Photo by Olga LermontovaCover by Mats Barkow

2 Appeal and Proximity The Linguistic Construction of Security Threats

4 It’s not you, it’s me Understanding British reticence to anything European

8 Where am I from?

10 Memories of Conflict and Conflict of Memories

12 Manchester to Mosul British citizens and the Islamic State

Europe’s and the European Union’s involvement in, and experience of conflicts of all kinds, of those occurring internally or externally, is a central issue with which we as editors decided to deal in this 2015 spring edition of the Eureka magazine. There are all sorts of instances of conflict affecting Europe today, and we therefore find the topic not only centrally prevalent, but currently quite simply unavoidable in evaluating the social and political scene of Europe today. Whether these following analyzed instances of conflict be remnants of inner social strife and inter-communal unrest, issues concerning setting an ap-propriate foreign policy paradigm the EU can employ to confront conflict outside its borders, reconciling diverg-ing inner political views on any number of events affect-ing Europe today, or simply a decisive investigation on how we view and come to talk about instances of conflict in the news or in our daily lives, these following articles comprise an extremely diversified and relatively exhaus-tive documentation of the many different issues currently affecting Europe that are linked in one way or another to a conflict of some kind.

As always we would like to graciously thank all of the writers and photographers that have generously given of their time to think critically about, and capture images of, the current social and political reality of Europe to-day. We feature writers from a variety of different back-grounds both European and international, and without the immense array of voices we can draw on to consider certain themes affecting Europe today, we wouldn’t have a magazine as excellent nor as diverse and informed. Thank you very much for your contributions, and we do look forward to seeing your work again in next year’s edi-tions of Eureka.

Wishing you all a lovely Easter holiday and the best of luck in exams,Your editors,Hendrik Obelöer and Shane McGoldrick

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14 The potential of a German interpretation of “Leadership” Why Germany’s crisis management is special but yet a chance for diplomacy

16 Murdered by Politics

17 On the present day relevance of Holocaust education

20 Do good fences make good neighbours? Trans-border cooperation and lived European reality in the Upper Rhine region

22 Lessons to be learned from Northern Ireland?

24 UCL 2015 EU and Europe an Careers Event

26 Who Will Guard the Guards Themselves?

28 A Game Without Winners

29 Germany’s Greece Policy Or How to Fail Miserably

29 Syriza The Frontal Assault

Kindly Supported by UCL European Institute

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Building on this foundation, the UCL European Institute works to stimulate new research and support mul-tidisciplinary collaboration across the university. It acts as the one-stop access to UCL expertise on Europe and the EU, and provides a conduit between the university and policy-makers, civil society and the media. We offer a diverse programme of public events, provide expert analysis and commentary, build up networks and alliances and aim to provide an intellectually stimulating environment for researchers at all stages of their careers.

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Amidst all this talk of conflict, “rising” tensions and “ever-advancing” spheres of influence, of “close” mil-itary exercises and “advancing” or more “frequent” armed flyovers, it becomes decidedly necessary to analyze the ways that this sort of information con-cerning the world outside of London is being crafted, shaped, and exported to us, as we glance distractedly at the daily headlines, trying to avoid that looming essay on that one week’s reading we actually took the time to consider. It is my very simple, but cer-tainly important point in writing this article, that we truly take the time to consider the ways in which our perceptions of the outside world are linguisti-cally fabricated, and thus prone to inherent inter-pretations that may deceptively block our ability to form objective opinions on world affairs. Likewise, it is also undeniably requisite to observe the way the presentation of certain “threats” affects our resul-tant discursive decisions in speaking to these threats either in daily life or formalized writing.

I should like to clarify that this is not an attack on how global events are portrayed via digital mediums, but rather a brief analysis on how we come to know or accept certain global events as veridical, how we come to know them as they purportedly are, or how in this case we come to accept any number of Putin’s

actions in the past few months as immi-nent or growing security threats.

The way I would like to contextualize this analysis is by looking at the presentation of certain ongo-ing events along the Russian Federation’s western border. I shall assert that there are certain innate issues that media outlets must overcome to garner attention and readership, and explain how these proposed problems affect journalistic discourse on the whole, before engaging in a brief discussion of how we ought to think about reported events that are directly affecting important international policy decisions.

The issues that any media outlet or even government policy maker must prevail against in speaking on global affairs can ultimately be reduced to proximity and appeal. They must win the proximity or magni-tude of a certain issue, lest the public’s eye strays to a different more locally prevalent story. Whether we like it or not, there has to be a reason that one should care in reading a certain story, in considering a cer-tain policy option. Thus secondly, a reported news event must have a kind of appeal, a kind of glowing allure which may excite the reader in one way or other and draw their attention further. In any news story covering events stringing from the advance-ment of troops into Crimea to NATO’s recent military training exercises in the Black Sea and the parading of US tanks through certain Baltic States, there is al-ways a described sense of urgency and closeness to the events. The events are not only often described 2

Appeal and ProximityThe Linguistic Construction of Security Threats

Editorial by Shane McGoldrick

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as ongoing or increasing in seriousness, but they are also often quite appealing in the imagined visu-al sense to the reader. In reading any story on NATO ships sailing swiftly into the Black Sea or large tanks being unloaded and driven around in a sort of pseu-do-masculine display of muscle power, there is often this undertone of subtle sex appeal to such events, especially when portrayed in conjunction with lin-guistic instances of words such as “tension” and “confrontation”. Military exercises aren’t described in the ways they should be, as preparations for very real instances of conflict in which human lives are quite literally ripped apart in the name of security or ideal, but as “Black Sea manoeuvers”. War ships are described as “sleek grey frigates” and not weap-ons of very real destruction—troop movements are illustrated as “provocative” (an adjective repeatedly used and abused by art critics speaking about…art), and not as again, a very real display of the very or-ganized and systematized way man goes about de-stroying his fellow man.

When we read such articles describing conflict or conflict escalation, we need to be aware of how the portrayal of these events affects us internally and then juxtapose these evoked feelings with the de-cidedly less than glamorous reality of military exer-cises, military forces, and armed conflict in general. It is ridiculously simple to recognize that we too often become inured to the way conflict, whether

portrayed as rising or falling, is made out to be sexy and seductive, and not violent and destructive. The instances of journalistic discourse recounted and analyzed above should illustrate to us just how com-monplace it is for situations of very real opportunity for conflict and death to be so described as to evoke feelings of excitement and a rise of bodily tempera-ture, instead of disgust and critical evaluation of the reality of the conflictual event as a whole. We need to consider the very real prevalence of these notions of appeal and proximity that media coverage, and even everyday conversation deal with in speaking to world events somehow concerned with violence or conflict, and recognize that very often the only con-ception of the reality of these situations we have ac-cess to is going to be linguistically constructed. We create the atmosphere to these events in our minds eye, and react to them accordingly. At the end of the day, journalistic accounts of conflict often simply describe instruments of war being ordered by men and women behind desks to be used in some stra-tegic way to achieve some goal of an often disput-ed nature. The rest is all… well, just talk… isn’t it? So let’s become aware of how we use our words and how others use there’s, because often they are all we have, and they quite literally can create and shape the world we live in.

