority of the Kaum Tua. However, over the long term, the KaumMudas impact on Malay society was felt in both the religious andpolitical spheres. The Kaum Muda was successful in propagatingtheir ideas in Perlis. The most important figure who promoted theKaum Muda/Salafi ideas in Perlis was Haji Ahmad Muhammad, aMecca educated religious scholar who was also Chairman of theCouncil for Islamic Religious Affairs and Malay Customs in thestate.25Haji Ahmad was active in promoting the ideas of the Salafis

    by translating and publishing various books, treatises and journalsdiscussing Salafi ideas. In the same vein, Haji Ahmad curtailed the

    ideas of the Kaum Tua forcing several pondoks (Islamic boardingschools) in Perlis to be closed. Several bureaucrats, such as WanAhmad Wan Daud who was personal secretary to Perlis Raja (king),and UMNO politicians such as Sheikh Ahmad Md Hashim, whowas appointed Chief Minister of Perlis in 1959, were instrumentalin the institutionalization of the Salafi thought within the stateconstitution. Unlike other states in Malaysia that listed the Shafiemazhab as the official school of jurisprudence, the constitution ofPerlis asserts that there is to be no official school of jurisprudence

    that the state subscribes to.26 This early influence on the statelegislature has made Salafism the mainstream religious orientationin Perlis.

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    The second wave of Salafism arrived in the 1980s when anew breed of Malay religious scholars educated in Saudi Arabia

    returned to Malaysia. As part of its attempt to limit the influenceof Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Saudi Arabia beganto exert its influence in the Muslim world. A key strategy used

    by the Saudis was to offer scholarships and financial assistanceto Muslim students from around the world to study at Islamicuniversities which were dominated by Salafi scholars. Most ofthe scholars these students were exposed to were of the quietistvariant such as Albani, Muhammad Ibn Al-Uthaymeen (19252001)and Saleh Al-Fawzan (b. 1933).27 Beyond these Salafi scholars,many scholars from the Muslim Brotherhood were also presentin Saudi Arabia. As mentioned earlier, these scholars includedMuhammad Qutb and Said Hawwa. As such, a segment ofMalaysian students became more oriented towards the MuslimBrotherhood rather than the Salafis. A case in point is thecurrent president of PAS, Hadi Awang who was strongly influenced

    by Saeed Hawwa (193589) and was part of his personal usrah(study group).28 By the 1980s, these Saudi-trained Malaysianstudents had returned to Malaysia and began propagating theirideas.29

    Two main groups emerged from the Saudi alumni. The MuslimBrotherhood-oriented group joined PAS and began campaigning forthe establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia.30 The puritanSalafi-oriented group focused on teaching and preaching theirdoctrine. Due to the influence of the quietist Saudi Salafi scholars,these individuals stayed clear of politics. Among these Salafischolars were Dr Sulaiman Nordin who taught at the NationalUniversity of Malaysia, and Dr Abdullah Yassin who became afreelance preacher. Traditionally, all the Muftis of Perlis were of

    Salafi orientation. This is true for former Muftis such as Mat JahayaHussin and the current Mufti, Juanda Jaya.

    In 2010, several younger Salafi ulama formed Pertubuhan IlmuwanMalaysia (Association of Malaysian Scholars, ILMU), an organizationwith the aim of upholding Islam and freeing Islamic teachings inMalaysia from deviant practices. The organization comprised bothmore senior Salafi scholars such as Sulaiman Noordin and RasulDahri as well as younger Salafi such as Fathul Bari Mat Jahaya,Fadhlan Osman and Ahmad Fauzan Yahya. Several of these ulama

    were also members of UMNO.31 ILMU has focused on organizingIslamic classes and seminars as well as online engagements wherethey preach Salafi Islam and criticize other variants of Islam

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    including Sufism and Shiism. The organization is also implicitlypolitical and has used its various platforms to defend government

    policies and actions while criticizing any Islamic groups or partiesopposed to the government.

    Salafism and the Malaysian State

    The Malaysian government has attempted to impose a standardform of homogeneous Islam in the country.32 In pursuit of thisgoal, the governments religious bureaucracy, the Department ofIslamic Development (Jabatan Kemajuaan Islam Malaysia, JAKIM),has issued fatwas(religious edicts) and statements declaring variousIslamic sects to be deviant.33 However, the federal nature of theMalaysian state, and the fact that matters pertaining to religionare under the purview of the Malay rulers, makes it difficult forthe Malaysian government to achieve this homogeneity. In thecase of the Salafis, several discussions were held to address theproblems in the teachings of this sect.34 While Malaysias highestreligious authority, the National Fatwa Council of Malaysia, did notgazette the Wahhabis as a deviant sect, it has issued five differentstatements in 1985, 1986, 1996, 1997 and 2003 declaringWahhabism as a sect that must be curtailed due to its divisivenature.35In line with this position, several books by leading Wahhabischolars have been banned in Malaysia. For example, in 2003the Islamic Religious Councils of the state of Penang and NegeriSembilan banned several works by Rasul Dahri.36 In 2009, Salafisencountered another setback when a number of Salafi scholars,including Fathul Bari Mat Jahaya and Dr Azwira Abdul Aziz, were

    banned from preaching in several states because they did not possessthe necessary documentations to do so.37

    The anti-Wahhabi/Salafi orientation of religious bureaucraciesin Malaysia can be attributed to several factors. First, many of thereligious scholars working in Malaysias religious bureaucraciesare traditionalist in their orientation, and hence have no sympathyfor Salafism which questions many aspects of their beliefs. 38Second, most of Malaysias royal families continue to adhereto traditional Islam. For instance, members of the royal familyin the state of Perak are adherents of the Naqshabandi-HaqqaniSufi brotherhood.39 The Sufi brotherhood is known for its

    avowedly anti-Wahhabi stance, and sources within the brotherhoodin Malaysia note that members of the royal family haveinitiated measures to limit the influence of the Salafis in Perak.40

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    Third, the Salafis do not enjoy much political patronage due totheir lack of connections to key politicians or religious bureaucrats.41

    Such patronage is crucial for the survival of minority sects inMalaysia.