Olga Lermontova

Mats Barkow

It’s not you, it’s meUnderstanding British reticence to anything European

Sebastian Spence

At a recent discussion at Chatham House, an Interna-tional Affairs think-tank, a panel of four took turns to give their opinion about the financial implications of a potential British exit from the EU - or ‘Brexit’. Much of the argument has been well-rehearsed for years. Those favouring exit cite, amongst other things, the flexibility of organising bilateral free-trade deals with emerging economies (which EU membership prevents). Eurosceptics bemoan how EFTA nations, who belong to the single-market but aren’t a mem-ber of the union, have just signed a free-trade deal with India, whilst EU negotiations have stalled. Given Britain’s overlap of interests with India, this is frus-trating. Yet the benefits of membership are equally stark. Access to the single-market is of course a huge advantage (nearly half our exports head to the conti-nent). And there is much to be said for the economic clout that comes with negotiating as a continent of 500 million rather than as a small offshore island. In fact, no one really knows what the alternative to membership would be. Free trade deals might take years to negotiate (always supposing countries can be bothered to negotiate with us); although most ex-perts think that would be a transitory phenomenon, rather than a fundamental conundrum of successful exit. It is unlikely Britain would be refused access to the single market, though we may face some tariffs. But if there are two things I took away from the dis-cussion, it is that there are good arguments on both sides and whether we decide to leave or stay, eco-nomically Britain will be okay.

It seems strange, therefore, for so much of the main-stream discussion regarding EU membership to be about the economics. Our membership has always

focussed on whether it is in Britain’s economic inter-est. But what needs to be understood is that British reticence to the EU is an entrenched historical phe-nomenon.

In this year’s shiny Winter Issue of Eureka one of my peers, Arthur Davis, asks ‘Will Brits ever be proud Europeans?’ He is right to raise the issue. Indeed, I think it matters more than anything else. He is also correct in saying that we in Britain feel as if we “don’t need Europe”. But why are the British (particularly the English) so anti-Europe? When you ask them, they might grumble about sending billions of pounds to the EU, although many didn’t seem as bothered be-fore the financial crisis and the rise of UKIP. A more interesting point is the idea that ‘our laws are made in Brussels’, albeit this is obscured in mainstream debate by distortions and half-truths. I don’t think your average Joe fundamentally cares much about the fact that the EU banned fruit and veg that were too curvy (only to repeal the ban in 2008). The fact the law is made in Brussels - that alien, bureaucrat-ic, soviet metropolis – even if British civil servants are party to the deliberations and the lawmaking - is what irks the British mindset. Of course some Ger-mans, Swedes and French probably feel the same, but the hostility is far more profound and prevalent in this country.

So, I disagree with Arthur. I believe there is a case for saying British identity (as well as the sub-national and regional identities it encompasses) is particu-larly at odds with the idea of a European one. There is something which makes us feel different from Eu-rope. The most obvious historical explanation for

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this is how we view the Second World War. When European countries lost the war to fascism, Britain held its ground. Western victory was of course ulti-mately due to American intervention, but there is a sense in which ‘we’ won the war and all the founding members of the EU either lost it or were occupied for several years by Hitler’s forces. Even today, the En-glish football hooligan reminds the German fan that we were victorious (before Klose and Müller finish off the game).

Looking further back in history, there is something in the political liberalism of the British Isles that has meant we never sympathised with extreme politics and the big state. Historically British institutions hugely shaped the bedrock principles of what we understand as the modern, market-based liberal de-mocracy. And in the 20th century, unlike many Euro-pean countries, Britain didn’t have a dictatorship (in-deed, one would have to go back to Oliver Cromwell to find anything close). We have always been suspi-cious of the big state. Hence our dislike of suprana-tional institutions and our European partners ready acceptance of it, seemingly feeling our commitment to the rule of law, habeas corpus and free markets is not for them.

So, there is a case for saying that if there is a European identity, it does not incorporate the British one. But does it matter? Practically speaking, the arguments for remaining a member seemingly outweigh those in favour of leaving - at least until a very compelling, unambiguous alternative is presented. The problem is that we Brits have never cared much about the EU; the NHS being the more salient acronym in modern

political discourse. The answer is: yes, it does matter. Euroscepticism is increasingly prevalent, and its ubiquity is exempli-fied by the rise of UKIP. But, it would be a mistake to think that the crisis is causing anti-European feeling. Certainly, it might be exacerbating it, but the under-lying tensions are much more fundamental. The Eu-ropean question has always been divisive because it boils down to national identity rather than political ideology. The Labour for a Referendum group, which emerged after Cameron’s pledge to hold a referen-dum should the Conservatives win a majority, illus-trates the extent to which this is not a party issue.

In fact, understanding why Britain feels different to Europe matters for one simple reason. Figuring out what kind of relationship we want with Europe can-not be debased to economic pragmatism. We have always been the reluctant, ‘awkward’ partner, and this doesn’t really suit us or the EU. Whether we fully commit to Europe as a member of the union, or de-cide to cooperate but not integrate as a neighbouring state, will be decided by our understanding of who we are. As the loss of colonial influence leaves a void in the British nation’s view of itself as a powerful leader, will we become part of a greater European identity? Or will we prefer to stand true to the his-toric albeit increasingly enfeebled institutions, while we figure out what it means to be British? Maybe the two are not mutually exclusive. Maybe we can main-tain respect for our traditions without alienating ourselves from the continent? I will not pretend to have the answers, but these are certainly the ques-tions we need to be asking.

Taisiya Shifrina

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Shortly after moving to London I decided that when people would ask me “where are you from?” I would answer with a meagre “I was born in Barcelona”, moving the conversation swiftly towards safer grounds. The question, despite its intentioned innocence, stems from a metaphysical concept with which I do not feel comfortable dealing in a short chat inside a lift. To be from somewhere requires subscribing to and identifying with a specif-ic “us”. It is based on confirming that you belong to those broad social and cultural groups we call nations. This topic often only pre-cipitates conflict when posed to someone born and raised in Cata-lunya. Where am I from? I can only confirm I was born in Barcelona, at the “Virgen del Pilar” hospital. Or so have I always been told. Since the democratic tran-sition in 1978, the most complex political issue in Spain has been dealing with the interests of the different national identities that compose the country. Despite be-ing a serious threat to the integrity of the State, several governments have been unable, and most prob-ably unwilling, to give the topic the relevance it deserves. The most re-cent upsurge of Catalan national-ism has been first neglected, then silenced, and now irrationally op-posed by both conservative and social democrat governments. This is a consequence of the inherently conflictive nature of issues about nations and rights. The recognition of oneself bears the necessity to recognize the other. The existence of an “us” depends on the recogni-tion of a “not-us” with which you can either cooperate or clash. “Cat-alonia is not Spain”. The core of the indepen-dentist’s arguments is based on two simple ideas. First, that Cata-lans are being exploited by Spain. “Espanya ens roba” (Spain robs

us) is the usual motto to simplify the reality of fiscal imbalances be-

tween Catalonia and the Spanish State. As most rich regions in Eu-rope, such as Lombardy or Bavar-ia, Catalonia contributes a dispro-portionate amount of resources if compared with those others. Con-flict over taxation and redistribu-tive powers has been at the core of Catalan politics, causing almost all major revolts in Barcelona over the last century. However, I do not believe this argument is the most important. It stems from the rec-ognition that Catalonia is a nation with its own rights and sovereign-ty, which conforms to the second idea. Traditionally, mainly the Catalan republican left adhered to this belief, preferring to exalt irrational debates about collective identities rather than reaffirming

their Socialist ideology as a strate-gy to “fer país” (build the country). Within our context of neo-roman-ticism and idealistic post-Modern irrationality, addressing feelings and sentiments is hugely effective. “Som i serem” (We are and we will be). That is the radical ideological and cultural framework of inde-pendentists. Their concept of a nation is a very democratic one: a nation exists when its people de-cide to consider it as such. Nations are built by public sovereignty, and uphold public sovereignty. The combination of these two main arguments and their development have been key to the success of the independentist campaign so far. Madrid’s propaganda can-nons have so far simply denied both of these arguments. First, they have tried to use the Consti-

tution as a hammer against inde-pendence. However, this strategy is unsustainable as it only alien-ates Catalans from the political system created in 1978 and pro-vides the independence campaign with even more arguments. Sec-ond, they have aimed to propagate fear among property-owners and small bourgeoisie (very relevant in Catalan social structure) about the economic consequences of independence. It is true that en-gaging in an open discussion on these topics and the reality of fis-cal imbalances can deter the move-ment’s strength, especially among the powerful urban middle class-es. This was proven by the “No” campaign in Scotland, but it will never effectively tackle the feel-ing of alienation shared by many Catalans towards Spanish national identity. To solve the social and emotional conflict provoked by na-tionalism, Spanish culture needs to be freed from the hijacking of the central regions. Spain must stop being identified with a culture produced in Madrid and Castile and develop one with a more in-clusive nature. To be Spanish must be an umbrella concept in which different national identities and cultures can strive towards. The country cannot sustain a national culture placed in conflict with oth-er subcultures belonging to any of its communities. “Spanish” should not be the natural “other” of “Cat-alan” It should rather be elevated to be considered a product of the interaction between different cul-tures and nations within Spain, always in recognition of their par-ticularities. I also believe that only then would a Spanish republican federation be a realistic alterna-tive for the organization of the State and a new Constitution. A re-sponsible intellectual and political leadership is key to create these new paradigms. I want to be able to say without remorse: “I am Cat-alan, and thus Spanish”.

Where am I from?

NachoArroniz

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Alberto Delclaux

There exist presidents who declare war and invade illegally, but ‘to protect international peace’. There are other presidents who deny desiring war but send troops. There are those even with enough ‘con-viction’ to deny the occurrence of the holocaust. And there are governments that have made it impossible to research national massacres, even under the code-name “May 35th”. History is sometimes distorted to fit frames or narratives, usually for political reasons. History is a science. It does not appear as rig-orous as physics, or perhaps as accurate as chem-istry. There is not one absolute, objective historical truth waiting to be discovered; human life is not so dualistic. There is a perpetual tension between fac-tuality, interpretation, and argumentation. We don’t have the privilege of claiming to approach history completely objectively either. However hard we try, contemporary preoccupations will always influence our objectives and our analysis, and historians can-not exist outside society. Nevertheless that is not to say that there are no facts, nor that we can discard our historical responsibility under the pretence of relativism. It still happens that groups hold different ‘truths’, especially when it comes to armed conflict. If think of conflict in Europe, there is one striking example that more often than not comes to mind: the Yugoslav wars. Starting with the seceding of Cro-atia and Slovenia from what was then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. The conflict escalated until the Dayton agreements of 1995, and slowly picked up again until the Kosovo war broke out in 1998. The history of these wars is pervaded on all sides by the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘they’,

between ‘friend’ and ‘foe’, and between ‘victims’ and ‘aggressors’. In the 80’s, af-

ter the fall of Tito, it was out of this binary relation that the rising nationalist leaders constructed the identities of the different constituting ethnicities of Yugoslavia. It would not be an exaggeration to say that these wars were a case of ritual re-enactment of all the previous conflicts amongst ethnicities. Reclaim-ing symbols and national emblems, political leaders did not hesitate to appeal to memories of the First and Second World Wars to vilify and dehumanise the other ethnic groups. For instance, Serbs were told that the Croats had fed Serbian babies to a zoo’s li-ons, or that Muslims were trying to repopulate South Eastern Europe and evict Christians. Conversely, Cro-ats, Bosnians, and Slovenes were told of Serbia’s as-piration to dominate Yugoslavia and subjugate them. After the war and the infamous ethnic cleansings, out of this unending tumult of genocide and rape, emerged the different accounts of the conflict, where everyone deems himself solely the victims and the others exclusively the perpetrators.

Memories of Conflict and

Conflictof Memories

Emma Nabi

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It isn’t rare to hear people heave in a resigned sigh that ‘there is too much history to the Balkans.’ True, there are many versions, many controversies, many ‘historical’ facts. But isn’t it rather that there is too little history, and too much memory? Memory simplifies. It can only account for one perspective. It only implies constancy. History allows for nuances. It allows for multiple perspectives. It is the record of change. The collective memories of the former Yu-goslav peoples eclipsed history. But, perhaps a little paradoxically, these different historical narratives are part of history. Seeing what stories Serbs, Croats, or Bosnians ‘tell themselves about themselves’ gives us precious information about their identity, espe-cially so soon after the conflict. There is no time-pe-riod so remote as the recent past; the memory of it is still burning, the social implications are daunting, and distancing ourselves is undeniably complicated. For this reason, some say amnesia and discontinuing the teaching of the histories recounted above would be the best remedy to the problematic history of the

Balkans-- diverging memories of the past would at least not be used to set the region aflame once again. These discordances stress the importance of historical narratives in wars. The Regimes of truths are expressions of a given culture, and revelatory of a group’s social imagination. The Yugoslav wars are an extreme example of this, but other examples may be found in most interstate conflicts, and almost all civil wars. The experience of conflict is unique, and peoples can’t be stripped of it for the sake of one absolute historical truth. Although belligerents can come to an agreement on a chronology, or particular events, controversies inevitably arise when politics demands that fingers be pointed at the responsible party. We can side with the Bosnian-Muslims and call it a war of aggression, or with the Bosnian-Serbs and call it a civil war. A version may prevail, but whichever it turns out to be, this will tell us far more about ourselves than it will tell us about the conflict itself.

Jose Hong

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Manchester to Mosul, Rotherham to Raqqa, Birmingham to Baiji. Hundreds of British citizens have left the relative comforts of home to join the Islamic State’s (IS) strug-gle to establish a caliphate across the Mid-dle East. Worryingly for the British govern-ment, this includes many young men who will become battle hardened and have their extremist worldview strengthened. The con-cern, then, is that these men may eventually return to the UK hoping to bring the battle to these shores. YetBut this does not givetell us the full picture. A state needs citizens, not just fighters. Many of the fighters have tak-en their young families in a permanent move to Iraq or Syria, and women and young girls have been enticed to move in order to marry Islamic State fighters.

So are these people simply misguided or dangerous criminals? In this article I will address some of their motivations for leav-ing the UK, and will consider measures that could be taken to stop the flow.

According to figures from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Vi-olence at King’s College, almost 4000 of the foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from Western Europe. Between five and six hun-dred are estimated to have left the UK to fight there, joining a myriad of militant groups. As previously mentioned, this figure excludes those who have gone to establish a domes-tic life. The pressing and puzzling question is simply: why?

Graeme Wood, in a recent article in The Atlantic, points out that IS are strategical-ly committed to ‘returning civilisation to a seventh-century legal environment, and

Manchester to Mosul

British citizens and the Islamic State

Ali Arif

ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse’. Wood argues that the followers of IS take a deeply literal and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, and are committed with a fervour that is perhaps difficult for secular Westerners to understand. The concept of a caliphate, or Islamic type of ‘empire’, is central to the ideology.

Whereas Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda did not expect to see a caliphate established in their lifetimes, IS are taking active steps to forge an empire through the most brutal means. Unlike Al-Qaeda, holding territo-ry is crucial. Upon declaring a caliphate on the 29th of June last year, Baghdadi, the leader of IS, implored Muslims across the world to move there and help it grow. For IS followers, therefore, it is a spiritual ob-ligation and a ‘vehicle for salvation’ to move to their territories.

The opportunity to fulfil these fundamentalist ide-als holds an intoxicating sway over a tiny number of British Muslims, and provides their motivation. Mosul, Baghdad, Dabiq. These names echo through history and are the setting for prophecies concern-ing mythical battles said to usher in the apocalypse. Fulfilling these prophecies is, sadly, irresistible for some.

The Islamic State’s mastery of social media is an im-portant factor in attracting Western recruits. The slick, well-produced videos of casual murder glamo-rise their crimes, giving a Hollywood feel to the con-flict. Monitoring of social media reveals that foreign fighters are excited by such videos, with many feel-ing that the West is getting what it deserves. If you were to look at the Facebook or Instagram ac-

counts of British peo-ple who have gone to Iraq and Syria, you may be surprised. Photos abound showing Pot Noodle and Cadbury Dairy Milk, large modern houses, fighters relaxing in swimming pools or posing with weapons. These all have the effect of normalising the conflict and obscuring the grim real-ity. Accompanied by exhortations to join the Islamic State in order to build a community, these posts are convincing to many.