    The UMNO-Salafi Religious Nexus

    The anti-Wahhabi/Salafi sentiment within the Malaysian religiousestablishment has not prevented these scholars from being co-opted toform the young ulama wing within the party in June 2010. Sourceswithin UMNO report that the inclusion of the Salafi ulama wasproposed by several UMNO politicians such as Shahidan Kassim,former Chief Minister of Perlis and Reezal Marican, a key memberof the youth wing of UMNO.42 Shahidan Kassim, himself a Salafi,had proposed the inclusion of the Salafi ulama as an attempt to

    buttress UMNOs Islamic image. It was also argued that many ofthe ulama in PAS are of traditionalist (subscribing to the Shafiemazhab) or Sufi orientations. Hence, having a group of Salafisto counter their religious views can be beneficial to UMNO as itenhances the partys Islamic credentials and improves its credibilitywith Malaysian Muslim voters. Salafi ulama can also use religious

    based arguments to discredit PAS and its leaders. Likewise, Reezaland Khairy Jamaluddin, head of the youth wing of UMNO, werereported to be in favour of these ulama joining UMNO to bolster thepartys Islamic image.43 However, this position was not necessarilysupported by all UMNO members and leaders. Nakhaie Ahmad,one of the most senior ulama in UMNO, has been a strong criticof the Salafi ulama.44 Nevertheless, the UMNO leadership stillagreed to grant membership status to the Salafi ulama. In June2010, several Salafi ulama submitted their membership forms to

    the President of UMNO, Prime Minister Najib Razak, in a highlypublicized event attended by several UMNO leaders such asShahidan Kassim.45

    The Salafi ulama were led by Dr Fadlan Othman, a lecturer atthe Islamic studies faculty in the National University of Malaysia.Other prominent Salafi ulama including Ustaz Fathul Bari Mat Jahayaand Ahmad Fauzan Yahya were part of the group. Dr Mohd AsriZainul Abidin, a former mufti of Perlis and perceived by many as aSalafi was conspicuously absent despite earlier reports suggesting

    that he had joined UMNO. Shortly after the event, several of the40 ulama, including religious scholar, Mohd Hosni Mubarak,claimed that they had been misled into attending the event which

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    was misrepresented as simply a meeting with Prime MinisterNajib.46 This tarnished the image of the Salafi ulama as many in

    the opposition circles started questioning whether 40 ulama hadjoined the party. The Salafi ulama themselves did not attempt toaddress this allegation, which further strengthened the claim made

    by Mohd Hosni that the number of those who actually joined UMNOwas substantially smaller. As highlighted earlier, some members ofthis group also formed ILMU with the aim of striving for Islamin line with the Quran and the Ways of Prophet Muhammad.47The advisory committee of ILMU comprised a total of ten scholarsincluding several older scholars such as Sulaiman Noordin andAzwira Aziz. It should be noted that a number of prominentMalaysian Salafi scholars such as Asri Sobri disagreed with thestance taken by fellow Salafi scholars and felt that involving oneselfin a democratic system and joining a party whose ideology isnationalism transgresses Islamic teachings.48In terms of its activities,scholars from ILMU conduct religious classes for UMNO membersand in the wider Malay-Muslim community, make regular mediaappearances and have published numerous books on religious andpolitical issues.

    Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Religious and Political Positions

    In line with the position of the quietist Salafis, such as Albaniand Sheikh Rabee al-Madkhali (a prominent Saudi Salafi scholar),scholars in ILMU support the government of the day.49 However,support for the government does not mean that ILMU membersagree with every aspect of the current political, legal and economicsystem. A closer examination of their views on issues such as thepromulgation of an Islamic state, the implementation of Islamiccriminal law and the concept of democracy highlight disagreementswith the current Malaysian political system.

    Malaysia as an Islamic State

    ILMU scholars have argued that Malaysia is an Islamic state. Indoing so, their benchmark is whether the Islamic prayer call can

    be heard and whether political power is in the hands of Muslims.By using this yardstick, Fadlan Othman argued that Malaysia is an

    Islamic state.50 Other Salafi ulamas such as Fathul Bari are morecircumspect in their assessment of Malaysias Islamic credentials.He stressed that there are weaknesses in the implementation of

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    Islam within Malaysia. Nevertheless, such weaknesses can berectified if the ulama work with the government to further enhance

    the role of Islam in the political system. These Salafi ulama areresolute in their defence of a Muslim-led government to remain inpower in Malaysia. Citing Prophet Muhammad, who said that it isun-Islamic for a Muslim community to be led by more than oneleader, Fathul Bari argued that Muslims in Malaysia cannot opposethe government since the current Prime Minister, Najib Razak, isa Muslim. Any act of opposition to his leadership must thus beviewed as un-Islamic.51 Echoing Fathul Baris position, Rasul Dahriespoused that any attempt to challenge a Muslim ruler is treason.

    He stressed that during the leadership of the second Caliph ofIslam, Umar Ibn Khattab, any opposition to the state was viewedas an act of treason punishable by death.52 This underscored theseverity of any opposition to the Malaysian government.

    Islamic Criminal Laws

    A key criticism that has been leveled at the Salafi ulama overtheir support for UMNO is the latters purported rejection of theIslamic criminal law.53 ILMU ulama have made it clear that they

    view Islamic criminal laws as being an integral part of Islamand therefore must be implemented.54 However, these ulama feltthat it was more essential for the government to ensure that coreIslamic beliefs and principles take root within Malaysian society.The chairman of ILMU, Fadlan Othman, believes that it is morepertinent for Malaysia to take action against certain Islamic sectsthat are considered deviant.55Fadlan stressed that even if the justicesystem is Islamic, it will do little good to society if Muslims donot subscribe to the core beliefs of Islam.

    In 2012, the Salafi ulama made their stand clear on the hududissue.56 They wrote that the group supported the implementationof hudud and that it is an integral part of Islamic law.57 Theywere forced to issue a statement after the then President of theMalaysian Chinese Association (MCA) stated his opposition to theimplementation of hudud in Malaysia.58 Fathul Bari remarked thatthe implementation of Islamic criminal laws comprising hudud,taazir and qisas is an obligation for all Muslims.59 However, he

    requested a meeting with the President of the MCA, Chua Soi Lek, toclarify the latters remark. Following the meeting, Chua backtrackedfrom his statement explaining that he was opposed to the PAS

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    version of the hudud rather than hudud itself.60 Chua himself hadremained vague about how PAS hudud differs from the hudud as

    supposedly explained in traditional Islamic sources. Fathul Barihimself concurred with the statement noting that many aspects ofPAS hudud run contrary to Islamic teachings. In sum, it is clearthat the religious scholars in ILMU support the implementationof Islamic criminal laws and their differences with PAS are overtechnical issues.61