What can be done to stop them? The British govern-ment may talk about censorship of social media and confiscating passports. However, perhaps the change needs to come from within communities themselves. This can mean parents keeping a closer eye on their children, or community leaders condemning leaving the UK in the strongest terms. Indeed, only last year a group of senior Islamic scholars in the UK issued a fatwa condemning British people joining the “op-pressive and tyrannical” Islamic State.

Unfortunately, many young British Muslims feel at odds with British society as a whole. Maybe in or-der to foster a sense of belonging, the media needs to dial back some of the alarmist rhetoric and promote an inclusive vision of British society, where all reli-gions and races are welcomed.

Ultimately, people will leave no matter what mea-sures are taken. Nevertheless, it is an issue we must confront head on, whilst making sure our well-earned liberties remain intact. Creating a general at-mosphere of paranoia must be avoided at all costs, as it may well exacerbate the issue.

both photos by Ali Arif

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The potentialof a German interpretation of “Leadership”Why Germany’s crisis management isa chance for diplomacyGwinyau Machona

Mats Barkow

It was at the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014 when Germany’s President Joachim Gauck and the Minister of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen, de-clared with lofty words, that Germany, as a stable de-mocracy with economic capability, was ready to take up more responsibility in conflict resolution. The international community appreciated those state-ments, having witnessed Germany’s past hesitation in that respect. However, is Germany really about to become the longed for loyal partner for the apparent hard-line policy of the United States, the UK and oc-casionally France? This essay seeks to briefly tackle this ques-tion and explain why it will take many more years until Germany openly accepts this European leader-ship, which it is regarded to have occupied already. I shall however argue, that it will define its own ver-sion of leadership, which can already be observed in the rather odd way Germany is “leading” Europe today. Exemplary are the continuing and desperate attempts by Germans to mediate and negotiate in the Ukrainian crisis. If it was for many US politicians, the “West” would supply the Ukrainian forces with weapons. If it was for German politicians, the “West” would negotiate with one voice, preferably with Ger-man views, and grant some successes to Russia and Putin for the sake of stability. One obvious advan-tage is the fact that one voice shared by 28 Europe-an states is more powerful than 28 different voices. Moreover, Germany could remain just one ordinary EU member. In Berlin this would be at least seen as a welcomed side-effect. Germany could represent the European Union and would not be the frontrunner, instead it could enjoy a shadow role in this sort of European peloton. Chancellor Angela Merkel has understood how unpopular Germany as a leader in conflict management would be; not so much abroad, but more at home. Subsequently, she has already qualified the apparent new role as “the leader” by introducing the rather odd definition of leadership being “directing the way out of the middle”. This is the position most Germans would like to see their country in: Determining the direction of European crisis management without running ahead.

Why is the German population not prepared to lead Europe? The reason for this hesitation is not primar-ily the fear of running ahead in the wrong direction. The policy of mediating in endless conferences, rath-er than a policy of clear statements and action, is the result of Germany’s history. The First World War and the following years of extreme right wing nationalism had shown that Germany was capable, due to its size and popula-

tion, to cause devastating catastrophes in Europe, if it pursued a policy of confrontation. In addition to the Second World War, the communist period in East Germany and the Cold War followed. Consequently, the concept of strong leadership had completely lost its appeal and attraction, let alone any form of mili-tary action. Until today, from an early age onwards, Ger-mans get told how their country carries the heavy burden of guilt on its shoulders resulting in a re-sponsibility to avoid any form of military conflict in Europe. This traditional hesitation, perhaps rather to be called “policy of precaution and reservation”, is cemented into the German identity. Today the politi-cal establishment derives from a generation that was born at a time of military confrontation which sepa-rated their country and it was raised by a generation horrified by the Second World War. Germany will not be prepared to be a front-runner in international politics, until its citizens are free of highly emotional experiences, direct or indirect, with totalitarian regimes and their conse-quences. It will not be today’s young generation that changes Germany’s role dramatically. This genera-tion was raised by parents who experienced the Cold War, who were in turn raised in a society in which ev-ery political statement needs to survive the scrutiny of political correctness. Nevertheless, the direction for Germany is clear: The more distanced its citizens are towards Germany’s history, the more they will be prepared to accept the role of a leader. Though, its history will never be forgotten and Germans in general will remain deeply pacifistic and sceptical towards any form of military involvement.

This can be a great potential for Europe and the World. In times of conflict and confrontation a com-monly respected mediator, believably dedicated to peace, could be a key factor for more successful di-plomacy. Theoretically Germany has the political and economic influence to hinder any military in-tervention or involvement of the so-called western countries, including the United States. If Germany spoke up against military actions, it became very difficult for others to morally justify any arms sup-ply or military intervention, when other options are still available. Yet, the German voice cannot be one of hesitation or reservation, like in 2011 where Ger-many abstained from voting on the no-fly-zone in Libya. The German voice would need to be decisive, clear and predictable. This role has not been played properly by German politicians yet. If it ever will be, remains to be seen. Certain is that the po-tential for a German leadership in global diplomacy is real and existing. 15

On the last day of winter a political murder took place in Moscow, of the scale that has not been seen for years. Boris Nemtsov, the man who was murdered not a hundred meters away from the Kremlin wall, was one of the most consistent critics of Mr. Putin’s regime and one of the most popular opposition lead-ers in Russia. He was a politician of federal signifi-cance, boasting an untainted reputation and a very successful career in the past when he rose to become vice-president under Yeltsin, and was widely antici-pated to succeed him, until the fateful decision was made in favour of Vladimir Putin instead. Despite the immense efforts of state propaganda, Nemtsov re-tained the sympathy and respect of anyone in Russia who has ever so much as made an effort to inquire about current news beyond the state-controlled me-dia. Such a blatant act of political violence thus came as a shock and marked a new political reality in Rus-sia.

The last politically motivated murder of compara-ble resonance happened 9 years ago in 2006 when journalist Anna Politkovskaya was shot dead in the elevator of her apartment house, on Putin’s birthday. Does that mean that these killings were personally ordered or sanctioned by Putin, like some commen-tators suggest? Probably not. To allow this would be absurd for at least two reasons. Firstly, Putin did not have a pragmatic reason to fear these opponents to such an extent as to need to remove them physically. The state controlled media already does a successful

job of tarnishing opposition and blocking any dissent from the public’s discourse,

while the loyal courts assist conveniently by jailing the opposition leaders on a regular basis, disrupt-ing any effective organization. Secondly, however surreal this may sound, a national leader has to up-hold some standards, befitting his status--being as-sociated with political terrorism is not one of them. There is reason to doubt that anyone, including Pu-tin, would like to see a contract killing happen on the doorsteps of their office.

Does this mean that Putin is absolved from guilt on the account of this murder? The answer, again, is no. The fact that the shooting took place in one of the most heavily guarded and monitored places in the capital and that the killers managed to escape at all, tells us something about the political regime. It is clear that the operation could not be carried out without the complicity of state security – the FSB, which rose to a dominant position of influence un-der Putin. It is plausible that the killing was contract-ed by the people from those structures interested in the perpetuation of conflict in eastern Ukraine who might have had a direct clash of interests with Nemtsov, who was expected to release a detailed re-search on the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine. Among other things, the security structures contract and curate militant reactionary groups to provide “volunteers” in the east of Ukraine and help silence opposition at home. Just weeks before the murder took place, a pro-government rally “Antimaidan” gathered in Moscow to chant in support of the gov-ernment policy and vow to physically deal with the “national traitors” if necessary to prevent “Maidan”

Murdered by PoliticsRoman Varum

Olga Lermontova

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in Russia, waving portraits of Nemtsov as one of such “traitors”.