    Democracy: An Un-Islamic System

    The ILMU ulamas attitude towards democracy is an important

    corollary of its relations to the Saudi Salafi scholars. Salafi scholarssuch as Al-Albani and Bin Baz have explicitly rejected democracy

    because it challenges the Oneness of God.62 Al-Albani had evenprohibited his followers from voting or participating in elections.The fact that Salafi scholars in Malaysia use Al-Albani as a referencepoint begs the question of how they can justify their support forUMNO.63 The view of Rasul Dahri on this matter can shed somelight on this seemingly contradictory position. He declared thatdemocracy is an un-Islamic system that does not emanate from

    Islam.64 For him, ultimate sovereignty lies in Gods hands and notin the hands of the people, a core concept of democracy. Rasuladded that democracy is a system created by the Jews to divideMuslims. Within the democratic system, there must always bea group that governs and another group that opposes which inessence will result in the division of Muslims.65 However, in theMalaysian context, Rasul Dahri argued that the democratic systemensures that the government remains in the hands of Muslims. Heargued that to strengthen the position of the Muslim community,

    Muslims in Malaysia must vote for UMNO.66 This is to ensurethat political power is not divided within the Muslim communityresulting in non-Muslims usurping power.67 In essence, Rasul Dahriviews democracy as an un-Islamic concept but noted that democracycan be utilized to protect Malay political dominance. During apublic seminar, Fathul Bari was questioned about his involvementwith UMNO. While he admitted that democracy is not an Islamicconcept, he justified his association with UMNO by arguing thatit is a necessary evil to change the system from within and that

    ultimately he is working for an Islamic system to be implemented.68

    The views of Salafi scholars reveal that there is an attempt ontheir part to change the system from within. While most Salafis

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    agreed that the process of voting in an election is un-Islamic, it isessential in the struggle to establish an Islamic system in Malaysia.

    The Salafi Ulama and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)

    The Salafi ulama in UMNO have been emphatic in their opposition toPAS. Prior to understanding their opposition to PAS, it is importantfirst to understand PAS position towards Salafis. Many PAS membersare from the northern Malay states where traditional Sufism remainspredominant.69 Nonetheless, there are many PAS members whowere influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood as well as those whoare Shiites and a smaller number from Salafi backgrounds. TheseSalafis are, however, of the Sahwa orientation described earlier.70PAS itself has taken a non-denominational approach towards itsmembership. This view is best encapsulated by Hadi Awang, thePresident of PAS who is opposed to Salafi teachings due to theirdivisive nature but still considers Salafis to be part of mainstreamIslam. This view is not shared by all of PAS leaders. Dr HarunDin, the deputy spiritual leader of PAS, holds avowedly anti-Salafiviews and has labelled its teachings extreme and deviant.71

    It is thus of little surprise that the Salafis are opposed to PASreligious position. In their criticism of PAS, ILMU members condemnseveral of the partys key positions. First, PAS has been criticizedfor supposedly allowing Shiites to be members of the party. Thedeputy president of PAS, Mohamed Sabu, is often as accused bythe Salafis as being Shiite. Hence, PAS is deemed to accept Shiiteswho are considered by Salafis as deviant.72 Second, ILMU ulamadeem PAS leaders with Sufi orientation as deviants who have ceasedto be Muslims and therefore must be opposed. Most importantly,PAS interpretations of Islamic law are viewed as flawed, as it

    is heavily influenced by both Sufi and Shiite doctrines. Third,PAS has been denounced for dividing the Muslim community byopposing the government of the day which is comprised mainlyof Muslims. By opposing UMNO, PAS leaders are believed to becommitting treason against a Muslim government and thereforemust be countered.

    Understanding the Salafi-UMNO Nexus

    The decision by the Salafis and UMNO leaders to cooperate isdriven by political expediency on both sides. For UMNO, there arethree main reasons to explain its collaboration with Salafis. First,

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    the formation of an ulama wing within the party comprising young,well-educated and sophisticated religious scholars has buttressed its

    religious standing with many Malaysian Muslims. This is especiallycrucial in its attempt to limit the onslaught by PAS against thepartys ethno-nationalist ideology.73 Second, the Salafi ulama playan important role in using religiously driven arguments againstPAS Islamic positions ranging from the emotive hudud issue tothe religious credibility of PAS leaders. For years, UMNO wasdependent on scholars within the governments religious bureaucracyto defend the governments Islamic positions from PAS. Due totheir civil service status, and thus beholden to the government,

    these scholars lacked credibility. Therefore the ILMU ulama filla void within UMNO. ILMU scholars have played this role withaplomb. They follow every action and statement made by PAS andpresent a strong counter-argument. After the 2011 Ijtima Tarbawi(Religious Discourse Conference) organized by PAS Youth,which featured several speakers from HAMAS and the MuslimBrotherhood, ILMU members released a series of five videos onYoutube admonishing the Muslim Brotherhood as an un-Islamicmovement inspired by the Freemasons.74 Such a move is clearly

    aimed at attacking PAS for working with an organization that seeksto destroy Islam. Third, UMNO could now engage PAS at anequal level without feeling inferior. In 2012, a debate was held

    between Nasruddin Tantawi, the then PAS Youth chief and FathulBari, a key leader of ILMU to discuss the issue of the Islamic statein Malaysia in which both individuals were equally knowledgeableon religious issues.75 This attempt to posit an Islamic image is inline with UMNOs quest to gain legitimacy, popularity and electoralsupport among Malay voters. This move is even more important

    following the disastrous performance by the National Front coalition(Barisan Nasional, BN) in the 2008 and 2013 elections. In thepost-2013 political context, Malay votes are now key to UMNOssurvivability at the polls.

    For the Salafis, the move is aimed not only at protectingtheir precarious position by seeking political patronage but is alsomotivated by a drive to supplant its version of Islam at the officiallevel. As highlighted earlier in this paper, the religious bureaucracyin Malaysia has issued several edicts calling for Salafi teachings to

    be curbed. Nevertheless, even their involvement in UMNO did notsafeguard them from persecution. Several ILMU leaders includingFathul Bari, Azwira Abdul Aziz, Sulaiman Noordin and Fadlan

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    220 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

    Othman were banned from teaching in the state of Selangor by thestate religious department because they lacked proper accreditation.