The corporate, authoritarian nature of the state has exposed itself at its new low, marking a new reality – that of open political violence. By letting the security services loose, Putin has effectively lost control over the situation. Decentralized violence carried out in the name of the Kremlin may prove difficult to stop. Even if Putin really wanted to find the culprit, as the state media reports, the arrests will not extend be-yond the executor of the crime, for the investigation is sure to stumble into someone loyal to the regime at some point.

The murder of Boris Nemtsov is an act of sabotage and could just as much be a signal to Putin as it is a threat to the liberal opposition, should its members attempt to expose those involved in the conflict or obstruct their interests. Escalating violence at home is only a logical continuation of the current authori-tarian regime as its constituent groups try to assert their power amid crumbling economy and violent interference abroad. It is, however, more a sign of fear than of control. Putin has done nothing to pro-vide security or stability in Russia in any reliable in-stitutional form. One is only left to wonder what the future holds once this control slips.

--- This text was inspired by the European Institute Event ‘Between Obsession, Routine, and Contestation: Remembering the Holocaust in Europe today‘ on the 24 February 2015. The event featured a panel debate of four renown experts on German history, the history of the Holocaust and Holocaust education. --- The 27th of January 2015 marked the seventieth an-niversary of the liberation of Auschwitz concentra-tion camp by the Soviet First Ukrainian Front. That day, more than three hundred camp survivors gath-ered at the Auschwitz site, sheltered by the flysheets of a large tent adjacent to the camp’s looming tow-er gate. As selected survivors addressed the world leaders present, silence fell over the marsh. Of the decision makers involved in the anniversary festiv-ities, none were born before the end of the second world war. Although remembering the Holocaust seems to remain a relevant topic on the agenda of today’s political elites, for just how long will it con-tinue to do so? A recent study by Germany’s con-servative Bertelsmann Stiftung informed the public that 81 percent of today’s Germans say they want to ‘put the history of the persecutions of the Jews behind them’ and for their leaders to turn to ‘con-temporary problems’. As the significance of keeping Holocaust education a part of national curricula is debated throughout Europe whilst the last surviving witnesses of Nazi atrocities perish in ever-growing numbers, how can their memory be preserved for future generations, and how can we deal with the conclusions deducted from their suffering?

With concrete social memory fading, the problems that arise from occupation with the Holocaust cease to be purely historical, assuming a philosophical character difficult to communicate to younger stu-dents who are unfamiliar with questions of ethics and the peculiarities of 20th century history. How could one of the most advanced nations of its time, within the time frame of a mere twelve years, de-scend into an abysmal barbarity unparalleled in all of human history? In the years leading up to 1933, German scientists had collectively accumulated more Nobel Prizes than their British and American colleagues combined. Austrian and German contri-butions to world literature and art were at an all-time peak. German cultural life was highly sophisticated, and in the decades since its unification in 1871, the country had experienced an astonishing economic rise, with industrial production increasing fivefold in the years between 1870 and 1914. What lead to this apparently stable and civilised nation to commit crimes of such unique brutality? In most of its contradictions and historical unclari-ty, the Holocaust remains completely incomprehen-sible. It seems that what disturbed and perplexed the first journalists and officials who arrived at the Dachau, Birkenau and Auschwitz sites in 1945 are the very same problems that continue to disturb and perplex modern day students of the Holocaust. The efficiency and bureaucratic accuracy attributed to the German nation as a whole had, for its civilis-ing functions in Germany’s political and economical systems, often inspired awe

On the present day relevance of Holocaust education

Lukas B. Wahden

17

and envy in foreign observers. Yet in the barracks of Nazi prison camps, efficiency and bureaucratic accuracy had been thoroughly everted, vesting an industrial dimension to what would later become known as the materialised reverse image to Euro-pean civilisation as a whole. The collected works of Weimar classicist poets, famous for their en-lightened and rationalist moral principles, served as the bedtime reading of Auschwitz’s Lagerkom-mandant Amon Goeth. The sorting of new camp inmates into the forced labour barracks and gas chambers was often musically accompanied with pieces by Bach and Beethoven. In Auschwitz, high civilisation and unrivalled barbarism amalgamat-ed entirely. This cynical contradiction tends to shock and dis-turb. It confronts those who study it with ques-

tions of ethical imperfection, and sparks doubt in regard to the concealability of the animalistic ele-ments in human nature. How, for instance, could the population of Weimar, with its proud cultural history, ignore the obvious evidence of the crimes committed in the nearby Buchenwald concentra-tion camp? How could a country with a tradition in universalist ethics and Christian morality remain completely indifferent to the removal and suc-ceeding extermination of millions of people from its very midst? How could ideological constructs of such vapid one-dimensionality lead a nation of astonishing general education into a devastating discharge of all its inherent values? And what does this mean for us? Is indifference to crime and injustice a crime and injustice in itself? And if so, are we able to picture

18

Olga Lermontova

ourselves,our families, friends and neighbours as guilty criminals, only because we also often remain indifferent to injustice for pragmatical or personal reasons? What is the ethical difference between a 1937 Berlin man’s ignorance of the deporta-tion of his Jewish neighbours and a 2015 London man’s ignorance of the origins of his designer shirt “Made in Bangladesh”? If we know that the gradu-al de-humanisation of the Jewish people in 1930’s Germany lead into their eventual destruction, why do we still allow our Tabloid press to collectively stigmatise modern minorities such as immigrants or unemployed workers? It is questions like these that the study of the Holo-caust provokes. No other historical event demon-strates the inherent fragility of human civilisation more effectively than the Holocaust. For this rea-

son anyone concerned with the preservation of modern civilisation must have a stark interest in educating young people about it. Holocaust education remains relevant not because it delivers concrete historical answers, but be-cause it inspires doubt and uncertainty. Its value does not lie in making people understand, but in making them question. I like to see social progress as product of constant doubt. Knowing about the atrocities committed by Hitler’s Germany causes young people to question themselves, their beliefs and ethical standards, enabling them to achieve progress whilst retaining a scepticism towards the progress achieved. For these very reasons, I believe Holocaust education to remain relevant. It should be made available to students of coming generations.

On a sunny Saturday morning, Freiburg is buzzing. The cobbled square around the old cathedral in the southwestern German city is packed with mar-ket stalls, and the smell of freshly grilled sausages wafts alluringly through the air. It is no wonder that this market is popular with the town’s residents. Yet, what becomes evident immediately, as I listen to the many different voices in the crowd admiring “la cathédrale magnifique”, or using “odr?” at the end of every other sentence, is that the market is in

fact a meeting place for residents from all across the Upper Rhine region. Around

6 million people live in this region, which covers the French Alsace, parts of the German states of Rhineland-Palatinate, B a d e n -Wü r t te m b e rg and Hesse, as well as five Swiss cantons around the city of Basel. Histor-ically, a contested border

region. Today, a model for European trans-border cooperation?In his poem “Mending Wall”, Robert Frost meditates on the old adage that “Good fences make good neigh-bours” as he describes the dialogue between neigh-bours who follow the annual ritual of repairing the wall which separates their farms even though the wall appears to serve no modern need. Tri-nation-al cooperation in the Upper Rhine region has ques-tioned the purpose of boundaries and fences from the 1960s when societies and associations were

Do good fences make goodneighbours?

Trans-border cooperation and lived European reality in the Upper Rhine region

Inga Sagolla

20

founded in all three countries with the purpose of advancing cooperation across borders. In the follow-ing years, structures increasingly developed and re-sulted in the Upper Rhine Conference in 1992, which provides an institutional framework for cross-bor-der cooperation in the region. Today, it is not only the lack of lengthy controls at the borders and the touristic attractions of the re-gion which make cross-border visits so numerous. Today it is rather the way in which cooperation in the region influences the day-to-day lives of the lo-cal population. For university students, there is the chance to spend time at a neighbouring country’s university through the tri-national EUCOR scheme, which allows every student inscribed in one of the five participating universities to freely attend cours-es at one of the other institutions. In the cultural sphere, a one-year museum pass opens the doors to 300 museums, castles, and gardens across the Upper Rhine region, while regular cross-border radio and TV shows with a focus on local topics of interest con-

tribute to a sense of regional trans-border identity. Moreover, the tri-national EuroAirport Basel-Mul-house-Freiburg provides easy access to far-flung holiday destinations, while the local public transport system links towns and villages in the region with-out stopping at borders. Living in the German city of Lörrach, a friend of mine works in Basel, and makes a detour through France every evening after work to buy a baguette for the family dinner – a perfectly normal daily routine.Is everything perfect though? No, of course not. Bor-ders remain in the minds of people and at the heart of administrative structures. Language, culture, and the differences in judicial systems all have possibly dividing functions, and the practical path across borders often continues to be paved with stumbling blocks. After the German town of Bergzabern and the French commune of Wissembourg jointly enlarged the swimming pool on the German side, pupils from Wissembourg were not allowed to have their swim-ming lessons at the facility because of insurance rea-sons. Moreover, the Alemannic dialect, which used to unite the region, is not only no longer spoken by many people, but learning French or German at school is also losing its appeal in favour of English or Spanish. Equally, crises originating outside of the region can easily overshadow the advances made in trans-border cooperation as the outcome of the most recent European elections demonstrates where the nationalist “Front National” was successful all across the Alsace region. And where do the large number of Roma adults and children in refugee camps on all sides of the borders feature in the regional cooper-ation? How do they, as Europeans, profit from open borders?Nevertheless, the successes of trans-border cooper-ation in the region should not be played down. What used to be referred to as a “border region”, considers itself today to be in the “heart of Europe” and part of a trans-national community. Go to the annual Muse-um Night in Basel or the Christmas Market in Stras-bourg and a similar picture of cultural interaction to that of the weekend market in Freiburg will emerge. And cycling freely across the bridge linking Breisach and Neuf-Brisach, the twin cities, who used to see in each other nothing but a threat, never fails to evoke in me a profound feeling of excitement, gratitude, and freedom. Yes, walls, fences, and borders may serve to avoid conflict. Yet, the residents of the Upper Rhine region prove that it is possible not only to live by the prov-erb “Good fences make good neighbours”, but that through the abolishment of boundaries, trust and freedom can be won and neigh-bours can become friends.

Mats Barkow

21

Unity in diversity. These three words are said to rep-resent how Europeans have come together for peace and prosperity all while being enriched by the mul-tiple cultures, traditions and languages that make up this continent. Yet, how far does this hold true? Has Europe managed this? The classical reply would be that, yes of course – over the course of a century Europe (or at least where the EU draws its boundar-ies) seems to have transformed itself from being one of the most bellicose continents to one of the most peaceful, where it is now inconceivable that any of the member states would declare war against anoth-er.

This is not to say that conflicts since the birth of the EU are limited to conflicts of

interest or conflicts of opinion of Europe’s future. Conflicts stemming from national and even religious identity are not only becoming in many ways increas-ingly present in Europe today but are characteristic of Europe’s history.However, if they are so characteristic of Europe’s his-tory then hasn’t the problem already been solved? But one need not look any further than the British Isles to see such an example taking place in a more modern context. Why was it that two groups, sep-arated often by both religion and politics, from the same area within the same island, were at conflict with each other right up into the late 20th century, and perhaps are still at conflict today? What became known as “The Irish question” is long, complex and in many ways still in want of an answer. It was not only about religion. Likewise, it was not only political. The split of politics along the lines of religion occurred only in the late 19th century where, for the most part, Catholics found themselves aligned with the nationalist cause and Protestants with the unionist. What ensued was a number of clashes – fought both within the House of Commons and between the communities themselves. By the

Lessons to be learned from

Northern Ireland?Stephanie Bruce-Smith

22

late 20th century, after a thirty-year period of inten-sified hostilities that burst out into terrorism (“The Troubles”) The Good Friday Agreement was signed, for many marking the end of the conflict and the be-ginning of a new age of power-sharing and tolerance.Aontaithe san éagsúlacht. The Irish translation is almost literal, but instead of “unity”, the word shifts to become “united” (aontaithe). It is a step already taken, something achieved rather than an ideal, con-cept or goal. Perhaps this is a rather fitting transla-tion, and in some ways, better than the original in highlighting the key issue at hand. Yet the problem lies not in the sentiment behind the three-word slo-gan but rather in its practical application: is it at all possible to achieve such a feeling of unity all while maintaining those traditions and cultures held so dear and in many cases fought for so ardently ?Often religion cannot be separated from politics or extricated as something to be done only in private, especially once it becomes intertwined with identity. In Ireland, for example, the difference between Prot-estantism and Catholicism is much more than mere-ly that of transubstantiation and consubstantiation or of which side believes that the Pope is the Vicar

of Christ and which rejects his authority. Indeed, re-ligious affiliation often determines what sports are played; which newspapers are read and also, less now than before but still prevalent, which socio-eco-nomic class one belongs to plays a part in identity formation. So how was it that two communities so diverse in their outlook on politics and feelings of cultural identity came together to live in peace?One possible answer is that they haven’t. The Com-munity Relations Council’s third Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report published in March 2014 shows how in a number of ways, although twen-ty years since the first ceasefires were concluded, Northern Ireland remains a much divided society. Perhaps rather than unity and diversity being linked to provide peace and prosperity, the 30 years of in-tense conflict led to a certain weariness for violence among the general populace – a trend perhaps re-flected in the fact that at the grassroots level the de-sire for reconciliation remains strong, even if this is not seen on a political level. Rather than finding a solution of how to solve the problem of diversity but rather, the crux of the matter may well be that many “just don’t care that much any- 23

Mats Barkow

The 24th of February was set to be-come a big date in the UCLU Euro-pean Society’s 2014/2015 calendar as we held our annual EU and Eu-ropean Careers Event, jointly run with our institutional partner, the UCL European Institute, and the UCL chapter of EU Careers - the Europe-an Personnel Selection Office, the recruitment agency selecting staff for the EU institutions and agencies. With stalls and speakers from EU Careers, from most of the main stan-dard institutional jobs in the EU and from an ambitious selection of pri-vate firms, the event - spanning the whole afternoon from 1pm to 5pm - ought to give attendees a broad over-view of possible career paths within the EU institutions and the related industries. Although a long-standing Eu-roSoc tradition now five years old, our annual careers event saw two transformative innovations for this year’s instalment. Firstly, a clear sep-aration of institutional jobs and pri-vate-sector related industries into two different panels. Secondly, the addition of a stalls and networking session framing the event on both ends and in between the two panel sessions. Where previous editions of the event consisted only of one pan-el and a short follow-up networking session afterwards, 2015 saw a more resourceful and all-round careers event, modelled on any reasonably sized careers fair. On the first panel, looking at careers in the EU institutions, the

aim was to sit speakers from the few main career pathways that gradu-ates are likeliest to look into. Train-eeships in the European Commis-sion, arguably the biggest internship programme in the world, couldn’t be missed: Lizzie Durham, a current trainee herself at the DG Justice hav-ing graduated last year from UCL’s MSc in European Public Policy, gave insights into the traineeship appli-cation process, the programme itself and career prospects upon comple-tion. Concerned that UK nationals were disproportionately under-rep-resented in the EU institutions (they still are), the UK Civil Service set up in 1991 its European Fast Stream - with a selection procedure through “concours” very similar to that for most EPSO job openings - giving the chance to UK nationals to use the Civil Service as a stepping stone to a career in the EU institutions. A Euro-pean Fast Streamer himself at the UK Department for International Devel-opment, Matthew Ashworth joined us for a presentation of the EFS and to share his do’s and don’ts as well as general career advice. Having 24 official and work-ing languages, the wheels of the EU are greased by armies of linguists working in all institutions and agen-cies (more or less 5300 interpreters and translators combined), translat-ing from and into all 24 languages. Paul Kaye, now the language officer of the European Commission’s Rep-resentation in London and former-