    Nevertheless, it is clear that the influence of the ulama hasincreased significantly within UMNO and the Malaysian state. Inthe 2013 election, Fathul Bari was fielded as UMNOs candidatein the state seat of Sanglang in Perlis. While he lost by a verysmall margin of 121 votes, his performance was laudable especiallygiven that the seat was considered a PAS stronghold. In the sameyear, Fathul Bari garnered the most number of votes in the contestfor the UMNO Youth executive council, attesting to his growinginfluence within the party.76

    ILMU ulama have also been invited to address UMNO gatheringsthroughout the country. They are also featured regularly in theprint media and on television on religious and political issues.Rasul Dahri, long banned from Malaysian television for his extremeviews, was recently allowed to speak on a television programme.77At the religious policy level, recent decisions made by the rulingparty to curb Shiite teachings could be attributed to lobbying byILMU leaders to proscribe the sect. Sources within UMNO reportthat ILMU ulama are actively lobbying for several Sufi brotherhoodsto be banned in Malaysia.78 Most importantly, ILMU ulama haveconvinced some UMNO leaders to give Islam more focus within thenational political landscape. Interestingly, awareness about hududand other aspects of Islamic law long associated with PAS agendahas increased significantly within UMNO partly due to lecturedelivered by ILMU. The 2013 UMNO General Assembly meetingsaw Prime Minister Najib demonstrate a new commitment to Islamincluding the announcement that the strengthening of Islam would

    be one of the five areas of focus for UMNO.79 It is unsurprising,therefore, that ILMU ulama has become more dominant in nationalpolitics and religious affairs.

    Defending the Sovereignty of Islam

    ILMU ulama have taken a hardline stance in dealing with severalissues affecting the country. Two key issues that ILMU focusedon were the Bersih rallies and the Allah controversy. The JointAction Committee for Electoral Reform better known by itsacronym Bersih (Clean) was formed in 2005 with the objective of

    achieving free and fair elections. In 2007, Bersih organized its firstdemonstration. In 2010, Bersih was re-launched as a civil societymovement, Bersih 2.0, and attempted to distance the movement

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    from partisan interests. It was also announced that a second protestwould be organized under the leadership of former President of

    the Malaysian Bar Council, Ambiga Sreenevasan.

    80

    The Malaysiangovernment outlawed Bersih 2.0 on the grounds that the movementposed a security threat. Regardless of the ban, the protest wentahead as planned and an estimated 20,000 people attended.

    Prior to the second protest, ulama from ILMU held a seriesof talks and posted videos online to discourage Muslims fromparticipating in Bersih 2.0. In dealing with the Bersih rallies, ILMUargued that demonstrations were not in line with Islamic teachingseven if they were aimed at correcting unjust government policies.Citing Prophet Muhammad, Fadlan Othman explained that Islamhas prescribed proper ways of correcting the government.81 Forinstance, he noted that the government must be corrected behindclosed doors. Additionally, he postulated that the Bersih ralliescaused disturbances, inconvenienced others and caused divisionsamong Muslims, and therefore contravened Islamic teachings.Fathul Bari argued that it is indeed un-Islamic for Muslims toinvolve themselves in the rallies due to the fact that the leaderof Bersih is a non-Muslim woman and Islam has stipulated clearlythat leadership must be in the hands of Muslim men. ILMUsposition on the Bersih showed clearly how the Malaysian authoritiesseek to justify their repression of civil rights using Islamicrationalization.82At the same time, they validate tough actions taken

    by the authorities against the demonstrators as necessary and inline with the need to defend the Muslim community. In essence,an oppositional act which was essentially secular was Islamizedand aimed at blunting criticism from the opposition.

    ILMU has also taken a strong stance on the issue of apostasy.This highly emotive issue first surfaced in 1999 when Lina Joy,

    a Malay-Muslim woman, decided to convert to Christianity andapplied to the Malaysian courts to have her conversion legallyrecognized.83 In 2007 the Malaysian High Court finally decided thatonly the Shariah court could legally recognize her right to leaveIslam. In 2012, Nurul Izzah, a key opposition leader, noted thatIslam does not forcefully impose its teachings on Muslims after shewas asked whether freedom of religion also applies to Malays.84 Incommenting on this statement, Fathul Bari explained that Islamprotects the rights of non-Muslims and forbids forced conversion to

    Islam. Nonetheless, he opined that there is no freedom of religionfor a person who is Muslim. In fact, he stated that under Islamiclaw, the punishment for apostasy is death which he believed should

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    222 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

    be implemented in Malaysia.85 Therefore, ILMU believes that theMalaysian government has taken the right stance in dealing with

    the Lina Joy case and that Muslim apostates in future should besubjected to the death penalty.An equally important issue that ILMU has been actively

    exploiting is the usage of the word Allah in Malay translations ofthe Bible. The ILMU ulama stated their explicit rejection of suchpractice in Malaysia. While acknowledging that the word has beenused in the Arabic bible for years in the Middle East, AhmadFauzan, a member of ILMU argued that the word has never beenused in the Malay Bible. Ahmad Fauzan then explained that it

    is an act of disrespect against Muslims in Malaysia for the wordAllah to describe God within the context of the Christian belief oftrinity. In a bizarre analysis of the issue, Fadlan Othman arguedthat the dispute was brought up by the Malaysian opposition,and in particular by the Democratic Action Party (DAP), to createChristianophobia among Muslims with the ultimate aim of drivinga wedge between Muslims and Christians.86 Fathul Bari used thisissue to attack PAS for failing to defend the position of Islam andplaying second fiddle to the DAP and Peoples Justice Party (Parti

    Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) which are both trying to promote pluralismof religion.87

    An analysis of the position forwarded by the ILMU ulama onthe issues cited above indicates the symbiotic relationship betweenthe ulama and the Malaysian government. Contentious issues aredealt with from an Islamic standpoint and hence enhancing theIslamic credentials of the Malaysian government. This is especiallyuseful in countering the ideas of PAS. On the part of the ulama,they are able to gain a national platform to promote their ideology

    and indirectly push the government for a stricter implementationof Islamic laws.

    Malaysia: A Future Salafi State?

    The increasing influence of the Salafi ulama has raised the questionof whether Malaysia will adopt Salafi Islam as a state ideology. Theco-options of the various Islamist parties by Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistanand the National Islamic Front (Muslim Brotherhood) by Jaafar

    al-Numeiri in Sudan have seen an intensification of the Islamizationprocess in those two countries.88 In Pakistan, the ulama from theDeobandi Jamaat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) have infiltrated the political

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    Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency? 223

    system and contributed to the radicalization of Pakistani society.89Dr Mahathir Mohameds Islamization drive in the 1980s and 1990s

    has also resulted in growing religious conservatism within Malaysiansociety.90 As such, it is pertinent to consider what the likely impactof Salafi ulama will have on the Malaysian state and society in thelong run.