more” about their distinct identities.Is this a problem – or a solu-tion? Rather than true di-versity in a society could a lack of diversity have been the solution and the driver towards peace? Was Eu-rope perhaps not created by the coming together of people with vastly distinct national identities but rath-er was driven by apathy to-wards patriotism, wearied by two world wars on their doorstep? Are communi-ty integration policies in Northern Ireland only ac-cepted by those who value their diversity less, with di-visions continuing among groups who value it more? If so, what happens when such patriotic or religious fervour reignites and be-comes strong once again? Or perhaps when people lose faith in the idea that their identity can be main-tained within the European framework? The econom-ic downturn in Europe has seen a return to nationalist and separatist tendencies. Religion has jumped back up to the top of the political agenda. Economic revival will often mitigate these tensions but it does not provide a long-term solu-tion. Rather than repeating with an almost religious fervour the words “unity in diver-sity”, it is time that Europe questioned what this re-ally entails and whether or not this has really been achieved. Because if not, it is almost certain that in-ternal conflict may come knocking once again on Eu-

rope’s door.

UCL 2015EU and European

Careers EventEvent Report by Jorge González-Gallarza

24

ly a staff translator at the Commission’s Director-ate-General for Translation, was there to talk about translating in the EU institutions. Applicants to translation traineeships in the Commission and oth-er EPSO job openings for linguists must be EU citi-zens with good command of various EU languages but don’t necessarily need a languages bachelor.

Zuzanna McClintock, whose job as UCL am-bassador at EU Careers is to promote EU Careers op-portunities among UCL students, was not only one of the organisers of the event but also spoke on the first panel, giving a broad overview of career starting opportunities for graduates, as well as the EPSO’s entry criteria, deadlines and selection procedure. As part of the EPSO application process, there are four computer-based tests - namely numerical, verbal, abstract reasoning and situation judgement - and an assessment centre stage with practical language tests, an oral presentation, a structured interview and a group exercise - much like in many of the stan-dardised application procedures to big multination-al firms.

The second panel aimed at pooling together repre-sentatives from the main EU affairs related indus-tries in Brussels. David Hubert - an experienced public affairs professional having worked for various organisations and the founder of Hubert Consulting, his public affairs startup operating in Brussels and London - took first to the stage to speak about his ex-perience and about careers in EU political consultan-cies and public affairs firms. Brussels hosting more lobbyists than Washington D.C., the EU is a breeding ground for such businesses as interest representa-tion, lobbying and political consulting.Geraint Edwards, the Head of Policy at EU Issue

Tracker - one of our guest companies at the stalls fair - spoke second, giving a general overview of the different EU related industries operating in Brus-sels parallel to the institutions, from the legal sector (consultancies, law firms, legal monitoring…) and interest representation (NGO’s, trade associations…) to think tanks and the media. His do’s and don’ts warned against going down the slippery path of ap-plying for everything - it is preferable to efficiently narrow down one’s interests to make fewer, more performant and better tailored applications - or un-derestimating competition, and praised networking and good preparation for interviews.

Thirdly, speaking on behalf of the media industry was Ian Hall, UK Director of Euractiv, a pan-European media network with a local-language presence in more than 10 countries and a leader in EU news and policy debates. As nowadays press of-ficers and media attachés are needed across all in-dustries and institutions, Ian’s presentation focused on the analytical and communication skills as well as the types of previous experiences that can put an ap-plicant ahead of the competition when kickstarting a career in the media.

Last of all, we heard Claudia Chwalisz, policy re-searcher at the progressive think-tank Policy Net-work and recent graduate of UCL’s MSc in European Public Policy, talk about the world of think tanks in general and her job as a young researcher, involving both the development of research projects and rais-ing funds for Policy Network.

At the stalls and networking fair taking place next door, attendees had the chance to engage one-to-one with stall-holders on a closer and more net-working-type basis than at the panels, as well as to learn more about the internship opportunities and services offered. The stalls were held by EU Issue Tracker - the EU’s premium regulatory monitoring service -, Hubert Consulting, the European Parlia-ment Office in the UK, Online EU Training - Europe’s #1 EPSO preparation site, owned by the e-learning company Arboreus and offering all sorts of materials and practice for the EU institutions’ entrance exams - and EU Careers.

The slides displayed by some of the speakers at the event - as well as further info about the speak-ers and the fair itself - can be found on the official webpage of the UCL European Institute at the follow-ing link: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/analysis-publications/careers 25

Who Will Guard the Guards Themselves?

Robert von Kügelgen

Andrew Vakal

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes is the original latin of the quotation above – This phrase was penned by Latin poet Juvenal and is decidedly still relevant as it is directly applicable to numerous moral and ethi-cal questions we face today. The Frontex case is only one example. Frontex was established to guard the European borders and fight illegal immigration. In 2014 the EU registered 300,000 irregular border crossings with almost 75% of these people coming across the Mediterranean Sea,yet Frontex only react-ed with their minimum budget programme “Triton”. This operation is simply not big enough to help the vast number of people fleeing towards Europe. Thus there arise questions of what the agency actually does, and how Frontex’s actions and operations are legitimated and controlled.So who does guard the guards themselves? When having a look at Frontex we find them accountable on four levels: Political (the European Parliament and National Parliaments), Managerial (Frontex’ Management Board), Financial (European Court of Auditors), Judicial (European Ombudsman, the Eu-ropean courts).It would seem that these institutions should be able to control an organisation like Frontex. How-ever, Frontex was designed as a rather independent and autonomous agency with almost no obligation to transparency. Reports about human rights vio-lations by Frontex officers towards refugees made critics raise their voices calling for better surveil-lance and more inspections of Frontex. The Europe-an Parliament reacted by installing two other bodies to control Frontex. The Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) is supposed to suggest preventive and corrective measures to prevent human rights vio-lations. The Consultative Forum on fundamental Rights (CF) is a merger of 15 organisations includ-ing UNHCR, Amnesty International and the Interna-tional Catholic Migration Commission. The problem with these institutions is that they are only able to announce recommendations but do not exert pres-sure on Frontex.Despite the new bodies watching over Frontex, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International repeatedly shock the news with reports on human rights abuses by Europe’s frontier-guards. These violations most-ly refer to life-threatening operational tactics called “push-back” or “diversion” which include pulling boats filled with refugees back to the open sea and abandoning them to their fate.Sabur Azizi is a refugee who survived a manoeu-vre like that. According to him their cutter was only a few hundred meters away from the Greek island Farmakonisi when Greek coastguards “diverted” the

boat back to the sea. He says that when the wooden boat started sinking the Greek officers did nothing to help the drowning shipwrecked people. “They didn’t want to help us”, Azizi told the media. Ac-cording to him only 16 people managed to enter the coastguards’ ship. Greek coastguard director Dim-itrios Bantias later apologized to the refugees and the Greek nation. Yet, the GPS-data which could have clarified what exactly happened that night was lost. Afterwards the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, distanced Frontex from the accusations as the “responsibility for that inci-dent lies with the Greek coastguards” who – accord-ing to her – do not represent Frontex.Ex Frontex Executive Director Ilkka Laitinen has a very similar approach concerning that topic which became clear during an interview with the Finnish newspaper FifiVoima. He indicated that Frontex was not able to violate human rights as any responsibil-ity for joint operations between member states and Frontex lies with the member states’ coastguards. This legal grey area is shamelessly used as a means to escape responsibility and accountability.Reports localize other examples of push-back prac-tices at the Eastern European borders to the Ukraine. The stories end quite similar: Innocent people whose only crime was to seek refuge from persecution, pov-erty and misery in their countries of origin are tak-en and brought far away from the European Union. This kind of deportation is against the Geneva Con-vention which states that applications for asylum are to be reviewed and examined in a hearing. Although the European Court of Human Rights declared push-back practices unlawful in early 2012, they have not been ended. This shows that the longed for princi-ple of “non-refoulement” which should be a natural standard has not been implemented in the Europe-an’s policy on refugees.However, it seems that the new Executive Director could bring a refreshing change to our European border control agency as he openly criticized the “push-back-incidents”. He claims they conflict hu-man rights and thus should not and will not happen in the future.Frontex and all operations supervised by it should primarily serve the purpose of saving refugees and asylum seekers at the borders of Europe and should not focus on cutting down illegal immigration by any means. The EU abandons human beings knowing that not giving them a fair opportunity to asylum and a chance to stay leaves them to discrimination, perse-cution or even death in their countries of origin. This is the wrong approach and a morbid statement by the European Union, the self-proclaimed defender of human rights. 27