    Already, the ulamas influence is beginning to be felt, forexample in the way the Malaysian state has dealt with ShiiteMuslims.91 However, in the long-term the influence of the Salafiulama is likely to be restricted for the following reasons. First, theMalaysian government is not dependent only on the Salafi ulama for

    its religious legitimacy. The mammoth national religious bureaucracycreated by Mahathir continues to be utilized by UMNO to legitimizemany of its policies. The ulama in the bureaucracy are generallyof the traditional orientation. Second, Malaysias Constitution statesclearly that Islamic affairs are the purview of the Malay rulers.Hence, UMNO politicians have little influence over the appointmentof key office holder in important institutions such as the NationalFatwa Council, the countrys highest Islamic legislative body.Among the current members of the council, only one, Dr Juanda

    Jaya, the Mufti of Perlis, could be described as Salafi. The rest ofthe Council members religious views are more traditional. At thelevel of the state religious bureaucracy, many key appointmentsare also made by Malay rulers. Once again many of thoseappointed are from traditional backgrounds and opposed to theSalafi orientation. A case in point is the state of Perak where theMufti issued an edict making it illegal for Salafi teachings to bepropagated.92This edict was supported by the Sultan of Perak. Third, itis highly unlikely that UMNO will allow ILMU to grow significantly.

    With the exception of Fathul Bari, none of the other ulama inILMU have been appointed to key positions within UMNO or thegovernment. Sources within UMNO report that they were aware ofthe possible problems that could arise from the Salafis legalisticinterpretation of Islam.93 ILMU will be utilized as an importantcounter to PAS, but will not be allowed to wield too much power orinfluence. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the nexus betweenUMNO and Salafi ulama will result in the Salafis gaining a largeraudience due to the public platforms that UMNO has created for

    the group. Therefore in the long run, Salafi religious ideas mightbecome more popular in UMNO and the larger Muslim communityin Malaysia.

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    224 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

    Conclusion

    The paper has examined the factors that have motivated Salafi

    ulama to collaborate with UMNO. The Salafi movement arrivedin Malaysia through students studying in the Middle East. They

    brought back the ideas of the Salafiyyah proponents such asAfghani and Abduh. However, it was the second wave of Salafiideas influenced by the Saudi Salafi scholars such as Albani andBin Baz that have become dominant in Malaysia. This Salafi strandis of the politically quietist form and is focused on spreading theSalafi doctrine through education.

    It was in the late 2000s that the Salafis began to organize

    themselves politically in order to fill a religious void withinUMNO. This move was spurred by various political and religiousconsiderations including to shield themselves from attacks by thetraditionalists within the governments religious bureaucracy andto spread their religious doctrine. This decision might seem awkwardgiven that the Salafi ulama reject democracy, views the Malaysianstate as insufficiently Islamic and considers it obligatory for Malaysiato implement Islamic criminal laws. However, the decision to joinUMNO has also allowed the Salafi ulama to play a key role in

    shaping policies on Islam in the country such as institutionalizinglaws against the Shiites and Sufis as well as creating awarenessof the need to implement rigid Islamic laws within the state.Fathul Bari has successfully positioned himself as a key memberof UMNO Youth and has extended his influence in the country.On the part of UMNO, the Salafis ulama political involvement isin line with the partys attempt to enhance its Islamic credentialsand present itself as the bastion of true Islam in Malaysia especiallyin light of the political gains made by PAS. The Salafi ulama haveplayed important roles in defending the governments position ona range of different issues including in opposing anti-governmentdemonstrations, curbing the rights of Muslims to leave Islam andencouraging the Muslim populace to vote for UMNO by invokingreligious justifications. Regardless of the ulamas role in influencingpolicies, the influence of these Salafi ulama is unlikely to increasewithin UMNO and Malaysian society as a whole and it is unlikelythat it will define religious discourse within the country due to the

    presence of other religious forces within the government.The Salafi ulama in UMNO serves as another case studywhich attests to the fluidity in which the Salafi movement can

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    move: from being politically quietist to politically active. This ispart of a worldwide trend which has seen Salafi movements in

    Egypt, Libya, Syria and the Gulf states becoming politically activethrough the formation of political parties and organizations. Inother parts of Southeast Asia, the Salafi movements are becomingmore active politically. In Indonesia, the Salafis have activelyopposed presidential candidate Joko Widodo who is deemed to besympathetic to religious minorities in the country. They have alsoescalated their efforts to denigrate minority religious communitieslike the Shiites and Ahmadiyahs. In Singapore, Salafi scholars havestarted an online campaign against Shiism and Sufism. More recently,

    they launched a campaign against the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual andTransgender (LGBT) community. The increasing politization of theSalafi movement is likely to continue within the next few years. Inthe Malaysian case, the political prospects of the Salafi ulama arelikely to fizzle in the long run given that there are numerous forcesin UMNO and the government that are opposed to them. The samecannot be said about the Salafi movement in other contexts whichseems to be growing in influence and gaining political momentum.This is likely to change religious and political expressions in the

    Muslim World.

    NOTES

    1 For more on Salafism in Indonesia, see Noorhaidi Hassan, Laskar Jihad Islam,

    Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia (New York:Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2010). For Salafism in Thailand seeRajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, Islam in Modern Thailand: Faith, Philanthropy

    and Politics (London: Routledge, 2014).

    2

    Three interviews were conducted with the Salafi ulama in Kuala Lumpur inAugust 2011. Interviews were also conducted with several leaders of UMNOand PAS between August 2012 and April 2014.

    3 For a sample of works on Islamism in Malaysia, see Joseph Liow, Piety andPolitics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2010); Farish Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS: 19512003 (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological

    Research Institute, 2004); and Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics of Islamin Contemporary Malaysia (Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti KebangsaanMalaysia, 2002).

    4

    One of the most comprehensive studies of the Wahhabi movement is NatanaDelong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Londonand New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007).

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    226 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

    5 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London and NewYork: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 10.

    6 Stephane Lacroix, Between Revolution and Apoliticalism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani

    and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism, in Global Salafism:Islams New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer (London: Hurst & Co.,2009), p. 60.

    7 Political quietism is a belief that Muslims should withdraw from politics toavoid anarchy or conflict. It stems from the argument put forth by classicalMuslim scholars such as Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (105811), arenowned theologian who argued tyranny is preferred to anarchy. Abd Al-Azizal-Fahad, From Exclusivism to Accomodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution ofWahhabism, New York University Law Review 79, no. 2 (May 2004): 485514.

    8 Exceptions are the Taliban in Afghanistan and more recently Boko Haram in

    Nigeria.9 Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious

    Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (Berkeley, California: University ofCalifornia Press, 1968), pp. 67.

    10 For a study of Abduhs ideas see Yvonne Haddad, Muhammad Abduh, inPioneers of Islamic Revival, edited by Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books, 1994),pp. 3064.

    11 Bernard Haykel, On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, in GlobalSalafism: Islams New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer (London:Hurst & Co., 2009), p. 46.

    12 Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: Belnapp, 2003),pp. 7090.

    13 Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a NewGeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 5.

    14 Lacroix, Between Revolution and Apoliticalism, op. cit., p. 48. For a critiqueof the Salafi-jihadi ideology, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in Gods Name:Islamic Law, Authority, and Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

    15 Adnan A. Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundationsof Radical Islamism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2005), p. 220.

    16 One of the most important works on the Sahwa movement is Stephane Lacroix,Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary SaudiArabia (Harvard, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).

    17 Al-Hawali and Al-Ouda were both influenced by the ideas of the MuslimBrotherhood during their student days. Al-Hawali wrote his doctorate thesisunder the supervision of Muslim Brotherhood leader, Muhammad Qutb.They formed a political opposition group, the Committee for the Defence ofLegitimate Rights (CDLR) in 1993. This is the first Saudi Salafi opposition groupin the kingdom accusing the government leaders and Saudi religious clergyof not doing enough to protect and accord rights to Muslims. The CDLR aregenerally opposed to the Salafi-jihadi strand of Salafism criticizing terrorism as

    an un-Islamic form of political action.18 Stephane Lacroix, Al-Albanis Revolutionary Approach to Hadith, ISIM Review

    21 (Spring 2008): 67.

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    19 Hassan, Laskar Jihad, op. cit., p. 108.

    20 Hafiz Zakariya, From Cairo to the Straits Settlements: Modern SalafiyyahReformist Ideas in Malay Peninsula, Intellectual Discourse 15, issue 2 (2007):

    131.21 One of the most important works discussing the Kaum Muda movement is

    William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: Universityof Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 5690. For more on the Al-Imam, see Abu BakarHamzah, Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society, 19051908(Kuala Lumpur: PustakaAntara, 1991).

    22 Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concept of Democracy and Community19451950 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 14.

    23 Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism, op. cit., p. 75.

    24 Ibid., p. 78.

    25 Abdullah H., Abdul Rahman, Gerakan Islah di Perlis - Sejarah dan Pemikiran[Islah Movement in Perlis- History and Thoughts] (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasadan Pustaka, 1989).

    26 Abdul Rahman Abdullah, Pemikiran Islam di Malaysia: Sejarah dan Aliran[Islamic Thought in Malaysia: History and Orientation] (Kuala Lumpur: DewanPustaka dan Budaya, 1991), p. 260.

    27 Mohammad Redzuan Othman and Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak, The Malays in theMiddle East (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2000).

    28 Hawwa was a key leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria who was forced

    to leave the country following state repression of the Brotherhood. He fled toJordan and Syria upon his release from prison in 1978. Author interview withHadi Awang, Kampung Rusila, Terengganu, 12 January 2006.

    29 For the impact of overseas students on the resurgence of Islam in Malaysia, seeZainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students(Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1987) and Chandra Muzffar,Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1987).

    30 For Malay politics prior to the Islamic resurgence in the 1980s, see JohnFunston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays NationalOrganisation and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books,1980).

    31 Author interview with Dr Fadlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2011.32 Judith Nagata, The Re-flowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Radicals and their

    Roots (Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press, 1984),p. 120.

    33 Hussein Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State?(Singapore:Singapore University Press, 1993), p. 31.

    34 One key problem associated with the term Wahhabism in Malaysia is the factthat this term is used to describe all Salafis and Wahhabis without any distinction.Hence, any edicts on Wahhabis are in fact applicable to Salafis as well.

    35 Jabatan Kemajuaan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM, Malaysian Islamic ReligiousDepartment), Keputusan Muzakarah Fatwa Kebangsaan Siri 2[Decisions Arisingfrom National Fatwa Meeting Volume 2] (Kuala Lumpur: JAKIM, 2003).

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    36 See Pengharaman Buku-Buku Tulisan Saudara Rasul Dahri Yang TelahDiperakui Haram [The Banning of Rasul Dahris Writings which has beenacknowledged as Deviant], available at .

    37 Abdul Rahim Sabri, JAIS tolak 7 penceramah Wahhabi [JAIS rejects 7 Wahhabischolars], available at .

    38 Traditional Islam refers to an orthodox form of Islam which refers to the Quran,Hadith, religious decrees of classical Muslim scholars, rational thought andlocal cultures as sources of Islamic reference. Traditionalist Muslims are moretolerant of local customs, cultures and are often practitioners of Sufism. Theyare highly critical of Salafi doctrines. See Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman,Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama, Southeast Asia Research 16, no. 1

    (March 2008): 135.39 Personal observation of the author at a Naqhshbandi-Haqqani event in Ipoh.

    Raja Ashman Shah, one of the princes of Perak, was appointed as therepresentative of the brotherhood in Malaysia. Also see the video Closing Duaafter 40th Day Tahlil for HRH Raja Ashman Shah by Mawlana Shaykh HishamKabbani, 8 May 2012, available at .

    40 Author interview with Shehzad Sultan, Naqshabandi-Haqqani Leader in Malaysia,Kuala Lumpur, 22 August 2013.

    41 The exception is Shahidan Kassim, former chief minister of Perlis who is known

    for his Salafi sympathies. Author interview with Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur,17 August 2011.

    42 Author interview with an UMNO leader, Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 2013.

    43 Ibid.44 Nakhaie has written a number of articles on his blog site against the Salafi

    ulama. See .

    45 Anwar Hussin dan Faiza Zainuddin, 40 ulama muda masuk UMNO (40 youngulama joined UMNO) [provide translation], Berita Harian, 26 June 2010; andauthor interview with an UMNO leader (who does not want to be named),

    Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 2013.46 Jimadie Shah Othman, Ulama masuk Umno: Siapa tipu siapa? [Ulama joined

    UMNO? Who cheated who?], Malaysiakini, 1 July 2010, available at .