The EUA Game Without

WinnersEditorial by Hendrik Obelöer

Frequently my friends and I gather around a small board game, shut all doors and don’t talk to any-one in the outside world. The game I am talking of is called Risk and It is highly strategic and usually lasts for one or two hours--however we like to play it for several more because we spend most of the time talking, bargaining, negotiating, ‘outsmarting’ each other.

Unfortunately, this perfectly encapsulates the cur-rent situation in Europe. Merkel, Tsipras and several other players are seeking to outmaneuver each oth-er within the framework of some fixed rules. Partic-ularly, everyone seeks to exploit the system for his or her own benefit at the cost of another. This is not what the EU was built for, this is not how the EU can sustain for long.

In the current financial crisis (this article actually ar-gues that we should think of it as an institutional cri-sis), we can see Merkel and and her finance minister Schäuble perpetuating the image of a strong Germa-ny. While the economic reasoning behind the auster-ity policy is widely contested, politically the finance minister experiences unprecedented support. Even Spain, Ireland and Portugal have signaled strong support for a hard line against Greece. At home, any other course would lead Merkel’s government into a strong schism, populist CSU and AfD only waiting for their chance. In Greece the atmosphere is just as politicised. Comparing the current German govern-ment to Nazi-Germany is not only historically and morally more than preposterous, it also serves no purpose in getting nearer to an economic solution, not to mention a common solution. It simply creates the image of an enemy in a last gasp attempt to try to keep voters’ support.

The crisis has crystallised into ‘Germany vs. Greece’ (and not only the Greeks have contributed to that!). Problematically, all sides pursue their own goals, act

independently, they are playing a non-co-operative game. Looking at it from this

point of view, it is no more a matter of personal an-onymities or economic rational thinking. One can rather see all these individual actors behaving most rationally considering their respective positions. Personally, I would not even expect to see any sub-stantial change if Schäuble and Varoufakis were to change their positions with each other. In the end, both sides act more or less ‘like the game makes them play’.

No side knows how far the other one is prepared to go. The ‘crisis meetings’ are marked by the bargain-ing of two opponents, or rather, of people who don’t know how the other is going to behave and therefore choose to behave like an opponent, for their own benefit. There is simply no person, no majority, no institution who forces them to work together. Con-sequently, Merkel, Tsipas, ‘the institutions’ etc. end up constantly playing against each other. So how to make this non-cooperative game a cooperative one?

An extremely strong (hegemonic) Germany might be able to streamline European action, but that is neither politically nor economically desirable. The real solution does not lie in a change of governments or attitudes, but in a change of rules. This means a federal restructuring of the EU, possibly a europe-an parliament overlooking national financial affairs and a commissioner with larger authorities. What this would look like precisely is open for discussion. Its consequences would probably mean the end of Britain in the EU, and possibly a Le-Pen-France. But on the other hand, the current developments do not seem to lead into any better future.

When I play Risk with my friends we normally collec-tively give up at some point in the early morning and speculate who might have won, if we had played for two more days until the end. This is not what Merkel or Tsipras or anyone else in the EU can do. Let’s talk about a common solution. The European populace has to radically rethink the arena in which decisions are made. It seems to be alternativlos.28

Jose Hong

Germany’s Greece PolicyOr How to Fail Miserably

LennardIt is very difficult to do every-thing right, especially if it comes to economics. But it is equally difficult to do everything wrong. Germany tries exceptionally hard to reach the latter with its Greece policy.

The true fact is that Germany has surrendered to the tabloid press and right-wing populism, which simplified the Euro crisis to the scenario “The Greeks want our money”. Listening to German politicians or a wide range of the media, you get the impression that the Greek population is not facing the most serious crisis of its modern history but that Greeks are just too lazy to work and relaxing on the money which Germany just granted them in their infinite generosity.

However, this perception is as economically wrong as it is polit-ically disastrous.

Economically, Germany failed to sufficiently encourage Greece to implement sustainable, and cer-tainly necessary, reforms, but demanded massive cutting of so-cial expenses. If an individual is in debt, it is a logical step to cut expenses, but it actually does not require much intellectual effort to realise that a State is not the same as an individual. If a State cuts its expenses people will earn less money and spend less mon-ey. Consequently, the tax reve-nue will decrease and the State will be forced to cut its expens-es even more. This vicious circle reveals the principle failure of a

strict austerity policy as promot-ed by German politicians – for example Volker Kauder, a prom-inent politician of Merkel’s party, pointed out that there will not be any margin for concessions to Greece. However, the fact that Greece suffers from 50% youth unemployment and has faced a GDP decrease of more than 20% within 5 years illustrates the ab-surdity of this position. If some politicians in Germany start cheering because a small growth of 2.5% is predicted for Greece in 2015, this is a slap in the face to those people who had lost their jobs or – in the case of young people – have been deprived the prospect of ever getting a job.

Politically, the EU was not sim-ply created as an economic trade union, but a unique project to maintain peace on a Continent which had been shaken by two World Wars in the last century. The EU is a project which has suc-ceeded in creating mutual trust and common values where only a short time before bitter enmity and hatred had been dominant. It is in these terms that the Eu-ropean Union is an impressive story of success.

In the current debate as to whether Greece should receive support, the fundamental role of Europe’s EU, mutual respect and European-wide solidarity, seems to have been forgotten. It is only a hope that Germany – as well as many other countries – become aware again of what the EU truly is--this hope is all we have.

Comments

As of now Syriza has stepped back from most of its mad socialist pro-posals, which is a point in their fa-vour. But let’s not forget that quite a short time ago, messianic Tsipras advocated for more public spend-ing, more civil servants, and stop-ping privatisations. That is all very well if the resources come from within, but not if they come out of the European taxpayer’s pocket. Greece has had an abominable track record of public finances for more than a hundred years and it is due time that the economy modernizes. Things started improving slightly with Samaras –first current account surplus since 1948!– but as usual in times of crisis, the political extrem-ists pop up to hinder progress.

Most Europeans agree that Ger-man-led austerity has not been the best pathway out of the crisis –al-though moral hazard in Southern Europe was not that easy to cir-cumvent. Yet Syriza, instead of ap-proaching the issue sensibly, chose a frontal assault. Not only did they choose to remind Germany of its quite recent past; the flirtations with Russia are also quite ill advised. Unless it wants to follow the path of Correa and Maduro, two wise pres-idents that have sold off their coun-tries to China. The start of Syriza on the European scene could hardly be worse, as it has managed to alienate the other 18 countries of the Euro-zone. Mr Varoufakis might be an ace at game theory, but as a commenta-tor said, you can hardly play poker with the opponent’s chips.

SyrizaThe Frontal AssaultAlberto Delclaux

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