    47 Details of the formation and structure of ILMU can be found on the groupswebsite at .

    48 For the differences between Asri Sobri and the ILMU ulama, see the videoUstaz Asrie Sobri - Semangat Nasionalisme Menurut Perspektif Islam [UstazAsrie Sobri-The Spirit of Nationalism from Islamic Perspective], available at.

    49 All these ulama have made references to Sheikh Rabee during their talksand sermons. See, for example, Al Madkhali Dicaci, Rabai Yahudi Dipuji[Al Madkhali was Insulted and Jewish Rabbi was Praised], available at

    http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/117350http://media.islamicsupremecouncil.org/Closing_Dua_after_40th_Day_Tahlil_for_HRH_Raja_Ashman_Shah-4328.htmlhttp://media.islamicsupremecouncil.org/Closing_Dua_after_40th_Day_Tahlil_for_HRH_Raja_Ashman_Shah-4328.htmlhttp://nakhaie.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/persoalan-aqidah-dalam-islam-politik/http://nakhaie.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/persoalan-aqidah-dalam-islam-politik/http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/136082http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/136082http://ilmuanmalaysia.com/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-D9uBLMzdAhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-D9uBLMzdAhttp://ilmuanmalaysia.com/http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/136082http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/136082http://nakhaie.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/persoalan-aqidah-dalam-islam-politik/http://nakhaie.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/persoalan-aqidah-dalam-islam-politik/http://nakhaie.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/persoalan-aqidah-dalam-islam-politik/http://media.islamicsupremecouncil.org/Closing_Dua_after_40th_Day_Tahlil_for_HRH_Raja_Ashman_Shah-4328.htmlhttp://media.islamicsupremecouncil.org/Closing_Dua_after_40th_Day_Tahlil_for_HRH_Raja_Ashman_Shah-4328.htmlhttp://www.malaysiakini.com/news/117350http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/pengharaman-buku-buku-tulisan-saudara-rasul-dahri-yang-telah-diperakui-haram-0
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    Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency? 229

    . In this video, Fathul Bari

    referred to Sheikh Rabee as his teacher and guide.

    50 Author interview with Fadhlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2011.

    51 Author interview with Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2011.

    52 Rasul Dahri, Demokrasi, Pilihanraya dan Mengundi: Satu Kajian Menurut Al-Quran

    dan As-Sunnah [Democracy, Elections and Voting: Research According toAlQuran and As-Sunnah] (Johor Bahru: Ummul Qura Publications, 2013),p. 56.

    53 Salamiah Druhamad Drahsin, Hudud: Bukan Muslim Lebih Terbuka Banding

    Ilmuan Islam [Hudud: Non-Muslims More Open than Ilmuan Islam], Sinar Harian,17 November 2012.

    54 Author interviews with Fadhlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2011 and

    Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2011.55 Author interview with Fadhlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2011.

    56 The hudud controversy erupted in 2012 when PAS declared that the partywould push for the implementation of hudud laws if the Pakatan Rakyat(PR) coalition were to win the 13th general election. The party faced the

    outright rejection of its objective by both its PR coalition partners andUMNO on the basis that Malaysia was not ready for the implementation ofthe laws.

    57 Ustaz Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, Komen atas kenyataan Karpal Singh & Chua Soi

    Lek [Comment on Karpal Singh and Chua Soi Lek], 4 November 2012, available

    at .

    58 Ida Li, Soi Lek disagrees with Umno ally over hudud, Malaysian Insider,

    28 October 2012, available at .

    59 Hudud laws refer to a class of punishments within Islamic laws that are fixedfor certain crimes including theft, adultery, consumption of alcohol or other

    intoxicants and apostasy. The punishments for these crimes are fixed by theQuran or Hadith. Tazir refers to punishments for offences not included in

    hudud. Qisas means settlement of accounts and governs crimes for which a

    victim or the family of the victim can demand that the same punishment beinflicted on the offender. In the case of murder, the victims family can demandthe offender be killed.

    60 Chuas statement on Hudud, New Straits Times, 3 November 2012.

    61 Mohammad Fairuz Jumain, Fathul Bari: Soi Lek persoal hudud versi Pas

    [Fathul Bari: Soi Lek Questions PAS version of Hudud], Sinar Harian,5 November 2012.

    62 Lacroix, Between Revolution and Apoliticalism, op. cit., p. 40.

    63 Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the

    United States (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006), p. 95.64 Rasul Dahri, Demokrasi, Pilihanraya dan Mengundi, op. cit., p. 127.

    65 Ibid., p. 135.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KI9rKKIDcSchttp://ustazfathulbari.wordpress.com/2012/11/04/komen-atas-kenyataan-karpal-singh-chua-soi-lek/http://ustazfathulbari.wordpress.com/2012/11/04/komen-atas-kenyataan-karpal-singh-chua-soi-lek/http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/soi-lek-disagrees-with-umno-ally-over-hudud-impact-on-non-muslims/http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/soi-lek-disagrees-with-umno-ally-over-hudud-impact-on-non-muslims/http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/soi-lek-disagrees-with-umno-ally-over-hudud-impact-on-non-muslims/http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/soi-lek-disagrees-with-umno-ally-over-hudud-impact-on-non-muslims/http://ustazfathulbari.wordpress.com/2012/11/04/komen-atas-kenyataan-karpal-singh-chua-soi-lek/http://ustazfathulbari.wordpress.com/2012/11/04/komen-atas-kenyataan-karpal-singh-chua-soi-lek/http://ustazfathulbari.wordpress.com/2012/11/04/komen-atas-kenyataan-karpal-singh-chua-soi-lek/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KI9rKKIDcSc
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    230 Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

    66 See the video URD-Hukum Mengundi Dalam Konteks Malaysia [URD-IslamicViewpoint on Voting in the Malaysian Context], available at .

    67 Ibid.68 See the video UFB - Demokrasi - Mujahid Yusof Rawa Seleweng Ayat Quran?

    [UFB-Demoracy- Mujahid Yusuf Rawa Misinterprets Quran], available at.

    69 The high number of northern Malays in PAS was alluded to by Farish Noor.See Farish, Islam Embedded, op. cit., p. 228.

    70 Author interview with Kamaruzzaman Mohamed, Head of PAS Youth in FederalTerritories, 23 November 2013.

    71 Author interview with Harun Din, Kangar, Perlis, 26 April 2013.

    72

    Author interview with Fadhlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 2011.73 PAS members have often criticized UMNOs ethno-nationalist ideology as being

    opposed to Islam. They noted that UMNOss ideology is a form of assabiyah(tribalism) which runs contrary to Islamic teachings. For an example of PAScritique of UMNOs assabiyah, see Liow, Piety and Politics, op. cit., p. 106.

    74 Ijtima Tarbawi PAS 2011 - UAF - PAS & Ikhwanul Muslimin Bermasalah Aqidah[PAS Annual Meeting 2011-UF-Problems in PAS and Muslim BrotherhoodsTheology], available at .

    75 Debat Sinar Harian antara Ketua Pemuda Pas, Nasrudin Hassan Tantawi danPengerusi Jawatankuasa Kerja Sekretariat Ulama Muda Umno, Fathul Bari

    Mat Jahaya dengan tajuk PRU13 - Orang Muda Pilih Siapa? [GE13- Whodid the Young Choose?], available at .

    76 Raziatul Hanum a Rajak, Fathulbari dahului Exco Pemuda Umno [FathulbariLeads in UMNO Youth Exco Race], Sinar Harian, 13 October 2013.

    77 Author interview with Fadhlan Othman, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2011.78 Author interview with Dr Shamsuddin Moner, UMNO Member and General

    Manager YADIM, Jasin, 19 March 2014.

    79 D. Kanyakumari, UMNO Assembly: Five Transformations Planned, says Najib,The Star, 5 December 2013.

    80 Kuek Ser Kuang Keng, Reform of Face Rallies, Bersih 2.0 warns EC, Malaysiakini, 11 November 2010, available at .

    81 See the video Demonstrasi BERSIH 2.0 - UFMO - Silap Pendalilan HadithHalal [BERSIH 2.0 Demonstrations-UFMO- The Mistake of MisinterpretingHadith], available at .

    82 Author interview with Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2011.

    83 For a detailed and insightful treatment of the issue, see Julian C. H. Lee,Islamization and Activism in Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies, 2010), pp. 6274.

    84

    Leven Woon, Nurul Izzah backs religious freedom for all, Free Malaysia Today,3 November 2012, available at .

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OgEEJl_trM&list=PL4XQgDCZIvO4TxRczWZYOoV4z1UxWLINphttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OgEEJl_trM&list=PL4XQgDCZIvO4TxRczWZYOoV4z1UxWLINphttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmV3Bdmvqk4http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqLU-SLuT-Yhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHZH1jg36Eghttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHZH1jg36Eghttp://www.malaysiakini.com/news/147889http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TwcmcRJ188http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2012/11/03/nurul-izzah-backs-religious-freedom-for-all/http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2012/11/03/nurul-izzah-backs-religious-freedom-for-all/http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2012/11/03/nurul-izzah-backs-religious-freedom-for-all/http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2012/11/03/nurul-izzah-backs-religious-freedom-for-all/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TwcmcRJ188http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/147889http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHZH1jg36Eghttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHZH1jg36Eghttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqLU-SLuT-Yhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmV3Bdmvqk4http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OgEEJl_trM&list=PL4XQgDCZIvO4TxRczWZYOoV4z1UxWLINphttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OgEEJl_trM&list=PL4XQgDCZIvO4TxRczWZYOoV4z1UxWLINp
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    85 Author interview with Fathul Bari, Kuala Lumpur, 10 May 2013.

    86 See the video Kalimah Allah: Lim Guan Eng Timbul KRISTIANOFOBIA[The Usage of Allah: Lim Guan Eng Promoting Christianophobia], available at

    .87 Ibid.

    88 For the Islamization of Pakistan, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard ofthe Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley, California:University of California Press, 1994) and for Sudan, see J. Millard Burr andRobert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State,19892000 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).

    89 See Amir Mir, Talibanisation of Pakistan (New Delhi: Pentagon Security Press,2010), pp. 117.

    90 For the impact of Islamization on domestic policies, see Sven AlexanderSchottmann, The Pillars of Mahathirs Islam: Mahathir Mohamad on Being-Muslim in the Modern World, Asian Studies Review 35, issue 3 (2011):35572 and Maznah Mohamad, The Ascendance of Bureaucratic Islam and theSecularization of the Sharia in Malaysia, Pacific Affairs83, no. 3 (2010): 50524.For the impact on foreign policy, see Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysias ForeignPolicy(London: Routledge, 1998) and Johan Saravannamuttu, Malaysias ForeignPolicy, The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism and Islamism (Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 23475. For Islamist conservatismin Malaysia see Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid and Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail,Islamist Conservatism and the Demise of Islam Hadhari in Malaysia, Islam

    and Christian-Muslim Relations 25, issue 2 (2014): 15980.91 For an interesting analysis of Shiite repression in Malaysia, see Mohd Faizal

    Musa, The Malaysian Shia: A Preliminary Study of Their History, Oppression,and Denied Rights, Journal of Shia Islamic Studies VI, no. 4 (2013): 41163.

    92 See Jabatan Mufti Perak (Perak Mufti Office), Keputusan Mesyuarat JawatankuasaFatwa Negeri Perak: Fatwa Mengenai Penegahan Menyebarkan Aliran danDakyah Wahabiah di Negeri Perak [Decision by the Fatwa Committee of theState of Perak: Fatwa on Curbing the Spread and Teachings of Wahhabism inPerak], available at .

    93

    Author interview with an UMNO leader, Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 2013.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40aCCCod_9Yhttp://mufti.perak.gov.my/perkhidmatan/e-book/372-fatwa-penegahan-menyebarkan-aliran-dan-dakyah-wahabiah.htmlhttp://mufti.perak.gov.my/perkhidmatan/e-book/372-fatwa-penegahan-menyebarkan-aliran-dan-dakyah-wahabiah.htmlhttp://mufti.perak.gov.my/perkhidmatan/e-book/372-fatwa-penegahan-menyebarkan-aliran-dan-dakyah-wahabiah.htmlhttp://mufti.perak.gov.my/perkhidmatan/e-book/372-fatwa-penegahan-menyebarkan-aliran-dan-dakyah-wahabiah.htmlhttp://mufti.perak.gov.my/perkhidmatan/e-book/372-fatwa-penegahan-menyebarkan-aliran-dan-dakyah-wahabiah.htmlhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40aCCCod_9Y